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ABSTRACT
This thesis approaches the questions of the jurisdictional immunities of international 
organisations and their officials as the means whereby international organisations can 
be accommodated within the system of international law which allocates 
jurisdictional competence to States.
The range of doctrinal approaches to these questions in the secondary literature is 
considered. However, general rules on such immunities are only of limited value in 
that each organisation must viewed on its own merits, and in the light of its own 
particular functional requirements.
The thesis therefore seeks to demonstrate this individuated approach empirically by 
mapping the extensive range of international practice, i.e. treaty provisions, official 
decisions and views of international organisations and decisions of international 
courts and tribunals. At the level of national law, a comparative survey is made of 
legislative practice of various States and the decisions of their courts.
The immunities of international officials are an extension of the immunities of their 
employer organisations, and also a means of ensuring institutional coherence and 
integrity.
This thesis concludes that there are primarily two aspects to this process of 
accommodation of international organisations in the system of allocation of national 
jurisdiction:
Firstly there is a functional aspect, which concerns the degree to which national 
authorities may exercise jurisdiction over the relations of international organisations 
with third parties. This is derived from treaty law and is specifically granted to meet 
functional requirements of each organisation.
Secondly there is an institutional aspect, which concerns the internal relations of an 
organisation, including the relations between its organs, its relations with its member 
States and its employment relations. The abstention of national courts on these issues 
might best be considered as a requirement deriving from the international status of 
organisations, and, therefore, of more general application as a requirement of 
customary international law.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of this study is the jurisdictional immunities of international 
organisations and their officials. These immunities arise at the point at which 
international organisations or their officials come into contact with a municipal legal 
system. This maybe as a result of their relations with States in which they operate, or 
with private persons whose activities are subject to the jurisdiction of such States. 
Immunities are required by international law (though in practice their 
implementation will be achieved through the action of national authorities) and seek 
to ensure an appropriate response from that municipal local system to the entry of an 
international organisation into its purview.
In seeking to understand and explain international immunities, they might be seen as 
measures which seek to protect an organisation from unwarranted interference, or 
control, by any individual State, in the achievement of the functions collectively 
entrusted to it by its member States. This will usually require a recognition that in 
achieving those purposes the collectivity is a distinct actor from its member States 
(i.e. many of its acts will be attributable to the organisation itself, rather than 
constituting an aggregation of a series of similar acts by each member State).
As a common endeavour, no single State should seek to wield undue influence over 
an organisation or seek to derive undue benefit for itself. Thus an organisation is 
subject to the collective control of its member Sates, but independent of the control 
of any single State - it is created by and governed by international law.
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However since international organisations are established under international law, 
law serves two important purposes in relation to international organisations. On the 
one hand international organisations rely upon law and legal technique as the 
primary means of their protection. On the other hand one of the major claims to 
legitimacy of international organisations is their rational-legal foundation. It is 
therefore important to provide a legally coherent account of the relations between 
international organisations and national legal systems, particularly where the rights 
of individuals are concerned.
This thesis will seek to examine the techniques by which these relations are 
managed, on a comparative basis between different organisations and in different 
legal systems. The approach will be empirical examining how in practice solutions 
have been sought at the international and national levels.
The distinctive personality of international organisations is of quite a different nature 
than that of States. A State represents a political community, the effective 
government of a population in a fixed area territory, enjoying sovereignty and 
equality with other States. International organisations by contrast are essentially legal 
constructions. In legal analysis they do not have the material attributes of States, their 
actions always take place on the territory of a State, and their officials are nationals 
of States. Under international law each State enjoys plenary jurisdiction over its 
territory enabling each to develop a complete legal system of its own, including both 
public law and private law. International organisations on the other hand tend only to 
have a limited system of internal law fashioned to meet their institutional needs, and 
must rely on the legal systems of particular States in respect of other matters. Finally
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whilst States have, within the parameters of their international legal obligations, free 
appreciation of their own interests and how they may wish to pursue them and in that 
sense are omnicompetent, an international organisation only has limited competences 
whether express or implied, and can only act to further the achievement of its 
functions.
Therefore Chapter 1 considers the legal foundations of international organisations, 
and in particular the concept of personality by which they are empowered to act in 
their own names at the levels of both international and national law.
However at the same time as demonstrating the limitations on the scope of their 
ability to act, the derivative nature of the personality of international organisations 
also highlights their potential vulnerability. Organisations are heavily reliant upon 
their own institutional law which governs their relations with their member States. 
The founding instrument of an organisation, setting out its basic rights and duties, 
also represents a careful poised equilibrium of the rights and duties of the individual 
members negotiated inter se. Protection of the organisation as a distinct entity, 
including the raft of obligations relating to status, privileges and immunities, is thus 
the legal means of protection of that equilibrium. There is thus a collective interest 
shared by one and all in its maintenance, by reason of observing in good faith the 
obligations of membership and in the principle of sovereign equality of the members.
Chapter 2, therefore, considers the rationales which have been offered for their 
immunities i.e. the primary technique whereby their international status is protected 
within the national legal system. The functional basis of those immunities is
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considered, and the diversity views put forward by academic authors as to how it 
should be interpreted are examined. It will be proposed that the functional 
explanation of immunities does not require a uniform measure of immunity to all 
international organisations, but rather that each organisation will be endowed the 
necessary degree of immunity which its member States believe is necessary for the 
achievement of its purposes.
Chapter 3 continues that theme considering the treaty provisions governing the 
immunities of a range of international organisations. It is suggested that the 
functional basis of immunities has always been intended to be flexible, and that this 
is bome out in practice. Considerable differences in the extent of immunities granted 
to different organisations are noted, which, it is suggested, can be explained by 
reference to the primary functions of each organisation. The same flexibility inherent 
in the functional standard of immunity can also be observed in the interpretation of 
relevant treaty provisions by international courts, enabling a range of different 
interests to be accommodated.
Chapter 4 follows the implementation of immunities in the national legal systems of 
the member States, and their application by national courts. In contrast to other areas 
of international law such as State immunity where considerable differences exist 
between national legal systems, there appears to be, though with some exceptions, a 
greater degree of homogeneity of results in respect of international organisations. 
This appears to be explicable largely by the treaty basis of the immunities of 
international organisations. The chapter also considers the approach of national
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courts where there is no treaty provision granting immunity, or where the forum 
State is not a member of the organisation in question.
Chapter 5 then considers the jurisdictional immunities granted in respect of the 
officials of international organisations. Most international officials enjoy immunity 
ratione materiae in respect of their official acts, and thus their immunities are in 
reality the immunities of their employer organisations.
There are serious methodological problems in seeking to generalise about the law of 
international organisations. These arise primarily from the fact that the period since 
1945 has seen a huge proliferation in the numbers of international organisations, each 
with their own particularities in terms of their functions and mechanisms. The 
conclusions are therefore necessarily somewhat broad, it being necessary in practice 
to consider the situation of each international organisation on its own merits.
Finally in this introduction a word needs to be said about the definition of 
international organisations. The organisations which this thesis considers are 
essentially intergovernmental organisations. Although the breadth of the field and the 
particularities of each organisation prevent a precise definition, the three-element 
definition offered by Schermers and Blokker1 presents a minimum definition, which
1 Schermers and Blokker International Institutional Law (3rd ed., Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) at §§.29- 
45
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broadly corresponds with the suggestions by other leading writers in the field. The 
three elements are the an organisation must:
(i) be established by States, sometimes with the participation of other 
international organisations as well, usually by a treaty;
(ii) have at least one organ with a will of its own; and
(iii) be established under international law.
This thesis takes a similar approach as to the defining elements of an international
organisation, but noting the breadth of the definition and the very widely different 
forms of organisation which it covers.
2 see for example Reinisch International Organisations before National Courts (CUP, Cambridge, 
2000) at pp.5-10; Muller International Organisations and their Host States (Kluwer, The Hague,
1995) at p.4; Bekker The Legal Position o f  Intergovernmental Organisations. A functional necessity 
analysis o f their Legal Status and Immunities (Kulwer, The Hague, 1994) pp.39— 42.
Sands and Klein introduce further elements include the possession o f legal personality, and the 
capacity to adopt norms addressed to its members - Bowett’s Law o f  International Institutions (5th ed. 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2001) at pp.16-17. This issues of personality and the development by 
international organizations of their own internal law, will be important aspects o f this thesis.
Some authors consider similar definitional criteria in discussing the objective approach to the 
establishment o f international personality o f international organisations, see Brownlie Principles o f  
Public International Law, (5th ed. Clarendon, Oxford, 1998) at pp. 679-80; Amerasinghe Principles o f  
the Institutional Law o f  International Organisations (CUP, Cambridge, 1996) at pp. 82-4; White The 
Law o f International Organisations (MUP, Manchester, 1996) at pp.27-31; Rama-Montaldo “The 
International Personality and Implied Powers of International Organisations” (1970) 44 BYIL 111- 
156 at p.l 12. On this issue see Chapter 1 infra.
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CHAPTER 1
THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
Introduction
Modem international organisations are created in international law primarily by the 
agreement of States (though occasionally with the involvement of other international 
organisations), in most cases by means of a constituent treaty.1 The constituent 
instrument will set out the functions and goals of the organisation and the structures 
and powers through which these are to be achieved. In particular international 
organisations are usually endowed with organs of their own, including an assembly 
or council, at which the membership is represented in plenary, to determine the 
direction and policy of the organisation, and a permanent staff employed by the 
organisation which will at very least service the representative organ, but also will 
often carry out the policies of the organisation or assist, supervise or coordinate their 
execution by others. Some organisations, or course, have more sophisticated organic 
structures requiring more clearly defined separation of powers.
The relationship of an organisation to its member States is complex and multi­
faceted. On the one hand the organisation is the servant of the member States, in that 
the member States as a collectivity establish the organisation, fund it and determine 
its direction and policy. However once the organisation is established individual 
members owe numerous duties to the collectivity, including not only the specific
1 Exceptionally some international organisations are created by resolution of another international 
organisation. An example o f an organisation founded by such an unusual route is the World Tourism 
Organisation, which established when a non-government organisation (the International Union of 
Official Travel Organisations was transformed when UN General Assembly Resolution modifying the 
Statute of IUOTO was subsequently approved by 51 States -  see R.Wolfrum (ed.) United Nations: 
Law, Policies and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht and CH Beck Verlag, Munich, 1995) at 
pp 1501-4.
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duties contained in the constituent instrument such as to contribute to the funding of
•y
the organisation, but also duties of good faith and cooperation. It follows that where 
the membership has collectively empowered an organisation to act, each member 
States must respect the rights of an organisation to act accordingly, and must eschew 
any interference which would amount to an undue unilateral attempt to modify the 
collective will.
To this extent an organisation is therefore equipped in legal terms to act in its own 
name, and in doing so to manifest a will representing the collectivity, but distinct 
from that of the individual member States (yolonte dinstincte). This volonte distincte 
is the basis of the institutional autonomy of an organisation. This “autonomy” is 
clearly of a very different nature to the sovereignty or independence exercised by 
States, as it is limited both politically by the collectivity of the member States, and 
legally by the limits of the powers with which the organisation is endowed and more 
generally by the functions and goals for which it is established. The nature of that 
autonomy in international law will be explored in the first part of this Chapter, before 
considering how it is reflected in municipal law in the second part of this chapter.
A. The Status of International Organisations in International Law
1. Historical perspective
2 For an illustration of the duties o f good faith and cooperation between an international organisation 
and its host State see the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation o f  the Agreement o f  25 March 
1951 between the WHO and Egypt -  1980 ICJ Rep. 73 esp. pp.94-96
3 Reuter International Institutions (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1958) at p. 215. See also 
Dufour “De l’extraterritorialite a l’autonomie intemationale: a propos des relations de 1’organisation 
inter gouvemementale avec l’etat-hote”, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et 
du developpement. Melanges Michel Virally (Pedone, Paris, 1991) p.239-256
The development of a status for organisations as entities distinct from their member 
States, and the degree to which they can oppose such status to States or other 
international persons, can be demonstrated by means of a short historical review. 
From this two central themes will emerge: firstly the question personality of an 
organisation, i.e. its capacity to be the subject of rights and duties in international law 
in its own name; and secondly the reflection of its international status, in the status 
accorded to its employees and others through whom its works.
The origins of modem international organisations are often traced back to the system 
of diplomacy, which developed in Europe in the period since the Treaty of 
Westphalia.4 At the broad political level the development of the Concert of Europe, 
arising out of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, operated as a succession of ad hoc 
conferences of the major powers to ensure international order. At this time the 
multilateral treaty was developed as a primary means of international law-making, 
and thus conferences for their negotiation and review became increasingly common. 
With the increasing frequency of diplomatic conferences so developed the need of 
the services of a secretariat and, in due course, some form of permanence.
However such conferences fell short of the modem international organisation. The 
system operated purely by means of cooperation between the States. Conferences 
operated ad hoc and purely on the basis of consent and unanimity. A conference 
afforded States the chance to state their own positions and to hear those of other 
States, but the conference had no independent power or authority. In general during
4 See Sands and Klein (ed,s) B ow ett’s Law o f International Institutions (5th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2001) ppl-13, and Reuter op.cit.. note 3 supra at pp. 205-214
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this period the secretariat was provided by the administration of the State organising 
the conference.5
Beyond the arena of high politics, the 19th Century also saw rapid growth in 
international communications and commerce, giving rise to the need for closer 
cooperation and coordination between States in various administrative matters. This 
in turn led to the establishment of the first international administrative bodies, 
established on a functional basis to meet administrative needs. However it should be 
noted that whilst in some of these bodies, participation was purely by governments, 
others allowed the participation of interested private parties as well as the 
representatives of States.
Among the most developed of these administrative bodies were the international river 
commissions. The Congress of Vienna itself, called for the establishment of an 
international commission to govern international navigation for the Rhine. The Central 
Commission for Navigation of the Rhine was established under the Mainz Convention
f \  71831, and further revised and amended under the Manhiem Convention of 1868. It 
was composed or representatives of the riparian States and created to ensure, 
administer and police the regime for navigation of the Rhine contained in the treaties. 
To that end it was given broad regulatory power over navigation on the river, though 
the riparian States reserved to themselves certain powers, such as customs powers. 
That regulatory power over navigation was exercised by the member States voting on
5 Though a permanent bureau was established to service the Pan-American Union on its foundation 
following the Washington Conference o f 1889.
6 Consolidated Treaty Series (ed. Parry) vol.81 p. 307
7 Consolidated Treaty Series (Parry) V ol.138 p.167
10
resolutions within the Commission, resolutions adopted unanimously creating binding 
obligations to be translated into the national law of the member States, whereas those 
adopted by majority only had recommendatory effect (unless they related to certain 
internal matters of the Commission) (Art.46). It was also given an independent 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, which allowed private persons to appeal to 
the Commission from a judgment at first instance of their national courts (art.45). The 
officials of the Commission were originally given the status neutrals in time of war, 
though following the installation of the Commission in France after the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) the French Government endowed those officials who did not have 
French nationality with the privileges enjoyed by members of a foreign diplomatic 
mission.8
The European Danube Commission was established by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, 
and subsequently enhanced by the Paris Conference of 1865.9 As originally envisaged 
the Commission was to carry out dredging work and improvements of the Salina 
navigation channel, its competence and duration were extended by Conferences of 
signatories of the Treaty of Paris. However by 188110 it had achieved a permanent, and 
largely independent status. Its goal was to ensure the regime of free navigation of the 
River, and to this end it was given extensive regulatory and police powers, powers to 
set and to collect dues, powers of compulsory pilotage, and, importantly, jurisdictional 
powers. The independence of the Commission and its officials from the territorial 
control of the riparian States was ensured initially by guarantees of neutrality in time of
8 see Cahier Etude des Accords de Siege Conclus entre les Organisations Internationales et les Etats ou 
elles Resident (Giuffre, Milan, 1959) atp.280
9 see Consolidated Treaty Series (Parry) V. 131 p. 115, p.209, and p.399.
10 see Consolidated Treaty Series (Parry) vol. 158 p.245
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war, and later by more extensive privileges and immunities under the Public Act of 
1865 and the succeeding treaties.
By the early Twentieth Century the degree of independence exercised by the
Commission was a cause for concern to Romania, which sought to limit the powers of
the Commission in that part of the river which flowed through Romanian territory.
When an Advisory Opinion was sought from the Permanent Court of International
Justice, it differentiated between the jurisdictions of the Commission and that of the
Romanian authorities in the following terms:
“Although the European Commission exercises its functions ‘in complete 
independence of the territorial authorities’ and although it has independent 
means of action and prerogatives and privileges which are generally withheld 
from international organisations, it is not an organisation possessing exclusive 
territorial sovereignty. Roumania exercises power as territorial sovereign over 
the maritime Danube in all its respects not incompatible with the powers 
possessed by the European Commission under the Definitive Statute. When in 
one and the same area there are two independent authorities, the only way in 
which to differentiate their respective jurisdictions is by defining the functions 
allotted to them. As the European Commission is not a State but an 
international institution with a special purpose, it only has functions bestowed 
upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, 
but it has power to exercise these functions to their full extent in so far as the 
Statute does not impose restrictions upon it.”11
Thus the Court recognised the independence of the Commission in relation to the 
functions which it was established to perform. When this was juxtaposed to the 
independence of Romania, the Court decided in favour of the effective functioning of 
the Commission.12
11 Jurisdiction o f  the European Commission o f  the Danube, Advisory Opinion, (1927) PCIJ Series B 
no. 14, at pp. 63-4
12 It appears that the Commission at this time clearly had a degree of international personality as it was 
able to make a claim against Germany for reparations after World War I in its own name, see Cahier op. 
cit .note 8 supra p. 59-60.
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In addition to the international river commissions, whose capacities and level of
11autonomy are striking, other international administrative bodies were also established 
during this period with more limited capacities on technical (as opposed to political) 
areas of government activity (e.g. postal services, railways, weights and measures, 
intellectual property, public health etc). The States parties to these bodies, often 
referred to as Unions, would tend to meet regularly, in Conference in order to 
determine how co-ordination or uniformity might be achieved in national 
administration on such topics. They would often only act by unanimity and they would 
usually have a permanent bureau to carry out the secretariat functions of the unions. 
These permanent bureaus however were frequently tied very closely to the law of the 
State in which they were based, their members did not usually enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and the question of such guarantees of their independence does not appear to 
have arisen at this early stage of their development. To the extent that autonomous 
status was considered it was generally limited to their status in municipal law.14
During World War I the Allies had sought to coordinate national policies and resources 
in the prosecution of the War through the machinery of Inter-Allied Councils. This 
experience, together with that of the international administrative bodies (referred to
13 Amongst these were the International Telegraph Union (whose permanent organ was the International 
Bureau of Telegraphic Administration in Berne) established in 1865; the Universal Postal Union 
established in 1874 (with an international bureau in Berne); the International Meteorological 
Organisation established in 1879 (though its predecessor the permanent International Meteorological 
Committee was established in 1873); the International Bureau of Weights and Measures established in 
1875, the Bureaux Intemationaux Reunis pour la Protection de la Propriete Industrielle, Litteraire et 
Artistique - see Cahier op. cit. note 8 supra at pp. 70-73
14 See for example Art. 3 o f the Treaty establishing the International Bureau for Weights and Measures 
(20.5.1875): the Treaty establishing the International Health Office (9.9.07). The Bank for International 
Settlements is a little different for though its constituent instrument refers to Swiss law, a “stabilisation 
clause” provides that changes in Swiss law subsequent to the treaty will not affect the Bank (in fact the 
current HQ agreement between Switzerland and the Bank recognises it as having “international 
personality” Art 1 of HQ Agreement of 10.2.1987 at http://www.bis.org/about/hq-ex.html.
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above), served as a source of inspiration for the establishment of the League of Nations 
- the first major attempt to create an international body for the promotion of peace and 
order in the political sphere. Smuts described in strikingly modernist terms his vision 
of how the League was to be the rational solution to the problems of nationalism and 
imperialist ambition. Nevertheless even in his view the League’s purpose was not to 
replace the States, but rather to provide the forum by which collective solutions could 
be found for international problems.15
The machinery of the League was more sophisticated than most of the pre-existing 
organisations, providing for an Assembly (primarily intended as a deliberative organ in 
which the membership met in plenary on annual basis), and a Council (an organ of 
limited membership intended as more of an executive organ).16 Though many 
decisions of these organs were required to be adopted by unanimity, there were some, 
largely relating to the internal functioning of the organisation, which could be taken by 
qualified or simple majority. Further under articles 15 (6) and (10) and 16 of the 
Covenant of the League, the requirement of unanimity was effectively limited so that a 
State which was involved in a dispute of which the Council or the Assembly was 
seised, could not vote on a resolution relating to that dispute. Furthermore the League
17had certain powers even in relation to disputes involving non-member States.
15 See the Smuts Plan o f 16 December 1918, reproduced in Hunter Miler The Drafting o f  the 
Covenant (Puttnams, New York 1928) Vol. 2 at pp.23-60
16 The separation of powers between the organs under the Covenant was poorly defined with 
considerable areas of concurrent competences see Sands and Klein op. cit. note 4 supra, at pp. 11-13.
17 see Cahier Etude des Accords de Siege Conclus entre les Organisations Internationales et les Etats ou 
Elies Resident (Giuffre, Milan, 1959) at p. 100.
14
With establishment of a permanent Secretariat, whose members were to be appointed 
and supervised by the Secretary-General, the League also saw the birth of a sizeable 
international civil service. The establishment of a permanent international civil 
service in this way was a considerable departure from the pre-existing practice of 
conference diplomacy. During the Paris Peace Conference Sir Maurice Hankey had 
proposed that the League be staffed from national civil services paid for by their 
respective governments, and coordinated by the Secretary-General. However that 
proposal was rejected in favour of an international service appointed by the 
Secretary-General with the approval of the Council, whose expenses should be
1 ftapportioned between the members of the League. Beyond this the Covenant made 
little reference to the role or status of the staff of the Secretariat, but importantly 
included a provision that members of the staff were to enjoy diplomatic privileges 
and immunities when engaged on official business. 19
It was the first Secretary General of the League Sir Eric Drummond and the first 
Director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, who quickly established the enduring principles
* • 90of an international civil service. Both believed that for the their respective 
organisations to function effectively they needed to carry the confidence of the
member States, and that this would be impossible unless they were “visibly
• » • * 21 * • * independent of national pressures and prejudices”. In other words international civil
servants had to serve not their national interests but the international interest
18 Art.6 Covenant of the League of Nations
19 ibid. Art. 7 (4) -  on which see chapter 5 infra.
20 see Lemoine The International Civil Servant -  an endangered species (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) 
esp at pp.29-33
21 See A Ali “The International Civil Service: the idea and the reality” in C.de Cooker ed.
International Administration at 1.1/4. See also Lemoine op cit. note 20 supra at ch.3
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embodied in the respective organisations. Drummond, familiar with the traditions of 
permanence and political neutrality of the British civil service, envisaged a discrete 
and restrained role for the Secretariat to carry out the essential preparatory work to 
enable the decision-making organs of the League in which the member States were 
represented, and once such decisions were duly made, to execute them faithfully. 
Lemoine suggests that this role was intentionally set out in self-effacing terms, in 
order to reassure the concerns of the member States. However Drummond was 
uncompromising in requiring members of the Secretariat pledge their loyalty to the
•  •  • • 9 1  ,sole authority of the League during their service. This tradition of independence of 
members of the international civil service from national control, and loyalty to the 
organisation has been an enduring legacy of the League.
As to the status of the League itself, the Covenant makes no mention of its personality 
either in international law or municipal law. However it soon started exercising 
capacities which suggest that it enjoyed international personality, so for example in 
1926 the Swiss Government concluded the modus vivendi24 with the League which 
served as its headquarters agreement. In its first article the agreement stated that the 
Swiss Federal Government recognised that the League had “international personality 
and juridical capacity”. These words in this agreement, made between the League
22 ibid. at p.34
23 Staff regulations prohibited members of staff from seeking or receiving instructions from any 
government or any authority external to the authority o f the League. Furthermore an oath of loyalty 
was introduced by Drummond, on which the current oath of loyalty made by UN staff is based.
24 See Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities 
o f International Organisations (UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11) Vol. II at p.134
25 However some Member States were more cautious about the League's international personality. The 
UK Government for example was keen to point out that the League was not a super-State - see for 
example Fischer Williams "The Status of the League of Nations in International Law" Chapters on 
Current International Law and the League o f  Nations (1929) p.477-500
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and a non-member State, and against the context in which the League had already 
undertaken action as an entity in its own right, can only be considered declaratory of its 
existing status in international law. In municipal law, personality was also quickly 
assumed by the League, simply in order to carry on its daily existence. It was able to 
register its ownership of property and to enter into contracts in its own name. This was 
a result of practical necessity since the alternative would have been to insist on the 
member States all being party to each transaction of the League.
Finally in this short historical review of the pre-1945 development of the international 
status of organisations, mention should be made of the Italian Court of Cassation case 
of International Institute o f Agriculture v. Profili. The Court found that the Institute 
was an international person, and this being so “its power of self-determination or 
autonomy, which includes that of arranging its own organisation and controlling the 
relations of the organisation” gave it immunity from suit before the municipal courts. 
The Court's conclusion that the autonomy of the organisation resulted in immunity will 
be examined in Chapter 4 (infra), but for now it is the Court's premise that the 
organisation was an international legal person, which is of greater significance. This 
was based on a consideration that, at the time two types of international administrative 
union existed under “international practice”: one in which the organisation was 
entrusted to one of the member States; the other in which “the organisation remains 
autonomous and removed from the interference of any one State of the Union”. It 
was the finding that the International Institute of Agriculture fell into the second 
category which enabled the Court to conclude that it had international personality.
26 1 February 1930, 5 ILR 413
271bid.
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2. The United Nations
The experience of the League clearly informed the negotiations for the establishment
of the United Nations in many areas, including the provisions on the Secretariat. In
addition to enhanced powers of the Secretary General, the Charter of the UN includes
more detailed and specific obligations to ensure the independence of the Secretariat. In
particular the first paragraph Article 100 provides:
“In the performance of their duties the Secretary General and the staff shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority 
external to the Organisation. They shall refrain from action which might reflect 
upon their position as international officials responsible only to the 
Organisation.”
Thus the duties of the Secretariat in this respect are not simply a matter of the staff 
Regulations as they had been in the League, but are now “constitutionalised” in the 
Charter. Article 100(2) imposes the corollary obligation on the member States to 
respect the “international character” of the member of the Secretariat and not to seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. In addition, under Article 
105(2) the staff are to enjoy such “privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
9Qindependent exercise of their functions”.
The Charter also provides that, in the territory of each of its members, the Organisation 
shall have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and 
the fulfilment of its purposes (Art. 104). As will be discussed below this is usually
28 discussed further at Chapter 5 infra.
29 for more detailed discussion see Chapter 3 infra.
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interpreted as requiring the grant of legal personality to the UN in municipal law to 
enable it to contract, hold and dispose of property and to be party to legal proceedings. 
However the Charter says nothing about the international legal personality of the 
Organisation, although the question was raised during the drafting of the Charter at the 
San Francisco Conference on International Organisation. A Belgian proposal to 
include express provision by which the Member States recognised that the 
Organisation “possesses international status, together with the rights that this 
involves”, was rejected on the basis that it was “superfluous” as it would be
' i  t
“determined implicitly from the provisions of the Charter taken as a whole”. The US 
delegation reported back to Washington that the omission of a provision relating to the 
international personality of the organisation, was based on the following political 
considerations:
“The Committee which discussed this matter was anxious to avoid any 
implication that the United Nations was a ‘super-state’. So far as the power to 
enter into agreements with States is concerned, the answer is given by Article 
43 which provides that the Security Council is to be a party to the agreements 
concerning the availability of armed forces. International practice, while 
limited, supports the idea of such a body being a party to agreements. No other 
issue of ‘international personality’ requires mention in the Charter. Practice 
will bring about the evolution of appropriate rules as far as necessary.” 32
In any event the question was soon to be decided by the International Court of Justice 
in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United 
Nations. The request essentially arose out of the murder in 1948 in Israel of the UN 
Mediator for Palestine, Count Bemadotte, and other UN agents. The Secretary-General
30 see for example the Reparation case (discussed infra at note 33 ff), as well as Article 1 of the 
1946General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
31 See (UNCIO CDoc.933, IV/2/42(2) p.8)
32The Report to the President on the Results o f  the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman o f the 
United States Delegation, the Secretary o f  State, June 26 1945, Department o f State publication 2349, 
Conference 71,1945, pp.157-158
33ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174
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put the question before the General Assembly as to whether in cases such as this, the 
international responsibility of a State was engaged by the injuries caused to the UN, 
and if so how the UN should proceed with such a claim. In the Assembly's Sixth 
Committee various positions were taken, some clearly felt that the UN currently did 
not have sufficient status in international law to make such a claim, and recommended 
that the question be referred to the International Law Commission with a view to it 
drafting an international convention on the issue.34 Others felt that the Secretary- 
General might immediately be authorised to present the claims of the Organisation,35 
and the socialist States suggested that he pursue redress through the national courts of 
the relevant State. However after full discussions the majority favoured requesting an 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. The questions drafted by the 
Sixth Committee were contained in the Assembly's Request for an Advisory Opinion, 
which the Assembly adopted unanimously and without abstention.
The Court unanimously held that the Organisation had the capacity to bring an 
international claim against both a government (de jure or de facto) of a Member State 
and of a non-Member State, responsible for injuries to an agent of the Organisation in 
the performance of his duties, with a view to obtaining reparation in respect of damage 
caused to the Organisation. Where the Court divided was on the question of the 
Organisation's capacity to bring claims against States with view to obtaining reparation 
for damage caused to the victim or persons entitled through him.
34 UN Doc. A/C.6/276
35 UN Doc. A/C.6/279
36 UN Doc. A/C.6/284
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Before reaching its decisions on the first issue, the majority found it necessary to 
decide whether the Organisation had international personality, which it considered in 
terms of whether the UN was “an entity capable of availing itself of obligations 
incumbent upon its members”. It is interesting to note the question of personality was 
not expressly raised in the General Assembly’s Request to the Court, though some of
<50
States in making observations to the Court made affirmative comments. The Court 
based its affirmative finding on the provisions of the Charter. It held that the 
Organisation was more than just a centre for the coordination of national action, but 
that it was equipped with organs and given special tasks. It took into consideration: (a) 
the position of the member States in relation to the Organisation as spelt out in various 
provisions of the Charter; (b) the provision legal capacity, privileges and immunities in 
national law of the member States; and (c) the treaty-making powers of the 
Organisation under the Charter. The Court also took account of the practice of the 
Organisation, the politically important tasks of the organisation and the means 
available to achieve them. Finally the Court also singled out the position of the 
Organisation in contradistinction from its members under the General Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946).
The Court concluded the review of the capacities and status of the organisation, in the 
following terms:
“... the Organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact 
exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on 
the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and 
the capacity to operate on an international plane ... it could not carry out the 
intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality. It must
37 ibid, at p. 178
38 See for example Statements o f Belgium, France and the UK, as well the statement made to the 
Court by counsel for the UN (ICJ Pleadings Series, 1949).
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be acknowledged that its members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with 
the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence 
required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.”39
For the Court therefore personality could be implied by virtue of the principle of 
effectiveness from the intentions of the founders as encapsulated in the Charter, in its 
provision of functions, rights and duties.
However the Court was less clear as to the consequences of a finding of personality. It 
held that its finding of international personality meant that the Organisation “is a 
subject of international law capable of possessing international rights and duties, and 
that it has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims”. Earlier 
the Court had made clear that “competence to bring an international claim is, for those 
possessing it, the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognised by 
international law for the establishment, the presentation and the settlement of claims” 
[emphasis added].40 Thus it would appear that personality, once established, gives rise 
to rights subsisting in customary international law, rather than being solely reliant upon 
the capacities contained, either expressly or by implication, in the constituent 
instrument.
Finally in relation to this decision, the majority also appeared to have little difficulty 
with the notion objective character of the Organisation’s international personality. 
Objective international personality in the court’s view could be established in an 
organisation comprising “the vast majority of the members of the international
39 ibid at p. 179
40 ibid. at p. 177
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community”, and thus the organisation could bring its claims for reparations for 
injuries against non-member States, which, at that time, included Israel.41
3. International personality in practice
The Court's historical importance of the decision obviously was that it settled 
authoritatively that, in certain circumstances, an international organisation enjoy a 
measure of international personality. Despite the varying interpretations of the Court’s 
decision which have been made in subsequent academic writings, this point has not 
been challenged. A restrictive view of the case might suggest that this finding might 
not easily be applied to other organisations, given the unique position of the United 
Nations and its central role in the maintenance of international peace and security, o r , 
alternatively, that it might give rise to differentiation in the measure of personality 
accorded to the various organisations. However it would seem that most international 
organisations are now accepted as enjoying some degree of international personality, 
and few major problems arise on this issue in practice 42
It is true that whilst constitutive treaties of international organisations will quite 
frequently make reference to the personality of the organisation within municipal law, 
an express provision on international personality is comparatively rare 43 However it is
41 see p. 185. It should also be noted that the part o f the decision concerning the capacity o f the 
Organisation to bring an international claim against either a member State, or a non-member State, for 
damage caused to itself, was unanimous and the separate opinions provide little alternative reasoning in 
this respect.
42 In this respect it is interesting to note in the question o f the international personality o f the European 
Union (as opposed to that o f the European Communities) some fundamental issues as to the nature of 
European integration have been raised. — for an introduction see Macleod, Hendry and Hyett The 
External Relations o f  the European Communities (Clarendon, Oxford, 1996) at pp. 29-36
43For examples of organisations whose constituent treaties expressly provide for their international 
personality see ICSID, IFAD, and the AfDB. Most recently under Article 2 of the Agreement on the 
Privileges and Immunities o f the International Criminal Court of 9 September 2002, the States parties 
recognize the international legal personality o f the Court, see http://www.un. org/law/icc/apic/apic(e).pdf.
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submitted that where such express provisions exist, they are declaratory rather than 
constitutive, since the constituent instruments of most of the larger and most 
significant organisations do not contain express provisions on international personality 
- a contrario interpretations drawn from the absence of an express provision would 
clearly be inappropriate (being contrary to the finding of the ICJ in the Reparation 
case).
Discussion of international personality by international organisations in practice tends 
to centre on the enjoyment of three main capacities international law: (i) the capacity to 
enter into treaties in their own name; (ii) the capacity to conduct diplomatic relations; 
and (iii) the capacity to make international claims for violation of their rights.
(a) Treaty-making powers
In practice international organisations have been able to enter into agreements 
governed by international law, and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organisations or between Organisations,44 
though not yet in force suggests that there is widespread acceptance of the treaty-
Under the “modus vivendi” agreements between Switzerland and a number of the organisations whose 
headquarters are established on its territory, Switzerland expressly recognises the international 
personality o f the latter.
It might also be pointed out that international organisations have on occasion interpreted the ambiguous 
phrases such as "legal personality" , or "juridical personality" as intending international personality 
rather than personality in municipal or private law - see Morgenstem Legal Problems o f International 
Organisations (Grotius, Cambridge, 1986) at p.20, where she quotes the opinion o f the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs in relation to the UN Demographic Centre in Bucharest see [1975] UNJYB p.159.
44 25 (1986) ILM 543. See Zemanek “The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organisations: the unrecorded history of its ‘general agreement’.” in Bocksteigel 
et al. (ed.s) Festschrift fur Ignaz Seidl-Hoheveldem (1988) 665
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making capacity of international organisations.45 Most organisations demonstrate such 
capacity at least by entering into a Host State Agreement, and many organisations will 
enter into other agreements governed by international law in the course of their 
performance of their functions. Thus, for example, the European Communities have a 
highly developed practice on treaty-making, and have entered into substantial numbers 
of treaties, on the broad range of subjects in which they have competence 46
(b) Powers of legation
In relation to the capacity of international organisations to enter into “diplomatic” 
relations, many of the larger organisations demonstrate a capacity of passive legation 
in receiving representatives from member and non-member States, as well as from 
other international organisations. What is interesting is that such powers are not 
usually specified in the constituent instruments of organisations, though recognition 
can sometimes be implied in provisions in the HQ agreements of international 
organisations.47 The more general question arises therefore as to whether the powers of 
legation of an international organisations are implied from express treaty provisions, or 
whether they derive from customary international law.
The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organisations of a Universal Character was intended to codify and make 
uniform the law relating to privileges and immunities of permanent missions to the
45 This might be compared with restrictive the positions on this question previously taken by Kunz 
“Privileges and Immunities o f International Organizations” (1947,41 AJIL 828) and by Kelsen The Law 
o f  the United Nations (Stevens, London, 1950) at p.
46 See The External Relations o f  the European Communities I.MacLeod, I.Hendry and S.Hyett (Oxford, 
1996) at pp. 39-74
47 Such provisions are of course only declaratory as the HQ agreement could not be constitutive of such 
capacities of the organisation.
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universal organisations. However in the absence of the agreement of the host States of 
the larger organisations to its terms, it seems unlikely to realise this aim. Interestingly 
the Convention appears to take the view that powers of legation of international
48organisations derive from customary international law.
As Morgenstem points out, the fundamental difference between the powers of legation 
of international organisations, as opposed to those of States, is that the relations of 
organisations with States must to some extent involve coordination and cooperation 
with the host State.49 This may require an accommodation between the rights of the 
organisation to conduct its relations with other States independently, and the rights of 
the host State to protect its own interests, the chief of which appears to be national 
security.50 In contrast to diplomatic relations between States, the host State’s remedies 
are less explicitly established, though there is a recognition that the host State is 
entitled to take measures necessary for its own protection.51 Practice suggests that 
where a host State can establish that a mission or members of a mission to an 
international organisation constitute a genuine threat to its national security, it should
• S Ibe entitled to insist on the withdrawal of the persons or missions in question. Thus as
48 The last preambular paragraph states “the rules of customary international law continue to govern 
questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention” - for text see (1975) 69 
AJIL 730. For commentary see “La Conference et la Representation des Etats dans leurs Relations avec 
les Organisations Internationales” A. El-Erian 1975 AFDI445.
49 op. cit. note 43 supra, at pp. 10-13
50 In relation to the United Nations, some US measures for the protection o f national security at UN 
HQ in New York have proved controversial - see Zoller “The National Security o f the United States as 
the Host State of the United Nations” (1989) 1 Pace YIL 127. See also Reismann, M., “The Arafat Visa 
Affair: Exceeding the Bounds of Host State Discretion” (1989) 83 AJIL 519.
51 See article 77(4) o f the 1975 Vienna Convention
52 Note the absence o f contradiction of the US assertion of its right to invoke national security in 
relations with the UN as host State, before the Committee on Relations with the Host Country 42 UN 
GAOR Supp. (No.26) at para.31 UN Doc. A/42/26 (1987). In contrast to the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations provisions, the 1975 Convention contains no provisions whereby the host State can 
make a declaration of persona non grata. This was one of the reasons for its rejection by the major host
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the international organisation is an international person, but without the material 
attributes of a State (i.e. territory and population), the system of bilateral diplomatic 
relations based upon reciprocity between sovereign States, has required modification, 
to reflect the tri-partite, or indeed multi-partite, relationships between the international 
persons involved, not all of which are equal.
(c) powers to make or receive international claims
The capacity of international organisations to make international claims was of course 
the basis of the Advisory Opinion in the Reparation case,54 as has been said was found 
to be a consequence of personality. The capacity of international organisations to make 
claims and to be involved in international arbitral and even judicial proceedings is 
broadly accepted. However the question of the converse international responsibility of 
international organisations in relation to their international legal obligations is more 
controversial and the law on this topic remains underdeveloped in many respects.55
States see JG Fenessy “The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation o f States in their relations 
with International Organisations of a Universal Character” (70 (1976) AJIL 62, at pp.67-8). Zoller states 
that the difference in the position of a host State, when compared with that o f a receiving State in relation 
to the members of a foreign diplomatic mission, is that when national security is at stake, the host State 
must justify its position by invoking cogent and relevant facts, i.e. the individual State must account to 
the collectivity for its actions (cf Art.9 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relatrions) (pp. cit. note 50 
supra at p. 155).
53 It was the failure fully to consider the complexities of such relations which led to the failure of the 
1975 Convention to attract its widespread acceptance, particularly by the major host States - see Ritter 
1975 AFDI 471, and Fenessy op cit at n.52 supra. In this respect note the limited place of reciprocity in 
diplomatic relations of international organisations see Zoller op.cit. note 50 supra at p.154
54 For details of the claims by the UN in relation to this case and other missions see “The practice of 
the UN, specialised agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning their status, 
privileges and immunities: Study prepared by the Secretariat” 1967 vol II YBILC p. 155, at p.218 
para.52. The practice of the UN in this respect is not extensive, but the widespread acceptance of the 
Reparation Opinion suggests that the capacity of the UN to present an international claim would not in 
itself be challenged. The same Study indicates that of the Specialised Agencies only UNESCO has made 
such a claim, at that time (see p.302 para.23).
55 See for example Wickremasinghe and Verdirame “Responsibility and Liability for Violations of 
Human Rights in the course of UN Field Operations” in C.Scott (ed.) Torture as Tort (Hart, 
Oxford,2001) p. 465.
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Whilst some practice of the United Nations is available,56 the topic is generally under- 
researched though it might be noted that the ILC has recently taken up work on this 
topic.
A particularly problematic aspect of the topic is the opposability of the organisation’s 
personality to third parties, and in particular the question as to whether it shields the 
member States from individual liability for acts or omissions of the organisation. The 
problem is particularly apparent in relation to parties who are not members of the 
organisation. As has been observed most international organisations are established by 
treaty, and it is of course a well established rule that “a treaty does not either create 
obligation or rights for a third State without its consent”.57 As noted above, the 
objective character of the United Nations was the subject of a specific and unanimous
c o
finding by the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless in practice where private 
persons have sought to recover from die member States of an international 
organisation for losses that they claim to have incurred by default of an international 
organisations, they have tended to be unsuccessful.59 On the other hand States have
56 For example the UN settled claims presented by the governments of Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Italy and Switzerland (a non-Member State) for damage suffered by their nationals during the UN 
operations in the Congo in 1965/6, recorded in various Exchanges o f Letters: 535 UTS 191, 565 UNTS 
3,585 UNTS 147, 588 UNTS 197 and UNTS 564 UNTS 193. See Salmon “LesAccords Spaak-U Thant 
du fevrier 1965” (1965) 11 AFDI 468.
57 Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
58 The reason given for this finding appears to be the number of States which established it (at p. 185 -  
“fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members o f the international community had the 
power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective 
international personality”). If this fact alone is decisive it may be that all universal, or almost all 
universal, organisations should have objective international personality. However it is also clear that 
since that time regional organisations have also conducted considerable external relations.
59 See the International Tin Council cases in the UK Courts (culminating in the House of Lords 
judgment at [1989] 3 All ER 523) and the ECJ ([1990] ECRI -1797), and also the cases Westland 
Helicopters dispute with the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, see 80 ILR 595, 622, and 657, 
also note 118 infra. For comments see R. Higgins “The Legal Consequences for Member States o f 
the Non-Fulfillment by International Organisations toward Third Parties” (1995) 66 Ann. ID I249-89 
and 373-420.
28
occasionally sought to bring claims against the member States of international 
organisation for activities carried out within the organisations, but so far these efforts 
have proved inconclusive.60
4. Doctrinal writings on international personality
Since the Reparations case most doctrinal writing on the international personality of 
international organisations has been devoted to establishing the source of personality 
and the consequences which flow from there. Broadly speaking the writers divide into 
two camps. For the first group personality is to be implied from the constituent 
instrument of an organisation, whilst for others personality is derived from customary 
international law. For the former grouping, personality can only be derived from 
interpretation of the constitutive instrument and is a formal rather than a substantial 
quality which does not, in itself, increase the rights and duties of the organisation. 
Whereas for the latter grouping the quality of being an international person brings with 
it a variety of rights and duties, which are attributable to all international organisations 
but may be limited by the terms of their constitutive instruments or by their factual 
circumstances. An important practical issue for this latter group is the opposability of 
the personality of the organisation to non-member States.
(a) The “delegated powers” approach
The most restrictive approach to this question is sometimes called the “delegated 
powers” approach, since it insists that the powers of international organisation derive 
solely from their constitutive texts, and that these are primarily provided express
60 See for example the Lockerbie cases brought by Libya against the UK and USA in the International 
Court of Justice; also the Use o f  Force cases brought by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against 
the member States of NATO in relation to the use of force in connection with the Kosovo campaign.
29
provision. Other powers may only be implied where they are strictly “necessary ... for 
filling lacunae in specific grants of power”.61 Kelsen, writing in 1950, considered the 
powers of the UN primarily through analysis of the express provisions of the Charter. 
Through this method he established that the UN itself (rather than its member States 
individually) may be the subject of international rights and duties. The UN could 
therefore make international claims and be responsible for unlawful acts which it 
commits, provided that the organisation has organs competent to carry out the duties 
and exercise the rights and competences of the organisation. However apart from this 
procedural capacity in relation to the bringing of international claims, Kelsen appears 
less confident about the legality of any further content of the concept of international 
personality.63
Such a restrictive approach may be criticised for not offering sufficient explanation of 
the reality of the practice of international organisations. International organisations 
have frequently exercised powers which are not expressly contained in their
61 See the partly Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Hackworth in Reparation (1949 ICJ Rep. 198). Judge 
Hackworth deduced that the right of the UN to make claims for damage it had suffered, against States, 
on the ground that such a power was necessary and consistent with the specified powers o f the 
Organisation. However when it came to the Organisation espousing claims in respect of damage caused 
to one of its agents (as opposed to making claim in its own right), Judge Hackworth found that the 
necessity for such power could not be established, since the victim's State of nationality would be in a 
position to exercise diplomatic protection in respect o f the victim (notwithstanding the international 
nature o f his employment). Judge Hackworth therefore held that there was no need to grant additional 
powers to the Organisation in this respect.
62 See Kelsen The Law o f  the United Nations (1951) p.329.
63 For example he takes a very restrictive view in relation to the treaty-making capacities of the UN, 
stating that it only has such treaty making powers as are expressly provided in the Charter, p.330, though 
he recognises that the Organisation has in fact entered into a number of international agreements that do 
not have specific authorisation. Kelsen also suggests that the UN may have the right of active and 
passive legation as a result of its international personality, emphasising that the Charter does not provide 
for this, although it appears to have developed in the practice of the organisation. Cf. Rama-Montaldo 
“International Legal Personality and Implied Powers o f International Organisations” ((1970) 44 BYIL 
111 at p. 114 n.5) interprets Kelsen’s as an essentially “material” view o f personality, but that the extent 
of personality for him is less than for others who take a “material” view. Muller too states that Kelsen 
holds a material view, and categorises him with Seyersted (International Organisations and their Hosts 
iSita/ey(Kluwer, The Hague 1996) at p82.
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constitutive instruments and which could hardly be said to arise by any strict test of 
necessary implication.64
(b) The “implied powers” approach
The “implied powers” approach also sees the text as the basis of all powers of an 
organisation, but takes a more liberal attitude in relation to implied powers. For Seidl- 
Hohenveldem, a proponent of this approach, all powers and capacities exercised by 
international organisations which are not expressly provided by their constituent 
instruments, are explained as implied powers, rather than powers inherent in 
international personality. On this view therefore personality may be established by the 
exercise by an organisation of certain powers, such as treaty-making, legation and so 
on rather than vice versa.65
Further, powers may be implied where they can be derived by means of an extensive 
interpretation of the constituent instrument, in order to give it ejfet utile in accordance 
with the purposes of the organisation. As an alternative he suggests that, by analogy 
with national constitutional interpretation, which may go beyond the written text of the 
“constitution”, they may be exercised by reference to the “customary international
64 See for example the ICJ Advisory Opinions on Status o f  SWAfrica 1950 ICJ Rep. 128 at p.137; Effect 
o f  Awards o f Compensation made the UNAT1954 ICJ Rep. 47 at p.56-61; Certain Expenses o f  the UN 
1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at p. 163. See also Sands and Klein op. cit. note 4 supra, at pp.470-475; and 
Weissberg The International Status o f the United Nations (1961) at p.25.
65 Though he restricts the endowment of international personality to those organisations of an iure 
imperii quality (see Corporations in and under International Law (Grotius, Cambridge, 1987) at p.72), 
thus precluding inter-State enterprises from possessing the status o f international persons. This view 
though it has initial attraction in explaining the personality and immunities of international organisations, 
has not been widely accepted, largely because the distinction of an actum jure imperii from an actum 
iure gestionis is not itself an easy distinction. Thus it tends to create or at least transfer problems rather 
than provide solutions, (see Higgins op.cit note 59 supra esp. the responses to questionnaire (esp. to 
q.4) at pp. 301-371.
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law” of the organisation in question.66 This “customary international law” he suggests 
may be established by the practice of an organisation in its actual exercise of such 
powers coupled with their conviction that such acts are a legitimate exercise of their 
rights. It is therefore not clear precisely in what sense Seidl-Hohenveldem uses the 
term “customary international law”. Whilst the term may suggest a source of law 
independent of the constitutive instrument, it may be that in fact what he referring to is 
the interpretation of the written instrument in the light of “subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
fin
interpretation”. In any event the organisation is thereby enabled to exercise a 
potentially broad degree of competence de la competence.
For Seidl-Hohenveldem the only limitation to such implied powers, and even those 
exercised under the “customary international law” of the organisation, is that they are 
justified by reference to the aims of the organisation, though these are interpreted 
broadly for this purpose. Therefore he concludes that an international organisation is 
entitled “to act without specific authorisation to that effect, unless the constituent 
instruments of an organisation declare expressis verbis that the organisation shall not 
act in a certain manner or unless the act cannot be justified as necessary to fulfil the 
aims of die organisation”. Despite the breadth of these conclusions it should be 
observed that the actual powers of the organisation appear not to be increased by virtue 
of the fact of personality, but rather by virtue of interpretation of the constituent
66 See "The Legal Personality o f International and Supranational Organisations" 21 (1964) Rev. E.D.I. 
35 at p.39
67 Article 31(3)(b) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which has an important role in the 
law of all organisations. This may provide a link back to the constitutive treaty, which in keeping with 
the “implied powers approach” to international personality.
68 op. cit. note 66 supra, at p. 40
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instrument, over which, as with any other treaty between States, the States Parties 
firmly remain the masters.69
70A slightly different version of the implied powers approach is taken by Weissberg. 
He finds that theoretically an international organisation cannot take on new functions, 
and it can only use powers not expressly provided for under the constitutive instrument 
in order to administer its original functions. However he concedes that in practice this 
distinction is not realistic. He suggests that in fact what occurs when an express 
provision is interpreted or applied in a specific situation is that additional or unforeseen 
functions are assumed by the organisation, although they are derived from the original 
functions. He finds support for such an approach by analogy with the development of 
national constitutional law. He thus sees a division of the functions of an international 
organisation, between the “primary functions” specifically delegated to the 
organisation and enumerated in the constitutive instrument, and the derivative or 
secondary functions, of an implied nature and auxiliary in scope. These derivative 
functions follow from the existence of the primary functions and the possession of 
international legal personality.71
However he does not identify in terms the secondary functions to which he is referring 
at this point. He later identifies the following as contributing to the development of 
international personality: the capacity to bring international claims; implied treaty- 
making powers (which may even be delegated to subsidiary organs of the UN); the
69 see Corporations in and under International Law (Grotius, Cambridge, 1987) at pp.75-81
70 The Legal Status o f the United Nations (New York and London, 1961), Chapters 1 and 2
71 ibid. atp.24
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operation by the United Nations of military forces, in both enforcement action and 
peacekeeping activities; the capacity to administer territory; the rights of active and 
passive legation; the use of a flag; the registration of treaties; and the ability to possess
and register vessels. There is perhaps a danger here of the type of circular reasoning
11against which Sands and Klein warn, e.g. identifying the existence of personality 
from limited treaty-making powers, and then implying a full treaty-making power from 
the finding of international personality. It may be however that what Weissberg 
intended was that the process is evolutive, with the various elements interacting and 
developing in the light of changing circumstances.
(c) The “inherent powers” approach
The best known proponent of the “inherent powers” approach is Syersted, who is also
I ' Xthe author for whom the content of international personality is the broadest. 
Seyersted practically equates the position of international organisations endowed 
international personality, to that of States, suggesting that the full range of sovereign 
powers is inherent in international personality.74 The only legal limitations on the 
exercise of such powers by an international organisation are those matters which it is 
precluded from performing by its the constitutive instrument or under general 
international law. Whilst specific prohibitions on particular acts by organisations in 
their constitutive instruments are not common, there may be restrictions on the 
purposes which an international organisation can pursue, or on the competences vested 
in its organs. Further, Seyersted holds whilst an international organisation has an
72 op. cit note 4 supra at p.474
73 See “International personality of international organisations - do their capacities really depend upon 
their Constitutions?” (1964) 4 Ind JIL 1, and “Is the international personality of intergovernmental 
organisations valid vis a vis non-members?” (1964) 4 Ind JIL 233
74 For Seyersted such differences as exist are differences of fact and degree rather than law
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“organic jurisdiction” over its organs and membership, beyond this jurisdiction it 
cannot impose obligations upon its Member States (or non-Member States), without a 
specific legal basis either in the constitutive instrument or by some other authorisation 
by the States concerned. Other limitations on the organisation's powers to perform 
sovereign or international acts are purely limitations in factual circumstances and/or 
resources.
Seyersted claims that these rather radical conclusions are based on and required by the 
practice of organisations, and rather than legal theory. It is this which leads him to 
reject both the delegated powers and the implied powers approaches. However it must 
be remarked that few other writers go so far, in drawing conclusions from the practice. 
Though others may agree that the international personality has an objective character 
and a material content, the main criticism of his position is simply that he claims too 
much. To claim the totality of the rights and duties of sovereign States for every 
international organisation as being a necessary consequence of personality, results in 
“an arbitrary and artificial transfer of concepts from one sphere to the other, and not
n c
least, the concept of sovereignty”. Seyersted’s examination is largely based on the 
UN and League of Nations, and whilst this may be understandable given the 
importance of these organisations, it is an insufficient base on which to generalise for 
all international organisations, the variety of which is vast. Furthermore it does not 
accord with the specific distinction drawn by the ICJ in the Reparation case, between 
the position of States and that enjoyed by international organisations, nor with its 
finding that all international persons did not necessarily have the same capacities.
75 Rama-Montaldo “International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organisations” 
(1970)44BYIL 111 at p. 120
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A further criticism leading from this is that Seyersted does not take into account the 
functional nature of the international organisation. He acknowledges that the 
organisation is not in the position of a sovereign State, in that it does not have free 
choice in relation to the purposes it may pursue as these are defined by its constitution. 
However he claims that the organisation then has available to it complete freedom of 
choice as to what means it will adopt to achieve those purposes. Rama-Montaldo 
illustrates the rather different approach of the International Court of Justice in Certain 
Expenses which justified the legality of the operation of UN forces, not by reference to 
powers inherent in personality but by reference to the functions of the organisation, 
given its purposes and the “not unlimited” powers available to the organisation by
77which these purposes could be effected.
However whilst the claims for inherent powers made by Seyersted may be too large, 
there remains the possibility that a more limited selection of rights and duties are 
inherent in international personality. Rama-Montaldo finds them to be limited those 
necessary for the recognition of organisations as distinct entities from their member 
States:
76 op. cit. note 73 supra at pp.48-50
77 Further questions are raised in the debate concerning the possibility o f judicial review of Security 
Council actions, in relation to the Lockerbie case before the ICJ. Bedjaoui for example maintains that 
there is legitimate scope for the International Court of Justice to review the means which the Council 
adopts in order to restore or maintain international peace and security, though not determinations 
of the Security Council under Article 39 (- See Bedjaoui The N ew  W orld O rder an d  the Security  
Council - Testing the L egality  o f  its A cts  (1994) at p .53). On the other side o f  that debate 
there are few  w ho w ould suggest that the range o f  activities open to the Security Council is 
unlimited, the question concerns, instead, what organ has or should have the power o f  
appreciation or review.
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“(a) This right to express its will through the different legal ways found in the 
international order for producing legal effects on the international plane. This 
right constitutes the capacity of international organisations to perform 
international acts, understanding by these Hie different legal ways of 
manifesting the will of the organisation, which manifestation is capable of 
producing particular legal effects and aims at creating, modifying, conserving 
or extinguishing international legal relations. Thus international organisations 
bilateral acts (treaties) and unilateral acts, whatever their form, as for example, 
promise, notification, recognition, renunciation or claim ...
(b) Rights which enable the organisation to manifest itself as a distinct entity 
and make possible relations with other international persons. Within this group 
are to be included: active and passive jus legationis; recognition of other 
subjects of international law and their governments; and the right to use 
distinctive signs, flags, etc.”78
It is submitted that the views of Rama-Montaldo on this subject represent a doctrinal
• •  •  • 7Q aapproach which conforms with the practice of organisations. It seems unlikely that 
the notion of personality in itself has no legal consequences. If this were true one might 
ask why in the Reparation case the ICJ, and those who made representations before the 
Court, felt that it was necessary to raise the issue of personality at all since it was not 
one of the questions put to it by the General Assembly. They might simply have relied 
on a strict doctrine of delegated powers, as Judge Hackworth did. As Higgins says the 
objective view of personality (i.e. that it exists by virtue of rules of customary 
international law on the establishment of organs not subject to the jurisdiction of one 
State) accords with the “objective reality” of the existence of international
78 Rama Montaldo op. cit. at pp. 139-140
79 In relation to the treaty-making power o f international organisations, see Zemanek op. cit. note 44 
supra at p.671. He states that article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the law o f treaties between 
States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, which states that “The 
capacity of an international organisation to conclude treaties is governed by the rules of that 
organisation”, must be read in the light of the 11th preambular paragraph which notes “that international 
organisations possess the capacity to conclude treaties which is necessary for the exercise of their 
functions and the fulfilment of their purposes”. He concludes that the most plausible interpretation o f the 
two provisions, is that the treaty-making capacity of international organisations recognised in the 
preambular paragraph is inherent in customary international law, whereas article 6 merely provides a 
limit on that inherent power.
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• O A  • • • »organisations as actors on the international scene. This view provides an affirmative 
(and realistic) answer to the question of whether the personality of international 
organisations can be opposable to third parties (i.e. both non-member States and 
private parties). However it does not pre-judge questions responsibility, since on this 
view the rights inherent in personality are simply those procedural capacities which 
enable relations between States and international organisations to take place, rather 
than imposing on the substance of those relations.
B. The Status of International Organisations in Municipal Law
1. The relationship of international personality and legal personality in municipal 
law
In contrast to the wealth of doctrinal writing on the nature of the international 
personality of international organisations, the status of organisations in municipal law 
has attracted far less comment. It is widely accepted that personality must operate at 
different levels if an international organisation is to perform activities on levels other 
than that of public international law. Thus for example an organisation will need to 
employ staff, to occupy premises from which to operate, and, at a minimum, to 
purchase basic goods and services. That an organisation should be able to carry out 
such activities for itself, without having to obtain the agreement of each member State 
for each such activity, has long been recognised as necessary for the effective
01
achievement by the organisation of its functions.
80 Higgins op.cit. note 59 supra, at p.386
81 As an example of the quotidian necessity of a degree of personality in municipal law, Cahier notes that 
the League of Nations was registered as the proprietor of the site of the Palais des Nations even before a 
formal agreement had been reached between the League and the Swiss Federal Council, recognising the 
legal personality o f the League, op cit. note 17 supra at p.91
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In the constitutive texts of international organisations established since 1945, it is quite 
usual for a provision declaring that an international organisation shall have personality 
in municipal law, and requiring member States to give effect to such personality. 
Although such provisions may put the matter beyond doubt, given that the 
international personality of organisations is broadly accepted, it may be questioned 
whether such provisions are strictly necessary. It might be said that international 
personality merely requires its own reflection in municipal law, and that these 
provisions are, therefore, simply declaratory rather than constitutive of legal
O'}
personality. Such provisions appear to be included in constitutive treaties ex
o-j ( t
abundante cautela. It follows also that the non-inclusion of such a provision should 
not necessarily be taken {a contrario) as a denial of legal personality, but rather that 
this will have to be determined from the circumstances of each case.
2. Legal Personality in municipal law
(a) Where the forum State is a member of the organisation
The mechanics of the translation of this international requirement on member States to 
accord an international organisation legal personality in their municipal law, will 
depend upon the means of reception of international law into the local system. If, as 
has been submitted, the international personality of international organisations exists in
82 see J.-F. Lalive “L’immunite des juridiction des etats et des organisations internationales” (1953) 84 
Rec. des Cours 205, at pp.306-312: also Dominice “L’imunite de juridiction et d’execution des 
organisations intemationales” (1984) 187 Rec. des Cours 145 at p .165: and Duffar Contribution a 
I ’etude des privileges et immunites des organisations intemationales (LGJD, Paris, 1982) at p. 16
83 See Yuen-li Liang "The Legal Status of the United Nations in the United States" 2 (1948) ILQ 577, at 
p.584, who finds that "...the concept of legal personality of international organisations should be written 
into international instruments, not because of theoretical or doctrinal soundness, but because it has 
substance in the context o f municipal law. A few words may thus be used to supply a wealth of meaning 
which would otherwise be very difficult to convey."
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customary international law, then this should be reflected in the municipal legal 
systems of most States, since customary international law forms part of the body of 
municipal law in most legal orders, without any special mechanism for incorporation 
into municipal law.84 If on the other hand personality only existed by virtue of a treaty 
provision, then in dualist States, before an international organisation could avail itself 
of personality in the domestic sphere the treaty would have to be incorporated into the
• • • QC .mumcipal legal system by means of legislation. In any event, however, it is essential, 
as Jenks points out, that the international law basis of the organisation is recognised, 
and that municipal law is not considered in any way as constitutive of the organisation. 
He counsels:
“... it is as inherently fantastic as it is destructive of any international legal 
order to regard the existence and extent of legal personality provided for in the 
constituent instrument of an international organisation as being derived from, 
dependent upon and limited by, the constitution and laws of its individual 
member States.”86
In practice the constitutive instruments of international organisations, will usually 
choose one of two main formulations to require the enjoyment of personality in 
municipal law, either:
84 See Dominice and Voeffray “L’application du droit international general dans l’order juridique 
interne” in Eisemann (ed.) L 'integration du droit international et communautaire dans I 'ordre juridique 
national (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996) at 51-63
85 As will be shown later an alternative to this may be that provided an organisation has been accepted as 
a legal person in the legal system of State which the forum State recognises, then by principles of private 
international law, the personality of the organisation may be recognised by the forum. It is however 
submitted that this is a somewhat artificial approach, it being preferable to consider an international 
organisation on its own terms i.e. as a question of international law. The variation o f this approach 
applied by the House of Lords in the AMF v. Hashim (No.3) case (see below), by which the Court 
recognised an international organisation as a foreign corporation (in a manner similar to that of a foreign 
private law corporation), shows the dangers of this whole approach if  not very carefully reasoned.
86 Jenks “The Legal Personality o f International Organisations” XXII (1945) BYIL 267 at pp. 270-1. It 
should be noted that though he speaks here of “personality provided for in the constituent instrument”, in 
the earlier part of the sentence quoted he refers to the attribution of personality by the constituent 
instrument or by customary international law.
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(i) in the mode of Article 104 of the UN Charter, that the organisation in
question “shall enjoy such capacity in municipal law as is necessary for the 
exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes”;87 or
(ii) that the organisation “shall possess full legal or juridical personality,
including the capacities (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of
moveable and immoveable property, and (c) to institute legal
proceedings”.88
However despite their differences, and the apparently more limited formulation 
relating to functional necessity, in practice there appears to be little to difference 
between them.89
87 See for example the ITU (art. 17 International Telecommunication Convention 1982, 33 
UKTS(1985)); WHO (artXV (WHO Constitution 1945 (as amended 1976) 14 UNTS 185); WIPO 
(art. 12 Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation 1967, 828 UNTS 3);
WMO (art. 27 of the WMO Constitution 1947 (as amended 1979 and 1983) 77 UNTS 143); OAS (art. 
139 Charter o f the OAS 1948 (as amended), 119 UNTS 4); International Institute of Refrigeration 
(art.XXIX of the Agreement concemg the International Institute of Refrigeration 1954, 826 UNTS 191). 
The status of ICAO has a variation in its wording (see art.47 o f the Convention on Civil Aviation 1944, 
84, UNTS 389), personality necessary for the performance of its functions is recognised, but full 
juridical personality is granted wherever this is compatible with the constitution and laws of the State 
concerned. However Jenks suggests that no conclusion can be drawn from the inclusion of the additional 
words, and that they were added to overcome certain difficulties within US law on multiple 
incorporations {op.cit. note 80 supra at p. 271).
88 See eg. African Development Bank (art.51 Agreement establishing the African Development Bank 
1963, for consolidated amended text, see UKTS 58 (1990)); Asian Development Bank (art. 49 
Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank 1965, 571 UNTS 123; Caribbean Development 
Bank (art. 23 Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank 1969, 712 UNTS 217); Council 
of Europe (art. 1 o f the General Agreement o f the Privileges and Immunities o f the Council o f Europe, 
250 UNTS 12); Inter-American Development Bank (art.XI s.21-ADB Agreement 1959 (as amended), 
389 UNTS 69); IBRD (art. VII s.2 Articles of Association of the IBRD, 2 UNTS 134); IDA (art. VIII s.2 
Articles o f Agreement of IDA, 439 UNTS 249); IFC (art.6 s.2 Articles o f Agreement o f the IFC, 264 
UNTS 117; ILO (see art 39 of the Constitution of the ILO 1919 (as amended), UKTS 47 (1948)); IMF 
(art.IX s.2 Articles of Agreement (as amended), 1 UNTS 39); International Coffee Organisation (art 
23(1), International Coffee Organisation 1983,1333 UNTS 119).
89 Thus Article 104 of the UN Charter provides that “the Organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each 
of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise o f its functions and the 
fulfilment of its purposes”. However in seeking to give more flesh to this provision, Article I section 1 
the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 states that the 
organisation shall have “juridical personality and the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose 
of immoveable and moveable property and (c) to institute legal proceedings: 1 UNTS 15.
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The different provisions of national law concerning the juridical status of international 
organisations have in general not caused difficulties in the legal systems of their 
member States. In monist States treaty provisions of the type considered in the 
preceding paragraph (whether derived from constitutive treaties, multilateral treaties on 
privileges and immunities, or host State agreements) may be applied directly in the 
municipal legal system.90 A number of the Northern European dualist systems re-enact 
the text of the relevant treaty provisions in their incorporating legislation.91
In the United States the federal International Organisations Immunities Act92 enables 
the President by Executive Order to provide inter alia that an international 
organisations in which the US participates has the powers to contract, to acquire and 
dispose of real and personal property and to institute legal proceedings. In the case of 
the UN, the Executive Order is probably simply declaratory in this respect, since as 
Article 104 of the Charter has been found to be self-executing.
90 For a description of how this question is dealt with in the Dutch legal system in respect o f organisation 
of which the Netherlands is a host State, see Muller International Organisations and their Host States 
(Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995) at pp. 111-116. Though Dutch treaty practice shows some variation as to the 
formulation, there appears to have been no major difficulties in giving effect to personality in local law. 
In relation to France, Duffar notes how host State agreements have changed from recognition of 
“personalite civile”, which apparently limited the scope of personality in local law only to capacities to 
contract, to acquire and dispose of moveable and immoveable property and to institute legal proceedings, 
to a recognition in more recent agreements of a fuller notion of personality o f international organisation, 
reflecting also its international character, in formulations such as “Tagence jouit de la personalite 
juridique et possede enparticulier la capacite a) de contracter, b) d’acquerir des biens immobiliers et 
mobiliers et d’en disposer, c) d’ester en justice”, see Duffar op.cit. note 82 supra at p. 15.
91 In this respect see the German Act of 22 June 1954 (as amended) (for English translation see UN 
Legislative Series, vol. II at p.25 (ST/LEG/SER.B/11); Norwegian Act of 19 June 1947 (UNLegislative 
Series, vol. I, at p.72, ST/LEG/SER.B/10); Swedish Act of 10 July 1947 (as amended) (UNLegislative 
Series, vol. /, at p.72, ST/LEG/SER.B/10).
92 22 USC 288
93 See Curran v. City o f  New York, (Supreme Court of Queen's County) 77 NYS 2d 206; Balfour, 
Guthrie and Co Ltd v. United States (US District Court, Northern California) 90 F.Supp. 831, 17 ILR 
323.
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The International Organisations Act 1968 of the United Kingdom provides that an 
international organisation of which the UK is a member may have conferred upon it, 
by secondary legislation, “the legal capacities of a body corporate”. Similar 
terminology is used by a number of Commonwealth States.94 This phrase has been 
criticised as being ambiguous or tending to ignore the intergovernmental nature of 
international organisations,95 and as it has been so widely used further consideration is 
merited.
The phrase was adopted for the first time in this context in the Diplomatic Privileges 
Extension Act 1944 (a predecessor to the 1968 Act), which was introduced primarily 
in order to give effect to UNRRA resolutions calling for the jurisdictional and fiscal 
immunities to be granted to UNRRA officials. Marston, detailing the legislative history 
of this provision,96 suggests that from the very first there was a division of opinion as 
to whether the common law (of which, of course customary international law forms a
07 • •part) might consider an international organisation as a legal person, or whether 
legislation was necessary in order to give it personality in English law. In fact when it
94 Including the following: Barbados - s.6(2)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 1967 (1967 
UNJYB); Canada - s.5 Foreign Missions and International Organisations Act 1991 (c.41 1991); Fiji - 
s.6(2)(a) Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1971 (1971 UNJYB 7); Guyana - ss.l0(2)(a) and 
12(2)(a) Privileges and Immunities (Diplomatic, Consular and International Organisations) Act 1970 
(1970 UNJYB 12); Jamaica - s.6(2)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 1964 (1964 UNJYB 
5); Kenya - s.9(2)(a)Privileges and Immunities Act 1970 (1970 UNJYB 18); Malawi s.691)(a) 
Immunities and Privileges (Extension and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 1964 (1964 UNJYB 
13); Malta - s.5(2)(a) Diplomatic Immunities and privileges Act 1966 (1966 UNJYB p.6); New Zealand
- s.9 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 (1969 UNJYB 4); Seychelles - s.l2(2)(a) Privileges 
and immunities (Diplomatic, Consular and International Organisations) Act 1980 (1980 UNJYB 8); 
Singapore - s.2(2)(a) International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities Act (1985 ed Statutes 
c.145); Trinidad and Tobago - s.7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a) Privileges and Immunities (Diplomatic, Consular and 
International Organisation) Act 1965 (1965 UNJYB 10); and Zambia - s.4(2)(a) Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities Act 1965 (1965 UNJYB 15).
95 see Duffar op.cit. note 82 supra at p. 17
96 G.Marston “The Origin o f the Personality of International Organisations in United Kingdom Law” 40 
(1991) ICLQ 403-424
97 See for example Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank o f Nigeria, [1977] 3 All ER 437, and 
Pinochet No. 3, [1999] 2 All ER 97
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was being introduced in the House of Commons, the Attorney-General stated that an 
organisation would, under the common law, have the same status, privileges and
QO
immunities as the member States would enjoy individually. Marston notes that the
phrase “legal capacities of a body corporate” did not appear in the earlier drafts of the
legislation, and explains its effect as follows:
“The use as a reference datum of the capacities of a body corporate may 
initially have been made by Parliamentary Counsel simply to provide a 
domestic law yardstick less potentially productive of uncertainty that the use of 
the ‘capacities of the government of a foreign sovereign Power’. With the 
removal during the Bill’s second reading of the reference in clause l(2)(a) to 
the ‘capacities of the government of a foreign sovereign Power’ and the 
reinstatement of the yardstick of ‘the legal capacities of the a body corporate’ it 
became less likely that an international organisation would be perceived as 
being domestically equivalent to an association or partnership of foreign States 
or governments, although Somervell [the Attorney General] would presumably 
not have welcomed such a shift of view.”99
The phrase was considered in great detail during the International Tin Council 
litigation in the English courts.100 In this case it was found that an international
98 See Editor’s Note “The Relationship o f International Organisations to Municipal Law and their 
Immunities and Privileges”, XXII (1945) BYBIL 249 at p.250
99 See Marston op. cit. note 96 supra at p.422
100 [1989] 3 All ER 523. This arose out of the failure of the ITC during its unsuccessful attempts to 
support the price o f tin on world markets but in particular on the London Metal Exchange. Though 
numerous cases arose out o f this failure o f the ITC (the combined claims by the creditors added up to 
over $1 billion), there were three broad questions which reached the appellate courts. First whether the 
creditors had a direct claim against the member States; second whether the English courts had 
jurisdiction under the Companies Act 1985 to wind up the ITC (though this appears to have been 
dropped before the House of Lords); and thirdly whether the Court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, 
by way of equitable execution, to pursue claims which the ITC might have against its member States. 
Though there were questions as to the status of the ITC in English law in relations to all three actions, it 
was in the direct actions that the question of personality was dealt within greatest detail. The direct 
actions were, in turn, based three alternative submissions:
(A) that the ITC had no personality in English law. Although the Order in Council, made under the 
International Organisations Act 1968, gave it the legal capacities o f body corporate it was argued that it 
had no distinct status. Thus the member States, though they had been able to enter into contracts in the 
collective name o f the ITC, themselves remained jointly and severally liable for debts arising thereunder.
(B) That though the ITC had legal personality, this did not exclude a concurrent or secondary liability of 
the member States (i) either through interpretation of the Order in Council, or (ii) through the nature of  
the organisation in international law.
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organisation which enjoyed the capacities of a body corporate by virtue of an Order in 
Council made under the International Organisations Act, was for that reason a separate 
person in English law from its member States, and thus responsible for its own debts. 
The conclusion that the ITC enjoyed legal personality separate from its member States 
is sound in law (despite the hardship caused to plaintiffs in this litigation). However 
the treatment of the issue as primarily a question of English law, rather than 
international law, has caused concern.101
It was common ground that the ITC was an international organisation established by 
treaty, and was therefore not a municipal corporation by virtue of having “the 
capacities of a body corporate” in the law of the UK under the relevant Order in 
Council. However in the House of Lords, Lord Oliver took the position that “the effect 
of the 1972 order was to create the ITC (which, as an international legal persona, had 
no status under the laws of the United Kingdom) a legal person in its own right, 
independent of its members”.102 Considering the ITC simply in terms of its constitutive
(C) that the ITC acted as agent for the member States, either (i) as a question of fact, or (ii) by 
implication from its constitution.
In the decisions at all instances the personality of the organisation, even if  only as a matter o f English 
law, was upheld, and submission (A) failed. Similarly submission (C) as to agency failed, some judges 
finding that this raised a non-justiciable issue, whereas others, though finding it justiciable, rejected the 
claim on the principle derived from Salomon v. Salomon, ie the basis o f the separate personality o f  
corporations in English company law, which makes clear that the relationship between a corporation and 
its members in respect o f contracts of the corporation was not one of agency. (As to the appropriateness 
of using English company law in relation to any international organisation see text infra).
The submissions under B(i) also failed, at all instances as a question o f construction of the Order in 
Council. The arguments under submission B(ii) were also rejected (though in Court o f Appeal Nourse 
LJ, who was incidentally one o f the judges who dealt with the issues o f international law most 
convincingly, dissented).
101 See for example R.Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, 
1994) at p.48. Also Jennings “An intematioal lawyer takes stock” (1990) 3 9 ICLQ 513, at pp.524-6
102 [1989] 3 All ER 523, at p.549. See also his Lordship's comments at p.552 “Whilst it is of course not 
inaccurate to describe art.4 of the 1972 Order as one which ‘recognises’ the ITC as an international 
organisation, such ‘recognition’ is of no consequence in domestic law unless and until it is accompanied 
by the creation o f a legal persona. Without the 1972 order the ITC had no legal existence in the law of 
the United Kingdom and no significance save as the name of an international body created by a treaty
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treaty, Lord Oliver’s concern was the question of justiciability. His starting point was 
that under the doctrine of non-justiciability, treaty provisions which are not 
incorporated into UK law by legislation can not give rise to rights in favour of 
individuals nor can they deprive an individual of rights.103
It is submitted that it would have been open to the Court to find that the international 
personality of international organisations arises in customary international law, and 
that as customary international law forms part of the common law (at least to the extent 
that there is no legislative act or binding authority to the contrary), it could have 
considered the organisation more appropriately as the created and governed by 
international law. If this approach were taken, the words of the Order in Council 
endowing the Organisation with “the capacities of a body corporate” would have had 
little constitutive value. This both accords with the reality,104 and, it is submitted, 
reflects more closely the views of the Attorney General who introduced the 1944 Act 
to Parliament.
(b) Legal personality of international organisations in the courts of third States
The question about the source of personality in international law becomes important 
when the court of non-member State is seised with a dispute involving an international
between sovereign States which was not justiciable by municipal courts. What brought it into being in 
English law was the 1972 Order and it is the 1972 Order, a purely domestic measure, in which the 
constitution of the legal persona is to be found and in which there has to be sought the liability o f the 
members which the appellants seek to establish, for that is the act o f the ITC's creation in the United 
Kingdom.”
103 The UK dualist approach to treaties is based upon the constitutional position that treaty-making 
power is part of the Prerogative exercised by the Executive, whereas any modification of the UK law 
must be done by the Executive. In contrast it might be noted that in the Court of Appeal Kerr LJ [1988] 3 
All ER 257 at p292, had found that it was both permissible and necessary to consider the treaties ‘against 
the background of international law’ in order that the court could inform itself about the nature of the 
ITC, and secondly in order to be able to interpret the 1972 Order.
104 See R.Higgins op. cit note 101 supra at pp.47-8.
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organisation. Where the State of the forum is a member of the international 
organisation in question it will be under an obligation to observe its treaty 
commitments in good faith,105 as well as a more general obligation of cooperation with 
the organisation However where the forum State is not a member of the organisation a 
different approach is required. There may be a treaty between the organisation and the 
forum State which sets out the terms of the relationship,106 and if this treaty forms or is 
incorporated into domestic law, the personality of the organisation in question is 
unlikely to be problematic. However where there is no such defining instrument the 
question arises as to what are the guiding principles. If objective international 
personality -  i.e. personality which is opposable to member States and to non-member 
States alike - is vested in an organisation by virtue of customary international law, and 
given that customary international law forms part of most municipal legal systems, 
international personality may be given recognition in municipal law. However it must 
be said that this approach has not been expressly adopted by any municipal court faced 
with an international organisation, of which the forum State was not a member. In 
most cases in which international organisations have appeared before national courts 
of non-member States the personality of those organisations has not been challenged, 
and the courts have simply accepted the organisation as a party., without further 
explanation107
However this issue has been litigated more extensively in the English Courts. It was 
suggested above that the result reached in the House of Lords decision on the
105 See eg Art2(2) o f the UN Charter
106 Thus before Switzerland was a member of the UN it entered into an Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities with the UN in 1946, see UN Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B/10 at p. 196
107 see for example the US case o f ITC v. Amalgamet 80.ILR 30, and the French case CEDAO v.
BCCI, 1993 JDI 353, notes 122-123 infra
47
personality of the International Tin Council was acceptable in so far as the personality
10Rof the organisation as distinct from its members was upheld. However the 
difficulties with the approach of the House of Lords become clear in the case of an 
organisation of which the UK is not a member and for which there is no legislative act 
recognising its legal capacities, but which nevertheless seeks to litigate in the UK 
courts.109 The case of Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No.3)no provides a clear 
example. In that case the Arab Monetary Fund, an international organisation of which 
the UK was not a member sought recovery of assets which had allegedly been 
embezzled by its former Director General, the first defendant. The defendants sought 
to strike out the proceedings, on the basis that the AMF had no capacity to bring 
proceedings in the English courts, since there was no statutory instrument to “create” it 
as a person in English law. The AMF had been created under a treaty which provided 
that “the Fund shall have an independent juridical personality and shall have, in 
particular the right to own, Contract and litigate”. In Other respects the Fund had its 
own organs, its own functions, and a measure of financial, technical and 
administrative autonomy. It is very likely therefore that if the Court had been able to 
consider whether the Fund had international personality, it would have answered the
108 see text at note lOOff supra
109 Prior to the Tin Council case, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had appeared to accept that 
international organisations o f which the UK was not a member, might nevertheless “be acknowledged” 
as possessing legal personality. In reply to a Parliamentary question it was indicated that the English 
courts might be able to find in favour of the legal personality and capacity of an international financial 
organisation “in same way and to the same extent as any other banking, commercial or other trading 
organisation established in a country other than the United Kingdom and enjoying legal personality and 
capacity in that country”. In answer to the question as to whether the FCO would be prepared to make a 
statement to the court as to the Executive's attitude to the matters of personality and capacity of an 
organisation, the reply continued “on the assumption that the entity concerned enjoys, under its 
constitutive instrument or instruments and under the law of one or more member States or the State 
wherein it has its seat or permanent location, legal personality and capacity to engage in [banking] 
transactions ... governed by a the law of a non-member State, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as 
the branch of the Executive responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, would be willing officially 
to acknowledge that the entity concerned enjoyed such legal personality and capacity, and to state this.” 
See XLIX (1978) BYBIL 346, at p.347-8.
1,0 [1991] 1 All ER 871
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question in the affirmative. However following the House o f Lords judgment in the 
ITC cases, such arguments were abandoned. The issue was instead couched in terms of  
private international law. It was argued that the Federal Decree o f the UAE (a State 
recognised by the UK), which recognised the Fund as having personality in UAE law, 
should be treated as creating a person which might be recognised in the English courts, 
by analogy with the conflicts rules on foreign corporations. Lord Templeman, giving 
the leading judgment in the House o f Lords,111 largely agreed with such reasoning, 
relying on “comity” 112 rather than explicitly upon private international law.
This form o f reasoning was expedient in the instant case, but it seems simply not to 
accord with the reality o f the situation.113 Although it may be permissible to take a 
private international law approach to question of the recognition of the personality o f  
international organisations,114 it is unnecessary to say that the foreign municipal law 
creates the organisation, for this is to ignore international character of the legal person.
111 [1991] 1 All ER 871. This was also the reasoning of Hoffman J. at first instance ([1990] 1 All ER 
685), who clearly felt that this was a less attractive route than recognising the Fund an international 
entity, but that following the House of Lords judgment in the ITC  cases, he had no choice but to 
recognise it as an Abu Dhabi entity (p.691). The majority o f the Court of Appeal (Lord Donaldson and 
Nourse LJ) found that, following the ITC case, the AMF, as an international entity, had no personality in 
English law without some form of legislative enactment. The tone of Lord Donaldson's remarks suggests 
that he was clearly unhappy with the conclusion he was forced to reach, but plainly felt unable to 
regularise the position of English law with that of both international law and objective fact. Lord Lowry 
in his dissenting speech in the House of Lords calls explicitly for legislation.to be introduced
O f particular note is Bingham LJ's dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal ([1990] 2 All ER 769, at 
pp.779-83), in which he accepts that the UAE decree only gave recognition in the local legal system to 
the personality of the organisation, but did not create a local corporation.
112 ibid at p.878. The use of the term “comity” in the English courts is ambiguous; it can mean more than 
courtoisie internationale, and in fact can be used to refer to rules of private or public international law, or 
even public policy see Mann Foreign Affairs in the English Courts (Oxford, 1986) Ch.7.
113 It should be noted that the House of Lords had little option but to follow the private international law 
route, as this was the route which the representatives of the Fund chose to place before the court. They 
were in fact given the opportunity to put their appeal to the House of Lords on other grounds but 
declined (see Marston op cit note 96 supra at p.424).
114 Schermers and Blokker International Institutional Law (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1994) at para. 1598, also 
suggest this as an alternative to the route of finding that legal personality exists in general international.
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To suggest that this foreign law has a constitutive (rather than declaratory) function 
may lead to the absurd result there exist a number of different “emanations of the 
[organisation] under the laws of other member States and even the possibility of suit 
by one against the other in an English Court”.115
That danger was subsequently brought out in the Westland Helicopters v. AOI, 116 in 
which there was an underlying dispute between the member States as to the status of 
the AOI, which was reflected in their municipal legal systems. However Coleman J 
effectively found that the House of Lords judgment in the AMF case was limited, by 
holding that where a foreign municipal law gives effect to the personality of an 
international organisation, that serves only to enable the English court to recognise that 
same personality. He found no necessary implication in either the AMF decision or 
English conflicts rules that such a foreign law was in any way constitutive of the 
organisation, which was created by treaty and whose proper law was therefore public 
international law. The principle of non-justiciability did not prevent a court from 
looking at the constitutive treaty where it was a part of the foreign municipal law under 
consideration, in order to assist in establishing the nature of the organisation. However
115 per Bingham LJ [1990] 2 All ER 782. The other judges who took the private international law 
approach, also noted this argument but did not provide convincing solutions to it - see per Lord 
Templeman [1991] 1 All ER 871 at p.877 and 881; also Hoffmann J. [1990] 1 All ER 6685 at p.692.
116 Westland Helicopters v. AOI [1995] 2 All ER 387. Westland had been through extensive arbitration 
proceedings in a dispute with an international organisation, the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation
(AOI). After eventually obtaining an award in its favour, and successfully enforcing it in part against 
AOI assets in New York, Westland applied for garnishee orders in respect o f various deposits held in the 
name of the AOI in six banks with offices in London. However the AOI had ceased to exist and an 
organisation established under Egyptian law, the EAOI, claimed that it was a continuation of the AOI 
and sought to intervene in the garnishee proceedings, on the basis that the bank accounts belonged to it, 
and seeking that the arbitral award be set aside. The EAOI claimed inter alia that in English law an 
international organisation was subject to the national law o f the State in which it had its seat by analogy 
with the conflicts rule concerning foreign corporations, in this case Egyptian law, and cited Lord 
Templeman's speech in the AMF case as authority.
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the question of whether or not there has been any breach of that treaty would be non-
117justiciable in the English courts.
Though this issue has taken considerable working through in the English courts, it does 
not appear to have caused similar problems elsewhere. In the United States the 
International Organisations Immunities Act only allows Executive Orders providing 
for the status, privileges and immunities of international organisations, to be made in
11 o
relation to organisations of which the US is a member. Preuss states that the general 
practice of the US before the passage of the International Organisations Immunities 
Act was to recognise the legal capacity of international organisations including those 
of which the US was not a party (eg the League of Nations) but to deny them 
privileges and immunities.119 As the Act does not apply to organisations of which the 
US is not party, its enactment would not affect practice in relation to them. However 
where the issue has arisen before the US courts their attitude is not entirely easy to
170elicit as none of die judgments address the issue squarely.
1.7 ibidatp.412
1.8 Note that the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was amended in 1987 to enable the Executive to 
extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Mission of the European Communities and its 
members. However no mention o f the status of the EC in US law is mentioned.
119 See L. Preuss “The International Organisations Immunities Act” (1946) 40 AJIL 332, at p.333.
120 In International Association o f  Machinists v. OPEC 477 ((1981) F. Supp553, CA (9th Cir.) 649 F2d 
1354), the issue was avoided as OPEC was found to be immune from service. Similarly in Rios v. 
Marshall the British West Indies Central Labour Organisation moved for and was granted dismissal on 
the basis o f immunity. In Steinberg v. Interpol ((1981) CA 672 F2d 927) (the defendant organisation 
being one of which the US was a member, though not one which was the subject of an Executive Order 
as to status privileges and immunities) the Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) treated Interpol as if  it were 
capable of being a defendant in legal proceedings and ordered it to answer the proceedings. Dellapenna 
concludes that the issue is one of recognition, where the US is not a member o f the organisation, that 
organisation will not be considered as having status in US law, whereas where the US has recognised the 
organisation in some way, for example by joining it as a member State, the US courts will treat it as 
having capacity to sue and be sued (see Suing Foreign Governments and their Corporations (BNA, 
Washington, 1988) at p.25-29). It is submitted that the cases he cites are insufficient evidence for this 
conclusion, in none of them is recognition mentioned by the courts as an issue.
In any event since Dellapenna wrote there has been a further case which arose in relation to the 
International Tin Council litigation (ITC v. Amalgamet Inc., 8 0 ILR 30). The ITC brought a suit in the
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The paucity of caselaw on the point outside the UK suggests that in general few
191problems have arisen in this respect. However where such questions arise the 
approach of Dutch law is instructive. Muller shows how the Dutch courts have been 
willing to refer to customary international law in establishing the legal status of
199international organisations, and cites the advice given by the Legal Advisers of the 
Foreign Ministry to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in relation to an international non­
governmental organisation:
“if an international organisation operating independently in a legal capacity ... 
appears before the courts to answer for its actions or omissions, it is 
undesirable to deem the organisation incompetent to put forward a defence at 
law on grounds of its not possessing legal personality.”123
Practice suggests therefore that separate personality of an international organisation 
should generally be acknowledged whether the fomm State is a member or not, though
New York courts to seeking a order to stay arbitration proceedings brought by creditor, on the basis of 
the its immunity by virtue of its "sovereign status". The Supreme Court o f New York County held that 
the ITC had no immunity in US law, and even if it had such immunity had been waived. However the 
Court did not doubt that the Council was a legal person for the purposes of bringing proceedings.
121 In the French case of CEDAO c. BCCI, the claimant organisation that it had objective international 
personality and therefore also immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts o f non-member States. The 
French court rejected the claim to immunity but made no comment on the question of personality in the 
courts o f non-member States. However the fact that CEDAO (in English ECOWAS) was able to make 
the claim at all suggests that the court recognised that it had the capacity to bring proceedings in France.
Malaysian law appears to take a similar attitude to that shown by the New York Supreme Court in ITC v. 
Amalgamet (see note 123 supra). In Bank Bumiputara Malaysia Bhd v. International Tin Council, 80 
ILR 24, (though this is a case involving an international organisation of which Malaysia was in a fact a 
member) the Malaysian High Court found that the immunity enjoyed by the ITC in the UK courts did 
not affect its position in Malaysia. There Court found without difficulty that the ITC could be joined as a 
party to the Malay proceedings.
122 UNRRA v. Daan ( ILR 337) in which UNRRA sought recovery of an overpayment to an official, who 
sought to defend the action on the basis that the organisation was not a person in Dutch law, which he 
claimed recognised associations of individuals, but not associations of States. The Supreme court 
rejected this argument apparently on the basis of its personality as constituted in international law. See 
also Spaans v. Iran-US Claims Tribunal, [1987] Neths YBIL 357 which found that an international 
organisation had the benefit of immunity defences by virtue o f "unwritten international law". In this 
respect see also the Belgian case of the UN v. B (Brussels tribunal civil; Pasicrisie beige 1953 pt 3 at 
p.66) where, on the basis o f facts similar to the Daan case, a similar decision was reached.
123 A.S.Muller op.cit note 90 supra at p. 115.
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there may be differences of approach in different national legal systems as to the 
means by which this achieved.
3. Capacities attendant on legal personality
As has been shown practice suggests that international organisations will require the 
municipal legal capacities to contract, to hold and dispose of movable and immovable 
property and to participate in legal proceedings. It is also important to note that such 
capacities can be enjoyed by entities which have less than full international 
personality. Practice of subsidiary bodies of the UN, which do not have full 
international personality in their own right, may still enjoy the capacity to contract124 
and to hold property125. When it comes to their position in legal proceedings, they are 
able to protect their rights in relation to such transactions by the commencement of 
legal proceedings, to the extent to which this is authorised by the Secretary-General of 
the UN. However in relation to claims made against them, they will usually claim 
the jurisdictional immunities of the United Nations under the General Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. As Morgenstem points out the appears here
1 onto be an element of these bodies “having their cake and eating it too”. Nevertheless 
this probably explained by practical considerations. For instance it must make practical
124 see Memorandum of the Office of Legal affairs o f 24 March 1969, reproduced in the UN Secretariat's 
study to the ILC, "The Practice of the United Nations, the specialised agencies and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency concerning their status, privileges and immunities", 1985 YBLIC Vol.II pt.l, 
145, at p. 152. See also the express grants o f contractual capacity contained in the Regulations of various 
UN peacekeeping forces including UNEF, UNFICYP, .see Higgins UN Peacekeeping 1946-67, 
Documents and Commentary Vol.s I-IV (OUP, Oxford, 1969-1981) esp Vol. 1 pp. 374-81, and Vol IV,
pp. 211-220.
125 See “Legal Opinion of the Secretariat o f the UN on the Legal Status o f the UNDP - the Question 
whether the UNDP has the Capacity to Acquire Real Property” 1990 UNJY at p.276-7, which concludes 
that the UNDP had the capacity to acquire real property, though the reasoning is somewhat elliptical.
126 See for example “Legal Opinion of the Secretariat o f the UN on the Authority o f UNEP to take direct 
legal action against private entities of States Members of the UN” 1995 UNJY at p.411
127 Morgemstem op.cit note 43 supra at p.25
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sense that some activities of the subsidiary organs have to be devolved to them without 
direct reference to the central Secretariat. Whereas the conduct of litigation will 
usually require the assistance or advice of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and thus 
commencement of proceedings should only be dome after proper consultation with 
OLA.128
(a) The capacity to contract
The capacity to contract is clearly essential for international organisations in order to 
carry on their daily existence, and it appears not to have caused major problems in 
practice for the majority of organisations. In practice the question of an international 
organisation’s capacity to contract appears to have given rise to few problems in
19Qitself. However it must be borne in mind that the capacity of an international 
organisation, even when recognised in municipal law of a State, does not imply the 
application of the law of that State to the contracts of the organisation. In its 
contractual practice, for example, the United Nations and many of its specialised 
agencies will generally prefer not to specify a national system of law as governing their 
contracts, but opt instead for general principles of law.130 Further, in addition to the 
presence in most cases of jurisdictional immunities, such contracts will usually contain 
an arbitration clause. It is thereby intended that the connecting factors between the 
contract and the local legal system should be cut, in relation to both choice of law and
128 o p cit note 126 supra
129 See the UN Secretariat's study to the ILC, "The Practice of the United Nations, the specialised 
agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning their status, privileges and 
immunities", [1985] Vol.II pt.l YBILC 145 at pp. 152-160 and 182-4.
130 ibid. at pp. 153-4.
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jurisdiction.131 In the UN Headquarters Agreement with the US, there is provision that 
the federal, State and local law of the US shall apply in the headquarters district,
1 37except to the extent that the agreement provides otherwise. However this has never 
been interpreted by the organisation as imposing local law on its contracts. The reason 
given for this is that as the Organisation contracts in a number of different countries as 
well as from Headquarters, and the result would be that some of its contracts were 
governed by general principles, whereas those made at Headquarters would be 
governed by US or New York law. It is said that the possible resulting difficulties or 
confusion would not be consonant with the proper and efficient functioning of the
• * 133Organisation.
In relation to contracts of employment there is a growing body of international 
administrative law134 which often governs these relationships, and to which specialised 
international procedures apply. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the existence 
of a system of international administrative law coupled with their jurisdictional 
immunities, results in many international organisations enjoying a complete 
independence from any system of municipal law, in respect of their employment 
relations.
131 This underlined further by those who hold that arbitrations arising out of such contracts should not be 
subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the local courts. See the award of Battiffol quoted at [1985] 
YBILC Vol.II ptl 157, and the Swiss case Groupement d ’entreprisesFougerolle v. CERN(1992) 102 
ILR 209: for further discussion, see chapter 4 below.
132 Art/Ill, section 7 (b) see UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.B/10 at p.204
133 See “The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialised Agencies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency concerning their Status, Privileges and Immunities” [1985] Vol.II ptl YBILC 145, at 
p. 153
134 See Amerasinghe The Law o f  the International Civil Service (2nd ed. 1994). To speak generally of an 
international administrative law, should not obscure the nature of that body of law. The relationship of 
each organisation with its employees will in most cases be governed by its own internal law. The sources 
of the internal law of an organisation are not formally recorded, but include Staff Regulations and Staff 
Rules, Statutes of tribunals and constitutive instruments, decisions of tribunals and courts.
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(ii) The capacity to own property
The capacity to acquire and dispose of property both movable and immovable, is 
obviously a capacity which international organisations, are likely to require in any 
State in which they wish to cany out any operations. Thus for example, the UN owns 
the headquarters site it was given by John D. Rockerfeller, Jr, and the City of New
ITSYork, and its capacity to own property is recognised both in federal and State law.
1Whereas in Geneva under the Ariana Site Agreement, the UN has an exclusive right 
of user {servitude personelle) over the site (including the right to build), property in the 
soil however remains in the ownership of the Canton of Geneva.
• • • 1T7Though capacity to acquire and dispose of immovable property is seldom denied, a 
number of organisations have not availed themselves of it, entering instead into 
agreements with a host State for use of property owned by that State. The very 
beneficial terms of these arrangements for the organisations appear to make this a more 
attractive option than, albeit potentially less secure and more dependent position than if
ITSit were the owner of property in its own name.
135 See 22 USC 288a Executive Order No. 8698, and McKinneys Laws o f  New York, Bk 56 para 59 (1) 
and (j).
136 11 UNTS 11
137 Mexico has entered a reservation to the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN, in accordance with Art. 27(1) of its Constitution which limits the rights o f foreigners to own 
property - though interestingly foreign States may with permission of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
own property for the direct service of their embassies or legations. Mexico is not a party to the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies, and it is reported to have 
declined to permit UNESCO to purchase premises for a regional basic education centre on Mexican 
territory (see [1967] YBILC Vol.II, 154, at p. 301 para. 9).
138 See for example the terms of FAO-Italy Host Agreement (including a rent of $1 p.a.); also the 
UNIDO-Austria Agreement for which the rent is 1 Schilling p.a -  see 1967 UNJY 144 and 1986 UNJY 
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As Jenks139 points out, for those organisations which have either acquired freehold or 
leasehold titles in property, in common with the widely accepted principle of private 
international law, the law applicable to such immovable property is the lex situs. To 
insist otherwise would be a derogation from the sovereignty of the territorial State.140 
The property rights of international organisations are therefore generally created under 
local law and thus are often subject to necessary formalities such as registration of title, 
though such acquisitions may well be exempt from land registry fees, stamp duty and 
other dues.141 However as will be shown below, the privileges and immunities of 
international organisations may put them in a different position to that of other 
landowners, in case of dispute or litigation.142
For those organisations which rely on rights of user over land owned by the host State 
rather than outright ownership, their respective HQ Agreements will usually provide
139 See Jenks The Proper Law o f  International Organisations (1962) at p. 135
140 A number of authors (including Cahier op cit note 8 supra pp.207-211, and Jenks The 
Headquarters ofInternational Institutions: a study o f  their location and status (RILA, London, 1945)) 
have considered the establishment o f an international district, in which all o f the universal organisations 
might have their headquarters, rather along the same lines as the District of Columbia in the US, there is 
no sign that this is even a possibility in the immediate future.
However it is worth noting that in this respect there have been certain property rights created in 
international law. Jenks shows how the ILO has certain rights o f user o f the Palais des Nations stemming 
from its establishment alongside the League, and the subsequent agreements for the dissolution of the 
League and redistribution o f its property. He also notes that the lease which the UN granted to the WMO 
in 1950, prior to its conclusion of a headquarters agreement with Switzerland and the Canton of Geneva 
in 1960, appears to have been governed by international law (see Chapter 12 of The Proper Law o f  
International Organisations(Stevens London, 1962)
141 see 1967 YBILC Vol .II at p.301 at paral3
142 See Procureur General o f  the Court o f  Cassation v. Syndicate o f  the Co-owners o f  the Alfred 
Dehodencq Property Co., 21 ILR 279, where a neighbouring land owner was unable to bring a claim 
against the OECD in relation to an infringement of an easement it enjoyed in respect of the 
Organisation's land,. However c f the case INPDAI v. FAO (87 ILR l)where the landlord o f premises 
leased by the FAO was allowed to bring proceedings to have a rent set by the Italian Court, on the basis 
that the lease was in the nature of act jure gestionis ( for comment on this case see Chapter 4 infra).
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for the settlement of any disputes by arbitration, and may even specify that it should be 
interpreted at least secondarily in the light of the general principles of law.143
(iii) The Capacity to participate in legal proceedings
The capacity of international organisations to participate in legal proceedings before 
municipal courts has been considered above. In general international organisations are 
more likely to participate in proceedings, which they have brought, rather than 
proceedings they defend. The reason for this is of course that often international 
organisations are able to raise defences based on their privileges and immunities 
(though even here if such privileges and immunities are limited, or if  they are waived, 
then the question of capacity must clearly be addressed before an action can proceed).
It appears that municipal courts have not had difficulties in practice in the recognition 
of the UN or its specialised agencies to bring proceedings. In many matters the UN has 
preferred to use arbitration rather than the local courts,144 but nonetheless there have 
been a number of occasions on which both it and its specialised agencies have 
instituted proceedings in municipal courts.145 However in relation to the organisations 
of which the forum State is not a party, it has been suggested that national courts may 
require some form of recognition by their own government before they can be a party
143 See Jenks op.cit. .note 139 supra at pp. 140-4
144 see above concerning the contractual practice o f inclusion of arbitration clauses.
145 UNRRA v. Daan, 16 ILR 337; UN v. B 19 ILR 490; UNv. Canada Asiatic Lines 26 ILR 622; Balfour 
Guthrie and Co v. US 17 ILR 323; IBRD and IMF v. All America Cables and Radio Inc. and others, in 
the Matter of, 22 ILR 705; WHO and Verstuyft v. Aquino and other 52 ILR 389; IRO v. Rep. SS Corp. 
189 F2d 858.
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to litigation,146 however there is no formal practice of recognition equivalent to 
recognition of States, and no case can be found which has raised this as an issue.
Where an international organisation commences proceedings in municipal courts, it is 
prima facie subject to the same procedural law as any other litigant147. Basing himself 
on authorities relating to State immunity, Jenks suggests, that where an international 
organisation commences an action before municipal court, it will no longer be able to 
raise an immunity defence in relation to a counter-claim or set-off which relates to the 
same transaction as the organisation's claim148. Nevertheless rules on disclosure or 
discovery of evidence may have to amended in the light of the inviolability of the 
archives of international organisations, 149and/or the immunities of the officials of the 
organisation when giving evidence to the court.150
International organisations do not exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of their 
headquarters sites. Even the UN which has a power under section 8 of its Headquarters
146 See above as to the position in the UK. In the USA the decision in Amalgamet v. ITC (80 ILR 30) has 
been considered, though the US Restatement o f  Foreign Relations Law (Third) is more cautious 
suggesting that the US takes the position that it is not obliged to recognise small or regional 
organisations in which does not participate, but may well do so (see para 223 Reporter's Note 4); 
however no authority is cited for this proposition.
147 See UNKRA v. Glass Production Methods, 23 ILR 515 The UN was found to be subject to same 
venue requirements in establishing the jurisdiction of the federal courts as any other litigant (including 
the US government).
148 Jenks op cit note 139 supra at p.230
149 Maclaine Watson v. ITC (No. 2) 11 ILR 160 and 80 ILR 211; also Shearson Lehman v. Maclaine 
JFatson 77 ILR 107
150 Keeney v. US 218 F 2d 843
59
Agreement151 to make regulations, has not done so, instead relying on the local police,
1S7prosecution and courts.
Conclusions
To summarise, it is clear that as the degree of institutionalisation of co-operation 
between States developed for the achievement of certain functions in their common 
interest, it became increasingly necessary to recognize that activities undertaken in 
pursuance of those functions are not simply an aggregate of identical acts by each of 
the individual member States. Rather they are acts of the collectivity of the 
membership as a whole. In legal terms international organisations have developed a 
capacity to act in their own names, in accordance with the international tasks 
entrusted to them and the structures formulated for this purpose in their constituent 
instruments. Thus they enjoy personality in international law, which is in turn 
reflected in national law. Indeed it is difficult to see how as a matter of practical 
necessity, such capacity could be denied.
The separateness of international organisations from their member States, as serving 
an international interest as opposed to the national interest, suggests therefore that 
they enjoy a degree of institutional autonomy from the individual member States. 
The organisation and its employees must be neutral, in that they serve the 
international interest rather than the interests of any one of their member States.
151 This provision which gives primacy to UN regulations over local law would presumably give a 
defence to persons accused o f criminal offences when acting in accordance with these regulations.
152 see People v. Carcel, Mag.s Court (150 NYS 2d 436), and Court of Appeals (165 NYS 2d 113); see 
also People v. Coumatos 224 NYS 2d 507
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However it is necessary to emphasise that this degree of autonomy of international 
organizations is of a quite a different nature from the sovereignty of States.
Whilst international organizations the international personality of international 
organisations may mean that the have the necessary legal capacities to undertake 
activities in their own names, they are only entitled to exercise such capacities in 
accordance with the powers or competences with which their member States have 
endowed them. These competences and their limits are established by the constituent 
instrument of each international organisation.
61
CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE JURISDICTIONAL 
IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Introduction
There are a number of regimes of immunity under international law including those 
relating to foreign States, foreign Heads of State, diplomats, consuls, members of 
special missions and visiting foreign forces as well as international organisations and 
their officials, all of which require some degree of derogation from the jurisdiction of 
States over their territory.1 The otherwise plenary powers of States over persons, 
property and events within their territory, to make and enforce law, is thus limited by 
international law in relation to these categories of persons. Furthermore the 
immunities of officials of international officials may derogate from State jurisdiction 
exercised on the basis of nationality. Therefore as exceptions to the firmly 
established rules of jurisdiction based on territoriality2 or nationality,3 immunities 
must be broadly accepted and clear in their scope if they are to be effective.
The immunities of international organisations have their own distinctive basis, 
derived primarily from treaty law.4 Such treaty provisions may appear in the 
constitutive instrument of the organisation, and/or a further treaty between the
1 For a broad, if  now somewhat dated, introduction to, and some comparisons of, these various 
regimes o f immunity, see K. Ahluwalia The Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities o f  the Specialized 
Agenices o f  the United Nations and Certain other International Organizations (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1964) esp pp 1-47
2 See The Lotus case 1927 PCIJ Rep. Ser.A No. 10
3 See for example the Harvard Research Draft convention on Jurisdiction with respect to Crime,
(1935) 29AJIL Supp. 443
4 Dominice suggests that they are wholly derived from treaty -  “La nature et l ’etendue d I’immunite 
de jurisdiction des organisations intemationales” in Bockstiegel et al. (ed.s) Festschrift furlgnaz  
Seidl-Hohenvledem (Carl Heymans, Cologne, 1988) 77-93, at p. 86. See also Zacklin “Diplomatic 
relations: status, privileges and immunities” Dupuy (ed) Handbbok on International Organizations 
(Martnus Nijhoff, Dodrecht, 1988) at p 181-3
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member States more specifically defining immunities and privileges and/or in the 
Headquarters Agreement between the organisation and its host State. At the level of 
positive law these treaty provisions are usually in themselves a sufficient explanation 
of the immunities of international organisations, and they will be examined in more 
detail in the next chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the underlying 
rationale of such provisions and, in the light of that, to examine various approaches 
to the question of their proper extent.
A. The Nature of Jurisdictional Immunities
Jurisdiction is a broad concept including both powers of prescription aspects (i.e. 
law- making) as well as powers of enforcement (by which law is given effect in 
particular circumstances).5 In democratic States all three branches of government, 
that is the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, are given separate 
responsibilities in these processes. The legislature is obviously primarily involved in 
the prescriptive process of legislation, whilst the executive role in relation to 
enforcement of the law is similarly clear. Characterising the role of the judiciary in 
terms of the international law of jurisdiction is more complex as it can be seen as 
involving elements of both prescription and enforcement. F.A.Mann includes the role 
of the judiciary as part of the broad jurisdiction to prescribe -  he uses the term 
regulatory jurisdiction.6 Clearly the role of the courts in common law systems can be 
seen in this light, but more generally courts in all legal systems have the power to 
determine authoritatively how the law applies to the parties to any given dispute.
5 The distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction has traditionally been drawn -  see 
for example O’Connell International Law  (Stevens, London, 1970) at p.602; also F.A Mann “The 
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law” (1964) 111 Rec. des Cours 9 and “The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law after Twenty Years” (1984) 186 Rec. des Cours 9
6 ibid. (1984) at p.21
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However it might also be observed that where the courts apply legislation, they 
usually describe their role as one of giving effect to the wishes of the legislature, 
which appears to be closer to an enforcement role. Interestingly the American 
Restatement o f  the Law on Foreign Relations (Third) adopts a third term -
O
“adjudicative jurisdiction” - to describe this mixed role of the courts. In other words 
the courts have an intermediary, but pivotal, role, in the application of the law, 
determining how the law affects a particular situation, and sanctioning the executive 
action necessary for it to be given effect. Without the possibility of the intervention 
of the courts laws may be of limited practical effect.
Immunities of many of the larger international organisations are often contained in 
treaty provisions which make broad reference to “immunity from jurisdiction”, or 
“immunity from every from of legal process”. In much of the writing on the subject, 
immunities are portrayed as procedural bars to the jurisdiction of national courts, 
rather than exemptions from substantive law. This might suggest that, substantively, 
local law remains the applicable law, but simply that the local court is the wrong 
forum to apply it. This is underlined by the fact that modem diplomatic law has 
sought to avoid the logical and practical problems which arose from the concept of 
“extraterritoriality”, relying increasingly instead upon functional explanations.9
7 Brownlie appears to take this view, characterising the well-known controversies relating to extra­
territorial jurisdiction in antitrust law in the US and the EC as primarily problems o f enforcement 
jurisdiction see Principles o f  Public International Law at pp.310-312. However it might be noted that 
he later suggests that “[there] is... no essential difference between the legal bases for and limits upon 
substantive (or legislative) jurisdiction, on the one hand, and, on the other, enforcement (or personal, 
or prerogative) jurisdiction. The one is the function of the other.” ibid. at p.313
8 See also Akehurst “Jurisdiction in International Law” (1972/3) XLVI BYIL 145, who writes o f 
“executive jurisdiction”, “judicial jurisdiction” and “legislative jurisdiction”
9 In relation to diplomatic relations see the preamble to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations which states that the purpose of immunities is “to ensure the efficient performance o f the 
functions of diplomatic functions of diplomatic missions as representing States” -  Denza suggest that
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Nevertheless in seeking to rationalise State immunity in international law, certain 
authors have suggested that many cases in which courts have referred to immunity 
are in fact better explained by a more fundamental lack of competence on their part. 
These authors suggest that what is in fact operating is not a simple procedural bar 
preventing the courts from exercising the adjudicative jurisdiction which they would 
otherwise enjoy, but rather that certain national laws, the application of which is the 
basis of the local courts’ jurisdiction, are not applicable to foreign States.10 It is 
therefore an incompetence ratione materiae, by which certain acts of foreign States 
fall outside the local legal system entirely, excepting them from all aspects of 
jurisdiction - prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement.
As will be considered in more depth later in this chapter, Reinisch has recently 
proposed the adoption of this approach in respect of international organisations.11 He 
suggests that where such exemptions from local law are established, they constitute a 
more rational approach in that they overcome the perceived unfairness of procedural
the lack o f reference to the extraterritoriality suggests that it may finally have been discredited 
(Diplomatic Law (2nd ed., OUP, Oxford 1998) at p. 12
Similarly it appears that in the few instances where extraterritoriality is mentioned in relation to 
international organisations (eg s.6 of the FAO-Italy HQ Agreement o f 1950 and s.7 o f the IAEA- 
Austria HQ Agreement of 1957 ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p. 187 and p.327 respectively), such references 
are now considered to be anachronistic, and to add little to the immunities and inviolability, which 
these organisations enjoy under other provisions -  see J-M Dufour “De l’extra territorialite a 
l’autonomie intemationale: a propos des relations de l ’organisation intergouvemementale avec 1’etat- 
hote” in Melanges Michel Virally (1991) 239 at pp.240-2
10 A number of authors have identified this lack o f competence in relation to State immunity, e.g. 
Niboyet “Immunite de jurisdiction et incompetence d’attribution” (1950) 39 RCDIP 139-58; 
Brownlie’s work on “Contemporary problems concerning the jurisdictional immunity of States” for 
the Institut de Droit International, Preliminary Report and Definitive Report (1987) 62-1 Ann ID I1-42 
and 45-98 respectively, Supplementary Report (1989) 63-1 Ann. IDI 13-28. Also Brownlie Principles 
o f  Public International Law (OUP, Oxford, 1998) at pp326-339. See too Schroer “De l’application de 
l’immunite juridictionelle des etats etrangers aux organistions intemationales” (1971) 75 RGDIP 712.
11 Reinisch International Organizations before National Courts (CUP, Cambridge, 2000) at p.369 f
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immunities under which local law is applicable but the courts are prevented from 
applying it. Certainly there are instances in which exemptions from substantive law 
are expressly required, as for example with fiscal immunities, though these are often
19the subject of specific treaty provisions. Further as will be shown in this and 
subsequent chapters, the international status of international organisations suggests 
that in respect of questions such as their internal governance and administration, as 
well as their external operations on the international plane, national law is 
inapplicable. Therefore in many cases running alongside the question of immunity as 
a procedural bar, there may also be deeper questions as to the competence of a 
national court to determine the issue in hand.
B. Rationalising the Immunities of International Organisations
As has been observed the question of jurisdictional immunity arises at the point 
where an international organisation comes into contact with a municipal legal
system, usually that of one of its member States. That contact may arise directly in
• •  1 ^the relationship between the organisation and the forum State, or as a result of the
relationship between the organisation and a third party, which, in some respect, is
claimed to be governed by the law of the forum State. In order to gain general
acceptance, a stable regime of immunities is therefore likely to have to accommodate
a broad range of interests, including those of the organisation, those of the forum
State and those of third parties who come into contact with the organisation. Whilst,
as will be shown, the balance struck in respect of different organisations may vary, in
12 See for example Muller “International Organizations and their Officials: to tax or not to tax?”
(1993) 6 Leiden JIL 47-72 See also the European Molecular Biology Laboratory v. Germany 
Arbitration (1990) 105 ILR 1
13 For example exemptions from taxation discussed in the EMBL Award, cit. note 12 supra.
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most cases a similar set of basic factors will have to be weighed against each other. It 
is thus necessary to start by setting out the parameters of the discussion.
1. The functional basis of the immunities of international organisations
(a) International status and functional necessity
International organisations often claim their immunities are necessary for the 
achievement of their functions in accordance with their international character. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the collective will of the member States creates an 
organisation and entrusts to it the achievement of certain functions. It is the 
achievement of those functions which is the overriding concern of all organisations 
and which both explains their existence and also the extent of their legal 
competences. As we have seen the organisation represents the collective will of the 
membership, distinct from its individual member States, and is recognised as 
enjoying its own international status in international law. Dufour describes this 
institutional autonomy as underlying jurisdictional immunities international 
organisations.14
International organisations are in a potentially vulnerable or dependent position, 
since, unlike States, they do not have their own territory or population. They can, 
therefore, only act on territory over which a State exercises jurisdiction, and through 
persons who are tied to States through the bonds of nationality.15 Immunity is a legal 
technique by which the proper accommodation of an international organisation is 
guaranteed within an international system which otherwise allocates jurisdiction to
14 op. cit note 9 supra esp. at pp.249-51
15 See for example the “amicus brief’ o f the UN in the case o f Broadbent v. OAS (1980) reproduced in 
1980 UNJY 227-238 at pp 229-30
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States primarily on the basis of territoriality and nationality. It is through such 
accommodation within the jurisdictional system that the genuinely international 
status of an international organisation can be guaranteed. Without immunity an 
organisation would potentially be vulnerable to interference by the authorities of any 
State in which it operated, or even any State whose nationals were in its employment.
This vulnerability of international organisations certainly explains the importance 
and sensitivity for them of questions of immunity. However it would be wrong to 
suppose that the proper maintenance of immunities is solely a concern of 
international organisations themselves, since it is also important to their member 
States for reasons of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity lies at the heart of other 
regimes of immunity involving direct relations between States. For example 
diplomatic immunities can be defined and guaranteed, at least in part, because every 
receiving State has an incentive to ensure appropriate treatment of foreign diplomats, 
in that it will expect similar treatment for the diplomatic representatives whom it 
sends to other States. 16 Clearly the same rationale cannot be directly applied to the 
immunities of international organisations, since international organisations are much
* * * 17more limited subjects of international law than States.
16 E.g. diplomatic relations - see Denza op cit note 9 supra at p.2 and thereafter specific references to 
reciprocal treatment are made throughout her commentaries on many particular provisions of the 
Vienna Convention, as for example in relation to aspects o f the establishment of missions, tax and 
customs treatment.
17 Jenks note three respects in which the immunities o f international officials differ from those of 
diplomats: (i) international officials can oppose their immunities to their own State of nationality 
(though in the light of Art 38 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, this may be of 
lesser significance than Jenks considered when he was writing); (ii) the diplomatic agent though 
immune from the jurisdiction of the receiving State, is not immune from the jurisdiction o f the 
sending State, for which very often there will be no equivalent in the case o f international officials; 
and (iii) the effective sanctions which secure diplomatic immunities are reciprocity and the danger of 
retaliation by the aggrieved State, and international organisations do not have similar protection - see 
International Immunities (Stevens, London, 1961) Introduction at p.xxxvii and also at pp. 40-41
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However, it is submitted that reciprocity, albeit in a more tempered form, is 
nevertheless important in understanding the immunities of international organisations 
-  namely that there is a mutual interest of all member States in the maintenance of 
immunities. At the heart of each international organisation is a constitutive 
agreement made between the member States, setting out (i) the goals/functions of 
their cooperative enterprise, (ii) the structures and processes of the international 
organisation by which those goals/functions are to be achieved, and (iii) the 
distribution of the associated costs and benefits of the enterprise. As such the 
agreement establishes an equilibrium of the rights and duties of each member vis a 
vis the organisation and vis a vis the other member States. In agreeing to the 
immunity of an organisation each State undertakes not to seek any undue influence 
or obtain any undue benefit from the organisation, by refraining from the exercise of
1 ftjurisdiction over it. A violation of this undertaking is therefore not only a violation 
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda (to the extent it involves a breach of treaty), 
but also, as an infringement of the jurisdictional rules which reserve a genuinely 
independent place for the organisation, it is analogous to an exorbitant jurisdiction. It 
might thus be portrayed as a violation of the principle of sovereign equality of States 
operating between the members.19
18 A concrete example of this is relation to the fiscal immunities o f international organisations. In its 
arbitration with it host State Germany, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory claimed that to 
subject certain o f its activities to local VAT regulations, would infringe the principle that no single 
State should derive undue benefit from “common funds”, i.e. those of the organisation. However the 
arbitration tribunal declined to base its findings on this principle, and simply applied the relevant 
treaty provisions -  cit. note 12 supra.
19 Schermers and Blokker find that the principle o f sovereign equality o f States explains much of the 
institutional law o f international organisations International Institutional Law (Martnius Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1995) §1895. It might further be noted the importance o f the principles of sovereign equality 
and the fulfillment of the rights and duties of membership in good faith appear as the first principles 
of the UN mentioned in Art 2 of the UN Charter.
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The primary explanation of the immunities of international organisations is thus as a 
guarantee of the international status that they require in order to fulfil their functions. 
In following this through into the practical sphere two further factors appear as 
offshoots of this rationale.
(b) Ensuring institutional efficiency
It is sometimes said that international organisations require immunity because 
otherwise, given their international vocation, there may be a possibility of an 
organisation being subject to the jurisdiction of any State in which it is in any way
• 50 •operational. There may thus be a large number of States m whose courts 
proceedings would have to be defended separately, calling for the retention o f a full 
range of expert local lawyers resulting in expense, duplication of tasks and
51inefficiencies. Further, requiring an organisation to seek settlement of its disputes 
in a wide variety national legal systems would be likely to lead to varying and 
inconsistent results and leading to the organisation having to adopt different policies 
and practices, according to the different States in which it was operational. This 
might lead to the organisation being faced with invidious choices as to where and 
how it conducts its operations, and, in any event, would be likely to involve 
increased expenditure to the organisation.
It has therefore been argued that immunity from the local courts enables consensual 
solutions to be reached, with the possibility, if that fails, of international arbitration
20 See for example Lalive “L’immunite de jurisiction des etats et des organisations intemationales” 
(1953) 84 Rec. des Cours 205 at p 299.
21 See Jenks International Immunities (Stevens, London, 1961) at p.41; also the views of the UN 
Secretariat 1985 YBILC vol II Pt 1 at p. 153
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99under a more suitable body of law, for example general principles of law. Immunity 
is therefore further justified on the basis of organisational efficiencies, saving on 
common resources, which can thus be devoted to the achievement of the common 
goods/functions for which the organisation was established.
On the other hand it might be objected that this is not truly an argument of principle, 
but one of pragmatism. Any person or organisation involved in cross-border 
activities is faced with similar problems but few are offered the solution of
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immunity. In any event arguments of efficiency will be shown to cut both ways 
(see below security of transactions).
(c) Equity and equality within the organisation
A related argument is that as a body created by virtue of the collective will of the 
member States, an international organisation must itself show even-handedness in its 
relations with its various members States. It might be argued that without immunity 
this would be made considerably more difficult, since the most obvious way to 
achieve uniformity of treatment would be to operate under a single legal regime.24 A 
clear example relates to the refusal of some States to recognise the fiscal or other 
immunities of members of staff of an international organisation of their own
22 See 1996, UNJY 453-4. For a further statement of the approach o f the UN to issues o f applicable 
and dispute settlement in its contractual practice, see 1985 YBILC Vol.II Pt.l.at p. 152-60. This 
statement was a contribution to the survey o f the general topic by Valticos “Les contrats conclus par 
les organisations intemationales avec des personnes privees”, for his Reports see 1977 An IDI 1. and 
132.
23 In this respect it might be noted that primary amongst the techniques for de-localising disputes in 
relation to international trade or investment are also the choice of a system o f law other than a pure 
national system of law to govern contracts and the choice o f international arbitration for the settlement 
of disputes -  for a detailed examination see Delaume (Stewart ed.) Transnational Contracts (Oceana, 
Dobbs Ferry New York 1998)
24 See the of Mendaro v. IBRD, (1983 US Court o f Appeal (DC Circ) in which the Court noted the 
necessity of consistency in the Bank’s internal management and employment relations, given that it 
had missions in 36 States and was active in some way or another in 140 States: 9 9 ILR 92 at pp.97-98 
and 100.
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nationality. Thus, for example, the insistence of the US to subject US employees of 
the United Nations employed in the territory of the US to income tax resulted in the 
introduction of a system of a staff assessment for all employees to ensure that equity
1f%was maintained amongst the Organisation’s employees as a whole.
2. Countervailing pressures favouring the assertion of local jurisdiction
The immunities of an international organisation and its officials represent a 
considerable derogation from the sovereignty of a State over its territory or nationals, 
and will be particularly onerous for States in whose territory the headquarters or 
some significant level of activity of an international organisation is situated. This
derogation from national jurisdiction therefore has sometimes been seen as contrary
11to the values promoted by the national legal system.
(a) Maintenance of the rule of law
Perhaps the chief value embodied in any developed national legal system is the 
maintenance of the rule of law. The rule of law is admittedly a nebulous concept,28 
but it certainly includes the notion that the making of governmental decisions must 
be in accordance with law. Those exercising governmental power must be subject to
25 For further examples see Chapter 5 below.
26 See Schermers and Blokker op. cit. note 20 supra, at §§1070-1072
27 For a striking example see the language adopted by the Judge in the case o f Westchester County v. 
Ranallo( 1946) 13 ILR 168
28 The classic statement of the English common law tradition is by Dicey “it means in the first place, 
the absolute supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence o f arbitrary power... It means again 
equality before the law or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land 
administered by the ordinary courts; the ‘rule of law’ in sense excludes the idea of any exemption of 
officials or others from the duty o f obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the 
jurisdiction o f ordinary tribunals.” Introduction to the Study o f  the Law o f  the Constitution (10th ed, 
Macmillan London 1959) at pp202-3. Obviously his views have required refinement over the years as 
legal technique and greater understanding of other legal cultures have developed, nevertheless they 
stand in striking juxtaposition to the notion o f immunity discussed here.
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the law, since the law embodies the values of the local political community on whose 
behalf the government acts. Whilst substantive law of course differs between legal 
systems, a common link between them is the acknowledgment of the need to provide 
procedures by which government may be held accountable for its actions through 
law. In modem legal systems have therefore developed effective judicial 
protection of individuals against arbitrariness in Government decision-making.
However just as it is wrong to suppose that member States of international
organisations are somehow naturally antithetical to the immunities of international
organisations, so too it is wrong to consider international organisations as naturally
antithetical to the rule of law. Indeed as we have seen in the previous chapter,
international organisations have from their inception relied upon notions of
rational/legal authority for their legitimacy, in seeking to establish themselves vis a
vis a world made up of sovereign States. In the words of Arsanjani,
“Because [International Organisations] are created to promote public order, it 
would be perverse, even destructive to postulate a community expectation 
that [International Organisations] need not conform to the principles of public 
order.”30
(b) Human rights -  access to justice
Closely related to the establishment of the mle of law has been the development of
o I
the law of human rights. The emphasis here is obviously on fundamental
29 A Brewer-Carias Judicial review in a comparative perspective (CUP, Cambridge, 1989), see 
alsoCappeletti, M The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Clarendon, Oxford, 1989).
30 See M. Arsanjani “Claims Against International Organisations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes” 7 
Yale Journal o f World Public Order 131, at p. 134. See also the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Effect o f  
Awards 1954 ICJ Rep. 47 esp. at p.57
31 See for example the preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the central 
conception of the rule of law in the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights see for example 
Golder v. UK (1975) Ser A 18
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guarantees to the individual in relation to State activity. Of particular importance to 
the present inquiry into the question of jurisdictional immunities, is the individual 
right of access to fair and impartial tribunal for the determination of his or her rights 
and obligations, though other human rights questions might also arise. Whilst this 
is essentially a procedural right, its importance should not be underestimated for that 
reason. The centrality of the rights of due process to international human rights law is 
shown by the frequency with which these rights are raised in before the various 
international and regional human rights protections mechanisms.34 Indeed the 
development of the protection of human rights in international law has frequently 
focused upon the development of procedural protections of substantive rights.35
However in seeking to reconcile jurisdictional immunities with the individual right of 
access to a court, it is interesting to note that whilst international human rights law 
has led to more careful scrutiny of the regimes of jurisdictional immunity in 
international law, so far there has not been any international decision in which the 
right of access to a court has overridden such immunities, whether State immunity,36
i n  I Q
diplomatic immunity or the immunity of international organisations. The right of 
access to a court is not unlimited and provided that immunity is accompanied by
32 See Golder, cit. supra
33 See Singer “Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organisations: Human Rights and functional 
necessity concerns” (1995) VaJIL 53: also Wickremasinghe and Verdirame “Responsibility and 
Liability for Violations o f Human Rights in the Course UN Field Operations” in C.Scott (ed.) Torture 
as Tort (2001 Oxford, Hart), pp.465-489.
34 Thus for example Article 6 is the most litigated of all o f the rights contained in the ECHR.
35 In relation to the caselaw under the European Convention on Human Rights, see Gardner and 
Wickremasinghe “England and Wales and the European Convention” in Dickson (ed.) Human Rights 
and the European Convention (1997,Sweet and Maxwell, London) pp. 47-112
36 eg Al-Adsani v. UK, Fogarty v. UK  and McElhinney v.Ireland all decided 21 November 2001
37 N.,C, F„ and A.G. v Italy ((Appl. No. 24236/94) 4.12.95, 84 D&R 84
38 Beer and Regan v. Germany, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, both 18 February 1999
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appropriate safeguards, for example the avalability of alternative remedies for the 
claimant, it may be justified.
(c) Security of transactions
An economic analysis night also suggest thzt there are material advantages also to 
the maintenance of the rub of law, and perhaps also to the restriction of jurisdictional 
immunities. Under such analysis the establshment of legally binding rights and 
obligations, which can in the final resort be enforced, enables a complex fabric of 
social and economic relatons to be woven, t» the mutual advantage of all members 
of a society. The fact that each person may rely on the fulfilment by the others of 
their legal obligations, enables him or her to ise his/her resources more efficiently. If 
the jurisdictional immuniy of one party to a transaction were to mean that other 
parties might not be able t> rely on enforceabe legal rights and obligations then they 
might have to take other seps to insure themslves against risk, thus raising the costs
i n
of the transaction, and inefficiencies in the us< of resources. Thus the availability of 
a reliable and cost-effective jurisdiction fa the effective resolution of disputes 
should have important ecmomic benefits for all parties to a transaction and, in the 
case of international organisations, should result in more efficient use of public 
resources.
(d) National security
A fundamental interest md, indeed, an ohigation of governments is to ensure 
national security. This wll inevitably involvr the exercise of both law-making and 
law enforcement powers. Thus a State mightview the operations of an international
39 C.Schreuer makes this argurrent in favour o f the restiction on State immunity -  See State 
Immunity: some recent developnents (Grotius, Cambriige 1988) at p. 125-6
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organisation on its territory but which are not subject to its jurisdiction, as potentially 
of concern in this respect. Since immunity from jurisdiction applies not only to the 
organisation itself, but also to its officials (in respect of their official acts) and to the 
representatives of its member States, it is perhaps unsurprising that many host States 
have sought to insert into the HQ Agreements to which they are party, provisions 
reserving the right to protect their national security interests.40 In fact Zoller finds 
that in the case of the UN Headquarters in New York, the right of the US to protect 
its national security derives both from its reservation to the Headquarters Agreement, 
and from the established practice of the Organisation 41 However she also finds that 
the scope of such a right is constrained by a “hard core of necessary privileges and 
immunities [of the UN] which are non-derogable” 42 Since in her a view a host State 
is unable to limit this hard core of necessary privileges and immunities on grounds of 
national security, it may ultimately be left only with the option of requiring the 
organisation to remove itself from national territory.
UN practice suggests that there have been a small number of controversies in which 
the US has sought to oppose its national security interests to decisions of the UN 43
40 See Art.25 o f the 1946 Agreement on the Juridical Status o f the ILO in Switzerland, 
(ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at pl38); Art.25 of the 1948 Agreement on the Juridical Status of the WHO in 
Switzerland, {ibid. at p.254); Art.24 of the 1948 Agreement on the Juridical Status of the WMO in 
Switzerland, {ibid. at p.309); s.31 of the 1953 agreement between ICAO and Egypt {ibid. at p. 170); 
s.30 of the 1949 Agreement between the WHO and India {ibid. at p.265); s.31 o f the 1951 Agreement 
between the WHO and Egypt {ibid. at p.265); s47 of the 1957 Agreement between the IAEA and 
Austria {ibid. at p.327); and s.32 o f the 1953 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the 
Arab League {ibid. at p.414).
41 E.Zoller, “The National Security o f the United States as the Host State for the United Nations” 
(1989) 1 Pace Yearbook o f International Law p. 127
42 ibid. at p. 160
43 See for example M.Reisman “ The Arafat Visa Affair: Exceeding the Bounds o f Host State 
Discretion” (1989) 83 AJIL519; also regarding the attempted closure o f the of the PLO observer 
mission to the UN see D.Rosenberg “Etats-Unis contre Nations Unies: 1’affaire de la mission 
d’observation de l’OLP a New York” (11988 Rev Beige DI 451-95; see also Advisory Opinion
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In the cases in which resolution was possible, it was usually achieved by the 
recognition by each party of the legitimate concerns of the other, and making the 
necessary mutual accommodations. Moreover many of the most direct threats to 
national security, have been from activities of members of the permanent missions of 
member States or international officials acting outside their official capacity, by for 
example taking part in espionage on behalf of their State of nationality. It is now well 
established that where a member of the UN staff takes part in such activities they are 
subject to local jurisdiction, since in general their immunities only extend to acts 
performed in their official capacity, of which clearly espionage is not one.44
C. Doctrinal Approaches to the Proper Extent of Immunity
In the light of these various factors which are likely to bear upon decisions 
concerning the immunities of international organisations, it is necessary to consider 
the general approaches to the extent of the immunities of international organisations 
which have been suggested by commentators. Historically the period of greatest 
growth in the numbers of international organisations established has been the period 
since the end of World War II (though in recent years some industrialised States 
have urged caution in the establishment of new organisations). Interestingly the same 
post-War period has seen a more general move towards rationalising other regimes 
of immunities in international law, to ensure that immunities are granted where they 
are strictly necessary in order to protect the proper discharge of governmental
concerning the Obligation to Arbitrate under s.21 o f  the UN HQ Agreement 1988 ICJ Rep. 12 and US 
v .P L O (  1988) 27 ILM 1055.
44 See below Chapter V
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functions. At the multilateral level the results of these efforts may be seen in the 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations and, less widely accepted, the 1969 UN Convention on Special 
Missions, in all of which immunities are granted to differing extents but are based the 
concept of functional necessity -  i.e. that immunities granted are those that are 
necessary to enable these officials to carry out their functions on the international 
plane.
During the same period and principally for similar reasons, a large number of States 
have adopted the restrictive doctrine of immunity in relation to foreign States, in 
preference to the absolute doctrine.45 Under this doctrine a foreign State enjoys 
immunity only in relation to its public acts {acta iure imperii) but not in relation to 
activities of a private law nature {acta iure gestionis). The category of acts iure 
imperii, typically concerns the organisation and governance of the political 
community that is the State, and the distribution of public goods and burdens within 
it. Such acts are immune from the courts of other States by virtue of the principles of 
independence and equality which underpin the international system of sovereign 
States 46 On the other hand in relation to acts iure gestionis a foreign State has no 
functional need for immunity, but rather in choosing to trade in the market-place it 
must be treated like any other trader 47
45 See for example the Australian Law Reform Commission Report no24 on Foreign State Immunity 
Law (1984) esp. pp.6-28
46 see for example the well known case o f The Schooner ‘Exchange' v. McFadden 7 Cranch 116 
(1812)
47 see for example the Judgment of Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank o f  
Nigeria [1977] QB 529, and o f the speech of Lord Wilberforce in I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 
244
78
It is against this background that many authors have sought to draw conclusions 
about the proper scope of the immunities of international organisations. In the legal 
literature that deals with the immunities of international organisations, there is 
widespread agreement on the functional basis of immunity but considerable debate as 
to the proper extent of that immunity. As to the latter three broad positions can be 
identified: (1) that international organisations should enjoy absolute immunity from 
local jurisdiction; or (2) that the restrictive doctrine of State immunity be applied to 
international organisations, and in particular the exception from immunity of 
commercial activities; or (3) that immunity be limited in some way by reference to 
the functional standard. A fourth more radical position that immunity should be 
progressively abandoned in favour of a limited number of substantive exemptions 
from national law, is examined at greater length in the following section.
1. Absolute immunity
The majority viewpoint is that the jurisdictional immunities of international 
organisations are absolute. Writers such Lalive,48 Cahier,49 Jenks,50 Dominice51 and
m ( t t (
Seidl-Hohenveldem have all sought to distinguish the position of international 
organisations from the position of States. They tend to point to treaty provisions
48 op cit note 20 supra at pp. 296-9
49 Etude des accords de siege conclus entre les organisations internationales et les etat ou elles 
resident (Giufffe, Milan, 1959) esp. pp.231-41
50 op cit note 21 supra at pp. 40-1
51 “L’immunite de jurisdiction et d’execution des organisations internationales” (1984) 187 Rec. des 
Cours 145 at pp 178-82; also “La nature et Petendue de Pimmunite de juridiction des organisations 
internationales” Bockstiegel et al. (ed.s) Festschriftfurlgnaz Seidl Hohenveldern (1988), 77- 93
51 Corporations in and under International Law (Grotius, Cambridge, 1987) at pp81-2; “Piercing the 
corporate veil o f international organizations: the International Tin Council case in the English Court 
of Appeals” (1989) 32 GYIL 43 at pp. 52-3; also “Failure o f controls in the Sixth International Tin 
Agreement”, Blokker and Muller (ed.s) Towrds More effective supervision by International 
Organizations 255 at pp.271-3
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providing that international organisations enjoy “immunity from every from of legal 
process”,53 and stress the comparative weakness of the position of international 
organisations which do not have their own territory or population.54 Thus for 
example, in contrast with a State the majority of whose activity is focussed within its 
own territory and therefore clearly subject to its own jurisdiction, practically all 
activities of international organisations take place on territory over which a State has 
jurisdiction. It is therefore argued that their need for wider immunities corresponds to 
the relative weakness of their position vis a vis States.55
Nevertheless the absolute immunity of international organisations is likely to be 
increasingly called into question, in the light of the general increase in legal scrutiny 
of the exercise of public authority whether through developments in public law at the 
national level or in human rights law at the international level.56 Further as the UN 
itself points out “the changing doctrine of State immunity will inevitably have an
57effect on the way national courts view the activities of international organisations.”
53 e.g. the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the UN, though it might be noted that the 
French text only requires “immunite de juridiction”.
54 The views of Seidl Hohenveldem might be excepted from this in that he considers that since 
international organisations enjoy only limited competences i.e. to their public international (iure 
imperii) functions, their private law acts are always closely linked to the achievement o f those iure 
imperii purposes that they usually enjoy absolute immunity see e.g. Corporations in and under 
International Law (Grotius, Cambridge, 1987) at pp. 81-2;
55 Perhaps unsurprisingly a number o f international organisations, including the UN, take a similar 
approach for example (1980) UNJY pp.227-242.
In parenthesis it might be observed that these arguments for that international organisations require 
absolute immunity are made in rather formal terms, which do not necessarily reflect the political 
realities of every conceivable situation. It may be, for example, that a large and powerful international 
organisation can exercise significant political or economic leverage over a small or impoverished 
State seeking the assistance o f the former. Nevertheless to rely simply on informal means of  
maintaining the international status of international organisations would clearly be unsatisfactory, and 
therefore some measure o f immunity is necessary.
56 Thus the European Court o f Human rights has suggested that any form of immunity for 
governmental authorities should be subjected to review for its conformity with Article 6 ECHR -  see 
Osman v. UK, 28 November 1998
57 See 1985 YBILC Vol.II pt 1 at pi 61
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It might also be argued that simple reliance on the letter of treaty provisions seems 
somewhat formalistic. This is especially so when compared to the extensive 
interpretation which international organisations themselves and the International 
Court of Justice58 have made in relation to their constituent instruments, so as to 
enable them effectively to meet the exigencies of new circumstances which they 
face.
Writers who maintain that the immunity of international organisations is absolute 
often emphasise that the immunity from local jurisdiction is not an immunity from 
justice.59 They point to the obligation of international organisations to provide 
suitable alternative procedures for the settlement of disputes, in cases in which they 
rely on their immunity from jurisdiction. However this is, at very least, an obligation 
on which practice remains largely unreported and possibly undeveloped.60 The usual 
alternative remedies are generally based on consent, with the danger that the one 
party or other may refuse to cooperate. If it is the international organisation which is 
in default, then its ability to assert immunity may cause further difficulty, as for 
example when an international organisation has sought to prevent the judicial 
supervision of the operation of an arbitration clause by asserting immunity.61
58 See for example the Advisory Opinions o f the ICJ in cases of: Reparation fo r  injuries 1949 ICJ 
Rep. 174; Status o f  South West Africa (1950 ICJ Rep.133; Effect o f  Awards (1954) ICJ Rep. 47; 
Certain Expenses 1962 ICJ Rep. 151.
59 c.f. Dominice op cit note 50 supra (1984) at p.157
60 A relatively recent study on the settlement of contractual disputes o f international organisations 
located only seven arbitral awards in the public domain -  see Glavinis Les litiges relatifs aux contrats 
passes entre organisations internationales etpersonnes privees (LGDJ, Paris 1990).
61 see eg Boulois v. UNESCO 1997 Rev. Arb. 575 and 1999 Rev. Arb. 343; see also Groupement 
d'entreprises Fougerolle v. CERN 102 ILR 209 discussed at greater in length in Chapter 4 below.
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2. Restrictive immunity
The second position, that the restrictive doctrine of State immunity should be 
adopted in relation to international organisations, is a minority view both amongst 
writers on the subject, as well as in State practice. It involves interpreting treaty 
provisions establishing immunity from jurisdiction as only applying in the case of 
acts iure imperii of international organisations. The question posed by those who 
take this position is whether it is any longer sustainable for international 
organisations to enjoy immunity in relation to their private or commercial activities, 
particularly in view of the increasing adoption of the restrictive doctrine of State 
immunity. For example Gaillard and Pingel-Lanuzza, whilst accepting that 
international organisations are entitled to jurisdictional immunity in order to protect 
their institutional autonomy, suggest that such immunity should not extend to their 
private law or commercial activities. These authors take the view that since States 
have accepted that foreign courts may assert jurisdiction over their own private law 
activities without infringing their independence or sovereignty, then national courts 
can similarly assert jurisdiction over the private law activities of international 
organisations without infringing their independence.64 They acknowledge that 
arguments that the vulnerability of international organisations required a more 
absolute form of immunity than States, might have had some validity when first 
raised in the 1950s and early 1960s, but they claim that now international
62 see Chapter 4 below at notes ... concerning in particular aspects o f the jurisprudence from the US 
and Italy (though as noted in that Chapter these can, to some extent, be explained by particularities in 
the reception o f the relevant international obligations into national law).
63 “International organisations and immunity from jurisdiction: to restrict or bypass” (2002) 51 ICLQ 
1 , however these writers whilst supporting the restriction o f the immunities o f international 
organisations are somewhat equivocal about the direct transposition o f the restrictive doctrine o f State 
immunity, claiming that practice on the point is “inconclusive” (at p.9).
64 ibid. at p. 5
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organisations are sufficiently well-established for this not to be a concern which 
should override other considerations.65
Ebenroth wholeheartedly embraces the application of the restrictive doctrine of State 
immunity to international organisations.66 He notes that if  the immunities of 
international organisations were very much more extensive than those of States, it 
could lead to an abuse of the “corporate” form, i.e. that States might be tempted to 
combine in an international organisations to carry out certain acts of an iure gestionis 
nature simply in order to benefit from the more extensive immunities offered to 
international organisations, than would be available to them acting individually. He 
does not cite any cases in which this has occurred, however he was writing in the 
light of the collapse of the International Tin Council.
A variation on these views is offered by Schroer who suggests that international 
organisations enjoy immunity from jurisdiction in customary international law for 
their acts iure imperii but not their acts iure gestionis. For him the advantage of 
such customary immunities is that they can therefore also be opposed to non-member 
States.69 Nevertheless he accepts that in parallel with customary immunities are the 
conventional immunities granted by the member States inter se, which are not
65 ibid. at p. 15
66 Ebenroth “Shareholders Liability in International Organisations -  The Settlement of the 
International Tin Council Case” (1991) 4 Leiden Journal o f International Law 171-83
67 On which see Chapter 1 supra text at note 100
68 See Schroer “De l’application de Timmunite juridictionelle des etats etrangers aux organisations 
internationales” (1971) RGDIP 712
69 ibid. at p. 717 and 739
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generally limited, and which have primacy over the customary immunities as the lex 
specialist
However it should be noted that the distinction between acts iure imperii and acts 
iure gestionis is not without its problems even in relation to State immunity. The 
practice of different national courts on the characterisation of acts varies widely, and, 
whilst recent work in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly suggests 
that the divergences may be narrowing, there is still not consensus on how take 
forward the draft articles of the International Law Commission on the jurisdictional 
immunities of States. Furthermore the aptness of the analogy between the position of 
States and international organisations may be questioned. We have already seen that 
there are important differences between States and international organisations, the 
latter having few of the characteristics of States, and in particular being entities of 
limited competence, without territory and population. In these circumstances it is 
debatable whether international organisation can truly be said to perform acts iure 
imperii. 71
3. Functional criteria for restricting immunity
The third position is that the immunities of international organisations can be 
restricted on the basis of functional criteria. In recent years, this view has been taken
79most notably by Bekker. He seeks to overcome the difficulties of the vagueness of
701bid. at p.741
71 On this point compare for example Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We 
Use It (1994), p.93 who is sceptical of the analogy, with Seidl-Hohenveldern who considers 
international organisations to perform predominantly acts iure imperii (note 54 supra). See also 
Schroer in whose opinion the distinction of acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis is relevant to 
customary immunities o f international organisations, op. cit. note 68 supra at p.715-717 and 724.
72 Bekker The Legal Position o f  Intergovernmental Organisations - a Functional Necessity Analysis 
o f  their Legal Status and Immunities (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994)
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the functional standard by suggesting that immunity should be limited to their
“official activities”. These are defined as
“activities carried out by an organisation in the course of the actual exercise 
of its function in fulfilment of its purposes and should be a normal 
consequence of the organisation’s functions and purposes to such an extent 
that they could be said to logically arise from its functions and purposes,
• 70rather than being merely ‘useful’ to the pursuit of the latter”.
He cites in particular an arbitral award, the European Molecular Biological
7dLaboratory Award in support, which applied such a characterisation to determine 
the extent of the fiscal immunities of the EMBL. However this Award can be 
distinguished from cases before a national court in which the extent of jurisdiction 
immunity would typically be at issue, on the grounds that: (a) it did not concern the 
extent of jurisdictional immunities, but rather fiscal immunities; (b) that the parties to 
the dispute were therefore the German Government and the EMBL, i.e. that it was a 
genuinely international dispute; and (c) an international tribunal, composed of 
distinguished international lawyers, was appointed to settle the dispute which 
involved making interpretations of the constituent instrument of the EMBL and its 
Headquarters Agreement on sensitive issues.75
7iibid. at p.235.
74 see 105 ILR 1
75 In this respect it might be noted that the UN cites, apparently with approval, the Belgian case of 
Manderlier v. the UN, (69 ILR 139) in which the plaintiff claimed that the UN jurisdictional immunity 
was not absolute but could be limited according to what could be shown to be necessary for the 
performance of its functions, in accordance with Article 105 o f the UN Charter. The Belgian court 
found that the jurisdictional immunity o f the UN under 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN, was not subject to any such restriction. It held that national courts would be 
exceeding their authority if  they were to arrogate to themselves the right to determine whether the 
immunities granted under the 1946 Convention were necessary or not. (see 1985 YBILC Vol.II pt 2 at
pp 161-2).
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Thus whilst this functional standard in broad terms may seem to be an appropriate 
basis on which to establish the limits of the immunities of international organisations,
it may be a difficult standard for national courts to apply as a limit to the extent of
• • * • • • • • » • • jurisdictional immunity in practice. It is a vague test and, given the sensitivities
involved, one which the national court may not feel well-placed to apply. Further it
seems to be based on the “purpose” of the act rather than its “nature”. It might be
recalled here that in a number of jurisdictions the so-called “purpose” test has largely
been rejected in favour of the “nature” test in characterising State acts for the
purpose of applying the restrictive doctrine of State immunity.77 In that context the
“purpose” test is considered to be essentially a subjective criterion, concerned with
the motivation of one of the parties, which would tend to undermine the restrictive
doctrine.78
Furthermore it has to be remembered that international organisations are, by their 
nature, entities whose competence is limited to the achievement of certain functions. 
Thus their functions can be said to inform all of their actions, albeit that for some 
acts the connection with the ultimate goals of the organisation may be more obvious 
than for others. The difficulty in Bekker’s formulation is therefore that in stressing 
only the relationship between the act and the functions of the organisation, he offers 
no objective criterion for distinguishing between them. His interpretation of the
76 Schroer suggests it is too uncertain a standard to provide any assistance in determining the extent of 
immunity -  op. cit. note 68 supra at p.739-40
77 see eg the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, 28 USC § 1603(d) which states that “[t]he 
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the ... act, rather 
than by reference to its purpose. In relation to the UK see the judgment of Lord Denning in Trendtex 
Trading Co. v. Central Bank o f  Nigeria [1977] QB 529. However it may noted that subsequently the 
UK courts have taken a rather broader view the context as a whole to determine the nature of the acts 
(e.g. Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, HL, [2000] 1 WLR 1573
78 see for example Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank o f  Nigeria [1977] QB 529.
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concept of functional necessity therefore stresses thus the “functional” aspect at the
70expense of the concept of “necessity”.
A final difficulty related to the question of deriving an objective functional standard 
in Bekker’s analysis is relation to whose characterisation of whether an act is official 
or not should be determinative in cases where this is disputed. For Bekker it is the 
views of the international organisation that should be determinative, for reasons of its 
closeness to and familiarity with the legal questions involved. However, in a case 
decided after Bekker’s publication, the International Court of Justice has found that 
in determining whether an international official or expert on mission was acting 
within the scope of his of her functions, though the views of the international 
organisation are likely to be highly persuasive in most cases, it is the views of the 
local jurisdiction which in the final analysis are determinative.80
D. An Individuated Response - ratione materiae?
Whilst important points are made on all sides of this debate, it is argued here that in 
fact many of the contributions are pitched at a very general a level, and this makes 
any attempt to reconcile them or even to choose between them on purely legal 
grounds problematic. Interestingly when contemplating the adoption of the restrictive 
doctrine of State immunity, which is still unevenly applied in national legal systems, 
a number of common law States sought to codify the law by adopting an
79 but for the difficulties o f a national court in this respect see Manderlier v. UN (1969, 69 ILR 139 ) 
and note 75 supra
80 see the Cumaraswamy case [1999] ICJ Rep. 62 at p.87 §61
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individuated approach specifying which activities they considered acts iure gestionis
Q1
so as to provide consistency of characterisation.
An approach which seeks to consider in greater depth the appropriateness of national 
jurisdiction over certain categories of acts of international organisations has been 
suggested by Reinisch. He supports a radical re-thinking of the immunities of 
international organisations so that (1) they should enjoy substantive exemptions from 
local law in relation to matters of their internal governance and administration. 
However beyond that he suggests that national law and jurisdiction should apply in 
the usual way. Thus he suggests that (2) such lack of substantive competence is 
likely operate where employment cases are brought in national courts84, but that in 
other respects the national court will be fully able to apply its private law, 
particularly in (3) contract, (4) tort and (5) property cases, or if necessary its rules of 
private international law.85
The five numbered points indicate the types of subject-matter in respect of which 
Reinisch makes his proposal for the delineation of competences between 
international organisations and national authorities. His is clearly a radical proposal 
and Reinisch makes it on the basis of de lege ferenda rather than as an explanation of 
the current law. Nevertheless it brings out some complex and interesting points about
81 See Crawford “International law and foreign sovereigns: distinguishing immune transactions”
(1983) LIV BYIL 75-118. For examples o f national legislation which follow this pattern see the UK 
State Immunity Act 1978 the Australian Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1984.
Subsequently the ILC has adopted a similar approach on its draft articles on the jurisdictional 
immunities of States and their Property 1991 YBILC vol.II.pt 2 p. 13
82 op.cit. note 11 supra esp. at pp.369-88 and 393
83 ibid. pp.377-82
84 ibid. pp.383-5
85 ibid. pp.386-
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the relationship of immunity and the application of national law. As such the 
remainder of this extended section will be devoted to a more detailed examination of 
the five points identified in the preceding paragraph.
1. Substantive exemption from national jurisdiction - the internal governance 
of international organisations
Whilst jurisdictional immunities properly so-called operate simply as a procedural 
bar to the jurisdiction of national courts, it has been noted that there may also be a 
more radical lack of competence on the part of the national authorities, to the effect 
that certain aspects or activities of international organisations fall outside the
or on
compass of national law. We might call this an incompetence ratione materiae. 
As has been observed this form of lack of competence may occur in some cases in 
parallel with procedural immunity from jurisdiction, but is distinguishable in that it 
asserts that, instead of national law, international law or the internal law of the 
international organisation in question governs the dispute, and therefore the national 
courts simply lack the competence to determine it.
It is clearly the case that in certain respects States may expressly agree to exempt 
international organisations from the application of national law by means of treaty 
provisions, for example exemptions from taxation and customs regulation are
go
frequently provided for in treaties setting out privileges and immunities. 
Additionally the body of national caselaw concerning international organisations
86 text at note 10 supra
87 See Dominice op. cit. note 51 supra, at p.83
88 See Muller “International organisations and their officials: to tax or not to tax?” (1993) 3 Leiden JIL 
47
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reveals that national courts have felt that, quite aside from the question of immunity, 
they are unable to adjudicate over certain disputes because they do not have 
competence to apply the appropriate substantive law, where an issue of the internal 
governance of an organisation is in dispute.89
The basis of the claims for these exemptions from the applicability of national law is 
usually claimed to be the international personality of the organisation in question.90 
Thus it is said that international organisations enjoying personality and being the 
subject of rights and duties in international law, should not be subjected in those 
respects to national law. In particular it is claimed that to subject an international 
organisation to the local law of its host State, would be effectively to “nationalise” its 
international character 91
89 a striking example being the case o f Westland Helicopters v. AOI [1995] 2 All ER 387
90 Colin and Sinkondo take a very broad view of personality suggesting that it is close to the 
sovereignty enjoyed by States, noting that international organisations are often able to exercise a form 
of territorial jurisdiction over their HQ districts - “Les relations contractuelles des organisations 
internationales avec les personnes privees” in [1992] Revue de droit international et de droit compare 
7 at pp. 10-14.
In relation to the argument based on the regulatory power o f for example the UN over its HQ District 
it should be noted that such provisions only appear in the HQ Agreements o f some of the larger 
international organisations only and cannot therefore be the basis of a generalised rule. Moreover 
where it does exist the UN for example has not generally exercised such power to make regulations to 
replace substantive local law -  an exercise of this power which came close, merely sought to set a 
limit to awards of damages against the UN for certain types o f tort actions - see Szasz “The UN 
legislates to limit its liability” (1987) 81 AJIL 739.
91 Jenks quotes Niboyet as saying
“Elies ont necessairement leur siege dans un pays, parce que c ’est une exigence de la vie terrestre, 
mais ce siege ne les nationalise pas et ne les astreint en rien a soumettre a la loi de ce pays, et cela a 
quelque point de vue que ce soit, a moins que les Etats qui ne les creent n’aient cru devoir en disposer 
autrement. Cette solution irait a l’encontre du but meme, celui de faire de ces personnes des 
organismes avant tout intemationaux”
- see The Proper Law o f  International Organisations (Stevens, London, 1962) at p. 134.The same 
passage is cited with similar approval by Valticos in his preliminary report to the Institut de Droit 
International on the subject o f contracts concluded by international organisations with private persons
-  op cit note 23 supra at p. 10
90
It certainly appears essential that the internal management and operation of an 
international organisation cannot, without its consent, be subject to the law of one of 
the member States. To allow national courts to act otherwise would be to infringe the
• •  •  * Q?international character of the orgamsation. As has been observed above, the 
international personality of international organisations implies a degree of autonomy 
in the sense of self-organisation, governing both internal aspects of the organisation 
and its relations with its member States. However claims that the application of 
international/internal law to relations of international organisations with private third 
persons, over whom the organisation can not assert jurisdiction,93 appear to be more 
questionable, and as Valticos points out must be balanced against the importance of 
legal certainty in those relations.94
It is interesting to note the beginnings of a broader public law of certain international 
organisations in developments within the EU95 and a number of the development 
banks.96 These developments may provide improved means of accountability and
92 In this respect Seyersted identifies the primary principle of jurisdiction exercisable by an 
international organisation as “organic jurisdiction” - i.e. the jurisdiction which an international 
organisation exercises over its own organs and internal management, including its relationship with its 
own employees: “Jurisdiction over Organs and o f Officials o f States, the Holy See and 
Intergovernmental Organisations” (1965) 1 4 ICLQ 31-82 and 493-527.
Thus for example the English Court found that various claims relating to a dispute as to the structure 
and continued existence of the AOI were questions o f public international law which were not 
justiciable before national courts - see Westland Helicopters v. A O I[ 1995] 2A11 ER 387. Similar 
reasoning also explains the findings of non-justiciability in relation to the receivership actions against 
the International Tin Council see in particular the findings o f Millet J.[1987] 1 All ER 890.
93 In Seyersted’s terms the external relationships of an international organisation with third parties fall 
outside its organic jurisdiction and where the third party in question is a private person, he/she/it will 
remain subject to the jurisdiction o f those States which are entitled under international law to assert it, 
i.e. primarily under the principles o f territoriality and nationality -  op. cit. note 92 supra
94 op cit note 23 supra at p. 100
95 see for example Tomkins “Transparency and the Emergence of a European Administrative Law” 
2000 YBEL217
96 see for example the inspection panels o f the IBRD, the ADB, the I-ADB, the A f DB and the CDB. 
See Bradlow “International Organisations and Private Complaints: the Case of the World Bank
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even redress to individuals and other private persons in respect of acts of the 
international organisations in question, but for present purposes it is essential to 
underline the fact that they operate entirely outside the competence of national 
courts.
The fact that this substantive immunity is based upon a lack of competence of the 
national jurisdiction suggests that it is applicable in the courts of all States, whether 
or not they are members of the organisation. Thus for example in the Westland 
Helicopters case, though one of the member States wished the UK court to make a 
determination in relation to the status of the organisation, the court refused to do so 
on the ground that it had no competence to determine the issue.97
2. Employment
One area in which this limit to the applicability of local law arises frequently is in 
relation to employment questions. Employment is clearly a sensitive area for 
organisations, touching on questions of the integrity and independence of their 
internal structures. Dominice, even suggests that in this respect alone it is appropriate
n o
to think in terms of the ius imperii of international organisations. The employment 
law of international organisations is often called international administrative law, 
which is an indication of its public law character (analogies can be drawn with the 
public law character of public employment in many national systems of law).
Inspection Panel” (1994) 34 VaJIL 553; also Shihata The World Bank Inspection Panel (OUP Oxford 
1994).
97 See note 92
98 “L’immunite de juridiction et d’execution des organisations internationales” (1984) 187 Rec. des 
cours 145, at p. 185
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In practical terms also it might be observed that employment is a major source of 
litigation for international organisations: at least a half of the cases from national 
courts considered in the preparation of this thesis were related to employment issues. 
If one adds to that the development of international administrative law and the 
caseloads of the various international administrative tribunals, the practical 
importance of this area for the functioning of international organisations quickly 
becomes apparent.
However it is important to note that international organisations will often have 
different types of employment relationship for different categories of employee. At 
the highest level there is the international civil service," the officials permanently 
employed by the organisation to perform the functions for which it was created.100 In 
most cases international civil servants are employed under the internal law of the 
organisation rather than an under local law.101 There are then various categories of 
short-term or temporary employees, consultants and experts who also assist an 
organisation in accomplishment of various tasks. Though their employment contracts 
will usually be subject to the internal law of the organisation in question, they may
99 It has been estimated fairly recently that there are in total some 90,000 international civil servants 
(about 47,000 being employed by the UN and its Specialised Agencies (not including the Bretton 
Woods institutions) - see H-J Priess “The International Civil Service” in Wolfrum (ed.) United 
Nations: law, policies and practice (1995) pp.94-99 at p. 95.
100 The definition o f S.Basdevant is often quoted
“Est fonctionnaire international, tout individu charge par les representants de plusieurs Etats ou par un 
organisme agissant en leur nom, a la suite d’un accord interetatique et sous le control e des uns ou de 
l ’autre, d’exercer, en etant soumis a des regies juridiques speciales, d’une fa?on continue et exclusive 
des fonctions dans l ’interet de 1’ensemble des Etats en question” from Les Fonctionnaires 
International^ (Paris, Sirey, 1931) atp.53
101 Some elements of local national law may be incorporated into the internal law of some 
international organisations, often in relation to specific issues in the employment relationship, for 
example, social security (see also in this respect the cases o f Maida v. Administration fo r  International 
Assistance (1956) 23 ILR 510 and International Refrigeration Institute v. Elkaim (1989) 35 AFDI 
875 though even this is unusual in respect o f the larger organisations
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be distinguished from the international civil service in that often they are not fully 
integrated into the structure of the employer organisation, for example they may only 
have limited authority within the organisation or limited powers to represent the
109organisation in external dealings. Finally there is the category of local staff, who 
are often employed by organisations on local law terms, to perform ancillary and 
other support services to the organisation, and who again do not form part of the 
international civil service.
(a) The international civil service
It is often emphasised that the employment relationships of international 
organisations with the international civil service are subject to international 
administrative law and thus fall outside the reach of both national jurisdiction and 
national law. It is suggested that there is an important “public law” element to these
relationships which makes it inappropriate for national labour courts to examine
* 101 t # # them against national standards. Thus even if the relevant treaty provisions grant
only limited jurisdictional immunity national courts frequently decline jurisdiction
over such employment relationships.104
There are a number of cases before national courts, in particular from European 
“civil law” countries which support this approach based on lack of competence
102 See Schermers and Blokker op. cit. note 26 supra §§ 518-522.
103 In the Advisory Opinion on the Effect o f  Awards o f  Compensation made by the UNA T the ICJ 
stresses the capacity in which contracts o f employment o f members o f the international civil service 
are concluded on behalf o f the Organisation: “Such a contract of service is concluded between the 
staff member concerned and the Secretary General in his capacity as the chief administrative officer of 
the United Nations Organisation, acting on behalf o f that Organisation as its representative” (1954 
ICJ Rep. 46 at p.53).
104 See for example the consistent recognition by the US courts o f the “immunity” of the IBRD in 
respect o f its employment relations — see eg Mendaro v. IBRD (1983) 9 9 ILR 92.
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ratione materiae.105 However in common law jurisdictions this approach is less 
explicitly followed, though similar results are often reached through different 
reasoning. In these countries the closest analogies are with the conflicts of law 
principle of the non-application of foreign public law, and the less well-defined 
principle of non-justiciability in relation to the rights and duties of international 
persons under international law. There have been relatively few cases in the UK 
involving employment disputes of international organisations,106 though there have
107been more m the US. In all of them the complaints have been dismissed on 
grounds of immunity rather than non-justiciability.
In any event the policy interests of international organisations which are at stake on 
this issue of the law applicable to employment are very clear. The human resources 
of an international organisation are valuable assets, and the most essential 
determinants of its successful functioning. In this respect the staff of an organisation
105 Thus for example in the case o f Eckhardt v. EUROCONTROL (94 ILR 331)it was found that the 
international administrative law employment relationship in question , was by its nature not subject to 
local jurisdiction (notwithstanding that EUROCONTROL did not enjoy any conventional 
jurisdictional immunity in this respect). Dominice cites two cases in which employment disputes 
involving EUROCONTROL were decided similarly by the German courts (see 187 Rec. des Cours 
186). The French Courts have taken a similar attitude finding that the employment of international 
civil servants lies outside the framework o f French law (regardless of the extent of any conventional 
jurisdictional immunities which may nave been granted) see for example Chemidlin v. International 
Bureau o f  Weights and Measures (1945) 12 ILR 281; Klarsfeld v. Office Franco-A demand pour la 
Jeunesse (1968) ILR 191: Hinterman v. WEU (1995) 1997 JDI 141. In Italy the first such case was 
International Institute o f  Agriculture v. Profili (1930) (5 ILR 413), but can also be seen in cases such 
as Mazzanti v. HAFSE.(1955) 22 ILR 758; ICEMv. Chiti.(1973) 11 ILR 577; ICEMv. DiBanella  
Schirone (1975) 77 ILR 572; Scivetti v. Bari Institutue (1975) 77 ILR 609; Christiani v. IL-AI ( 1981) 
87 ILR 21; Galasso v. IL-AI 1987 RDIPP 827. In Belgium the case of Devos v. SHAPE and Belgium, 
(1985) (91 ILR 242 )similarly turns on the fact that the international civil service are not subject to 
local law.
106 see Mukoro v. EBRD (1994) 107 ILR 604 and Bertolucci v. EBRD (1997) unreported
107 See the cases, Broadbent v. OAS (1980) 63 ILR 162; Tuck v. PAHO (1980) 92 ILR 196; Weidner v. 
INTELSAT(1978) 63 ILR 191; Mendaro v. IBRD (1983) 99 ILR 92; Donald v. Orfila (1985) 618 
F.Supp. 645; Chiriboga v. IBRD (1985) 616 F.Supp. 963; Boimah v. UNGA (1987) 664 F.Supp. 69; 
Morgan v. IBRD.( 1990) 752 F.Supp. 492.
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need to act in the interests of the organisation regardless of any national interests 
which may be at stake. Thus from its earliest days independence has probably been
10Rthe most fundamental principle of the international civil service, and is often 
guaranteed in the constitutive instruments of international organisations.109 If the 
international civil service were subject to national law or national jurisdiction in the 
performance of its functions there might be serious implications for the international 
status of the organisation.110 Thus from the point of view of an international 
organisation the sensitivity of these issues is potentially acute.111
Furthermore national jurisdiction should also be restrained for reasons relating to the 
proper management and cohesiveness of the international civil service within an 
organisation, since the principle of uniformity of treatment of employees is essential. 
The differential treatment which would follow from the application of different 
systems of national employment law risks deleterious effects on employment within 
an organisation, might endanger its proper functioning.
108 In the League o f Nations the principle of the independence of the international civil service was 
promoted in particular By Lord Balfour and Sir Eric Drummond, following the tradition of 
independence of the civil service in countries such as the UK and France. Lemoine points to some 
particularly egregious attempts by States to interfere with the independence o f civil servants of the 
League, which in turn led to a much stronger enunciation of the principle in Art. 100 of the UN 
Charter - The International Civil Servant - An Endangered Species (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) at pp. 
104-6.
109 See Jenks The Proper Law o f  International Organisations (Stevens, London, 1962) at pp.27-33
110 see Reparation case 1949 ICJ Rep. 174 at p.183
111 Thus for example the issue of the independence of the international civil service arose 
dramatically during the controversy arising out of the loyalty investigations of international civil 
servants of US nationality during the McCarthy era. The particular issue of whether the national 
standards were acceptable in determining the suitability o f persons for international service was 
discussed in the UN General Assembly (7th Session 416 and 417 Plenary Meeting)s, and 
subsequently the Secretary General accepted that the standards applied in this respect should be 
international rather than national (GAOR 7th Session 421 Plenary meeting at paragraph 127) -  see 
Chapter V infra.
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Thus there are important functional interests of an international organisation in 
having a system of law to govern the international civil service, separate from any 
national system. However whilst this separateness from the national legal system 
protects international civil servants from undue interference by States, it also leaves 
them without the protections offered by the national legal system. Thus as 
Amerasinghe points out they will have an equally important interest that the relevant 
international administrative law should be an objective legal system, capable not 
only of protecting them from interference by States but also from arbitrary treatment
119by the employer organisation itself.
Thus international administrative law is drawn from a number of written sources 
including treaty provisions, staff rules and regulations, the employment contract 
itself (where applicable), and these are supplemented by other less formal sources 
such as the practice of the organisation in question, the general principles of law and 
the decisions of tribunals. An important aspect of the administrative systems of many 
international organisations is that the rights and obligations derived from these 
sources should be enforceable by a judicial organ, in most cases an administrative 
tribunal. The fully judicial nature of these tribunals has been asserted both by the
tribunals themselves, by the international organisations and also by the International
1 1 *1
Court of Justice, and appears now to be widely accepted.
Where the relevant system of international administrative law is well-developed, and 
the judicial protection it offers to employees is effective, there does indeed appear to
112 Amerasinghe Principles o f  the Institutional Law o f International Organisations (CUP, Cambridge, 
1996) at p.330
113 see for example the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Effect o f  Awards cit note 104 supra , at p.53
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be good reason for national courts to decline jurisdiction over matters which would 
properly be dealt with before a genuinely judicial international organ, such as an 
international administrative tribunal. In this respect it is interesting to note that there 
are a number of decisions in which national courts have sought first to establish to 
their own satisfaction that the international administrative system in question affords 
adequate judicial protection to the employee before declining jurisdiction.114
(b) Short term or temporary staff
This intermediate category of staff are usually employed on a purely contractual 
basis. In relation to these contracts unless these is express provision, it is much less 
clear that they will be governed by international administrative law or that an 
international administrative tribunal will have jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
them. Whilst it seems that express clauses can specify that international 
administrative law should be applicable and that jurisdiction should be vested in an 
international administrative tribunal, where the contract is silent there does not 
appear to be any automatic operation of either. Thus for example in the case of Rebek
1,4 Three cases may be cited in which the possibility o f bringing a claim before an international 
administrative tribunal appears to have been a factor in the reasoning o f the court. In two o f them, 
Chiriboga v. IBRD ((1985) 616 F.Supp. 963) and FAO v. Colagrossi, ((1995) 101 ILR 386) the 
decisions turned on jurisdictional immunity rather than questions of justiciability as such. In the third 
case Eckhardt v. EUROCONTROL (94 ILR 331) the court’s comments on the possibility of appeal to 
ILOAT could be interpreted as a supplementary argument to emphasise the separateness of the 
international administrative system from the Dutch legal system. Similarly, in its amicus brief, 
submitted to the US Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) in the case of Broabent v. OAS,({\9%2) 63 ILR 
162 and 337) the UN emphasised the availability o f genuinely judicial procedures and remedies in the 
international administrative system, but was careful to say it did so not as an invitation to the Court to 
assess the sufficiency o f judicial protection it afforded, but rather to stress its autonomy from the 
national legal system (1980 UNJYB 224, at p.236). As will be discussed in the cases of Waite and 
Kennedy v. Germany and Beer and Regan v. Germany (cit note 38 supra), the European Court of 
Human Rights found that availability of an alternative remedy in international administrative law was 
the reason that the jurisdictional immunity of an international organisation did not violate Article 6 
ECHR.
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v. WHO,115 in a dispute arising from the non-renewal of a fixed term contract which 
was silent both as to applicable law and as to jurisdiction, the parties agreed to 
arbitration of the dispute by the ILOAT. The Tribunal found that it could not apply 
WHO administrative law to the contract, as it was not an employment contract 
subject to the internal law of the WHO tribunal. Instead it was a service contract with 
an independent professional, governed by the system of law chosen by the parties, or, 
in default by the system designated by the tribunal seised of the dispute (whether 
national or arbitral). In this particular case the Tribunal appears to have applied the 
general principles of law.
Where an employee under a short-term contract seeks to seise a national court in 
these circumstances he or she may first have to overcome the hurdle of jurisdictional 
immunity. However if  immunity does not extend to the question, the national court 
may be faced with a sensitive decision as to whether it can exercise jurisdiction. 116
(c) Local staff
The position of local staff is quite different in that there is no presumption that they 
are engaged in direct relation to the achievement of the public international functions 
of an organisation. In other words the capacity in which an organisation engages 
such staff is much the same as a private employer. As such unless the employment 
contract expressly provides otherwise the presumption appears to be that the 
relationship is subject to local law rather than the internal law of the organisation (i.e. 
its international administrative law). In general local staff are engaged to undertake
115 See ILOAT judgment no.77 of 1 Dec. 1964, 1965 ILO Bulletin p. 126-30. See also Glavinis op cit 
note 60 supra at pp. 179-82.
116 See Ch 4 infra text at notes 120f
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tasks of a relatively low degree of responsibility, not unlike the “service staff’ of 
foreign diplomatic missions.
The treatment of local employees has been considered in a number of cases by the
117Italian courts, in particular m relation to the NATO bases in Italy. Under the 1951
NATO Status of Forces Agreement the distinction between local employees and
international civil servants is crucial, as the former are subject both to local law and
jurisdiction. Thus in a series of cases the Italian courts have had to consider the
nature of the employment relationship in order to establish the capacity in which
11 8NATO engaged their services.
As local law is usually applicable to such employment relationships,119 national 
courts will also have jurisdiction over disputes arising therefrom unless the 
organisation in question can assert jurisdictional immunity. Such immunity can 
certainly be waived expressly, and where the local law is applicable under the
17ftcontract national courts may be willing to find an implied waiver. Thus if 
international organisations wish to remove such contracts from the jurisdiction of the 
local courts, the onus should be on them either to elect to treat such persons as 
employees under international administrative law, or to provide alternative means for
117 It should also be noted that similar problems have arisen elsewhere in relation to NATO bases, e.g. 
the Belgian cases o f Devos v. SHAPE and Belgium (1985) 91 ILR 242 and Piha v. Belgium 82 ILR 
109 and also the French case o f Henaut v. Etat-major des Forces Alliees en Europe (1956) 2 AFDI 
764
1.8 see HAFSE v. Ferrero, Sanita and INPS (1975) 77 ILR 616 and HAFSE v. Capocci Belmonte 
(1976) in 3 (1977) IYIL 328
1.9 See Duffar Contribution a I'etude des privileges et immunites des organisations internationales 
(Pedone, Paris, 1982) at pp.38-39
120 See e.g. Maida v. AIA (1955) 23 ILR 510 and Elkaim v. HR (1989) AFDI 875
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171the settlement of disputes arising therefrom. In the absence of such provision it 
does not seem unreasonable for the local courts to adjudicate employment disputes of 
this nature.122
3. Contracts for goods and services
It will be recalled from the first chapter that from an early stage in their development 
international organisations have required the capacity to contract. It is difficult to 
conceive of an international organisation which does not need, or, indeed, have such 
capacity. As well as being frequently included in express provisions (either in the 
constitutive instrument itself or in another instrument dealing with the status of an 
organisation), it is likely that the capacity of international organisations to contract 
will readily, be implied, at very least by their member States.123 In conventional 
provisions capacity to contract, though granted as a matter of international 
obligation, must be given effect in domestic law.124 It is however sometimes argued
121 Thus for example Dominice cites practice of the UN in relation to local staff recruited in relation to 
peace-keeping missions (1984 op. cit note 51 supra at p. 191-2)
122 However it should be stressed that this only applies to adjudication of disputes arising from the 
contractual relationship between local employee and organisation. In no case has a local court been 
prepared to find that its jurisdiction should extend into the field o f collective labour law: see eg 
Camera confederale del lavoro and Sindicato scuola CGIL v. Bari Institute (1974) 87 ILR 86; and 
HAFSE v. Sindicato FILTAT-CISL Vicenza (1978) 77 ILR 630.
The remedies which may be granted against an international organisation, may also be limited to 
awards o f monetary compensation, as Orders for reinstatement may be found to impinge too greatly 
into the internal structure o f the organisation (see Minnini v. Bari Institute (1980) 87 ILR 29) . 
However such a limitation is not unusual in relation to parallel cases in the context o f State immunity.
123 As was observed in Chapter 1 supra the International Court o f Justice has on numerous occasions 
justified the doctrine of implied powers by invoking the principle of effectiveness -  se E.Lauterpacht 
“The Development o f the Law of International Organisation by the Decisions of international 
Tribunals” (1976) 152 Rec. des Cours 377 esp. at pp. 423f
124 For example Article 104 of the UN Charter and Article 1 section 1 of the UN General Convention.
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that these provisions should be interpreted broadly as entitling an international 
organisation to enter into contracts at both the national and international levels.
The question then arises as to whether, in the absence of an express submission of a 
contract to a particular system of national law, national law can be applied either as 
the applicable law of the contract itself, or to determine the applicable law in 
accordance with its rules of conflicts of law. Or alternatively whether the 
international status of the international organisation in question requires that its 
contracts be considered as outside the purview of any domestic system of law, except 
to the degree to which the organisation has expressly consented to the application of 
such law. The latter appears to be the position taken by the UN.
In fact rather than offering a categorical response to the problem, the numerous 
studies of the practice of international organisations in this respect suggests a more 
nuanced approach, in which the proper law should be determined in accordance with 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the intentions of the parties, the
197nature and terms of the contract in question. Such examination of the intentions of 
the parties is premised on the assumption that the parties have made appropriate 
provision in respect of the nature of the organisation, as well as any element of risk 
attaching to the relevant systems of national law.
125 see for example Meyer “Les contrats de foumiture de biens et de service dans le cadre des 
operations de maintien de la paix” XLII (1996) AFDI 79, at pp. 87-88.
126 1994 UNJY at p.449
127 See Valticos op. cit. note 22 supra; Seyersted “Applicable law in relations between 
intergovernmental organizations and private parties” (1967) 122 Rec. des Cours 425 esp. at 462- 473 
and 493-500; Mann “The proper law of contracts concluded by international persons” (1959) 35 
BYIL 34; Jenks op cit. note 91 supra.at pp. 147-55.
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Such a flexible, case by case analysis also accords with the emphasis on the
i yo
intentions of the parties in relation to most national systems of conflicts of law. It 
is also underlined by the fact that many international organisations seek to delocalise 
their contracts further by including arbitration clauses for the settlement of disputes. 
Whilst this may not be sufficient to remove disputes entirely from aspects of local
1 ?Qjurisdiction, the advantage of arbitration is that its flexibility will allow the choice 
of law of the parties to be given full weight in accordance with the principle of 
autonomie de la volonte.
In general international organisations appear to be reluctant to make an express 
choice of national law to govern their contracts. There appear to be three main 
bases for this preference. The first concerns the status of the organisation, as alluded 
to above some organisations take the view that it is incompatible with their 
independent international status to have their contracts subjected to national law.131 
Such reasons do not seem wholly convincing being set out in rather general terms 
without specifying how exactly how the independence of an organisation is 
compromised by the subjection of its contracts with private third parties to local rules 
of contract law. Nevertheless as the UN points out that for an organisation active in
128 See Jenks op cit note 91 supra p. 148.
129 It will be seen in Ch 4 infra that the degree to which international organisations may oppose their 
immunities from jurisdiction to national courts seeking to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over 
international arbitration proceedings remains controversial. See also 1994 UNJY 449.
130 An important exception to this appears to be the European Communities which are willing for the 
laws o f their member States to govern their contracts. Nevertheless they may also provide for 
arbitration by the ECJ.
131 It may also be from a fear that national courts might interpret a choice of law clause as a waiver of 
immunity from jurisdiction as occurred in the case of Maida v. AIA (1955) 23 ILR 510.
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as many countries in the world s it is, some standardisation of practice is necessary to
* iensure the proper and efficient performance of the functions of the Organisation.
The second basis put forward is that an organisation must ensure fairness and 
uniformity of practice within an organisation, to ensure that the equality of the 
member States is respected and that there is no discrimination between contractors 
which are from different member States. This argument has particular cogency in 
relation to employment matters, but may have some basis in relation to other 
contracts e.g. where tenders are invited in the procurement of goods and services.
The final argument put forward is not one of principle but one of both convenience 
and efficiency, though it reduces the merit of the second argument. The UN has said 
that it is less reluctant to agree to subject their contracts to certain systems of national 
law than others.134 Where the co-contracting party proposes a system of national law 
with which it is familiar, for example New York law, it is more likely to concede to 
the proposal than where the system proposed in unfamiliar. This is, of course, 
perfectly understandable given that there is bound to be a limit to the knowledge of 
different legal systems of the staff any organisation, and the pressure on resources 
makes it more efficient to deal with those legal systems on which there is in-house
132 1985 YBILC Vol.II pt2 at p. 153
133 See 1994 UNJY 449
134 See UN Office of Legal Affairs opinion of 10 December 1962, cited 1985 YBILC Vol.II pt2 at 
p. 154. Similarly the World Bank in its borrowing operations will usually enter into contracts, 
containing an arbitration clause, but governed by the national law of the market in which the 
transaction takes place - see Valticos, op cit note 22 supra.
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expertise rather than having to go to the expense of retaining private lawyers outside 
the organisation.135
A well-developed national legal system is likely to provide a comprehensive and
detailed system of rules to govern most transactions for the purchase and sale of
goods and services and therefore to provide legal certainty. Where the private party
to such a transaction with an international organisation has sufficient bargaining
power it is likely to be in its interests to insist on such a system of national law to
govern the contract. It may also be in the interests of the international organisation. It
is not therefore surprising that in relation to many contracts of a particularly technical
1or specialised nature, for example banking and insurance contracts, as well as 
some transportation contracts, international organisations will often agree that they
1 7*7
should be governed by a relevant system of mumcipal law.
In doctrinal writings, some leading authors take as a starting point a rebuttable 
presumption that in the absence of an express choice of law, relevant municipal law 
should be applicable to contracts between an international organisation and a private
135 It might appear that the European Communities are at an advantage having a comparatively large 
legal staff drawn from the legal systems o f the 15 Member States. As has been said the Communities 
appear to be willing to enter into contracts governed by the laws of any of their Member States -  
Hartley T.C. “Foundations of EC Law” 3rd ed, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994) pp.59-63.
136 Some banking and insurance contracts may not only require subjection to local law but also 
submission to local jurisdiction. In relation to banking contracts involving security for loans it would 
appear to be necessary to subject such contracts to local law and jurisdiction. This is so whether the 
international organisation is the lender or the borrower, thus for example where the IFC lends money 
to private parties secured by way of mortgage or some other form of security it may well be necessary 
to ensure it is enforceable in the local courts. -  se Valticos op cit at note 22 supra at p.59
137 This appears to be the UN practice Meyer cites a Memorandum of the Director of the Office of 
Legal Affairs o f 5 February 1988 to this effect - see “Les contrats de foumiture de biens et de service 
dans le cadre des operations de maintien de la paix” (1996) 42 AFDI 79 at p. 111-112, see also 
Valticos op. cit. note 22 supra at p.59
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1 ^8party. In the simplest cases the relevant system of municipal law is likely to be the
local law of the place of the Headquarters of an international organisation, though
1this will not necessarily follow in respect of all contracts, particularly in the light 
of the truly international nature of many of the contracts of the operational 
international organisations.140 In the absence of an express choice of law it will be for 
the tribunal chosen by the parties to determine finally the applicable law of the 
contract, but, particularly where the tribunal is a national court, it will probably only 
be able to do so by reference to the rules of conflicts of law of a given system of 
municipal law.141
On the other hand this presumption in favour of the application of municipal law 
carries with it the assumption that die ordinary law of contract should apply to a 
contractual relationship between an international organisation and a private party, 
into which both parties enter on the basis of equality. This model has been 
challenged in particular by a number of continental writers from jurisdictions which 
recognise a separate system of administrative contracts to govern the sale and
138 See Mann op cit note 127 supra-, Jenks op cit note 126 supra at p. 148; and even Groshens “Les 
marchees passees par les organisations intemationales” (1956 Rev. de droit pub. et de la science pol. 
741 at p.765.
139 Though Article 7 of the UN HQ Agreement with the US, provides for the application of relevant 
US, New York and local laws to be applicable in the Headquarters District unless otherwise provided 
for in the HQ Agreement or the General Convention, the UN does not interpret this as requiring that 
local law govern its contracts made at its HQ. However it does allow that the place of conclusion of 
the contract may be considered to be factor in the determination o f the proper law of the contract, in 
accordance with the general principles of the conflicts o f law - see 1985 YBILC Vol. II Pt 1 p. 153
140 see Meyer op. cit. note 137 supra at pp. 110 -117, in which she also raises the point that in certain 
situations where peacekeeping or peace-making forces have been deployed the local legal system may 
not be equipped to deal effectively with the types and complexity o f the contractual arrangements 
which are necessarily involved in operations such as the UNAMIR deployment in Rwanda, or simply 
that the State and therefore also its legal system have collapsed as had precipitated the deployment of 
the UNOSOM forces in Somalia and UNTAC in Cambodia.
141 see the UN Office of Legal Affairs Memorandum of 5 February 1988, cited by Meyer op. cit. note 
137 supra at p. 116.
106
purchase of goods and services in the public service, a relationship described as 
hierarchical in that it places greater powers over the negotiation and performance of 
the contract in the hands of the public service.142 These writers propose that it is thus 
the internal law of the international organisation in question, a branch of international 
administrative law, which should govern its contracts. This being so it is suggested 
that such contracts escape any local jurisdictional control, being governed by a form 
of international law and are thus non-justiciable or “irrecevable” before local courts.
Whilst as we have seen there is support for this type of approach in relation to 
employment disputes, there appears to be little or no practice of national courts to 
support these contentions in respect of contracts for goods and services.143 It is 
certainly true that some international organisations have increasingly stringent 
internal rules and procedures, like other public bodies, to ensure the efficiency and 
value for money in their procurement of necessary goods and services. However 
these are internal rules governing aspects of the process of procurement which are 
solely within the organisation. Thus they govern a stage anterior to the conclusion of 
a contract. Further it is not clear that they give rise to a direct relationship of 
responsibility between for example an international organisation and a person
142 For example France or Belgium where under domestic law contracts of public authorities with 
third parties maybe governed by a regime of administrative law (i.e. contrai administratif). See 
Groshens “Les marchees passees par les organisations intemationales” (1956) Rev D. Pub. 741 esp at 
pp.766-9. Also Colin and Sinkondo (op. cit. note 90 supra) consider the similarities o f procurement by 
international organisations with public procurement in domestic law, though they point out some key 
differences with respect to the question o f applicable law.
There may be some historical support for this approach in that in the 19th Century before the doctrine 
of international personality was fully developed organisation could be given the status of a public 
authority in the host States, as for example was recognised by France in the case of the International 
Bureau of Weights and Measures -  see Cahier op cit note 50 supra at pp.70-73.
143 In the majority of reported cases involving contractual disputes not relating to employment, the 
issues raised are those o f immunity rather than questions o f applicable law or non-
j usti ci abi 1 ity/irrecevabil ite
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tendering his goods or services to the organisation, and in any event it may well be 
that such questions will not be justiciable before any national court.144
It is also true that many international organisations have standard contractual terms 
which they will seek to introduce into all of their contracts. Some of these standard 
terms may seek to give the organisation in question greater powers of control over 
the performance of the contract or allow greater mutability of its terms than might 
commonly appear in contracts between private parties. 145 However such powers 
arise solely from the terms of the contract, which are the subject of negotiation and 
consent of the parties, whereas under, say, French or Belgian municipal law on 
administrative contracts the enhanced rights of the contracting public authority are 
ensured by general rules of law, rather than the terms of the contract.
An alternative to choosing national law as the governing law of the contract favoured 
by some organisations seeking to emphasise the delocalisation of their contracts, is 
an express choice of law clause electing some system of “transnational” law. The UN 
for example states that it has on occasion inserted a choice of law clause into its 
contracts electing “the general principles of law” as the governing law. Such a 
choice, however, is not without its own problems, particularly as some authors
144 It may be that the putative tenderer’s State o f nationality may be able to make an international 
claim against an organisation which failed to observe its own rules of procurement, but it is submitted 
that this would be a claim of the State rather than the tenderer, for the failure to observe the principles 
of the sovereign equality of States or non-discrimination as represented in the internal rules of the 
organisation on procurement.
An exception to this may be the European Communities for which rules of procurement are more 
firmly established, and for which the principle o f non-discrimination is a central pillar o f the 
Communities’ legal order, and may be justiciable before the European Court o f Justice.
145 Colin and Sinkondo cite the some of the technical contracts of INTELSAT and CERN as 
examples op. cit. note 90 at pp. 21-23
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seriously doubt whether the general principles of law can ever really represent a 
system of law at all rather than a supplementary source of law.146
Alternatively it might be suggested that international law (including the general 
principles of law) should be adopted as the governing law.147 Again here there is 
some doctrinal dispute as to whether it is possible for international law to govern 
contractual relations between an international organisation and a private person.148 
However as this is a solution which is used in practice and has been applied by 
international arbitral tribunals it is assumed here that international law can govern 
such contracts. Clearly then international law should govern a contract where that 
contract expressly chooses international law as its governing law. However some 
international organisations claim that where the contract is silent on the choice of 
law, international law will automatically apply by virtue of the international status of 
the organisation in question.149 Beyond these assertions by international 
organisations there appears, in fact, to be little judicial practice either to support or to 
disprove this proposition.150
146 See for example F.A.Mann op.cit. note 127 supra at p.45.
147 See for example Schneider “International Organizations and Private Persons: the Case for Direct 
Application of International Law” in Dominice et al. (ed.s) Etudes de droit international en I ’honneur 
de Pierre Lalive ( Basel, 1993) 345-58.
148 There is now a considerable body of doctrinal writing to suggest that this is possible (see eg Mann 
op cit note supra at p.45) and also some important arbitration awards, in particular Texaco v. Libya 53 
ILR 389. Similarly the practice of the EBRD might be cited by way of example. When making loans 
to public undertakings the EBRD will include a provision in relevant loan agreements that they should 
be governed by the rules o f public international law (specifying the sources as applicable treaties, 
treaties which though in themselves applicable as such reflect customary international law, other 
forms o f customary international law and the general principles o f law) see Head “Evolution o f the 
governing law for loan agreements of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks” 
1996 AJIL214.
149 See 1976 UNJY 164; also the award o f 1958 by Professor Batiffol cited by the UN in 1985 YBILC 
Vol.II pt 2 157-8 and discussed (critically) by Glavinis op cit note 60 supra at pp. 189-94.
It might also be noted that the position o f the World Bank has been that a non-State entity can not 
enter into a contract governed by international law with the Bank - see Broches “International Legal
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From the point of view of an international organisation a choice of international law 
to govern a contract may be attractive in that its independence will not be 
compromised by having to rely on the law made by a single State. Correlative to a 
choice of international law as the governing law, will be choice of jurisdictional 
instance which removes the contract from the local courts, for example by providing 
for arbitration or dispute settlement by an international tribunal with jurisdiction to 
hear such a case (- it is difficult to envisage a national court applying international 
law as the governing law of a contract). These may be particularly important 
considerations in circumstances where, for example, the nature of the contract is so 
closely connected to the public international ends for which the organisation was 
established that the imposition of local law would carry with it a risk to the 
achievement of the mission. This may explain why, in relation to their lending 
activities, multilateral development banks appear increasingly to choose international 
law be as the governing law, particularly where there are serious risks attached to the 
possible local legal system (either in terms of their sufficiency or their stability).151 
Similarly the UN is frequently involved in major operations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security or the reconstruction of States, in situations where
Aspects o f the Operations o f the World Bank” (1959) 98 Rec. des Cours 296 at p.351. However t 
should also be noted that Broches also felt that such a contract could not be governed by municipal 
law, rather unsatisfactorily leaving it juridically in no man’s land (ibid at p.352).
Though this may seem debatable (especially given that there is no such assumption in relation to 
contracts between States and private persons) the UN generally appears to prefer that its contracts 
remain silent on the question o f applicable law, on the basis that international law , or the general 
principles should be applied in that situation. It draws support for this conclusion from the Award of 
Professor Batiffol, see 1985 YBILC Vol.II Pt 1 at p. 157.
Clearly the Intstitut de Droit International did not see this as uncontroversial and in fact in its 
resolution on the question called for international organisations to consider making an express choice 
of law in their contracts (see resolution adopted 6 September 1977, 57(2) Ann. DI 129).
151 See Head op cit note 148 supra
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the relevant local systems of law may be insufficient, little known or even hostile, 
and subjecting their contracts to international law may be an important aspect of
1 5?ensuring its independent performance of its functions.
However it must be noted that the rules of international law relating to contracts (let 
alone the particular category of contracts between international organisations and 
private parties) are still incomplete or indeterminate in some respects, relying as they 
do in the main upon analogy with treaty law and a series of international arbitration 
awards. It might be anticipated that choosing a body of rules on which there is so 
much uncertainty as to their content may cause problems for both the private party to 
the contract and to the international organisation itself, and may imperil the very 
legal security for which the contract was drafted and the proper law clause was 
instated in the first place.153 It is therefore suggested that the principle criterion for 
the deciding the law applicable to the contract of international organisation should be 
the intentions of the parties,154 which, if not express, may be implied from the 
entirety of the circumstances in which the contract was made. It does seem that in the 
majority of cases the presumption of the applicability of national law is likely to 
prove persuasive as a starting point, but it is rebuttable. Under current thinking in 
economics and public administration, international organisations, like national 
governments, seem to be set increasingly to use contracts with private parties for the
152 See Meyer op cit note 137 supra
153 It might even be argued that in an extreme some case the danger o f prejudice to the interests o f the 
private party arising out o f such a contract is such that it does not conform to an “appropriate” mode 
of dispute settlement for the purposes of provisions such as Article 27 o f the UN General Convention 
on Privileges and Immunities.
154 Though Seyersted writing in 1967 thought that certain Latin American States may have problems 
with this, in particular he mentions Argentina and Uruguay as having long-standing private 
international law statutes containing more rigid rules -  op. cit. note 127 supra, at pp.48-9
111
achievement of many of their functions.155 Against this context therefore, where 
there are clear public international interests at stake international law may well prove 
to be an important alternative to national law for international organisations and as 
the international law of contract develops it is likely to be used more frequently.
4. Torts
Studies in comparative law show that in many legal systems the past fifty years have 
seen considerable development in establishing principles of tort liability in respect of 
public authorities.156 The former immunities of States from non-contractual liability 
in their own legal systems have in large measure been replaced in line with modem 
conceptions of the rule of law. However the breadth of potential liabilities in tort is 
very wide, and in many States the area marks an interesting crossing-point between 
public and private law, and special (in some respects, hybrid) mles apply.
In the context of foreign State immunity such developments were influential in the 
development of the proper scope of restrictive immunity in respect of torts 
committed in the State of the fomm, as shown in Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s classic
1 ^7article. In practice the position which the restrictive doctrine of State immunity has 
reached on tort liability is not as radical as Lauterpacht’s prescriptions. In part as a
155 see G.Burdeau “Les organisations intemationales - entre gestion publique et gestion privee” in 
Makarczyk, J. (ed.), Theory o f  International Law at the Threshold o f the Twenty-First Century: Essays in 
Honour o f  Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996) p.611. In relation to this trend in public 
administration in the UK, see M.Freedland “Government by Contract and Private Law” 1994 Pub.
Law 86.
156 see for example J.Bell and A.Bradley (ed.) Governmental Liability A Comparative Study 
UKNCCL, 1991
157 H.Lauterpacht “The Problem of jurisdictional Immunities o f Foreign States” (1951) XXVIIIBYIL 
220 at p232-6. Lauterpacht suggested that a foreign State should be subject to the same liabilities as 
the forum State would itself be subject if  it were the respondent (pp236-241).
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result of the potential breadth of tort liability and its closeness to the performance of 
public functions and in part as result of the involuntary nature of tort liability, tort 
liability tends to have been dealt with in piecemeal fashion with immunity restricted
1 5Ronly in relation to the least controversial aspects. Thus for example under s. 5 of 
the UK State Immunity Act a foreign State is not immune in respect of proceedings 
for personal or injury or death or damage to tangible property, caused by acts of the 
foreign State on UK territory. Immunity is also likely to be restricted in respect of 
commercial torts.159 In other cases the complainant is likely to have to rely on such 
remedies as are available in the foreign State itself.
The position in respect of international organisations is somewhat different. Most 
international organisations have not developed a law of non-contractual liability of 
their own. In most cases therefore persons with complaints against international 
organisations will seek, in accordance with general principles, to establish the 
liability under the lex loci delicti commissi. Whilst this may be uncontroversial in 
respect of relatively straightforward cases such as road traffic accidents, or 
occupiers’ liability,160 in more complex cases which may relate to the discharge by 
an organisation of its public international functions, rules of liability in local law 
which would equate the organisation with a private party may not be appropriate. In 
these latter cases reliance by international organisations on their jurisdictional
158 See H. Fox “State responsibility and tort proceedings against foreign states in municipal courts” 
(1989) XX Neth.YIL 1
159 i.e. s.5. o f the State Immunity Act 1978 It would also seem that the commercial transaction 
exception is broad enough to include commercial torts by virtue o f s.3(3)(c), see Fox ibid. at pp21-24
160 In practice organisations are unlikely to dispute their liability in local law in relation to these 
straightforward matters, and the availability o f insurance in respect o f such liability will often mean 
that organisations are even willing to waive their immunity from jurisdiction should it become 
necessary to refer claims to the national court for settlement.
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immunities may thus mask a more profound objection to the applicability of local 
law.
In this respect it is interesting to note two instances in which international 
organisations have departed from the picture sketched here. The first is the case of 
the United Nations which in 1996 passed a regulation seeking to limit its potential 
liabilities in tort damages at its Headquarters in the US.161 In that regulation the UN 
sought to avail itself of similar limits to tort damages as had been proposed or were 
in fact applicable to the US Federal Government.162
The second example is the European Community whose system of non-contractual 
liability is established under Community law by virtue of Art 288 (ex 215) EC. The 
Community is thus under the obligation to make reparation for any damages caused 
by its institutions or by its employees in the performance of their duties. The 
provision is subject to the sole jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Thus it 
appears that whilst the founders of the Community foresaw that it should enjoy very 
limited immunity from jurisdiction as a general matter, they considered that 
questions of non-contractual liability arising from the discharge by the Community 
of its public functions should be removed entirely from national legal systems, both 
as regards applicable law and adjudicative jurisdiction.
161 See Szass “The United Nations legislates to limit its liability” (1987) 81 AJIL 739
162 It might also be noted that the UN has subsequently adopted a regulation inter alia providing for 
limitation of its liability in relation to damage caused in the course of peace-keeping operations -  see 
D.Shraga “ UN Peacekeeping operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and 
Responsibility for Operations- Related Damage” (2000) 94 AJIL 406
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Finally in relation to tort liability it has been proposed that there should be an 
exception to immunity in relation to claims for abuses of human rights.163 This 
proposal appears to follow the suggestion of a number of writers that the immunities 
of foreign States should be limited in relation to claims made against them for human 
rights abuses.164 It might be noted that State immunity has not been limited in this 
way, and is unlikely to be so in the immediate future.165 In relation to international 
organisations such proposals also seem wide of the mark. Undoubtedly international 
organisations as subjects of international law, should adhere to and promote human 
rights standards. Indeed it is so important that human rights standards should be 
upheld in all aspects of their work, that these should form a primary aspect of the 
internal law of all organisations. A more appropriate strategy would therefore be to 
encourage international organisations to elaborate their own law and policies in this 
respect and to develop their own remedial systems, i.e. to develop the public law of 
international organisations rather than rely on the indirect route of characterising 
human rights abuses as private law torts.
5. Immovable Property
The principle that it is the lex situs which governs immovable property, is a broadly 
accepted in private international law, and corresponds to the notion of the exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction of sovereign States in public international law. As has been 
said the theory of extraterritoriality of diplomatic or international premises, has been
163 See M.Singer “Jurisdictional immunity of international organizations: Human rights and functional 
necessity concerns” (1995) 3 VaJILl-61
164 see for example Bianchi, A., “Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights'” 46 Austrian 
J. Publ. Int'lL. (1994) 195.; and J. Brohmer State Immunity and the Violation o f  Human Rights 
(Kluwer, The Hague, 1997)
165 Nevertheless in the case of Al-Adsani v. UK the European Court of Human Rights only upheld 
immunity by the narrowest o f margins see judgment of 21 November 2001
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abandoned in view the logical and practical difficulties of applying it. Thus there is a 
large measure of consensus amongst writers and in the practice of international 
organisations that the lex situs governs their immovable property.166
In practice many international organisations lease their Headquarters and other sites 
from public authorities in the host State, and those lease agreements often refer to 
local law.167 Organisations will also seek, where applicable, the protection of their 
title to immovable property through registration with the local land registry. It also 
seems unlikely that an international organisation would be able to develop its own 
regulations to govern real property in most circumstances.
However even in relation to such an apparently straightforward picture there may be 
complicating factors. Jenks notes for example how when international organisations 
have entered into real property relations with each other, e.g. by leasing buildings 
one to another, the better view appears to be that those relations are governed by 
international law, subject to compliance with local formalities such as registration. 
Similarly Knapp describes the complexity of legal relations in respect of the 
construction by the ILO of new buildings in the mid-1970s.169 Whilst local law was 
prima facie applicable, in an agreement with the Swiss authorities the application of 
certain aspects of that law was modified to reflect the international character of the 
ILO. Thus for example whilst the Organisation was bound by Swiss law in respect of
166 Jenks op cit note 109 supra at pp 135-46; see also Morgen stem Legal Problems o f  International 
Organisations (Grotius, Cambridge, 1986) atp.38
167 For a survey of such agreements see Jenks ibid. atppl35-38.
168 ibid. pp. 141-44
169 B Knapp “Questions juridiques relatives a la construction d’immeubles par les organisations 
intemationales” 1977 Sw.YBIL51
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matters such as land registration and aerial security, it was only bound “to take into 
account” the wishes of the Geneva authorities in respect of the design and 
construction of the new buildings.
Finally it might be noted that practice suggests that notwithstanding a general 
acceptance of the lex situs in respect of immovable property, national courts will not 
necessarily feel that this establishes their jurisdiction. The relevant caselaw reveals a 
great variety in the ways in which such questions have been dealt.170
* * *
It therefore seems that whilst a theory of complementary competences between 
international law, the internal law of an international organisation and national law 
may seem attractive as a systematic and rational approach to the complex interaction 
between national jurisdiction and an international organisation, it seems that it is 
premature. Where there is some consensus as for example in relation to the 
employment relations of international organisations with their permanent staff, the 
explanation of the lack of competence in the national courts is convincing. However 
in most areas practice remains extremely varied between, and even within, 
organisations and also between national jurisdictions. Any attempt to build consensus 
in these other areas on how to allocate respective competences between national 
and international authorities would clearly be a major project, requiring inter alia a
170 Thus for example when the Italian Court of Cassation found that the immunity of the FAO was 
limited in respect o f the rent review proceedings in INPDAI v. FAO (87 ILR 1) resulted in a great 
controversy in the FAO. Preparations were underway to seek an Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice when a settlement was found with the Italian Government -  see Reinsich op cit note 
11 supra at ppl87-8. By way of contrast in Askir v. Boutros Boutros Ghali et al.{ 1996, 113 ILR 516) 
a US Court found that the occupation of property by UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia was not an 
act iure gestionis and so was immune whether the restrictive theory o f State immunity applied to the 
UN or not.
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greater degree of convergence between national systems than currently exists. By 
comparison, the advantage of immunity as a technique is its simplicity and the
171relative ease by which it can be given effect.
£ . An Individuated Response -  Conventional Immunities ratione personae 
The huge variety in international organisations and their functions, powers and 
structures, must constantly be borne in mind when considering the law of 
international organisations - and this factor is no less applicable when considering 
questions related to their immunities. This heterogeneity suggests that the particular 
needs and circumstances of each international organisation in this respect will be 
reflected in the particular treaty provisions relating to each organisation. As will be 
shown in the next chapter such analysis shows some instructive patterns when the 
extent of immunities of international organisations are considered in the light of the 
functions of particular international organisations. Thus it can be seen that, in 
accordance with its functional needs, the immunities of a universal international 
organisation operating in the political field, such as the UN, are granted in the broad 
terms, for example “immunity from every form of legal process”. Whereas a small,
171 Professor Crawford has considered whether State immunity should be abandoned in favour o f an 
approach based on the incompetence ratione materiae o f the forum. However he concluded that State 
immunity should be retained because (i) it was a familiar technique for States and their courts and its 
removal would cause serious concern to many States; and (ii) with a proper level o f articulation 
immunity is a “relatively straightforward and predictable technique” and much better developed and 
more certain than the “vague, conflicting and disputable” doctrines of act o f State and non­
justiciability which form part of some common law systems. Furthermore (iii) the reliance on act of 
State or non-justiciability, may lead to an unnecessarily exaggerated form of dualism, which might 
threaten any ability of the municipal court to apply international law as part o f the law of the forum. 
The central point being that State immunity is defeasible by consent o f the respondent State. Similar 
objections mutatis mutandis can be made to the proposal to replace the immunities of international 
organisations by a general theory of the incompetence of municipal courts ratione materiae.
Crawford “International and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions” (1983) 54 
BYIL 75 atpp.81-2
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functional organisation involved in, for example, scientific research is likely to be 
granted more rudimentary immunities.
However the European Communities appear somewhat exceptional in this respect. It 
now seems almost trite to observe that the powers of the Communities are notable 
both for their breadth over so many areas of the governance of their member States, 
but also for their depth as demonstrated by the direct applicability of Community law 
to individuals. In other words the Communities come closer than other international 
organisations to establishing a genuine economic and political community, 
comparable in some respects to that of a State. Yet when considering their 
jurisdictional immunities, it is striking how limited these are, relating to execution
179 1 7 0  # .rather than jurisdiction. Seidl-Hohenveldem suggests that this is explained at the 
policy level by the intentions of the founding fathers of the Communities that they 
should resemble as far as possible the structures of a federal State, which do not have 
immunities from the constituent units, but rather enjoy wide areas of exclusive 
jurisdiction. In practice the European Court of Justice has wide areas of exclusive 
jurisdiction, and in some circumstances is available to private persons who are 
adversely affected by actions of the Communities. Moreover the ECJ has fashioned 
doctrines such as the supremacy of Community law which ensure that national courts 
can not hinder the functioning of the Communities.
It will be shown in the next Chapter that in respect of other international 
organisations, as a general rule, the greater that the involvement of a given
172 See Ch. 3 infra
173 see Seidl Hohenveldem “L’immunite de juridiction des Communautes europeennes” 1990 Rev. du 
Marche Commun 475-9
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organisation in commercial activities is anticipated in the performance of its 
functions, the more limited its immunity is likely to be in respect of those activities. 
Hence the constituent instruments of the international development banks and other 
financial organisations anticipate their involvement in significant transactions on the 
international capital markets, and correspondingly their immunities are reduced in 
respect of these transactions. The reason cited for the restriction of immunity is that 
it assists these organisations in the achievement of their purposes, as without it they 
would not carry sufficient confidence in the market to be able to carry on the 
transactions necessary for the achievement of those purposes.
There would seem to be two possible arguments as to this treaty practice, the more 
radical would be that the treaty practice suggests that since immunity is restricted 
when commercial activities are clearly included within the purposes of the 
organisation, immunity ought also to be restricted when other international 
organisations take part in commercial transactions ancillary to their purposes. 
However the more conservative approach would be that since immunity is only 
restricted in relation to certain organisations in the relevant treaty provisions, an a 
contrario interpretation would suggest that other organisations must be intended to 
enjoy absolute immunity. Practice as will be shown is not completely unanimous but 
tends to favour the latter argument.
For those organisations benefiting from an absolute immunity under relevant treaty 
provisions there appear to be two mitigating circumstances whereby injustice to 
private parties external to these organisations can be avoided. Firstly in all the treaty 
provisions considered there is an express exception to immunity in cases of
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waiver.174 It might be noted that early in the development of international 
organisations it was thought that there would be a general willingness on the part of 
international organisations to waive their immunity in the day-to-day contacts with 
third parties, unless there were special circumstances by reason of which waiver was
1 * jc
inappropriate. However in practice almost the opposite has proved true, in that 
international organisations have proved rather unwilling as a rule to waive their 
immunity unless special circumstances exist whereby the international organisation 
is rendered free from direct involvement.176
The second mitigating factor is the obligation upon international organisations in 
cases in which they avail themselves of their jurisdictional immunities, to establish 
alternative dispute settlement procedures. The variety of options by which this 
obligation may be fulfilled is open. Thus whilst some international organisations rely 
solely upon ad hoc arbitration in this respect,177 other possibilities range from a
178 • a •quasi-administrative claims procedure to a full blown judicial procedure before
170standing court or tribunal. However so far there has been little evaluation of how
174 See Chapter 3 infra
175 Mackinnon Wood “Legal relations between individuals and a world organisation o f States” 1944 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 141 at p. 162
176 For example where an international organisation has insurance against third party claims, see ch.3 
infra.
177 Glavinis reviews the relatively small number of arbitral awards made in contractual disputes 
between international organisations and private persons. He concludes that arbitration is most suitable 
means by which international organisations can fulfill the obligation to establish alternative remedies 
to third parties see P.Glavinis Les litiges relatif au contrats passes entre organisations intemationales 
et personnes privees (1990) esp. at pp.241-2
178 In situations where a number of similar relatively small scale claims are likely to be made against 
an international organisation, it may set up a claims commission to handle them, as has been done by 
the UN in relation to certain peace-keeping forces (see Bowett United Nations Forces .(Stevens, 
London, 1964) at pp.242-8
179 As regards the internal law of international organisations there are a number of well-established 
administrative tribunals which are established to settle employment disputes of international
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fully this obligation is in fact discharged by the adoption particular modes of 
settlement. Thus for example in the Beer and Reagan case for example the European 
Court of Human Rights found that the existence of an alternative procedure before an 
appeals board was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the right of access to a 
court for the determination of civil rights, without conducting a deeper enquiry into 
its adequacy.180
A final point to make is that these immunities ratione personae are granted to 
international organisations exclusively by treaty provisions. This means that by 
virtue of the rule of non tertiis nocent in international treaty law, such immunities 
only apply as between the member States of an organisation, and that there is no 
obligation upon non-member States to grant immunities of this nature.
F. Conclusions
The immunities of international organisations play an important role in ensuring the 
institutional autonomy and international status of international organisations. 
Jurisdictional immunities (properly so-called) are primarily granted by way of 
express treaty provision in accordance with the functional requirements of each
organisations with members of their staff. However there are also two examples o f standing judicial 
bodies which can hear a wider range of disputes:
The ILO Administrative Tribunal is also empowered to hear disputes arising out o f ILO contracts in 
relation to matters other than employment, though there appears to be little practice in this respect 
(see eg Knapp “Questions juridique relatives a la construction d’immeubles par les organisations 
intemationales” 1977 Sw.YBIL 51-80) and the competence does not extend to the non-employment 
contracts o f the other international organisations which use the services of the ILOAT in the 
settlement o f their employment dipsutes.
Secondly arguably the best example of a standing judicial procedure to determine the disputes o f an 
international organisation is o f course the European Court of Justice of the European Communities.
180 Decided 18 February 1999, see casenote by Reinisch (1999) 93 AJIL 933.
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organisation. It is therefore necessary to be cautious in generalising about the proper 
extent of the immunities of international organisations. The functional standard is a 
flexible one, and must be understood in the light of the treaty practice by which 
immunities of international organisations are granted. A consequence of such 
immunity deriving solely from treaty is that it only extends to the Parties to the treaty 
in question, and cannot impose on an obligation on third States to recognise 
immunity.
However at the same time as recognising these functional immunities, it might be 
noted that the international status of an international organisation may nevertheless 
require some recognition and accommodation within national law. It was argued in 
the last chapter that international personality derives from customary international 
law, and has an objective character, i.e. that it should be recognised by both member 
States and non-member States. It appears that the international status of an 
international organisation, gives rise to a rule requiring national jurisdictions to 
refrain from adjudicating upon issues governed by its own internal law or 
institutional law. This is based upon an incompetence ratione materiae and practice 
and principle suggest that it precludes all national jurisdictions, whether or not the 
forum State is a member of the organisation in question.
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CHAPTER 3
SOURCES OF IMMUNITY AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Introduction
The rationale of jurisdictional immunities of international organisations was discussed 
in the previous chapter, where it was shown that their conceptual basis in “functional 
necessity” was not a monolithic explanation, to be applied with equal effect to all 
international organisations. Instead it was suggested that the functional standard is a 
flexible approach, the purpose of which is to ensure that the functional requirements of 
each international organisation may be accommodated within the international system 
by which jurisdictional competence is allocated among States.
The aim of this chapter is to consider the sources of international law on the 
jurisdictional immunities of international organisations, in order to see how the 
functional approach has been applied and interpreted in practice. In contrast with the 
law on State immunity, the primary source of the law for the more recent and, in some 
respects, more complex immunities of international organisations is through a vast web 
of treaty provisions. The first section of this Chapter will consider those treaty 
provisions, and try and map through the range of this material. The second section will 
consider the practice of international organisations, which has a particularly significant 
role in the interpretation of treaty provisions relating to international organisations.1 
The third Section will consider how various international tribunals have interpreted 
international immunities.
1 See E.Lauterpacht ‘The Development o f the Law of International Organisation by the decisions of 
International Tribunals” (1976) 152 Hague Rec. 377, esp. at 447-465
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A. Treaty Provisions
Claims to jurisdictional immunities by international organisations in most cases have 
their basis in provisions of treaty law, whether in the constitutive instrument of the 
organisation, or in an additional multilateral convention or protocol specifically on 
privileges and immunities, or in the headquarters agreement entered into by the 
organisation with its host State. In the past such treaty provisions have been said to be 
so similar as to provide a uniform rule as to jurisdictional immunity. As will be shown 
below the multiplicity of organisations now in existence reveals a more varied range of 
treaty provisions than these writers anticipated. Certainly some organisations, mainly 
those which are universal, together with certain regional organisations which have 
broad political objects, as well as those which have judicial functions, enjoy wide 
jurisdictional immunities, often formulated in English texts as “immunity from every 
form of legal process”. However in relation to other organisations, for example those 
with more limited or economic functions which envisage their entry into the market­
place, or whose operations require direct considerable interaction with private persons, 
then immunity under the relevant treaty provision may be much more limited.
(1) Immunity from “every form of legal process”
(a) The United Nations
As was shown in the previous chapter, it is mainly in the post-World War II period that 
it has become usual for the immunities of international organisations to be addressed in
2 see J.-F. Lalive “L’immunite de juridiction des etats et des organisations intemationales” (1953) 84 
Rec. des Cours 205, at pp.304-6; and Jenks International Immunities (Stevens, London, 1961) pp.33-4.
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"X •  » •conventional provisions. The United Nations was one of the first organisations whose
own jurisdictional immunity was specifically addressed by its member States, and the
relevant conventional provisions have served in this respect as a model for subsequent
organisations and agreements. Article 105 of the UN Charter provides:
“(1) The organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
(2) Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the 
Organisation shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the independent exercise of the functions in connection with the 
Organisation.
(3) The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to 
determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article 
or may propose convention to the Members of the United Nations for this 
purpose.”
Thus it is clear from paragraph (1) that “functional necessity” is the basis of the 
Organisation’s own immunities. Examination of the documents of the San Francisco 
Conference reveals that this standard was chosen precisely because of its flexibility, 
both in relation to the extent of immunities and possibly even as between the different 
member States.4
3 The immunities o f the League of Nations itself, were not contained in the Covenant (though article 7(4) 
required that its officials should be granted diplomatic immunities in the performance o f their functions). 
However the modus vivendi o f 1926 between the Swiss Government and the League o f Nations and the 
ILO, contains an article providing that the League, “having international personality and juridical 
capacity, can not, in principle, under international law, be impleaded before the Swiss courts without its 
express consent” see ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p. 134.
The Bretton Woods Institutions established in 1944, appear to be among the first international 
organisations whose immunities are addressed in their constituent instruments, see text infra. For surveys 
of the historical development before 1945 see Cahier Etude des accords de siege entre les organisations 
intemationales et les etats ou elles resident (Giuffre, Milan, 1959) and Kunz “Privileges and Immunities 
of International Organizations”(1947) 41 AJIL 828.
4 The question of privileges and immunities was not considered in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but in 
the San Francisco Conference it was considered by a Subcommittee to Committee IV/2 on Legal 
Problems. The Subcommittee’s report contains text of what is now Article 105, and contains inter alia 
the following comments indicating the flexibility that was intended by the functional necessity formula:
“[Sub-paragraph 1] of this proposed article refers to the Organisation considered as a distinct entity... In 
order to determine the nature of the privileges and immunities, the subcommittee has seen fit to avoid the 
term ‘diplomatic’ and has preferred to substitute a more appropriate standard, based, for the purposes of 
the Organisation, on the necessity o f realising its purposes and, in the case of the representatives of its
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However in accordance with Article 105(3), in 1946 the General Assembly adopted 
the Convention on the on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, referred 
to as the “General Convention”,5 which seeks to give flesh to principle set out in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 105. The General Convention provides inter alia for 
the personality of the organisation, its immunities from jurisdiction and constraint, the 
inviolability of its archives and premises, its freedom from financial controls its fiscal 
immunities, and its freedom of communication. The General Convention also deals 
with the immunities of representatives of the Member States, the immunities of 
officials of the Organisation and the immunities of experts on mission.
The precise relationship between the provisions of Article 105(1) and (2), and the 
General Convention requires some consideration. Firstly there is a question as to 
whether the Convention contains obligations applicable only to the States Parties to 
that Convention, or whether it has a broader application as an interpretation of the 
functionally necessary privileges and immunities required by Article 105(1) and (2).
members and the officials of the Organisation, on providing for the independent exercise of their 
functions... The draft article proposed by the subcommittee does not specify the privileges and 
immunities respect for which it imposes on the member States. This has been thought superfluous. The 
terms privileges and immunities indicate in a general way all that could be considered necessary to the 
realisation of the purposes of the Organisation, to the free functioning of its organs and to the 
independent exercise o f the functions and duties o f their officials: exemption from tax, immunity from 
jurisdiction, facilities for communication, inviolability of buildings, properties, and archives, etc. It 
would moreover have been impossible to establish a list valid for all the member States and taking 
account of the special situation in which some of them might find themselves by reason of the activities 
of the Organisation or of its organs in their territory. But if there is one certain principle it is that no 
member State may hinder in any way the working of the Organisation or take any measures the effect of 
which might be to increase its burdens, financial or other.” See UNCIO Documents vol. 13 pp.778-780.
However Lalive suggests that despite its importance this Report should not be seen as providing an 
authentic interpretation, op.cit. note 2 supra, at p.311.
5 ie the Convention which governed the juridical relations between the Organisation and its Members 
generally, as opposed to the “Special Agreement” which was to deal with relations with the Host State. 
In fact the HQ Agreement with the USA does not deal with the question of jurisdictional immunity as 
such.
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The General Convention is widely taken up, and now has 146 ratifications out of 191 
member States. However the UN Legal Counsel’s opinion is clearly that the 
significance of the General Convention is broader than simply a contractual 
arrangement among the States which have ratified it, in a number of respects. Firstly 
Article 105 of the Charter obliges member States to accord the Organisation such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary. The General Convention then specifies that 
the immunities which the General Assembly considers are necessary. Its provisions in 
that sense may be seen as a minimum which all States must accord to the Organisation, 
whereas additional obligations may be necessary for certain States in which the 
Organisation carries out particular operations. Finally, not only are the vast majority of 
member States parties to the General Convention, but its provisions have been adopted 
in special agreements with a number of States which are either not parties to the 
Convention or not members of the Organisation. Legal counsel concludes therefore 
that whatever the status of the provisions of the General Convention may have been in 
1946, “they are now so widely accepted that they have become part of the general 
international law governing the relations of States and the United Nations”.6
On the question of jurisdictional immunities the General Convention provides:
“Section 2. The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and 
by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process 
except in so far as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. 
It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any 
measure of execution.”
6 See Statement made by the Legal Counsel at the 1016th meeting of the Sixth committee of the General 
Assembly on 6.12.67 (1967 UNJY 311-314).
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nThe words “every form of legal process” have been interpreted literally as endowing 
the organisation with an absolute immunity from “every form of legal process before 
national authorities, whether judicial administrative or executive functions according to 
national law”.8 The Convention terms were initially drafted by the Preparatory 
Commission of the United Nations,9 and at that time the question of jurisdictional 
immunity appears not to have been controversial either in the Preparatory Commission 
or the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.10
However there is another possible interpretation of section 2 of the General 
Convention, which is relevant to the present enquiry, but which has been raised only 
rarely in caselaw or the literature.11 The orthodox reading of section 2 of the General 
Convention together with Article 105(1) of the Charter is that the jurisdictional 
immunity required by the Organisation to fulfil its purposes is unlimited. However an
7 Though it might be noted that the French text o f the Convention refers simply to “immunite de 
jurisdiction”.
8 see UN Legal Counsel’s Statement 1967 YBILC Pt II at p.224 §76; and also see Dominice 
“L’immunity de juridiction et d’execution des organisations intemationales” (1984) 187 Rec. de Cours 
145 at p. 180.
9 The original draft is similar but it may be argued that it anticipated (a) a slightly more precise concept 
of jurisdictional immunity (the reference to judicial as opposed to legal process) and (b) a broader 
concept of waiver. The Prep. Comm, draft read:
“The Organisation, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that in any case it expressly waives its 
immunity for the purpose o f any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.”
It studied the terms of the constitutive treaties o f a number o f existing organisations but reproduced the 
terms of the IMF Articles o f agreement on the point. The other organisations it considered were the 
IBRD (see text infra), UNRRA and ECITO (both of which referred to the immunities granted by the 
members to each other including immunity from legal process) and the FAO (which refers to the 
immunities granted to diplomatic missions).
10 Sixth Committee discussions and documents A/C.6/17; A/C.6/19; A/C.6/28; A/C.6/31; A/C.6/32; 
A/C.6/33; and its Report to the GA A/43/Rev.l. For the discussion and resolution of the General 
Assembly see the Verbatim Record of the First Session for 13.2.46,p.448-456.
11 But see the Belgian case of Manderlier v. ONU  (1972) 6 9 ILR 139; also Wickremasinghe and 
Verdirame “Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human Rights in the course of UN Field 
Operations” in C.Scott (ed.) Torture as Tort (Hart, Oxford,2001) p. 465, at pp.476-8
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alternative reading would be that the immunity from every form of legal process in 
section 2 is limited by the notion of functional necessity in Article 105(1) of the 
Charter. Thus whilst Section 2 might be operative in relation to any form of legal 
process, it does not extend the scope of the immunity ratione materiae beyond what is 
functionally necessary in accordance Article 105(1) of the Charter. However as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, application of this approach may raise difficult questions 
relating to the appropriateness of national courts determining what is functionally 
necessary.
In any event there are two established qualifications to the immunity of the 
Organisation. Firstly under terms of the Convention itself national courts will have 
jurisdiction in cases where the Organisation expressly waives its immunity. However 
as will be discussed below practice in relation to waiver of immunity remains largely 
undeveloped, as it is the UN appears generally to take a cautious approach to waiver.
The second relates to road accidents involving cars owned or driven by persons
enjoying immunity from legal process. It was anticipated in the Sixth Committee that
this might constitute a frequent source of difficulty, and thus they recommended that
the General Assembly to adopt a resolution instructing the Secretary General to ensure
that all UN drivers and vehicles, as well as members of staff who own or drive vehicles
should be properly insured against third party risks. A resolution to this effect was
adopted immediately following the General Assembly’s adoption of the General 
1 ^
Convention. Further, as an exception to its general approach noted above, in cases of
12 see Resolution 23(1) Annex E adopted on 13 February 1946
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disputes arising from road accidents the United Nations may waive its immunity from
1 ^suit to enable its insurers to defend proceedings if so requested.
However as a counterpart to this wide immunity from suit in relation to proceedings 
before national courts, Section 29 of Article VIII of the General Convention also 
requires:
“The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement 
of:
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character 
to which the United Nations is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United nations who by reason of his 
official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the 
Secretaiy-General
In relation to contractual disputes this obligation is usually observed by the inclusion 
of a compromissory clause referring disputes to arbitration.14 This is only a partial 
solution to the problems which jurisdictional immunities raise, as it is a largely 
consensual mode of settlement, and there are no standing arrangements which can be 
accessed by complainants for the settlement of disputes. Further as will be discussed 
later this is an obligation which appears to be enforceable only at the international level 
i.e. by a State party to the General Convention bringing a claim against the 
international organisation, and there being little a private party can do to enforce it.15
13 See Documents A/CN.4/L.118 and Add.1 & .2, 1967 vol.II YBILC p.155 at p.225 § 84; and 
A./CN.4/L383 and Add.1-3,1985 Vol.II pt.l YBILC pl45 at p.162 §19.
14 Whilst the delocalisation o f disputes by the use of arbitration is in many ways understandable and may 
be important in relation to certain types of case, the juxtaposition of arbitration and jurisdictional 
immunity throws up some interesting questions which have not yet been resolved (see section on 
arbitration below).
15 This is not a solely academic point, as at least one international organisation in the UN family has 
taken the view that it is under no obligation to include such compromissory clauses in contracts but 
rather that its obligations only extend to providing suitable procedures once a dispute has arisen - see 
information provided by UNESCO to N.Valticos “Les contrats conclus par les organisations 
intemationales avec des personnes privees” (1977) Ann.IDI 1, at p.68). The point was also alluded to in
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Lastly mention should be made of the position of the UN in Switzerland which until
recently has been a party to neither the General Convention nor the UN Charter. In
Switzerland the UN had to rely upon the “Interim Arrangement on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations” of 1946.16 According to Art.l of this Agreement:
“The Swiss Federal Council recognises the international personality and legal 
capacity of the United Nations. Consequently, according to the rules of 
international law, the Organisation can not be sued before the Swiss Courts 
without its express consent.”
This formulation appears to owe much to the modus vivendi between Switzerland and
17the League of Nations of 1926, deriving jurisdictional immunity directly from
1Xinternational personality. The insertion of the words “according to the rules of 
international law” may suggest a possible qualification, limiting immunity if that is 
what other rules of international law require. Writing in 1953 Lalive appears not to 
assign any particular value to this phrase, ruling out the possibility that it might import 
either the distinction between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis from the law of 
State immunity, or the possibility of it referring to conventional rules such as Article 
104 and 105.19 As will be seen below this view seems to have been largely accepted in 
practice, as the Swiss courts have not sought to establish jurisdiction over the United 
Nations.
one part of the International Tin Council litigation (see Standard Chartered Bank v. ITC 77 ILR 8, at 
p l  5).
16 1 UNTS 163
17 reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER/B/11 at p. 134.
18 There may be a danger of circularity here. In the Reparation case (discussed in chapter 1 supra) it will 
be recalled that the ICJ deduced the international personality of the UN from inter alia the separateness 
of the Organisation from its member States as demonstrated in the General Convention.
19 op. cit. note 2 supra at pp.329-30
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(b) The Specialised Agencies
In addition to drafting the General Convention, the Preparatory Commission of the 
United Nations also recommended drawing together the law on the privileges and 
immunities of the Specialised Agencies as far as possible, but in the light of the
<jOflexibility inherent in the functional standard. The Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialised Agencies (hereafter the “1947 Convention”) seeks to 
strike this balance laying out in its text standard clauses setting out the privileges and 
immunities generally to be granted to the Specialised Agencies (closely modelled on 
the provisions of the General Convention) and then providing in annexes modifications 
in the application of the standard clauses in relation to each of the organisations. 
Although there may be an underlying tension between the aims of unifying the law and 
allowing it sufficient flexibility to meet the particular requirements of each 
organisation, this appears not to have been a difficulty in relation to jurisdictional 
immunities for these organisations. Whilst most of the Specialised Agencies have a 
general clause in their respective Constitutions obliging member States to grant them
•y t
privileges and immunities in very broad terms, few specify that jurisdictional 
immunity shall be granted.
20 See Report o f  the Preparatory Commission 1945, Chapter VII, §5:
“The Preparatory Commission recommends to the General Assembly that the privileges and immunities 
of specialised agencies contained in their respective constitutions should be reconsidered. If necessary, 
negotiations should be opened for their coordination in the light of any convention ultimately adopted by 
the United Nations ... There are many advantages in the unification, as far as possible of the privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by the United Nations and the various specialised agencies. On the other hand, it 
must be recognised that not all specialised agencies require all the privileges and immunities which may 
be needed by others. No specialised agency would however require greater privileges than the United 
Nations itself. Certain specialised agencies, may, by reason of their particular functions, require 
privileges of a special nature which are not required by the United Nations. The privileges and 
immunities, therefore, o f the United Nations might be regarded as a maximum within which the various 
specialised agencies should enjoy just such privileges as the proper fulfilment of their respective 
functions may require. It should be a principle that no immunities, which are not really necessary, should 
be asked for.”
21 ie in general, the Constitutions of the Specialised Agencies contain a general provision requiring 
member States to accord to them such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of
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Thus the 1947 Convention performs a similar function in relation to the Specialised 
Agencies as the General Convention does in relation to the UN itself. Its terms also 
reflect the General Convention: ss 4 and 31 of the 1947 Convention deal respectively 
with the questions of jurisdictional immunity and the settlement of disputes of a 
contractual or private law nature, in exactly the same terms as the provisions of the
99General Convention. In this respect only the EBRD, IFC and IDA have specified that 
a more limited jurisdictional immunity should be applied to them in accordance with 
their constitutive instruments (see below). For the other Specialised Agencies the 
standard of immunity enjoyed by the UN, appears also to be applicable under the 1947 
Convention.
This appears to have been widely accepted by the States parties to the 1947 
Convention. In the various reservations and declarations which States have made to the 
1947 Convention only Italy has reserved its position in relation to the extent of
their purposes/functions eg ILO (Art. 40 Constitution of the ILO 1946 (15 UNTS 40)); UNESCO 
(Art. 12 Constitution of UNESCO (4 UNTS 275)); WHO (Art.67 (2) Constitution of the WHO (14 
UNTS 186)); WMO (Art.XIX(b)(i) Constitution of WMO 77 UNTS 144); WTO (Art.VIII(2); UNIDO 
(art. 21 o f UNIDO Constitution (18 ILM 667) though in this case there is also reference to the specific 
standards of both the 1947 Convention and the General Convention); IFAD art. 10(2) of the Agreement 
establishing IFAD (15 ILM 922)).
Somewhat different provisions govern the immunities o f the FAO (Constitution of the FAO in Article 
XVI(2) obliges member States “to accord the organisation all the immunities and facilities which it 
accords to the diplomatic missions, including inviolability o f premises and archives, immunity from suit 
and exemptions from taxation”); the IMF (Art.IX(3) Articles o f Agreement of the IMF, provides for 
“immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity 
for the purpose o f any proceedings or by the terms o f any contract”); IMO (whose Constitution refers to 
the privileges and immunities as contained in the 1947 Convention (subject to the Annex relating to its 
application to the IMO)). For the IBRD and IFC see text infra.
The exceptions are: ICAO (Article 47 of the Chicago Convention o f 1947 (15 UNTS 295) and WIPO 
(Art 12 o f WIPO Constitution (828 UNTS 3)) whose Constitutions only refer to their legal capacity as 
being that necessary for the performance of their functions; and the ITU and UPU whose organisational 
structure is rather different, and whose Constitutions do not mention the issue.
22 Annexes VI, XIII and XIV to the 1947 Convention, respectively.
134
jurisdictional immunity which it will grant to any Specialised Agency wishing to 
establish its Headquarters or any regional office on Italian territory, claiming that in 
accordance with section 39 the terms of the Convention will be subject to 
supplementary agreements contained in host State arrangements.
In this relation it is interesting to note treaty provisions in the host State arrangements 
of two States which are not party to 1947 Convention, Switzerland and Canada, both 
which refer to extraneous standards of immunity. The practice of the Swiss 
government appears to use the diplomatic standard of immunity in HQ Agreements 
with international organisations based in its territory.24 Contrastingly ICAO’s HQ 
agreement with Canada refers to the Organisation as having the same immunity as a
95foreign State. As no cases have been decided in which these provisions have been 
construed it is not possible to say whether these provisions introduce significant 
qualifications to the immunities provided for in the 1947 Convention.
23 The text o f Section 39 in fact appears as if  it were not intended to allow such limitations of immunities 
in this way, but rather only allow for supplementary immunities to be granted. However no State has 
objected to this reservation by Italy.
24 See e.g. Art 3 of the HQ Agreement with ILO of 1946, reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at 
p. 138; and Art. 3 o f the HQ Agreement with the WHO reprinted ibid. at p.254.
25 In relation to ICAO’s HQ Agreement with Canada it is interesting to note that it was renegotiated 
relatively recently and yet this provision has remained unaltered -  see M.Milde “New Headquarters 
Agreement between ICAO and Canada” (1992) XVII-II Annals o f Air and Space Law 305-22
It is also interesting to compare this situation under the ICAO HQ Agreement with the situation which 
previously obtained in relation to Italy’s position on the 1947 Convention. When Italy first sought to 
accede to the Convention it also sought to make a reservation from the provision on jurisdictional 
immunity limiting the extent o f immunity from suit enjoyed by the Specialised Agencies in Italy to that 
enjoyed by foreign States. This reservation was deemed unacceptable and Italy was not considered a 
party to the Convention (see Dominice (1984) 187 Rec. des cours 145, at p.190). This strongly suggests 
that the opinio iuris o f States was that the rules o f State immunity should not be applied directly to 
international organisations.
The result o f the rejection o f Italy’s accession to the 1947 Convention was that, in the absence of an 
applicable treaty provision, the Italian Courts were left to apply customary international law. However 
following some controversial events which resulted from this situation, the anomalies o f which were 
brought out by the fact of the HQ o f the FAO being sited in Rome (and the fact that the HQ Agreement 
does not provide for the jurisdictional immunities of the Organisation), Italy has now modified its 
reservation see (text at note 23 supra) and acceded to the Convention on 30.8.85.
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(c) Other “political” and “military” organisations
Similar provisions requiring immunity from every form of legal process also apply to a
77number of broad political organisations including the Council of Europe; the WEU; 
the Arab League;28 OAS;29 OAU(Art II and IX);30 NATO;31 and the IAEA.32
It is interesting to note that in all of these cases the document in question is a 
multilateral agreement (“a general convention”) on the privileges and immunities, 
mostly dating from the 1950’s, and that they are set out in broad terms of principle. 
These conventions tend to include in their final provisions that the Secretaiy-General 
of the organisation in question can enter into supplementary agreements with
26 See General Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities o f the Council o f Europe (1949 reprinted in 
UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p390). Article 3 provides for immunity from every form of legal process 
except in so far as in any particular case the Committee of Ministers has authorised its waiver. Article 21 
requires that any dispute between the Council and private persons regarding supplies furnished, services 
rendered or immoveable property, shall be submitted to arbitration.
27 see Agreement on the Status of WEU, National Representatives and International Staff (1955 and 
reprinted in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.421). Article 4 provides for immunity from every form of 
legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Secretary General authorises waiver. Article 26 
provides that the Council shall make provision for appropriate methods o f settling disputes of a private 
character to which the organisation is a party.
28 see Convention of the Privileges and Immunities o f the League o f Arab States (1953 - reprinted in UN 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.414). Article 2 provides for immunity from every form of legal process, 
unless the Secretary General decides to waive it expressly. Article 31 States that the League shall 
establish an organ for settling contractual disputes and other disputes of a private law category.
29 See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the OAS (1949 - reprinted in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.377). Article 2 provides for immunity from every form of legal process except in 
so far as it is waived. Article 12 States that the Organisation will make provision for appropriate modes 
of settlement of contractual disputes or other disputes of a private law nature.
30 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the OAU (reprinted in Naldi (ed.) Documents of the 
Organisation o f African Unity (Mansell, London 1992).
31 Art.5 and 24 o f the 1951 Ottawa Agreement on the status of the NATO, National Representatives and 
International Staff 200 UNTS 3.
32 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities o f the IAEA (1959 - reprinted in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.357). Section 3 provides for immunity from every form of legal suit except to 
the degree it has waived it in any particular case. Section 33 States that the Agency shall make provision 
for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes arising out o f contracts or other disputes of a private law 
nature.
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members, which may include adjustments to these provisions. This raises the 
possibility for host States to introduce further qualifications to the immunity granted by 
the general conventions.
The position in relation to NATO is also subject to some qualifications in relation to its 
various HQ. Whilst the Ottawa Agreement is a General Convention stating the broad 
principle of an apparently absolute immunity enjoyed by the Organisation, in relation 
to its Headquarters, this is effectively modified by the incorporation of the provisions 
of the SOFA relating to claims. This establishes a special system for the settlement 
primarily of non-contractual claims.
The organisations considered here, largely share the opinion that they have a full 
immunity from local jurisdiction, and thus the jurisdiction of the local courts can only 
be established on the basis of their consent or waiver.34 Despite the breadth of these 
claims to immunity the numbers of disputes concerning their application are
i f  • •remarkably few. As will be discussed below the general policy of most of these 
organisations will be not to waive immunity in most cases. In accordance with the 
requirement to provide suitable alternative modes of dispute settlement, a number of
33 Interestingly contractual claims are specifically excepted from the scope of the SOFA, and although 
the Paris Protocol provides that the Supreme HQ may be brought before local courts as a defendant or a 
plaintiff, the immunity provision of the Ottawa Agreement appears to govern, thus sheltering the 
organisation from their jurisdiction - see NATO replies to Secretariat Questionnaire ST/LEG/17 on 6 
April 1987, at p. 106. Whereas the liability of sending States in relation to claims against their forces 
under the SOFA, appear to be subject to the usual rules o f State immunity regarding the difference 
between acts iure imperii and those iure gestionis, see Lazareff Status o f Military Forces under Current 
International Law (Sijthoff, Leiden 1971) at p.313-315 (similarly where the SOFA is not part o f local 
law the rules of state immunity are also likely to apply in relation to non-contractual liability eg see 
Littrel v. USA (No.2) ([1994] 4 All ER 203).
34 see Valticos op.cit. note 15 supra, at pp.91-94
35 In 1987, the UN collected together practice from many o f these organisations in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/17, and it is remarkable how few reported any difficulties at all in relation to the operation of 
immunities.
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these organisations incorporate compromissory clauses providing for arbitration in 
their contracts with private persons.
(d) International judicial bodies
A further category of international organisation which enjoy broad immunities from 
legal process are international courts and tribunals. It is axiomatic that the judicial 
function should be carried out in full independence as much in international law as it 
is in national law. The International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations enjoys immunity under Article 105 of the Charter. In addition 
Article 19 of the Statute of the Court specifies that its members shall enjoy 
“diplomatic immunities” (following the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice), and Article 42 provided that the agents, counsel and advocates 
of the parties before the Court enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary to the 
independent exercise of their duties. In 1946 the Court negotiated an agreement with 
the Government of the Netherlands on the privileges and immunities of all those 
connected with the Court (including the Judges the Registrar and members of the 
Registry staff, assessors, agents, counsel as well as witnesses and experts) contained 
in an Exchange of Notes of 26 June 1946, and subsequently approved by the 
General Assembly.38 The Agreement therefore deals only with the immunities of 
persons involved with the Court, rather than the Court as an institution itself. These 
immunities are granted in the interests of the administration of international justice
on
and not for the benefit of the individuals. The Exchange of Notes reflects the 
General Assembly’s view that the privileges and immunities of persons connected
36 ibid. at pp.74-86
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with the Court should be dealt with separately from the General Convention, since it 
was inappropriate to treat the Judges of the Court as “officials” of the Organisation.40
Other international courts which have express provisions on legal personality enjoy 
institutional immunities as well as the immunities of the various categories persons 
involved with diem. Thus Article 5 of the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), provides 
for an unrestricted immunity from legal process of the Tribunal, as well as the 
immunity of its property, assets and funds 41 Similarly Article 6 of the recent 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, 
provides for immunity of the Court and property, funds and assets from “every form 
of legal process” 42 Other International judicial/arbitral bodies provide make similar 
provision.43
(2) Treaty provisions containing express limitations on immunity
(a) Organisations involved in economic and commercial transactions
37 For text see ST/LEG/SER.B/10 at p. 193. For comment see Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice o f  
the International Court 1920-96 (Kluwer. The Hague, 1997) at pp. 426-30 and 440-41
38 See Resolution 9(1) o f 11 December 1946
39 A similar approach is taken in respect o f the European Court o f Human Rights, see Sixth Protocol 
to the general Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the Council o f Europe (ETS No. 162) - 
see A. Dzremczewski “The European Human Rights Convention: A New Court o f Human Rights as 
of 1 November 1998” (1998) 55 Wash. And Lee LR 697 esp. at pp.705-6
40 see Resolution 22 (I) Annex C of 13 February 1946.
41 Reproduced in International Tribunal fo r  the Law o f  the Sea - Basic texts 1998 (Kluwer, The Hague 
1999) at p. 81
42 see www.un.org/law/icc/apic/apic(e).pdf
43 see for example Article 18 on the 1965 Washington Convention on the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (4 ILM 352)
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Certain of the larger international organisations are granted only limited immunity 
under their relevant conventional instruments, including those in the World Bank 
Group, i.e. the EBRD, the IFC and the EDA. The jurisdictional immunity of the IBRD is 
dealt with in ss. 3 and 4 of Article VII of its Articles of Agreement, in the following 
terms:
“Section 3. Position o f the Bank with regard to judicial process 
Actions may be brought against the bank only in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has 
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or 
has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by 
members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The property 
and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be 
immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery 
of a final judgment against the Bank.
Section 4. Immunity o f assets from seizure
Property and assets of the bank, wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any 
other form of seizure, by executive or legislative action.”44
These provisions therefore quite severely restrict the scope of the jurisdictional
immunities of the Bank. Similar provisions are incorporated into the constitutive
instruments of other World Bank Group institutions, i.e. the IDA, the IFC and to some
degree MIGA45 (but not ICSID)46 Additionally the Charters of the regional
Development Banks also contain restrictions on their immunities, including the
African Development Bank (though immunity is only limited in relation to its
borrowing powers);47 the African Development Fund (for which immunity is limited in
4 o
relation to matters arising from the exercise of its powers to “receive loans”); the
44 2 UNTS 134
45 24 ILM 1598 at art.44 - but note the additional exclusion of disputes on personnel matters
46 supra at note 43
47 art. 52 o f the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank, officially published in the UK 
as Misc. 15 of 1981, Cmnd.8284.
48 art. 43 of the Agreement establishing the African Development Fund, UKTS 49 (1979)
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Asian Development Bank (whose immunity is limited in relation to its powers to 
borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of 
securities);49 Caribbean Development Bank (a similar provision to that of the Asian 
Development Bank);50 the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development;51 and 
Inter-American Development Bank.
The reason for the restrictions on the immunities of these organisations is the fact that 
the achievement of their primary functions requires their substantial involvement in the 
market-place (largely in relation to the raising of private funds and the making of loans 
to private parties). In order to do so they must maintain the confidence of private 
parties in the market-place, and thus the restriction of their jurisdictional immunities is
49 art. 50 o f the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank UKTS 53 (1968)
50 art.49 o f the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank UKTS 36 (1970)
51 see art.46 of the Articles o f Agreement, (1990) 29 ILM 1077: though note that a more specific 
immunities are prescribed in the UK, under the Headquarters Agreement, which provides:
"Article 4
1 Within the scope o f its official activities the Bank shall enjoy immunity from jurisdiction, except 
that the immunity of the Bank shall not apply:
(a) to the extent that the Bank shall have expressly waived any such immunity in any particular case 
or in any written document;
(b) in respect o f civil action arising out o f the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee 
obligations and to buy or sell or underwrite the sale o f any securities;
(c) in respect o f a civil action by a third party for damage arising from a road traffic accident caused 
by an Officer or an Employee of the Bank acting on behalf o f the Bank;
(d) in respect o f a civil action relating to death or personal injury caused by an act or omission in the 
United Kingdom;
(e) in respect o f the enforcement o f an arbitration award made against the Bank as a result o f an 
express submission to arbitration by or on behalf o f the Bank; or
(f) in respect o f any counter-claim directly connected with court proceedings initiated by the Bank.
2 The property and assets o f the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be 
immune from all forms of restraint, seizure, attachment or execution except upon the delivery of final 
judgment against the Bank.”-  see http://www.ebrd.org/pubs/insti/basic/basic6.htm
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functionally necessary. In other words there is a recognition that for an organisation 
whose functions include a considerable degree of interaction with private parties, 
limitations on jurisdictional immunity are appropriate. The point is brought out by a 
contrast with the position of the IMF, which, though its responsibilities are in the 
economic sphere, it acts primarily on the intergovernmental plane rather than at private 
law and thus its immunities are not so limited.
In relation to other economic organisations the various commodity agreements make 
an interesting contrast. In relation to the Common Fund for Commodities its 
involvement in the market place is clearly envisaged. Its constitutive instrument 
provides a comparable limitation on immunity allowing lenders to the Fund and 
purchasers/holders of securities issued by the Fund, and their assignees/successors to 
bring actions before national “courts of competent jurisdiction in places in which the 
Fund has agreed in writing with the other party to be subject”. However if the 
transaction makes no provision for forum, or if such provision as is made is ineffective 
through no fault of the other party, then an action may be brought in the courts of the 
host State (i.e. the Netherlands).
The constitutive instruments of a number of international commodity organisations 
also bear examination. In relation both to the previous generation of international 
commodity agreements which were equipped with economic provisions to maintain 
price and supply by market intervention, and to those which work essentially through 
research and analysis of markets and to some extent coordination of national policies,
52 See Art.9(3) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF UKTS 83 (1978)
53 See art 42(1) o f the Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities 30 September 1981.
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their constituent instruments usually do not specify the extent of their jurisdictional 
immunity, frequently stating that the organisation should enjoy such immunities as it 
may agree with its host State.
In the United Kingdom, which has been or is the host State to a number of these 
organisations, they have generally been granted quite broad jurisdictional immunities, 
but they are withheld in relation to proceedings in which the organisation has (a) 
waived its immunity, (b) road traffic accidents involving owned or driven by the 
organisation or its staff and (c) enforcement of arbitral awards.54 The counterpart to 
this breadth of this jurisdictional immunity is an obligation to include arbitration in its 
contracts, other than staff contracts.55 However in the light of collapse of the 
International Tin Council it might be thought that more limited immunities are 
appropriate to organisations directly participating in the market-place. The fact that the 
ITC enjoyed broad immunities under the Sixth International Tin Agreement was the 
source of some criticism during the litigation. It may be that greater restriction of its 
immunity may have ensured greater caution on the part of the ITC, or at least a 
realisation of its inability to meet its debts at an earlier stage.
The International Oil Pollution Fund presents an interesting case in that the Fund was 
established in order to provide an insurance pool to meet civil liabilities in respect of 
pollution from oil tankers. It was therefore anticipated that its functions would involve 
it in civil proceedings in respect of claims under the Liability Convention, but that in
54 see for example the International Sugar Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1969, SI No. 
734 (1969); and the International Cocoa Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1975, SI No. 
411 (1975).
55 The relevant provisions of the Headquarters Agreements of some of these organisations limit this last 
obligation to contracts entered into with British residents.
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certain respects it ought to be immune. Its immunities under its HQ Agreement with 
the UK are therefore heavily qualified.56
Finally, as regards the limitations on the immunities of organisations active in the 
economic/commercial sphere is quite clearly brought out in two of the institutions 
envisaged under Part XI the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention - the International 
Seabed Authority and the Enterprise. The former is a large inter-governmental body 
charged with a numerous functions primarily on the public international plane in 
relation to the governance of the seabed area (art. 157). As such it enjoys immunity
56 Article 5 of the HQ Agreement (1163 UNTS 3) provides:
“Article 5. IMMUNITY
(1) Within the scope o f its official activities the Fund shall have immunity from jurisdiction and 
execution except:
(a) To the extent that the Fund waives such immunity from jurisdiction or immunity from execution in a 
particular case;
(b) In respect o f actions brought against the Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;
(c) In respect o f any contract for the supply of goods and services, and any loan or other transaction for 
the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect o f any such transaction or of any 
other financial obligation;
(d) In respect o f a civil action by a third party for damage arising from an accident caused by a motor 
vehicle belonging to or operated on behalf of the Fund or in respect o f a motor traffic offence involving 
such a vehicle;
(e) In respect of a civil action relating to death or personal injury caused by an act or omission in the 
United Kingdom;
(f) In the event of the attachment, pursuant to the final order of a court o f law' of the salaries, wages or 
other emoluments owed by the Fund to a staff member o f the Fund;
(g) In respect of the enforcement o f an arbitration of an arbitration award made under article 23 of the 
Agreement; and
(h) in respect o f a counterclaim directly connected with proceedings initiated by the Fund.
(2) The Fund’s property and assets wherever situated shall be immune from any form of 
administrative or provisional judicial constraint, such as requisition, confiscation, expropriation or 
attachment, except in so far as may be temporarily necessary in connection with the prevention of, and 
investigation into, accidents involving motor vehicles belonging to, or operated on behalf of, the Fund.”
It is interesting to note Article 23 provides for arbitration at the instance o f  the host State o f claims, other 
than as between a member of staff and the Fund, in respect o f damage caused by the Fund or other non­
contractual responsibility of the Fund, in respect of which it enjoys jurisdictional immunity or claims 
against a staff member who benefits from immunity and whose immunity has not been waived.
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from legal process except only to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity in a 
particular case (art. 178). However as originally envisaged the Authority was not to be 
involved in the practical aspects of seabed mining and this was to be done by the 
Enterprise. Although the Agreement on the implementation of Part XI of the 
Convention, suggests that the commercial role of the Enterprise remains to be decided 
upon,57 the important point for present purposes is that in Annex IV of the Convention, 
the provisions relating to the privileges and immunities of the Enterprise, which at the 
time of drafting was expected to be a body acting with private parties on a commercial 
basis were very much more limited than those of the Authority. The Enterprise would 
not have immunity from proceedings in the courts of States in which it:
(i) has an office or facility;
(ii) has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of 
process;
(iii) has entered into a contract for goods and services;
(iv) has issued securities; or
ro
(v) is otherwise engaged in commercial activities".
However it would enjoy immunity from enforcement and attachment until such time as 
a final judgment is awarded against it.
(b) Specialised organisations of limited or regional composition
Of the more than three hundred international organisations which currently exist the 
largest number are regional organisations or those with limited membership (as
57 See Section o f the Annex to the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI o f the UNCLOS 
(adopted in by a General assembly Resolution on 17.8.94 A/RES/48/263) See also “Further Efforts to 
Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” - 
D.H.Anderson (1994) 43 ICLQ 886, at p.891.
58 Art 13. Annex IV
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opposed to those universal or quasi-universal organisations mentioned above), and 
which, in contrast to the broad political organisations such as the Council of Europe or 
the OAS or OAU, have narrower and more specialised or technical functions. Such 
organisations carry out a broad range of activities both promotional and operational, 
ranging from technical assistance on matters such as environmental protection or civil 
aviation, to education and scientific research. The large numbers of organisations and 
the breadth of the treaty provisions within this category mean that a comprehensive 
survey is not possible. However a few generalised comments may be made and 
examples will be provided as illustrations.
The most remarkable feature of these organisations looked at as a category is the vast 
range of specialist subject matter with which they are respectively concerned. Some 
deal with traditional governmental activities such as the regulation of air traffic 
whereas others, such as the European Molecular Biology Laboratory or even aspects of 
the work of the European Space Agency deal with matters which are not particular to 
the public sector. Similarly the powers and structures of the organisations within this 
category vary considerably.
In relation to the specific question of jurisdictional immunity there is a diversity in the 
degree to which such immunities are granted, if at all. Thus for example the European 
Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN) is granted absolute immunity from every form of 
legal process,59 this may reflect the sensitivity of its area of research but is probably 
also explained by the fact that it was negotiated in 1956. Other scientific research 
organisations have been granted more limited immunities, for example the European
59 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the CERN 200 UNTS 149
146
Molecular Biology Laboratory.60 Whereas the immunities of the European Centre for 
Medium Range Weather Forecasts are still more limited.61
Other formulations differ further. Thus for example certain organisations enjoy
(\*yimmunity only in relation to their “official activities”. Other organisations do not 
appear to enjoy immunity from jurisdiction at all, though they may still enjoy 
immunity from execution and other privileges.
In addition to considerations of the subject-matter, another factor favouring more 
restricted immunity might be that in an organisation of limited membership there is the 
possibility of greater consensus as to the appropriateness of the intervention of local 
jurisdiction. There is often a greater familiarity with the various legal systems of the
60 Under Art. 6 o f its HQ Agreement with Germany o f 10 December 1974, the immunity of the EMBL 
is limited in respect of waiver, civil liability arising from road traffic accidents, contracts (other than 
employment contracts subject to the staff regulations) enforcement o f arbitral awards, and attachment 
proceedings against the salaries of staff members - Bundesgezetzblatt 1975 II, 933.
61 Under Article 3 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities o f the Centre for Medium Range 
Weather Forecasts (Cmnd. 5632) immunity from jurisdiction is limited to activities within its official 
functions, and then further limited in respect o f waiver (on which there is an interesting provision that 
waiver shall be deemed if  the Centre fails to respond to a request for waiver within 15 days), civil 
liabilities in respect of road traffic accidents, enforcement of arbitral awards and attachment 
proceedings against the salaries of staff members.
62 For example under the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities o f the European Patent Office 
(1065 UNTS 370)
63 Thus for example the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (INMARSAT) does not enjoy 
immunity from jurisdiction under Art.6 o f its HQ Agreement with the UK, (UKTS 44 (1980)), but 
does enjoy immunity from execution. Similarly, the International Mobile Satellite Organisation 
(UKTS 73(1999). By way of contrast the HQ Agreement of the International Telecommunications 
Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT) with the UK does provide for immunity from jurisdiction but this 
is limited in respect of its commercial activities, civil liabilities arising from road traffic accidents, 
attachment proceedings against the salaries of staff members, and counter-claims.
EUROCONTROL does not enjoy immunity by virtue of its Article 26 of the EUROCONTROL 
Convention (UKTS 39 (1963)) as amended by the 1981 Brussels Protocol (UKTS 2 (1987)), but does 
enjoy immunity from execution.
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member States, and a closer consensus as to issues which might properly fall within 
the competence of judicial branch of government.64
(3) The European Communities65
The European Communities are dealt with separately from the other international 
organisations considered here as they display unique constitutional and institutional 
characteristics. The development of the body of EC/EU law in both its substantive and 
institutional aspects, its integration within the local legal systems of the Member States 
and its direct applicability to persons within the members States, give the Communities 
a much closer degree of involvement in the local legal system than other international 
organisations. Moreover in view of sophisticated national legal systems of the Member 
States, and the broad consensus amongst them as to the rule of law and democratic 
governance of its member States, it is perhaps appropriate that the Communities should 
not enjoy the broad jurisdictional immunities enjoyed by other international 
organisations.66
Jurisdiction over disputes involving the European Community is governed by Article 
240 (ex 183) which provides that unless jurisdiction is conferred on the ECJ under the 
Treaty, “disputes to which the Community is a party shall not on that ground be 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States”. 
However this jurisdiction of national courts under Article 240, must be read together
64 On the other hand organisations o f limited membership also put into sharp relief the question of the 
immunities o f international organisations in the legal systems o f non-member States (a problem 
considered in chapter 4 infra).
65 The reference here is to the Communities which enjoy legal personality, and not to the European 
Union, which as yet enjoys only limited personality and whose legal status is still evolving.
66 Seidl Hohenveldem “L’immunite de juridiction des Communautes europeennes” 1990 Rev. Marche 
Commun 475-9
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with Article 288 (ex 215) which deals with liability of the Community. Under Article 
288 the contractual liability of the Community is to be governed by the law applicable 
to the contract in question. Whereas non-contractual liability is governed by the 
general principles common to the law of die Member States and jurisdiction over such 
liability is vested exclusively in the ECJ (under Article 235 (ex 178). Jurisdiction over 
questions as to the legality of Community acts in terms of EC law are also vested 
exclusively in the ECJ. Thus the jurisdiction of national courts over the Communities 
will be largely confined to disputes arising from contracts which expressly or
fnimpliedly make a choice of such jurisdiction.
However it should also be remembered that the Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Communities of 1965, ensures inter alia the immunity of the 
Communities’ property, assets and operations from seizure, save with the authorisation 
of the European Court of Justice.68 As will be discussed below the ECJ has interpreted 
its power of authorisation under this provision in accordance with the functional 
principle, and has shown considerable flexibility in its approach.
(4) Public international corporations
A final category of organisations are die public international corporations, which may 
be distinguished from the other organisations in that their main function is to provide 
goods and/or services directly to private parties, and often on a commercial basis. They
67 In this respect it should also be noted that under Article 238 (ex 181) the parties may choose to subject 
their contract to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, whether it be of private or a public law nature.
68 It also deals with other questions such as the inviolability o f archives, the Communities fiscal 
immunities, communications and Laissez passer, and the personal immunities of Members o f the 
European Parliament, the representatives o f Member States, and officials of the Communities. For a 
general survey of the Protocol see Schmidt “Le protocole sur les privileges et immunites des 
Communautes europeennes” (1991 Cahiers de Droit Eur. 67)
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tend to take the form of corporations established under municipal law and so are 
outside the scope of this study. Though there is considerable variation amongst this 
category of organisations, many enjoy certain privileges and immunities, primarily in 
relation to fiscal and customs matters.69 As a mle they do not appear to have any 
functional need for, nor are they granted, immunity from jurisdiction, though a number 
enjoy immunity from execution.70
B. THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
1. General
The practice of international organisations is of particular relevance in considering the 
way in which the treaty provisions relating to their immunities have been interpreted. 
Where such provisions are contained in the constituent instrument of a particular 
international organisation, the organisation will often have the primary role in their 
interpretation (under the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Not only does reference 
to the practice of international organisations accord with the usual rules of treaty 
interpretation,71 but numerous decisions of the International Court of Justice suggest 
that the practice of an international organisations will be given a particularly important 
place in the interpretation of treaty provisions relating to institutional questions.
69 see E.Librecht Entreprises acharactere juriquement international (Sijthoff Leiden 1972) at pp.477- 
534; I.Seidl-Hohenveldem “Le droit applicable aux entreprises intemationales communes, etatiques ou 
para- etatiques”(1983) 60 Ann. IDI 1-37 and 97-102; and Sundstrom Public International Utility 
Corporations (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972).
70 See Librecht op cit note 57 supra at pp. 481-490; Sundstrom op cit note 57 supra at pp.36, 60, 79,96, 
120
71 i.e Art 31(3)(b) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
72 For a review o f these decisions see E.Lauterpacht note 1 supra.
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We have seen that the larger international organisations have claimed that they are 
entitled to unrestricted jurisdictional immunity, unless there are express limitations 
contained in the relevant treaty provisions. To the extent that this places international 
organisations in a more favourable position than is enjoyed by the individual States 
which established them, this is usually explained by reference to the different basis on 
which international immunities are granted. Thus it is claimed that the functional basis 
of the immunities of international organisations gives rise to broader jurisdictional 
immunities than those enjoyed by States. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
rationale of such claims is that international organisations are created to perform 
certain functions in the international public interest and the performance such functions 
should not be interfered with by unilateral assertions of jurisdiction by national courts.
However the danger which arises with such reasoning is that it looks only to the 
relationship of an activity to the functions of the organisation, not at whether immunity 
is necessary to protect the organisation. Since international organisations are entities of 
limited competence, whose existence as separate entities from their member States is 
based on the functional requirements, it is arguable that practically anything which is
* • ► • * 7 Tdone by an international organisation is connected the performance of its functions. 
There is thus a danger then of an over-rigid interpretation of the functional standard, 
and both contrary to the intentions of States when the functional standard was first 
adopted, and unwarranted by a plain reading of the relevant texts, which speak of such
73 In the context o f State immunity an analogous problem arises in choosing between the “nature” and 
“purpose” tests to determine whether an act is iure imperii or iure gestionis. Proponents o f the 
“nature” test insist upon it because a characterisation based on the purpose of act will be subjective 
since almost any act of a government will relate in some respect to its public functions.
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privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of the functions of the 
organisation.74
Nevertheless claims to immunity by international organisations tend to be broad. The
United Nations has said of its immunity from “every form of legal process”:
“These words have been broadly interpreted to include every form of legal 
process before national authorities, whether judicial, administrative functions 
according to national law. The Organisation’s immunity from ‘every form of 
legal process’ has also been regarded as extending irrespective of whether the 
Organisation was named as defendant or was asked to provide information to 
perform some ancillary role. This interpretation, the essence of which is the 
maintenance of freedom from interference of the United Nations, does not, 
however, imply that the United Nations may not itself decide to take part in 
such proceedings, in particular if it considers that the requirements of justice so 
demand, but only that the determination in each case is one to be made by the 
United Nations itself.”75
However in its practice even the United Nations, whose important political functions 
might suggest very broad immunity to be appropriate, recognises that in asserting its 
immunities some balance to take into account the interests of the local jurisdiction is 
necessary. As has been noted above from the very outset of the regime of the United 
Nations’ immunities, special arrangements have to be made for the victims of road 
traffic accidents involving United Nations drivers and vehicles, including the 
maintenance of insurance. The United Nations maintains similar insurance in relation 
to potential liabilities arising from occupiers’ liability at its Headquarters in New
74 see for example the “Memorandum by the Government of the UK on privileges and immunities o f 
international organisations and replies from governments”, appendicised to the Explanatory Report 
accompanying Resolution (69)29 o f the Committee o f Ministers of the Council o f Europe (Council o f 
Europe, 1970)
75 see the Secretariat’s survey in 1967 YBILC Vol.II 155 at p.224. The breadth of the UN’s claims to 
immunity from all forms o f legal process are demonstrated by, for example, the UN’s assertion of 
immunity to defeat garnishee proceedings brought by the creditors of UN employees.
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nf\York. In relation to insured risks the United Nations will be prepared to waive its
77immunity to enable its insurers to take part m proceedings.
In its commercial contracts the United Nations and many of its Specialised Agencies 
are unwilling to waive their immunity from suit, preferring instead arbitration for the 
settlement of disputes. Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, the United 
Nations has claimed that in the light of its international status in most cases its 
contracts will not be subject to a system of municipal law, but rather to the general
70
principles of law, unless there is an express choice of law to the contrary. However 
the claims and practice of other international organisations, including some of the 
Specialised Agencies of the UN, are less categorical, showing a diversity of solutions 
as to the applicable law and the techniques of dispute settlement, according to the
70organisation in question and the subject matter of the contract. In this respect it is 
also interesting to note that the IBRD though it does not enjoy immunity from suit in
OA
relation to its contracts, prefers in its practice the use of arbitration clauses.
Where an international organisation takes part in a commercial venture with a view to 
profit it seems likely that it will not enjoy immunity from suit. Thus UN has taken the
76 However in 1986 the UN General Assembly adopted Regulation No.4, which, in response to the 
escalation of awards of tort damages and therefore of the costs o f liability insurance, sought to limit the 
awards of damages to third parties in suits brought against the UN for torts committed in the 
Headquarters District - see Szasz “The United Nations legislates to limit its liability” (81 (1987) AJIL 
738) who emphasises that the adoption of the resolution was not reliant upon the UN's immunity from 
suit, but rather it was an attempt to amend the applicable law, and thus an exercise in legislation.
77 See 1985 YBILC Vol.II, pt2, at pp 162
78 ibid., at pp. 152-155
79 see Valticos op cit note 15 supra, at pp.55-64.
80 However it appears to be more willing to allow for a national system of law to govern its contracts 
particularly on financial matters, -see Valticos op cit note 15 supra at pp.79-80
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view that there are limits upon the commercially oriented activities it can undertake 
which are compatible with its status, privileges and immunities: it has considered that 
the publications, films etc which it produces, have not been predominantly commercial 
but rather for the purpose for increasing knowledge and understanding of the 
Organisation. Whereas any commercial activity it might undertake by means of joint 
venture would require it to waive its immunity.81
2. Waiver
Many international organisations appear to remain very reluctant to waive their
immunity from jurisdiction under most circumstances. There may be some danger that
this reluctance to waive immunity may entrench too rigid a regime of immunity to be
able to accommodate the various interests which tend to promote the restriction
immunity. Moreover this reluctance to waive immunity may not reflect the balance
which the General Convention and the 1947 Convention on the Specialised Agencies
sought to establish. Certainly it does not accord with the way in which Mackinnon
Wood foresaw developments in his well-known paper written in anticipation of the
establishment of the United Nations, where he wrote:
“...In all the normal transactions of normal times, the organisation will operate 
under ordinary law. We are thus left with the same abnormal factor as exists in 
the case of the present League, namely the exemption from the jurisdiction of 
the courts. We have seen why this is important for the organisation. How is it 
to be reconciled with the rights of persons having dealings with the
81 see UN Legal Counsel’s opinion on the “Advisability of the UN entering into a profit making joint 
venture with a private publishing firm” (1990 UNJYB 25). See also the opinions on whether UNICEF or 
its Greeting card operation could be a shareholder in a printing company (1990 UNJYB 1 256) and on 
whether UNDP could become a founding member of a corporate body (an educational institute) under 
the national law of a member State (1990 UNJYB 259), both which Legal Counsel advised against 
because of the necessity of submission to local jurisdiction inherent in such activities.
82 It is interesting to note that in the context of State immunity, the development of the doctrine of waiver 
of immunity, according to some accounts, was an important contribution in various of the European 
civilian jurisdictions to the development of the modem rule o f restrictive immunity see EJ Cohn “Waiver 
of immunity” (1958) 35 BYIL 260.
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organisation or its officials to have a legal remedy for wrongs done to them? ... 
Actually the national courts would seem to be the best, as well as the natural, 
forum for cases arising under a country’s domestic law. Except where it is 
necessary for one of the purposes for which it is granted, the rule should be to 
waive the immunity, and this will normally be the case with ordinary legal 
claims against the organisation.”83
It should be pointed out that the relevant treaty provisions relating to very few 
organisations impose an explicit duty to waive immunity in particular circumstances,84 
unlike the more frequently invoked provisions in relation to the waiver of the
Of
immunities enjoyed by their officials. In general national courts have not sought to
OIL 0 7
imply waiver except possibly in relation to counterclaims. However whether an 
express contractual term vesting jurisdiction in national courts in advance of any 
dispute is a valid waiver of immunity, has caused controversy in the past. Whilst the 
treaty provisions relating to some organisations, such as the IMF and the former 
UNRRA, make specific provision for such contractual waiver, the Preparatory 
Commission of the 1946 General Convention intentionally omitted such a provision. 
UN Legal Counsel have in the past taken the position that a contractual provision in 
advance could not therefore constitute a valid waiver, noting at the time that this was in
83 See H. Mackinnon Wood “Legal relations between individuals and a world organisation o f States” -  
(1944) 30 Transactions of the Grot. Soc. 141, at p. 162
84 see for example the European Space Agency Research Centre established in the Netherlands -  
discussed by A.Muller International Organisations and their Host States (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995) at 
pp. 164-5.
85 See Chapter 5 infra
86 It seems to be generally accepted that the entry of an appearance by an international organisation in 
proceeding solely for the purpose o f asserting its immunity will not constitute a waiver, (though in fact 
international organisations may not need to enter an appearance for these purposes, since judicial notice 
must be taken o f the question of immunity, and in practice this may be achieved in appropriate cases by 
a “suggestion of immunity” made to the court by the executive authorities o f the State o f the forum - see 
1984 UNJYB 188-9).
87 Reinisch suggests that this is probable but that there is not caselaw on the point -  International 
Organizations before National Courts (CUP, Cambridge, 2000) at pp.204-5
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■ g oline with US and UK authorities on waiver in relation to State immunity. It seems 
unlikely that such a position could be maintained today before a national court, not 
only has the law changed in both of these States in relation to waiver of State
OQ
immunity, but there is also greater appreciation of the position of plaintiffs especially 
since an organisation will have freely entered into a such contract.90
3. Immunity from measures of execution
Given die coercive nature of measures of execution, immunity from execution is 
clearly an important means of ensuring the independence of an organisation from 
undue pressure from a territorial State. Such immunity is thus often maintained as a 
virtually absolute immunity, even in relation to organisations whose immunity from 
jurisdiction is limited.
In general it appears not to have been problematic. However some practice has arisen 
on the particular question of garnishee proceedings against the organisation to enforce 
a judgment debt of a creditor of the organisation (often in practice a member of staff). 
The UN considers that its immunity from execution extends to such garnishee
88 Even at the time it appears to have been arguable whether this really reflected the opinio iuris of 
States, for example the US International Organisations Act on which the UN had to rely for the 
elaboration of its immunities in the US until the US acceded to the General Convention in 1970, clearly 
recognises the validity of contractual waivers, and in any event the tradition of the European civilian 
jurisdictions was to be less formalistic on the question of waiver, see Cohn op cit note 82 supra.
89 see s.2(2) of the State Immunity Act in the UK and §221 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 
the US.
90 see e.g. Standard Chartered Bank v ITC, 1 1 ILR 8
There may be a practical managerial problem for the United Nations in relation to contractual waivers, in 
that it takes the view that only the Secretary General can waive the immunity of the Organisation. 
Clearly even in relation to the principal organs of the UN this causes considerable difficulties but when 
one takes into consideration the number of subsidiary organs and programmes all o f which rely upon the 
privileges and immunities contained the General Convention (many of which apparently have 
contractual capacity in their own names).
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proceedings, but has now made administrative arrangements whereby the judgment 
creditor may obtain payment. However it stresses that these arrangements are not a 
waiver of its immunity.91 The approach of the European Court of Justice to such 
garnishees proceedings is rather different (see section C.2 infra).
C. Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals
By their nature the jurisdictional immunities of international organisations are applied 
primarily by national courts. It is not surprising therefore that there are considerably 
fewer decisions of international courts and tribunals than there are of national courts. 
However it is particularly instructive to consider how international tribunals have dealt 
with the questions relating to immunities and the treaties, for a number of reasons.
Firstly typical situations in which questions of jurisdictional immunity arise, often 
involve a tri-partite relationship between the international organisation, the forum State 
and the private claimant, or at least a combination of the parallel bilateral relations 
between them. Thus a national court, whose competences are defined by one of the 
parties in this tri-partite relationship, may not be in a position to appreciate the full 
implications of its decision in respect of all aspects of that relationship, and thus an 
international tribunal may provide a more appropriate forum. Secondly, decisions of 
international tribunals on immunities are likely to be particularly worthy of study, 
since they will have expertise and confidence in the interpretation and application of 
international law. International tribunals are therefore likely to have a broader view of 
the place of immunities within the context of international law as a whole, and thus
91 See 1967 YBILC pt II at p.224 §77-79 and 88
92 See for example the findings of the ICJ in the UN Headquarters Agreement case cited infra, at note 
112
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may be better able to elucidate unclear aspects of the law, or to resolve conflicts 
between international rights and obligations.
Following the tri-partite nature of the legal relations involved in the granting of 
international immunity, this section will consider the relevant decisions under all three 
aspects, i.e. (i) the relationship between the organisation and the forum State (governed 
by international law); (ii) the relationship between the organisation and the private 
party in question sometimes governed by international law, sometimes by national law, 
sometimes in the case of the European Communities, by European law and sometimes 
by some other system of law chosen by the parties, eg the general principles of law; 
and (iii) as between the forum State and the individual which though in the first 
instance by national law, may also be governed at least in part by international law, 
and in particular the international law of human rights.
1. The relationship between international organisations and the forum State
Despite its role in dispute settlement under the UN General Convention and die 1947
O'!
Convention on the Immunities of the Specialised Agencies, the International Court of 
Justice has handed down only a few decisions relating to the relationship of States with 
international organisations directly bearing on the regime of international immunities. 
However these decisions, when set against the context of the Court’s caselaw as a 
whole, are interesting as they constitute a meeting-point between two firmly 
established strands of that caselaw, namely the maintenance of the system of State 
jurisdiction and the promotion of the effectiveness of international organisations, and
93 See Art.30 of the General Convention and Art.32 of the 1947 Convention; for comments see Ago 
“‘Binding’ Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice” (1991) 85 AJIL 439; and 
Wickremasinghe (2000) 4 9 ICLQ 724.
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in particular the UN. As such the decisions considered in (iii) infra demonstrate how 
the Court has sought to accommodate the various countervailing rights and values 
raised by international immunities
(a) Decisions of the International Court of Justice
(i) State Jurisdiction
State jurisdiction exercised on the basis of territoriality is of course a central principle 
of the international legal system, and naturally is well-recognised in the jurisprudence 
of the PCIJ and the ICJ.94 It is often said to have been given its clearest enunciation in 
the Lotus case,95 but it also underlies many subsequent decisions. Exceptions to the 
principle of territoriality have been treated restrictively, so for example the duty of 
non-intervention in the territory of another State has been consistently upheld along 
with die prohibition on measures of self-help.96
In the present context the claimed exception to territorial jurisdiction pursuant to a
07 • •treaty provision in the Asylum case is of particular interest. In that case Colombia 
claimed the right to afford diplomatic asylum to a local fugitive from justice, at its 
embassy in Pem, pursuant to the 1911 Bolivarian Convention on Extradition and 1928 
Havana Convention on Asylum. In doing so Colombia claimed that, as the country 
granting asylum, it had the power, under the Conventions, to make a unilateral
94 The issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction was withdrawn from the Court in the Arrest warrant 
(Democratic Republic o f  Congo v. Belgium) case of 14 February 2002, but a number of the Separate 
Opinions made findings on this topic, including those of the President Judge Guillaume and Joint 
Opinion of Judge Higgins, Koojimans and Buergenthal. Despite the differing conclusions on the issue 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction, all started from the centrality of territorial jurisdiction to the 
international system.
95 (1927) PCIJ Rep., Ser.A, No. 10
96 eg Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ Rep. 4, and Nicaragua v. USA, 1986 ICJ Rep.14
97 see 1950 ICJ Rep.266
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determination of the nature of the offence which was binding on Peru. The Court 
distinguished between territorial asylum and diplomatic asylum, noting:
“In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the 
State where the offence was committed. A decision to grant diplomatic asylum 
involves a derogation from the sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the 
offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an 
intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that 
State. Such a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognised 
unless its legal basis is established in each particular case.”98
Thus the Court found that the institution of asylum provided for equal rights of
determination for each of the States concerned. It found no basis for Colombia’s claim
to a unilateral and definitive right, in either of the Conventions on which it was seeking
to rely. Instead, after emphasising the need to respect the jurisdiction of the territorial
State and die duty of non-interference, the Court insisted upon the observance of the
various procedural requirements for a valid grant of asylum under the Convention,
including procedures for mutual communication and cooperation. In particular the
Court emphasised that where, as here, there was no reason to suspect the impartiality
of the courts of the territorial State, their jurisdiction should be upheld.
“In principle, therefore, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation of justice. 
An exception to this rule can occur only if, in the guise of justice, arbitrary 
action is substituted for the mle of law. Such would be the case if the 
administration of justice were corrupted by measures clearly prompted by 
political aims...
...the safety which arises out of the asylum cannot be construed as a protection 
against the regular application of the laws and the against the jurisdiction of 
legally constituted tribunals. Protection thus understood would authorise the 
diplomatic agent [i.e. the person granting asylum] to obstruct the application of 
the laws of the country whereas his duty is to respect them...”99
98 ibid. at p.274-5
99 ibid. at p284
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(ii) The development of international institutional law
The Court has played an important role in promoting the effectiveness of international 
organisations, (especially the UN) through the development of international 
institutional law.100 As has been shown it was the Court which made the first definitive 
finding as to the international personality of the UN and the rights attendant thereon.101 
The Court has also contributed to the development of their internal legal orders both in
109terms of the allocation of powers between UN organs; and their employment 
relations;103 and their organic nature, including the recognition and development of 
their implied powers.104
(iii) The relationship of international organisations with State jurisdiction
The Court has been seised of a few cases in which these two strong strands of 
jurisprudence have had to be construed together. As noted in the Chapter 1 above, the 
first such case concerned the European Commission on the Danube}05 In order to 
differentiate between the overlapping competences of the Danube Commission and the 
jurisdictional rights derived from the territorial sovereignty of one of the riparian 
member States of the Commission (Romania), the PCIJ found the only way to do so 
was to define the functions allotted to them. That is, whilst specifically denying the
100 see E. Lauterpacht note 1 supra
101 see Reparation Case, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, see Chapter 1 text at note 33ff
102 Certain Expenses, 1962 ICJ Rep. 151
103 Effect o f  Awards case 1954 ICJ Rep. 47; and the UNAT cases (1973 ICJ Rep. 166; 1982 ICJ Rep. 
325; and 1987 ICJ Rep. 18) and ILOAT cases 1956 ICJ Rep. 77. For commentary see Amerasinghe 
“Cases of the International Court o f Justice relating to employment in international organisations” in 
Fitzmaurice and Lowe (ed.s) Fifty Years o f  the International Court ofJustice, at pp. 193-209
104 including Certain Expenses cit. note 87 supra', Status o f  South West Africa, 1950 ICJ Rep. 128
105 (1927) PCIJ Rep. Ser. B N o.l, see Chapter 1, text at note 11
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Commission was an organisation possessing exclusive territorial sovereignty, the 
Court found that it was an international institution with a special purpose and functions 
bestowed upon it by its Statute, and that it had the power to exercise these functions to 
their full extent.
There are then two cases in which the Court has considered the rights and obligations 
of States and organisations derived from Headquarters Agreements, though both were 
concerned with procedural aspects of that relationship rather than substantive 
provisions regarding privileges and immunities.
In the WHO Advisory Opinion106 the Court was asked by the World Health Assembly
to consider die Headquarters Agreement of the WHO Regional Health Office in Egypt,
and in particular the provision on its revision in the event that either party to die
Agreement wished to transfer the Office to another State.107 The Court insisted in
looking at the question in the light of its full legal context. It noted the need to balance
the right of an international organisation to select the seat of its headquarters or
regional office against the rights of the host State:
“The Court notes that in the World Health Assembly and in some of the written 
and oral statements before the Court there seems to have been a disposition to 
regard international organisations as possessing some form of absolute power 
to determine and, if need be, change the location of the sites of the headquarters 
and regional offices. But States for their part possess a sovereign power of 
decision with respect to their acceptance of the headquarters or a regional 
office of an organisation within their territories; and an organisation’s power of 
decision is no more absolute than is that of the State... International 
organisations are subjects of international law and as such are bound by any 
obligations incumbent upon them under the general rules of international law,
106 Interpretation o f the Agreement o f  25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ Rep. 73
107 The background of the case was that in the aftermath of Egypt entering into the Camp David 
Agreements with Israel, the majority of the other Arab States o f the Region wanted the Office transferred 
to Jordan.
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under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
_ „ _  j j ]08parties.
The Court found that it was necessary therefore to construe the requirements of the
Headquarters Agreement in question in the light of mutual obligations of cooperation
and good faith. These duties were based as follows
“The very fact of Egypt’s membership of the Organisation entails certain 
mutual obligations of cooperation and good faith incumbent upon Egypt and 
upon the Organisation. Egypt offered to become host to the Regional Office in 
Alexandria and the Organisation accepted that offer; Egypt agreed to provide 
the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the independence and 
effectiveness of the Office. As a result the legal relationship between Egypt and 
the Organisation became, and now is, that of a host State and an international 
organisation, the very essence of which is a body of mutual obligations of 
cooperation and good faith... the element of mutuality in the legal regime thus 
created between Egypt and the WHO is underlined by the fact that this was 
effected through common action based on mutual consent.”109
The Court therefore found that there was a duty incumbent on the Parties to consult 
together in good faith on the question of the conditions and modalities of any transfer; 
if so agreed to consult and negotiate on various arrangements necessary to effect a 
transfer in orderly manner minimising prejudice to each Parties' interests; and finally a 
duty on the Party proposing the transfer to give the other a reasonable period of notice 
of the termination of the existing situation.
The Court’s finding of rights and obligations based upon the principles of cooperation 
and good faith, suggest that the Headquarters Agreement should be viewed in the 
context of the ongoing relationship of the parties. As such the Court did not give the 
Agreement a narrow purely textual interpretation, but was concerned with “what legal
108 ibid at p. 89-90
109 ibid at p.93
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questions [were] really in issue”.110 This approach of weighing the interests of the 
Parties to the Agreement, and indicating a procedure by which the Parties may come to 
an accommodation, emphasises the consensual basis for the limitations on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of die territorial State necessitated by the presence of an 
international organisation.
A further case in which the Court considered the interpretation of a Headquarters 
Agreement was that of the United Nations itself.111 The United States had adopted a 
law that made unlawful the establishment or maintenance within the US of an office of 
the PLO, and this threatened closure of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN. The UN 
claimed that this violated US obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, and 
sought to put in train the dispute settlement procedure contained in the Agreement 
which entailed an international arbitration. The US refused to cooperate in the 
arbitration procedure, on the basis that a dispute had not yet arisen. For the US 
although the Anti-Terrorism Act had come into force, the Attorney General had 
requested the closure of the PLO Mission, and had commenced proceedings to enforce 
closure, as the proceedings were ongoing and the PLO had the possibility of 
challenging the law, a dispute triggering the obligation to arbitrate had not yet arisen.
In considering this point the Court was careful to emphasise that it was dealing with 
the arbitration procedure under the Agreement rather than substantive violations of the 
Headquarters Agreement. From the outset it stressed the international law character of 
the question before it, making clear it was dealing with the relationship between two
110 ibid at p. 8 8
1,1 Applicability o f  the obligation to arbitrate under section 21 o f  the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement o f  26 June 1947, 1988 ICJ Rep. 12.
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subjects of international law under a treaty. The Court looked to the object of the
arbitration procedure finding
“The purpose of the arbitration procedure envisaged by the Agreement is 
precisely the settlement of such disputes as may arise between the Organisation 
and the host country without any prior recourse to municipal courts, and it 
would be against both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement for the 
implementation of that procedure to be subjected to such prior recourse. It is 
evident that a provision of the nature of s.21 of the Headquarters Agreement 
cannot require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its 
implementation.”112
The Court found that a dispute had arisen notwithstanding the position in US law, and
11Tthe “fundamental principle ... that international law prevails over domestic law” was 
cited in support of this finding. Whilst the language and effect of the Court's Opinion 
may be rather different than in the Court's Opinion in the WHO case, the two Opinions 
may be reconciled in that both seek to make effective the procedural aspects of die 
Headquarters Agreements, in order to maintain the respective international rights and 
obligations of the Parties, at moments when their relationship was placed under stress 
by the unilateral actions of one of the Parties.
The only cases of die ICJ dealing directly with immunities of international 
organisations are the Maziluu4 and Cumaraswamy115 cases. Both concerned the 
applicability of Article VI, section 22 of the General Convention, concerning the 
privileges and immunities of experts on missions of the UN. In both cases the Court
112 ibid. at p.29
113 ibid at p.34. In the event the difficulties were overcome by a remarkable judgement o f the New 
Yrok District Court in which US law was interpreted in a sufficiently flexible way to accommodate 
the requirements of the UN -  see US v. PLO (1988) 27 ILM 1055 , for comment see R.Higgins 
Problems and Process (OUP, Oxford, 1994, at pp.214-5
1.4 1989 ICJ Rep. 177
1.5 1999 ICJ Rep. 62
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found the individual in question was entitled to immunities under the Convention and 
that these immunities could be opposed to the individual’s State of nationality.
The Mazilu case concerned a Special Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and whether he had the
status and therefore the privileges and immunities of an expert on mission under
section 22 of the Convention. In order to determine who was covered under section 22
the Court based took a purposive approach to the construction of “experts on mission”,
basing itself on the intent of the section to ensure the independence of experts in the
interests of the Organisation, and also on the practice of the Organisation in which
experts were entrusted with a very varied range of missions. The independent capacity
in which Rapporteurs performed their missions for the UN functions qualified them as
experts for the purpose of section 22. The Court found that this status pertained
notwithstanding the assertion of his State of nationality that he had become incapable
of performing his task as Special Rapporteur due to illness. Evidence had been
adduced to suggest that in fact the Rapporteur was willing and able to perform his task,
and the suggestion was that his Government was seeking to prevent him doing so. In
these circumstances the Court rejected the national Government’s claim to be entitled
unilaterally to determine the question, stating
“It is sufficient for it [ie the Court] to note, first that it was for the United 
Nations to decide whether in the circumstances it wished to retain Mr.Mazilu 
as a special rapporteur, and secondly to take note that decisions to that effect 
have been taken by the Sub-Commission.”116
1,6 1989 ICJ Rep. 177 at p
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In the Cumaraswamy case the Court was asked to settle a dispute which had arisen 
between Malaysia and the UN as to whether a Special Rapporteur of the Human 
Rights Commission enjoyed immunity from suit in defamation proceedings. The UN 
Secretary General had certified that the impugned words of the Special Rapporteur 
were said in the performance of his official functions and were therefore immune. 
However the Malaysian Courts had found that the Secretary General’s certificate was 
not definitive of the issue and that this was an issue which could be dealt with at the 
hearing of the merits of action, thus effectively denying the immunity to the extent of 
forcing the Special Rapporteur to defend himself.
The Court concluded that the Special Rapporteur had been acting in the performance 
of his functions when he made his impugned comments and was therefore entitled to
117immunity. The Court found that the Malaysian Government had failed in its
obligation to bring the Secretary-General’s certificate before the Malaysian courts, and
the Malaysian courts had failed in obligation to determine the issue of immunity in
limine litis. However, interestingly, the Court was more nuanced about the status of the
Secretary-General’s certificate in such cases. It appears that his finding that an expert
is entitled to immunity is highly persuasive but not a definitive determination of the
issue. The Court found:
“When national courts are seised of a case in which the immunity of a United 
Nations agent is in issue they should immediately be notified of any finding by 
the Secretary General concerning that immunity. That finding, and its 
documentary expression, creates a presumption which can only be set aside for 
the most compelling reasons and is thus to be given the greatest weight by the 
Court.”118
1,7 [1999] ICJ Rep. 62, §56
118 ibid. §61
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In other words the Court stopped short of giving the UN Secretary-General a unilateral 
and definitive determination of the applicability of immunity, but rather the final 
decision was that of the national court in accordance with the principle of exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction, but having given due weight to the views of the Organisation.
The cases before the International Court of Justice therefore suggest that in relation to 
these truly international disputes (i.e. between a State and an international 
organisation) concerning privileges and immunities, the Court will be careful to 
consider the claims in their broad legal context. It will give careful consideration to the 
rights both of the territorial or national State wishing to assert jurisdiction and to the 
independent international character of the organisation. In so doing it has rarely been 
willing to concede that one party has a unilateral right to characterise an act affecting 
both parties. Instead it has sought to strengthen such procedures for cooperation as are 
available to the parties to arrive at a consensual solution to disputes.
(b) International arbitral decisions
In two public international arbitrations concerning questions of exemptions from 
taxation, the agreements between an international organisation and its host State have 
been considered. Each case was dealt with purely as a question of treaty interpretation, 
of the constituent instrument of the organisation and/or the Headquarters Agreement, 
in accordance with the usual rules on treaty interpretation. The cases differ from the 
Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice considered above, in that the 
arbitral tribunals were called upon to settle a dispute in hand in accordance with the 
questions before them, and therefore they fashioned rather precise answers to those
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questions and tended not to be concerned with locating host State treaty arrangements 
within a broader legal context.
The first of these related to the taxation of officials of Euratom seconded to work in the
UK on a high temperature gas cooled reactor project, known as the Dragon Project, a
joint project with the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) conceived under the
auspices of the OECD.119 The single arbitrator Edvard Hambro, considered the treaty
arrangements in the establishment of the Dragon Project and found that they did not
provide for a right of seconded Euratom employees to exemption from income tax in
the United Kingdom. He found however that the employees had a claim against
Euratom to recover any taxes paid by them. The arbitrator commenced this section of
the Award by asserting the general rule, that as a matter of its own sovereignty a State
shall decide any question of taxation imposed on its residents or on income derived
from or paid in that State. He concluded by finding
“... no clear stipulation exists imposing a legal obligation on the United 
Kingdom Government to grant such tax exemption. This is not a very 
satisfactory situation, but an international obligation for a State to grant tax 
exemptions must be based on internationally binding texts and not on 
implications from negotiations between bodies or representatives not having 
full powers in this respect.”120
119 See Case concerning the taxation liability o f Euratom employees between the Commission o f  the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 
decision 25 February 1967, 17 UNRIA 487. It is important to note that the UK itself was not a party to 
the dispute, only the UKAEA. However it is included in this section as clearly involved interpretation of 
the United Kingdom’s obligations under the host State arrangements.
1 ?f) • • * •ibid at p.511. The arbitrator havmg found that the employees had a claim to 
exemption from income tax from the Commission, also found that by the terms of the 
treaty the UKAEA was solely liable for all actions, claims, costs and expenses 
whatsoever arising out of the construction and operation of the Project. When read in 
context, the arbitrator found no reason to give this a restrictive interpretation, thus 
sums which the Commission was forced to pay refunding tax paid by its employees 
to the Inland Revenue of the UK, could thus be claimed back from the UKAEA.
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The more complex and for present purposes the more significant was the case 
concerning the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) and its host State,
191the Federal Republic of Germany. The case concerned a dispute between the Parties 
over a number of tax exemptions claimed by the EMBL.
The Tribunal started from the position that the Parties were in public international law 
in a position of formal equality. It then went on to consider in some detail the ongoing 
relationship of the Parties. On all points in issue the Tribunal found that the 
relationship between the Parties was governed by treaty, i.e. the Agreement 
establishing the EMBL (the “constitutive Agreement”) and the Headquarters 
Agreement. The Tribunal explicitly stated, in accordance with the submissions of the 
Parties, that it would not give a restrictive interpretation to the relevant treaty 
provisions, but would instead seek their “effective” interpretation.
The finding of greatest interest for present purposes was in relation to the specific 
question of the indirect taxation of goods and services supplied by the EMBL’s 
canteen and guest-house. The Tribunal had to decide whether the supply of such goods 
and services was “strictly necessary for the exercise of its [ie the EMBL’s] official 
activities” in which case they were exempt, or whether they were non-official activities 
and so taxable. The Tribunal approached this as a question of interpretation of the 
relevant Agreements, capable of objective determination, rather than as a matter for the 
unilateral decision of one of the parties. It sought an “effective” interpretation of the 
HQ Agreement in the light of its primary purpose, so as to enable the EMBL “fully 
and efficiently to discharge its responsibilities and fulfil its purposes”.
121 Award of 29 June 1990,105 ILR 1.
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The “official activities” of the EMBL were primarily the scientific purposes and the 
provision of the necessary facilities for them, set out in the constitutive Agreement. In 
addition the HQ Agreement provided that “administrative activities and those 
undertaken in pursuance of the purposes of the Laboratory as defined in the 
[constitutive] Agreement”, were to be included within the term “official activities”. 
However the Tribunal found that the requirement that in order to qualify for the tax 
exemption, purchases of goods and services had to be “strictly necessary” for official 
activities, restricted the interpretation of “official activities” for these purposes. 
Looking also at the financial structure of the EMBL, the Tribunal found that its official 
activities were to be financed by the regular budget of the organisation, and not from
199the sale of goods and services. As such the Tribunal found that goods or services 
that were provided by the EMBL at a charge, whether for staff or visitors, became 
liable to taxation, since they constituted commercial activity, which did not fall within 
the official activities of the EMBL.
The major significance of the Tribunal’s findings for present purposes, was that it is 
one of the few international decisions which has sought to establish limitations upon a 
functional privilege or immunity primarily by using the restrictive criterion of 
“necessity”. Whilst it should be remembered that this arbitration concerned taxation 
rather than jurisdictional immunity, this aspect of the award may have broader 
application.123
122 The Tribunal pointed out “it is not part o f the functions conferred upon the EMBL to pursue business 
transactions for profit”(p-47).
123 see Bekker The Legal Position o f  Intergovernmental Organizations (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
1994) pp. 168-73
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2. International judicial decisions on the relationship of international 
organisations and private parties
There are very few standing international tribunals in which international organisations 
and private parties can bring claims against each other. The contentious jurisdiction of 
the ICJ for example only extends to claims between States. Nevertheless the ICJ has, 
as we have seen, made considerable contributions to the development of international 
institutional law through various of its advisory opinions, and in a number of these the 
Court has indicated rule of law considerations governing the relations of international 
organisations with third parties. In for example its Advisory Opinion on Certain 
Expenses o f the UN,124 the Court made reference to the position of third parties in 
relation to decisions of the UN which were made irregularly according to its internal 
law.125 The concern expressed there appears to be to protect the position of the third 
party and the need for security of legal transactions. The same mle of law concerns are
brought out more strongly in a number of the Court’s advisory opinions in relation to
* • 1 international administrative law. In the first, the Effect o f Awards case, before
determining that the effects of the UNAT awards were binding upon the General
Assembly considered that the power to establish an administrative tribunal was
conferred on the UN by necessary implication from the express powers contained in
the Charter. In this respect the Court found:
“When the Secretariat was organised, a situation arose in which the relations 
between the staff members and the Organisation were governed by a complex 
code of law.... It was inevitable that there would be disputes between the 
Organisation and staff members as to their rights and duties. The Charter 
contains no provision which authorises any of the principal organs of the
124 1962 ICJ Rep. 151
125 ibid. at p. 168
126 1954 ICJ Rep. 47
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United Nations to adjudicate upon these disputes, and Article 105 secures for 
the United Nations jurisdictional immunities in national courts. It would, in the 
opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter 
to promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant 
preoccupation of the United Nations Organisation to promote this aim that it 
should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of 
any disputes which may arise between it and them.
In these circumstances the Court finds that the power to establish a 
tribunal to do justice as between the Organisation and the staff members was 
essential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give effect to 
the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of efficiency, 
competence and integrity.”127
International administrative tribunals have jurisdiction over claims between 
international organisations and individuals, though the latter cannot be considered as 
purely “private” parties in that the subject matter of such claims, being official 
employment, is governed by international administrative. There have been rare 
occasions on which international administrative tribunals have had occasion to 
consider the questions related to the immunity (and particularly the waiver of
198immunity) of staff members.
International administrative tribunals will not in most cases have jurisdiction over 
disputes between international organisations and private parties. However the under 
Article II (4) of its Statute the ILO Administrative Tribunal does have the competence 
to exercise jurisdiction over contractual disputes of the ILO where this has been so 
provided by the parties.129 Though this has been warmly applauded by some writers as
127 ibid. at p.57
128 see B.Knapp “Les privileges et immunites des organisations intemationales et de leur agents devant 
les tribunaux intemationaux” (1965) 69 RGDIP 615. The case of Jurado v ILO (No.l) is considered in 
Chapter 5 infra text at note 129
129 For a short description of the ILO practice in this respect see Valticos “Les contrats conclus par les 
organisations intemationales avec des personnes privees” (1977) Vol.57(1) Ann. IDI 1. at p.84-6. It 
should also be noted that the administrative tribunals o f OAU and UNIDROIT enjoy a similar 
competence.
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an appropriate model for the settlement of contractual disputes of international 
organisations, it is interesting that there are no reported cases where the Tribunal has 
been seised of contracts outside the employment context, and in a survey of contractual 
practice of international organisations the ILO indicated that was simply one of a
i I
number of modes of dispute settlement that are adopted in its contractual practice. 
Under its Statute it is clear that this broader competence of the ILOAT cannot be 
extended to the other international organisations over whose employment disputes it 
has jurisdiction. However it is possible for the ILOAT to be seised of disputes of these
• 1T2other organisations for settlement by way of arbitration.
The lack of standing fora for the majority of claims between international 
organisations and private parties has been ameliorated in the case of contractual 
disputes in some measure by international arbitration, though even here there are 
relatively few decisions in the public domain. Given the consensual nature of the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal there have been few occasions on which 
conventional provisions on privileges and immunities have been in issue in such 
arbitrations.
130 eg J-F Lalive “L'immunite de juridiction des etats et des organisations intemationales” (1953) 84 
Rec. des Cours 205 at pp. 352-4: and Cahier Etude des accords de siege entre les organisations 
intemationales et les etats oil elles resident (Giuffre, Milan, 1959) at p.243-44.
131 See Valticos op. cit. note 129 supra, at p. 81
132 eg Rebeck v. WHO, (1965) 68 Bull. Off. Du BIT 127-30; for commentary see Galvinis Les litiges 
relatifs awe contrats passes entre organisations intemationales et personnes privees (LGDJ, Paris, 1990) 
pp. 179-182
133 Though the decision of Arbitrator Professor Batiffol in relation to an UNWRA arbitration might be 
noted for its suggestion that the international law basis for the Organisation’s legal personality and 
capacity to contract, had the effect of making the compromissory clause of a contract to which the 
Organisation had become party by virtue of this capacity, an international act. Therefore he found that 
the arbitration as a public international arbitration should escape entirely any national legal system, on 
the basis that this approach was only compatible with the Organisation’s immunity from jurisdiction - 
see 1985 YBILC Vol.II Ptl at pp. 157-8; see Chapter 2 supra at note 149ff and infra Chapter 4 at notes 
97ff.
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The main example of a permanent international tribunal with competence to consider 
the application and interpretation of treaty provisions on questions of immunity in the 
relations between an international organisation and a private person, is the European 
Court of Justice and its jurisdiction over the immunities of the European 
Communities.134 A variety of issues have arisen under die Protocol on Privileges and 
Immunities, and in almost all the ECJ has taken a characteristically purposive approach 
to the interpretation of its provisions.
As noted above the Communities do not enjoy immunity from suit, but their “property
and assets ... shall not be the subject of any administrative or legal measure of
1 ^constraint without the authorisation of the Court of Justice”. An issue which has 
frequently arisen is whether such immunity from execution is infringed by the making 
of a garnishee orders against the Communities, i.e. where an applicant seeks to attach 
monies owed by the Communities to a third party, in order to discharge a judgment 
debt which the third party owes to the applicant. The Court has consistently found that 
such garnishee proceedings do represent a measure of constraint falling potentially 
within Article 1 of the Protocol as this type of proceeding seeks to alter the legal
• t • 1 ' Xf tposition of the Communities.
Despite the wording of Article 1, however, the Court has found that its authorisation is 
not required for the enforcement all such garnishee proceedings. The Court has
134 see Schmidt “Le protocole sur les privileges et immunites des Communautes europeennes” (1991) 27 
Cahiers de Droit Europeen 67
135 Article 1 o f the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities o f the European Communities
136 see Hubner v. High Authority o f  the ECSC case 4/62 ([1962] ECR 41, at p.43. Also SA Generate de 
Banque v. Commission 1/88 SA ([1989] ECR 857 at § 9).
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dispensed with the need for authorisation proceedings, where the Community 
institution against whom the garnishee proceedings are commenced raises no objection 
to the garnishment. The Court has found that in these circumstances authorisation
1 T7proceedings are “pointless”, regard is had to the purpose of Article 1 which is to 
prevent obstacles to the functioning and independence of the Communities. The Court 
has found therefore that its jurisdiction with regard to garnishee orders “must be 
confined to considering whether such measures are likely, in view of the effects which 
they have under the applicable national law, to interfere with the proper functioning
1 TRand independence of the European Communities”. When faced with such cases the 
Court has considered with some care the degree to which the proper functioning or 
independence may be infringed by its granting such authorisation, and has for example 
authorised attachment of rent owed by the Communities to die Belgian State in
1 TOsatisfaction of the State’s judgment debts. However it has suggested obiter that 
attachment of payments due to a State under policies or action programmes of the 
Communities may hamper the functioning of the Communities.140
137 see X  Co. v. Commission Case SA1/71, 9[1971] ECR 363: also Universe Tankship Co Inc. v. 
Commission Case 1/87 SA ([1987] ECR 2807.
138 see Universe Tankship Co. cit supra, at p.2809
139 ibid.
140 see SA Generate de Banque v. Commission (cit. note 136 supra.) The Court has however pointed out 
that immunity from attachment will subsist until the Court itself has authorised attachment, or the 
Community institution in question has expressly waived immunity - Forafrique Burkinabe SE v. 
Commission C-182/91 ([1993] ECR 2161).
Once monies have been paid out to States under such programmes, unless the Communities have 
formally retained some interest in those funds, their ability to protect such payments by asserting 
immunity under Article 1 may be limited - see Philipp Brothers v. Republic o f  Sierra Leone (CA, [1995] 
1 Lloyds Rep. 289). The Communities therefore often disburse funds to ACP States under Lome/ 
Cotonou Conventions under an express deed of trust, to the effect that the recipient States hold the 
monies on trust for the Communities.
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The measures of constraint covered by Article 1 of the Protocol clearly go beyond the 
particular issue of garnishee proceedings, but it is striking again in relation to these 
other cases how by adopting a purposive construction of the Protocol, the Court has 
defined limits to the immunities granted thereunder. In the case of Ufficio Imposte di 
Consumo di Ispra v. Commission,141 the Court was asked to authorise entry to and 
inspection of a research centre of Euratom, by officials of a local excise duty office, in 
the preparation of an assessment for local duty in respect of the building of leisure 
facilities at the Centre. After considering the nature of the inspection, the Court, 
declining to follow the Opinion of the Advocate General, found that there was nothing 
to indicate that it “would raise difficulties which might place in jeopardy the 
functioning, independence or security of the Centre” and thus granted authorisation.
Even more striking is the case of Zwartveld142 in which an investigating magistrate 
(Rechter-commissaris) of a Dutch Court sought the assistance from the Commission in 
carrying out criminal investigations into alleged breaches of Community mles on 
fishing quotas, and in particular he sought disclosure of reports of EEC inspectors. The 
Commission had refused on the basis that the reports were part of one of its files on 
legal matters pending, and claimed that the inviolability of its archives under article 2 
o f the Protocol was on its face absolute, and made no provision for the Court to lift it.
However the Court took a quite different approach, starting from the fact that the 
Community was based upon “the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States 
nor its institutions can avoid review of whether die measures adopted by them are in
141 Case 2/68, ([1968JECR435)
142 Case C-2/88 Imm ([1990] ECR 3365
177
conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”.143 It noted the duty of 
sincere cooperation in the relations between the Member States and the Community 
institutions (Article 10 (ex 5), and its particular importance as between the Community 
institutions and the judicial authorities of the Member States, who are responsible for 
ensuring the application of and respect for Community law. By comparison it found 
the privileges and immunities granted to the Communities under the Protocol “have a 
purely functional character, inasmuch as they are intended to avoid any interference 
with the functioning and independence of the Communities”. The Court found that 
functional immunities were therefore relative, and that it had jurisdiction to examine 
whether a refusal by a Community institution to cooperate with a national authority 
was justified under the Protocol in order to avoid interference with the functioning and 
independence of the Communities. In the circumstances the Commission was either to 
co-operate with the Rechter-commissaris, or produce to the Court “imperative 
reasons” for not doing so.144
The European system displays many unique characteristics and so a direct application 
of the Community experience is not necessarily appropriate for all international 
organisations.145 However in displaying a strongly purposive approach to the 
interpretation of the immunities of the Communities, the Court has sought to 
accommodate the competing interests at stake, and to attempt a means of balancing 
them.
143 ibid. atp.3372 §16
144 A comparable approach is taken by the Court in relation to the giving of evidence by officials o f the 
Communities in legal proceedings to which the Communities are not a party, though this is governed by 
Rule 19 of the Staff Rules rather than the Protocol see Weddel and Co.BV v. Commission C-54/90 
([1992] ECR 871
145 see Plouvier “L'immunite de contrainte des Communautes europeennes” (1973) IX Rev. Beige DI 
471 at pp.483-4.
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3. International judicial decisions on the relationship of the private party and 
forum State in relation to immunity
As we have seen the operation of the immunities of international organisations risks 
hardship to private parties, and the primary way by which relevant international 
instruments seek to ameliorate this is by imposing on international organisations a duty 
to provide alternative remedies. However on occasion an injured private party might 
seek a remedy against the forum State which has given effect to the immunity of a 
respondent international organisation, either as an alternative or perhaps a default 
remedy.146 However there appears to be little evidence that there exists a general 
obligation on States to provide such a remedy of last resort.147
Nevertheless with the development of the international law of human rights, 
international law is likely to have at least a supervisory role in respect of the operation 
of immunities. The right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal
146 Seidl-Hohenveldem raises the possibility that where a plaintiff of the nationality of a non-member 
State of an international organisation is prevented from suing that organisation in the courts of one o f its 
member States, the plaintiffs State of nationality may be able to make an international claim on the 
grounds of a denial o f justice by the forum State -  see “The Legal Personality of international and 
supranational Organisations” 1965) 21 REDI 35, at p.61. Such a case appears not to have arisen in 
practice, and in any event it would seem more likely that the plaintiffs State of nationality (whether or 
not it was a member of the organisation in question) would first make a claim against the international 
organisation for the substantive injury - see Chapter I at note 55ff.
147 See for example Ministre des Affaires etrangeres v. Dame Burgat (1976) 74 ILR 275 where 
landlords o f property leased to a member of the Honduran delegation to sought an indemnity from the 
French State suffered loss and a diminution of their rights as landlords as a result o f the immunity 
obligations under the HQ Agreement which had been published as French Decree in 1956. The 
Conseil d ’Etat following a line of decisions which set out the circumstances in which the French State 
may be found liable for damage arising from its legislative acts, ordered the Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs to pay the indemnity by reason of the principle of equality in the bearing o f public burdens. 
However it seems doubtful that this case is authority for a more general proposition that as a matter of 
French law where an individual is deprived of rights or remedies against an international organisation 
by virtue of its jurisdictional immunities, the French State will liable to indemnify him -see casenote 
by Burdeau (1977) 104 Clunet 631 .A  fortiori it cannot be considered as evidence of a more general 
international legal requirement to provide a default remedy against the State itself.
148 It is important to make clear that the question here is not of applying human rights to an international 
organisation directly - where this has been attempted international human rights organs have found that
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established by law, for the determination of rights and obligations, is a human right 
protected in all of the major Conventions protecting civil and political rights.149 The 
importance of such rights is evidenced from the fact that due process rights are those 
which are most frequently litigated before international human rights courts. As is well 
known, the European Court of Human Rights, in its landmark ruling in the Golder 
case, interpreted Article 6 of the European Convention in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Convention, viz. being to guarantee the rule of law, so as to include a 
right of access to a court for the determination of any claims relating to a person's civil 
rights and obligations.150 However the Court took care to point that such this right was 
not unlimited, and in subsequent caselaw it has elucidated three criteria by which to 
ascertain the permissibility of limitations:
(1) the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, which 
may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the 
community and of individuals;
(2) in laying down such regulation, States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation: however the final decision will be that of the Court, which must 
be satisfied that the limitations do not restrict or reduce the access left to the 
individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right 
is impaired.
since organisations themselves are not signatories to the Conventions they can not be parties to a 
complaint (CFDT v. EC and their Member States, Appl. No 8030/77, 13 DR 231): and where the 
complaint has been against a State party to the human rights treaty in question it has been found that the 
acts o f an international organisation are not acts within the jurisdiction o f the Respondent State see eg 
Eur. Comm. HR, Heinz v. Contracting Parties to the European Patent Convention Appl. no. 12090/92, 
76A DR 125) also UN HRC HvDP v. Netherlands Doc.A/42/40 p.l 85).
149 See art. 6 European Convention on Human Rights; art. 14 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; art.8 American Convention on Human Rights; and art. 7 African Charter o f Human 
and People’s Rights.
150 see Golder v. UK Ser.A no. 18.p. 15-18
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(3) any limitation must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and aim sought to 
be achieved.151
The Court has sought to ensure that this right of access to a court, operates to prevent 
illegitimate procedural barriers to access to a court to vindicate a pre-existing civil 
right or obligation, rather than to be the source of additional substantive rights.
1 ^ 9However by its own admission such a distinction is not always easy. Thus for a case 
concerning the jurisdictional immunity of an international organisations to raise an 
issue under Article 6(1) it would be necessary to show that the immunity operated so 
as to prevent the access of a private party to a court for the determination of an 
otherwise justiciable issue relating to his or her civil rights or obligations.153
151 See Ashingdane v. UK, Ser.A No.93 at pp.24-25; Lithgow v. UK, Ser A No.102 at p.71; Philis v. 
Greece, Ser.A No.209 at pp.20-23. See also Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick Law o f  the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1995) at pp. 196-202
152 e.g see Fayed v. UK Ser.A no.294 at pp.50-1. In the context o f this study it is of course not always 
clear that the relationship between an international organisation and a private party is one of civil law, 
which but for immunity would be triable before the domestic courts.
153 The establishment of this last point may be far from easy, as the Commission's caselaw shows:
In Spaans v. Netherlands (58 DR 119) an application by a former employee of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal was found to be inadmissible ratione personae because concerned the actions of the Tribunal, 
which could not be said to be acts within the jurisdiction o f the Netherlands. The case concerned an 
employment dispute in which the Netherlands courts had upheld the immunity of the Tribunal. The 
Commission's decision appears not to address the applicant's claim against the respondent State for 
barring his access to a court.
In the field of diplomatic immunity, the Commission in a rather cryptic decision appears to find that 
diplomatic immunity imposes substantive limitations on the jurisdiction of national courts, and so Article 
6(1) is not applicable (N,C,F and AG  v. Italy, 84 DR 84).
Similarly in its decision in Dyer v. UK (39 DR 246) the Commission found that a statutory immunity 
from actions in tort brought by servicemen against the Crown, did not result in a breach of article 6(1), 
because the very nature of the work and training of the armed forces required that different rules on the 
civil liability of the State in these circumstances were applicable. See also Vernacombe and others v. UK 
and FRG (59 DR 186).
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In the cases of Beer and Regan v. Germany and Waite and Kennedy v. Germany154 the 
applicants were initially employed by private companies but were subsequently 
“placed at the disposal o f’ the European Space Agency (ESA). They later applied to 
the German Labour Court claiming to have acquired the status of employees of the 
ESA, but these actions were declared inadmissible when the ESA relied upon its 
immunity from jurisdiction. The applicants’ complaint to Strasbourg was therefore 
against Germany on the basis that they had been denied access to a Court, pointing to 
their complete exclusion from access to an independent tribunal by operation of 
immunity.
The Court, noting the permissible restrictions on the right of access to a court, 
considered the question of whether the immunity pursued a legitimate aim. It found in 
the affirmative on the ground that “the attribution of privileges and immunities to 
international organisations are an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of 
such organisations free from unilateral interference by individual governments”.155 
Moreover this was a long established practice in the interest of the good working of 
these organisations, which was enhanced by the trend towards greater international 
cooperation.
On the issue of whether the restriction imposed by immunity on the right of access to a 
court was proportionate to the legitimate aim of the immunities, the Court considered 
whether there were “reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights 
under the Convention” available to the applicants.156 The Court found that the
154 Appl. No.s 28934/95 and 26083/94, respectively, both decided 18 February 1999
155 ibid. at § 52
156 ibid. at §58
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applicants would have had recourse to the ESA Appeals Board, or alternatively could 
have brought proceedings against the companies which had originally employed them 
before hiring them to the ESA. The Court was therefore unanimous in finding that the 
immunity did not violate Article 6(1), and that to find otherwise would thwart the 
proper functioning of international organisations and run counter to the current trend 
towards extending and strengthening international cooperation.
The case is therefore a strong vindication of the grant of jurisdictional immunities to 
international organisations. Nevertheless it should be observed that before the 
Commission, the Government of Germany had unsuccessfully claimed that the 
immunity of the organisation constituted a substantive limit to the jurisdiction of the
1 57national courts. The Court also clearly rejected such a suggestion finding that:
“... where States establish international organisations ... and where they 
attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them 
immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental 
rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention 
... if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from all responsibility under 
the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such 
attribution.”158
Thus the Court found that the grant of immunities did raise issues under the 
Convention, and was therefore reviewable. However in the instant case the 
availability of “reasonable” alternative remedies was central to the Court’s finding 
that the restriction on Convention rights was permissible. There has been some 
criticism that the Court’s examination of the alternative remedies in this particular
157 88 D&R 130
158 ibid.at §57, on this point see also the case of Denise Matthews v. UK, 18 February 1999 at §32. It 
contrasts with the approach o f the Commission to diplomatic immunity in (N,C,F and AG  v. Italy, 84 
DR 84).
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case was rather superficial,159 and one might expect in future cases a more careful 
review to ensure that such remedies meet the procedural safeguards of Article 6.160
Conclusions
This Chapter has sought to demonstrate the flexibility of the functional standard in 
accordance with which international organisations are granted immunities. Firstly it 
was shown that the express immunities granted to international organisations under 
relevant treaty provisions, vary considerably depending upon the nature of the 
primary functions of the organisation in question. The more that involvement of an 
organisation in private or commercial activities is anticipated, the more restricted its 
immunities are likely to be in respect of those activities. In contrast organisations 
whose activities are in the political or military spheres are granted much broader 
immunities. A further dimension is that the UN and most of its specialised agencies, 
as organisations of universal or at least quasi-universal participation, and whose 
functions are to be carried out in the universal interest, broad immunities appear to be 
more justifiable than in relation to smaller regional organisations.
The review of international caselaw relating to the immunities of international 
organisations it can be seen that in general international courts generally seem to 
have adopted a similarly flexible approach. The relevant decisions tend to 
acknowledge the strength of claims of the various parties concerned, whether the 
international organisation, the forum State or a private individual. In none of these
159 See casenote by Reinisch, (1999) 93 AJIL 933
160 see for example Lithgow Ser A No. 102 at p.71. For commentary on this issue see W. Wedam-Lukic 
“Arbitration and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights” Arbitration Feb., 1998, at 
S16-21
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cases have international courts sought to establish the pre-eminence of one set of 
interests over the others, but have rather tried to accommodate them all recognising 
the ongoing relationships between an international organisation and its member 
States and their respective populations. In doing so they use techniques such as 
purposive or effective interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions and emphasise 
the importance of maintaining channels of communication and procedures by which 
the necessary accommodations can be found.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION OF IMMUNITIES
IN NATIONAL LAW
Introduction
The previous Chapter considered the treaty provisions that are the primary source of 
the immunities of international organisations, and their interpretation. It was noted how 
at the level of international law level, the treaty technique has enabled necessary 
flexibility in the formation of international immunities, allowing immunities of 
differing extent to be granted to different organisations according to their functional 
requirements. The focus of this study now shifts to the level of national law, at which, 
contrastingly, it is the uniformity of application of treaty provisions (i.e. ensuring 
evenness in the application of immunity by all member States) that is a major 
advantage of using die treaty technique.1 However this primary reliance on treaty 
provisions, leaves open the question of how cases may be dealt with where there is no 
applicable treaty provision. On this question the law less well settled, though a number 
of approaches to it will be considered.
The implementation in national law of treaty provisions on immunity, and their 
application by national courts will be considered in the first parts of this chapter. The 
final parts consider how national courts have dealt with suits involving international 
organisations in the absence of treaty provisions and raises the question of customary 
international law.
1 This contrasts with the doctrine of State immunity, which has developed primarily as a matter of  
customary international law, and treaties have had relatively little impact in the development of the 
law. Accordingly it has been State practice made up often o f action at the level o f national law, which 
has been the primary basis of developments in State immunity; see for example H.Lauterpacht “The 
Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States” (1951) 28 BYIL 88-121
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A. Implementation of International Immunities in National Law
It is clearly the intention of treaty provisions on the immunities of international 
organisations that they should be given their primary effect at the level of national law. 
Furthermore their effectiveness will often require their uniform implementation by all 
member States. However, as is well, known there are considerable differences in the 
way that States receive international obligations into their domestic legal systems.
In so-called monist systems treaty obligations become part of the national legal 
system upon their ratification, or, at least, upon their official publication. Therefore it 
is clearly the text of the treaty that national courts will apply and interpret. Whereas 
amongst the dualist States in which treaty obligations must be incorporated by 
domestic legislative enactment in order to form part of domestic law, a variety of 
legislative techniques are adopted in accordance with local practice. As we have 
seen, in international law the functional standard of immunity on which the 
immunities of international organisations are based, is intended to be a flexible 
standard, which, when applied, allows differentiation as between organisations in 
accordance with the requirements of each. Thus unlike for example the situation of 
legislating for the immunity of foreign States, the local legislator must take care to 
reflect the precise extent of immunity required under the relevant treaty provision, 
separately in the case of each international organisation.
2 For surveys o f European States see Eisemann P-M. (ed) L ’integration du droit international et 
communautaire dans I ’ordre juridique national (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996); also Lueke and 
Wickremasinghe “Analytical Report” in Treaty Making -  Expression o f  Consent by States to be Bound 
by a Treaty (Kluwer, The Hague, 2001) at pp.87-99.
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One solution adopted by some legal systems is the legislative incorporation of the full 
text of each treaty to which the legislating State becomes a party. The German 
legislation for example publishes the full text of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the UN, alongside the German Act of 
1954 by which it becomes part of domestic law.3 Some States adopt primary 
legislation to enact the obligations which must be given effect in national law in 
relation to the each organisation to which the State becomes a party, eg Sweden in 
which the relevant act names the organisations and refers to relevant provisions of 
regulations or agreements to which Sweden is a party.4
The common law States tend to follow the dualist approach to the reception of treaty 
obligations, and interestingly appear to take a more systematic approach to the 
incorporation of international obligations in this respect. In many of these States, an act 
of primary legislation enumerates the maximum range of immunities which an 
international organisation may enjoy, and then delegates to the Government the power 
to make regulations providing the precise immunities to which each organisation of 
which the legislating State is a member, is entitled. This method of legislation differs 
from that of other dualist States, in that the treaty texts themselves may not be 
incorporated by reference, instead the obligations are reformulated in the terms of the 
local legislation.
3 See the Act of 22.6.54 (IVKD, 1954, part II, No. 12, p.639) translated and reprinted in UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.25. Under Article 3 of the Act the Federal Government is empowered to grant 
similar privileges and immunities, in whole or in part, to other official international organisations which 
are not Specialised Agencies of the UN, and to “foreign welfare organisations”(see eg the Order of 
30.5.58, made under these powers in relation to NATO, reproduced in UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at 
P-26).
4 see the Swedish Act of 10.7.54 which relates to the privileges and immunities o f the UN, the OEEC the 
Council o f Europe, the Customs Cooperation Council, the Specialised Agencies of the UN and the ICJ 
see UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/10 at p . l l l  (No.s 511 and 334); and also the Act of 10.6.76 (No.661) 
(reprinted in 1980 UNJYB p.23).
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The United Kingdom was one of the first States to adopt this model.5 Accordingly the 
immunities of most international organisations are granted by Orders in Council made 
under the enabling powers contained in the International Organisations Act 1968 (as 
amended).6 The legislation seeks to provide a comprehensive basis to govern all 
aspects of the relationship of an international organisation of which the UK is a 
member, with the local legal system. Thus its enabling powers relate to the grant of 
privileges and immunities not only to the organisation itself in relation to judicial, 
administrative and fiscal matters, but also to its officials and to the representatives of 
other members to the organisation (whether they represent governments or not). The 
terms of the Act are broad enough to cover both organisations of which the UK is 
simply a member and those to which it is also the host State,7 as well as persons 
involved in international judicial or arbitral proceedings and representatives to 
international conferences.
Marston’s study of the preparation of the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act 1944 
(the original precursor to the 1968 Act) reveals that there was considerable uncertainty 
at the time as to the position of international organisations in UK law.8 In the pre-War 
period the office of the League of Nations in the UK had enjoyed broadly same status
5 In the United Kingdom the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act 1944, was the first Act on the subject 
and the first to adopt this model. Aspects o f its legislative history is carefully traced by Marston in “The 
Origin of the Personality of International Organisations in United Kingdom Law” 40 (1991) ICLQ 403- 
424.
6 There are some exceptions in relation to the Bretton Woods institutions and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, whose legal status, privileges and immunities are governed by primary legislation.
7 For organisations o f which the UK is not a member there is provision for the an Order in Council to be 
made to recognise their legal capacities and for certain tax reliefs, but there is no provisions for them to 
be granted jurisdictional immunities -  see s. 4 of the Act.
8 op cit note 5 supra
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as a diplomatic mission, though the specific question of its jurisdictional immunity 
appears not have arisen. On the establishment of UNRAA in 1943 there was a strongly 
held opinion within the UK Government9 that UNRRA, as an association of States, 
would enjoy the same immunities as its member States, and that the Foreign Office 
would simply be able to certify this status should any question arise before the courts. 
However it was anticipated that this might be more problematic in the case of other of 
the international organisations which were planned for the post-War period, and 
particularly given the variations in immunities to different organisations by virtue of 
the functional standard, it was felt the in order to avoid confusion it was more 
appropriate to adopt legislation than to leave the matter for the common law.10
As to the extent of immunities granted in the legislation, Marston’s study shows that 
the Government and the draftsmen were of the opinion that the range of immunities of 
foreign States should be the maximum to which organisations might be entitled.11 
Whilst it should of course be remembered that at the time foreign governments 
enjoyed absolute jurisdictional immunity in UK law, there was also considerable 
concern expressed about the need to ensure legal security when private persons 
contracted with international organisations. In fact the Act enables “immunity from 
suit and legal process” (without qualification) to be granted by Order in Council, 
though in practice any qualification to the immunity of a given international
9 This opinion was held in particular by the Attorney-General Lord Somervell who was also keen to 
avoid enacting legislation lest it be misinterpreted by other States less willing to grant immunities, as in 
any way constitutive of the status, privileges and immunities o f UNRRA -  ibid. at p.412
10 ibid. p.414, and especially the summing up of the position by the Attorney General quoted there.
11 Marston quotes the Attorney General as saying “[the Government’s] intention was never to accord 
greater privileges than were accorded to foreign governments; in some cases they might accord 
considerable smaller privileges, eg in the case of bodies carrying on trade” - op cit note 5 supra at p.414.
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organisation which is specified in relevant international instruments, will be translated 
into the Order made m respect of that organisation.
The UK legislation has clearly influenced similar statutes in a number of
1TCommonwealth States, and was considered by the US Congress during its 
consideration of die International Organizations Immunities Act 1945 (“the IOIA”).14 
Though the content and scheme of this legislation are in many respects similar to the 
UK Act, the pre-existing situation in US law was different, in that until the adoption of 
this Act the US had not recognised the immunities of any international organisation in 
customary international law, and nor had it accepted treaty commitments in this respect 
(even in respect of the Pan American Union which was based in the US).15
In recognition of the increased number of international organisations planned for the 
post-War period and of increased US involvement in them, as well as the likelihood of 
the situation of the UN Headquarters in the US, Congress accepted that the subject was 
of “pressing importance”.16 However the terms of the IOIA clearly show that Congress 
envisaged it as constitutive of the regime of international immunities in the US, rather
12 Thus for example the Order dealing with the UN provides for unlimited immunity from jurisdiction 
except to the extent that it is waived (see the United Nations and International Court of Justice 
(Immunities and Privileges) Order 1974 (SI 1974/1261), whereas for example the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992 (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1996 (SI 1996/1295) reflects the 
considerable limitations on the Fund’s immunities as provided for in its HQ Agreement with the UK (see 
Chapter 3 supra at note 56).
13 See for example: Australia - International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1963; 
Canada -  Part II o f the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act 1991,c.41; New Zealand -  
Part II of the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1963; Singapore -  the International 
Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, C.145.
14 see Report of House Committee on Ways and Means (House Report No. 1203, 79* Cong., 1st Sess.l 
1945) at p. 3. The IOIA (Pub. L. No 79-291, 59 Stat.669) is now codified at 22 USC §§ 288-288i
15 For a discussion o f the drafting o f the IOIA see Glenn, Kearney and Padilla “Immunities o f  
International Organizations” (1982) 22 Va JIL 247
16 op cit note 14 supra
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than simply as a means of translating into national law international obligations 
undertaken by the US in this respect.
The US legislation is applicable to public international organisations in which the US 
participates and which the President designates by Executive Order. It specifies the 
capacities, privileges and immunities which might be accorded by Executive Order to 
such organisations, their employees and representatives to them. In order to enable the 
differentiation between the privileges and immunities accorded to each organisation, a 
sentence is added that the President might in particular cases withdraw, withhold, limit 
or condition the grant of any immunity “in the light of the functions performed by any
17such organisation.” Though this might simply be interpreted as a rather clumsy 
attempt to ensure the flexibility inherent in the functional standard underlying 
international law of international immunities, its formulation in terms of a Presidential
1 ftdiscretion and without reference to international obligations is questionable. The 
Senate Committee on Finance suggested that it would “permit the adjustment or 
limitation of the privileges in the event that any international organisation should 
engage for example in activities of a commercial nature”.19 However in practice the 
section does not appear to have caused controversies.
17 22 USC 288
18 Preuss suggests that this section “should have be so drafted as to make it clear that the powers granted 
therein should be exercised in a manner consistent with international obligations, and to exclude the 
possibility that they might as a matter of municipal law, be construed to override the requirements of 
previous treaties and agreements”, see “The International Organizations Immunities Act” (1946) 40 
AJIL 332 at p.339.
The US courts have gone some way to remedying this danger by holding that art. 104 o f the UN Charter 
is self-executing, see for example Balfour, Guthrie & Co, v. US and others (1950) 17ILR 323 .
19 see Senate report No.861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p.2
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However more objectionable is the following sentence which allows for the revocation 
of immunities in cases of abuse. Though this was important to Congress as a means of 
ensuring the protection of US interests, it misconceives the relationship between the 
US and relevant organisations. That relationship is in fact governed by the constituent 
instrument and other relevant treaty obligations, and is not the same as that between 
two equal sovereigns which is governed by the international law of diplomatic
9ftrelations. As Lalive points out where international organisations are concerned, m 
cases of abuse it is more appropriate to seek the determination of an independent third
91party, than to have recourse to unilateral sanctions.
The same misconception appears to be responsible for the continuing controversy as to 
the extent of jurisdictional immunities allowed under the IOIA. The relevant section 
provides:
“International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located 
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every 
form o f judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the 
extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the 
purpose of an proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” [emphasis added]22
At the time of the adoption by Congress of the IOIA, the US adhered to the absolute 
doctrine of immunity, thus the governmental standard of immunity appeared to be
20 This is also clear from the provision now at §288e which enables the Secretary of State to counter 
abuse of privileges and immunities by officials by declaring them persona non grata: for criticism of this 
section as incompatible with the independence of the international civil service see Preuss op. cit. note 
18 supra atp.339.
See also §228f which enables the Secretary of State to withhold any privileges or immunities under the 
Act from nationals o f any State which refuses to grant corresponding privileges and immunities to US 
citizens.
21 see J-F Lalive “Les immunites des etats et des organisations intemationales” (1953) 84 Rec. des Cours 
at p.322. Both the UN General Convention and the 1947 Convention in relation to the Specialised 
Agencies establish a means o f seeking a binding advisory opinion of the ICJ, whereas the US-UN HQ 
Agreement provides for international arbitration.
22 22 USC 288a, subsection (b)
193
broadly appropriate. However since the adoption by the United States of the 
restrictive standard of immunity for foreign States,24 the question has arisen whether 
such a restrictive standard is also applicable to international organisations. As will be 
seen below the question has arisen in a number of cases but judicial pronouncements 
on the subject have been somewhat ambivalent, and so the question is still open 
pending a definitive determination by the Supreme Court. The State Department 
appears to take the view that, in general, international organisations only enjoy 
restricted immunity, but the weight of academic writing appears to be against this.
B. Application of Immunities by National Courts
The privileges and immunities of international organisations seek to protect their 
genuinely international status by preventing undue interference with their 
independent functioning by the courts of any single member State. In part it can be 
traced back to the principle of sovereign equality of States, and in part it reflects the
23 see Report o f the House Ways and Means Committee which stated “In general... the privileges and 
immunities provided in this legislation are similar to those granted by the United States to foreign 
governments and their officials ... The Committee has ascertained [from the Department of State] that 
the privileges to which international organisations and their officials will be entitled are somewhat more 
limited than those which are extended by the United States to foreign governments.” cit. note 14 supra.
Preuss writing in 1946 found that the IOIA “in adopting as its general standard for international 
organisations the treatment accorded to foreign governments, conforms almost completely with the legal 
requirements arising out of the [constituent] instruments [of the specialised organisations or agencies 
now in existence]”, op. cit. note 18 supra, at p.338.
24 First by virtue of the “Tate letter” o f 1952 and now as codified now in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act 1976 (28 USC §§1601-11).
25 See 1978 US Digest of Practice 115, and 1980 US Digest o f Practice 68
26 See for example Ehrenfeld “United Nations Immunity Distinguished form Sovereign Immunity” 
[1958] Proc. ASIL 88; Fedder “The Functional Basis o f International Law and Organization” (1960) 9 
AmULR 60; O’Toole “ Sovereign Immunity redivivus: Suits against International Organizations” 
(1980) 4 Suffolk T.JIL 1; Farugia “Boimah v. United Nations General Assembly: International 
Organizations Immunity is Absolutely Not Restrictive” (1989) XV Brooklyn JIL 497-525; Oparil 
“Immunity o f International Organisations in the US Courts: Absolute or Restrictive” (1991) 24 Vand. 
JTL 689. The American Law Institute Restatement o f  the Law on Foreign Relations (Third) appears to 
accept that the restrictive doctrine o f State immunity is not applicable to the UN and its Specialised 
Agencies, but is more nuanced about other organisations, §467, Comment d. and Reporter’s Note 4 
thereto.
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principle of effectiveness. The intention behind the carefully drawn treaty provisions 
on immunity is therefore to ensure a uniform treatment of international organisations 
by their member States. Thus the clarity of drafting of the relevant provisions is 
essential, leaving as little room as possible for differing interpretations by national 
courts. It may be a sign of success in this respect that, despite the large number of 
international organisations which exist (more than 300), there is a relatively small
• • • * • • 78number of reported cases in which their immunities have been at issue.
Nevertheless international organisations are, as has been observed, grafted on to an 
existing State-oriented structure of international law, rather than seeking to replace 
States. Accordingly, an appropriate accommodation of international organisations 
must be also made within the national legal orders of States, which are, of course, 
constituted primarily to reflect the values of the national community. Inevitably there 
have been some occasions on which that process of accommodation at the national 
level has been problematic. Whilst, viewed as a whole, the body of national caselaw 
on international immunities is relatively homogenous, suggesting a broad acceptance 
of immunities, there are nonetheless some notable exceptions and some remaining 
problem issues. Bearing in mind the functional rationale of international immunities, 
the sections which follow, therefore, consider how national courts have applied them 
in practice.
27 It is o f course well-established that States can not invoke provisions of their national law to excuse 
them from carrying out their international obligations, see art 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, and Advisory Opinion on the Jurisdiction o f  the Courts o f  Danzig (1928) PCIJ Ser B No. 15, 
at pp.26-27
28 A comprehensive survey of the caselaw was complied by A.Reinisch in International Organisations 
Before National Courts (CUP, Cambridge, 2000) in which he cites almost 250 cases from national 
courts. By way of comparison in the US alone a lexis search would show that the numbers of cases 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act runs into the thousands.
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The jurisdictional immunities granted to international organisations under the 
relevant treaty provisions, act simply as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction of the 
municipal court, which, but for the immunity, would ordinarily be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over the dispute in question. Thus such jurisdiction can be established 
when organisations waive their immunity. Express limitations on immunity in these 
treaty provisions tend to attach to certain types of subject-matter, particularly in 
respect of private law disputes with third parties (outsiders of the organisations such 
as members of the public, civilian contractors etc., as opposed to employees). Thus 
these are cases in relation to which the municipal court would have jurisdiction were 
they to take place between private parties, provided of course that sufficient 
connecting factors link the dispute to the forum and other local rules of jurisdiction 
are met.
Correspondingly it should be noted that there are other types of subject matter raised 
in disputes involving international organisations, over which the municipal court 
cannot appropriately exercise its jurisdiction. These are issues concerning the internal 
organisation and structures of organisations which are subject to the appropriate rules 
of each organisation, derived from international law. In most of these cases thus the 
issue is one of lack of jurisdictional competence of the municipal court, rather than a
* • 7Q • ttrue immunity, and thus the question of waiver cannot arise. Such lack of 
jurisdictional competence or non-justiciability is familiar in the context of inter-State 
relations, and as Professor Brownlie points out is based on the principle of non­
29 See Brownlie. The Principles o f Public International Law, 5th edn (1998) at 
p.326f. See also Niboyet “Immunite de juridiction et incompetence d’attribution” 
(1950) 39 Rev. crit. d.i.p. 139; and Dominice “La nature et l’etendue et l’immunite 
de jurisdiction des organisations intemationales” from Bocksteigel et al. (ed.s) 
Festschrift fur Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (1988) 77-93, at pp. 82-85
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intervention of in the internal affairs of other States. Certain municipal courts have 
extended this principle of non-intervention to international organisations so that 
where the subject-matter of the dispute would involve the municipal court in 
questions of the internal management or administration of an international
31organisation, the municipal court has found itself unable to hear the case. It is 
submitted that the principle of non-intervention may be so extended because of the 
international status of international organisations. There appears to be a general rule 
that disputes governed by the internal law of international organisations are not
37suitable to be determined by a national court.
An express immunity, granted ratione personae under a treaty, may co-exist 
alongside these areas of non-justiciability, and where this occurs both issues may be 
put before the court in the alternative. Since the scope of the two issues is different, a 
case may be dismissed on grounds of non-justiciability notwithstanding that an
33organisation’s immunity ratione personae is limited. Thus, using as a model 
Brownlie’s agenda of legal issues before a municipal court faced with a dispute 
involving the question of State immunity,34 a court faced with a dispute involving a 
question of the jurisdictional immunity of an international organisation must consider 
the following:
30 ibid. at pp.327-8
31 In particular see the treatment o f employment cases involving members of the international civil 
service discussed in Chapter 2 supra, at note 104, in which national courts have found that they did 
not have jurisdictional competence over the disputes in question because of their internal nature - in 
some of these cases, even in the absence of an express immunity enjoyed by the international 
organisations in question.
32 see e.g. the decision o f the UK High Court in Westland Helicopters v. AOI [1995] 2 All ER 387
33 see for example the discussion o f the case of Broadbent v. USA, (63 ILR 162 and 337) -  text at 
note 115 infra
34 op. cit note 29 supra at p.334
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1 .(a) The existence and proper interpretation of a treaty provision granting the 
organisation in question immunity ratione personae.
(b) The existence and proper interpretation of any limitations upon that immunity.
2. The question of immunity in the absence of an express treaty provision, including 
the existence and scope of any immunity which the organisation might enjoy as a 
matter of customary international law.
3. The question of the justiciability of the subject-matter of a dispute, including the 
existence and scope of issues which are non-justiciable before the municipal court 
because they raise questions of the internal law of an international organisation 
which a national court can not properly determine. The question is thus often one of 
applicable law, rather than jurisdiction simpliciter.
4. Characterisation of the dispute, i.e. a determination as to whether the facts of the 
case fall within the class of immune transactions. This has been a major issue in a 
number of cases concerning State immunity, particularly where the limitations on 
immunity are expressed in the broad terms of the iure imperii/ iure gestionis 
distinction, rather than say the more individuated approach adopted in some more
* • 36 • •recent formulations of the law on State immunity. It may thus be an important issue
35 e.g. the UK case of Kuwait Airways Corp v. Iraqi Airways Co., HL, [1995] 1 WLR 1147; and the /  
Congreso [1983] 1 AC 244. In the first o f these cases the court was faced with the question of whether 
or not Iraqi Airways actions in removing aircraft from Kuwait, and subsequently retaining them for 
their own purposes, were done “in the exercise of sovereign authority” as per  s. 14(2) o f the State 
Immunity Act. In the latter case various actions of State-owned companies some of which were at the 
behest o f the Government had to be characterised as either iure imperii or iure gestionis, under the 
common law.
36 Thus for example in the UK courts the difficult cases o f characterisation mentioned in note 35 
supra, have occurred in relation to areas in which broad distinctions between public and private acts,
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in particular when considering organisational immunities that are limited, and 
especially where those limitations are expressed in broad terms. An example of how 
such characterisation issues might arise in relation to the immunities of international 
organisations, might be where the extent of immunity from jurisdiction is subject to a 
general limitation on grounds of functional necessity. There is little practice from 
national courts in relation to the immunities of international organisations themselves
oo
on that question. However greater controversy ha arisen in relation to 
characterisation of “official acts” for the purposes of the immunities of international 
officials.39
The remainder of this chapter therefore broadly follows that agenda of issues, save 
that the final issue is not dealt with separately for the reasons given.
1. The application and interpretation of treaty provisions on immunity
(a) Immunity
It might be thought that the application and interpretation of treaty provisions on 
jurisdictional immunity in national legal systems might be affected by the way in 
which the treaty obligation in question is received into the national legal system. 
However in practice this is, if at all, only partly true. Certainly the courts of monist 
States apply and interpret the treaty text directly. They are therefore likely to have
rather than in relation to cases falling within the more specific and individuated rules in section 3-11 
of the State Immunity Act 1976.
37 As might arise should the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal which gave the EMBL Award (105 ILR 
1, discussed at Chapter 3 supra at note 12 Iff) be applied in relation to jurisdictional immunities. See 
Bekker The Legal Position o f  Intergovernmental Organisations - a Functional Necessity Analysis o f  
their Legal Status and Immunities (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) at 235
38 See section 1(e) infra
39 see chapter 5 infra
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the international basis of the obligation clearly in mind, and one might therefore 
expect them to adopt a similar approach to an international tribunal on questions such 
as interpretation. The courts of those dualist States which formally incorporate the 
full treaty text itself by legislative act might be thought to be in a largely similar 
position. On the other hand In States such as the UK and the US, in which the 
obligations of the treaty are reformulated in the incorporating legislation, there may 
be some danger of either: (a) an inaccuracy in the reformulation of the text, or; (b) 
the treatment of the obligation simply as one of local law, subject to the usual rules 
as to hierarchy and /or interpretation in the local system.
As discussed above the language of the US International Organisations Immunities 
Act may be criticised in a number of respects.40 Some commentators have noted a 
tendency on the part of US courts to apply immunities using “domestic law as the 
rule of decision”,41 which may explain to some degree the controversy concerning 
the application of the restrictive doctrine of State immunity to international 
organisations. Nevertheless the situation in the US should not be exaggerated. Whilst 
the numbers of cases brought in the US on international immunity points is relatively 
large in comparison with the numbers of cases from other countries, in absolute 
terms the overall numbers of cases are still very small.42 Further, as will be 
discussed, the courts of other States, which operate different systems for the
40 see text at notes 14ff supra
41 see Glenn et al. op cit note 15 supra
42 Reinisch op cit note 28 supra records about 65 decisions o f the US courts relating to international 
organisations spanning the post War period, which given the quantity o f US litigation in other areas of 
the law, suggests that this is not a major source of controversy.
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reception of treaties in domestic law, have made similar decisions concerning the 
extent of immunity.43
On other hand in the UK there have been very few reported decisions in relation to 
the immunities of international organisations. Whilst it has been noted that in the 
International Tin Council litigation, the interpretation of the phrase “the legal 
capacities of a body corporate”44 was a major source of controversy, the question of 
immunity appears not to have given rise to undue difficulties of application and 
interpretation. As regards interpretation, it is clear that the UK courts will look 
beyond the usual rules of statutory interpretation when dealing with legislative 
provisions by which international obligations are implemented, including referring to 
the text of the treaty itself and if necessary interpreting it in accordance with Articles 
31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 45
As a general proposition then, the notion of immunity granted under treaty provision 
have not been subject to fundamental challenge from national courts. In terms of the 
modalities of immunities, by analogy with State immunity, it might be thought that 
the court should take judicial notice of immunities, particularly where a court acts 
without the appearance of an international organisation. It is also clear now that a 
court’s failure to deal with the immunity of an international organisation in limine
43 see section 1(d) infra
44see s.l(2)(a) of the International Organisations Act 1968
45 See Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines [1980] 2 All ER 896; in the context o f the immunities of 
international organisations see the decision of the EAT in Mukoro v. EBRD (1994) 107 ILR 604, 
which considered the treaty basis of the immunities in the light of their object and purpose in addition 
to a textual analysis.
201
litis will engage the international responsibility of the forum State,46 since such 
failure effectively nullifies immunity by forcing the international organisation in 
question to take steps to defend the substantive proceedings.
If then, in broad terms the concept of treaty-based immunities is accepted by national 
courts is accepted by local courts, it is perhaps unsurprising that the body of 
jurisprudence from national courts tends to focus on the limitations of immunity.
(b) Waiver
A limitation on immunity found in all of the treaty provisions which have been 
considered is in relation to waiver. It should be remembered that waiver is effective 
in relation to immunities only where the court in question would, but for the 
immunity, ordinarily enjoy jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. As was 
noted above international organisations generally prefer not to waive their immunity 
and as a result there is not extensive jurisprudence on the question of waiver of 
immunity by international organisations 47
It seems clear that appearance in court only for the purpose of asserting immunity 
should not be deemed to be voluntary submission to jurisdiction or waiver of
4ftimmunity. This is of course well established in relation to State immunity and
46 Cumaraswamy case (1999) ICJ Rep.62, at para 63
47 In Boimah v. UNGA ((1987) 113 ILR 499) a US District Court insisted that waiver must be express 
since it suggested that there were policy reasons to suggest that “courts should be reluctant to find that 
an international organisation has inadvertently waived immunity”.
48 see for example s2(4) o f the UK State Immunity Act 1978; s . 10( 7) - ( 9)  of Australian Foreign States 
Immunities Act 1985; Article 3(2) o f the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (1979 UKTS 
no.74); and Article 8(2) of the ILC draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Property UN Doc.A /CN.4/L.457
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would appear similarly to apply to international organisations.49 It is interesting to 
note that the United Nations has on occasion intervened in lawsuits as an amicus 
curiae, but has been careful to emphasise that it did not thereby submit to the local 
jurisdiction.50
There appears not to be any case in which die question of the position of an 
international organisation in relation to a counterclaim in proceedings commenced by 
that organisation.51 However there do not appear to be strong policy reasons to 
differentiate the position of international organisations from that of a foreign State in 
an analogous situation, which has traditionally been considered to have submitted to 
the jurisdiction in respect of a counterclaim arising from the same subject-matter as 
the claim in which it has commenced proceedings.
(i) Contractual waiver 
(aa) Choice of jurisdiction
As noted above the UN has claimed that its immunity may only be waived expressly 
in a “particular case”, and moreover that the removal of an express provision 
allowing waiver in advance by contract from an earlier draft of what is now Article II
49 See for example African Reinsurance Corp. v. Abate Fantaye (1986) 86 ILR 655; US Lines v.
WHO (1983) 107 ILR 182.
50 See for example US v. Palestine Liberation Organization ((1988) 2 7 ILM 1055), Broadbent v. OAS 
(63 ILR 162 and 337), for the UN amicus brief see 1980 UNJY 224
51 In the case o f Communaute economique des Etats de VAfrique de VOuest v. BCCI ([1993] JDI 353) 
the Cour d’appel of Paris found that by commencing an action in the French Courts an international 
organisation may be deemed to waive any immunity from jurisdiction it may enjoy (see p.357); 
however the case, discussed in greater detail below, did not in fact involve a counterclaim as such, but 
the reasoning o f the Court would appear to apply to cases o f counterclaims.
52 For academic support for the general proposition see Dominice “L’immunite de juridiction et 
d’execution des Organisations Internationales” (1984) 187 Rec. des Cours 145 at p, 184, and 
Reinisch op cit note 28 supra at pp.204-5 and 361.
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section 2 of the General Convention, precludes the possibility of such contractual 
waiver.54 This interpretation appears to have been based on a previous rule applied in 
State immunity cases in certain jurisdictions, that waiver had to be express and in 
relation to the dispute which has arisen.55 This rule has been superseded in many of 
the common law jurisdictions which have placed their law on State immunity on a 
statutory footing,56 and it is doubtful whether it was ever generally applied in civil
• • •  <7  § ,  tlaw jurisdictions. The argument that the absence of an express treaty provision in 
relation to contractual waiver precluded the possibility of enforcing such a 
contractual clause was rejected in United Kingdom case of Standard Chartered Bank
c o
v. International Tin Council, on the basis that the requirement that waiver be in “a 
particular case”, was not that it must relate to a particular dispute or legal proceeding, 
but rather to “a specific transaction”. It is noticeable that Bingham J was clearly 
influenced by recent developments in the law of State immunity on this point. Thus 
certainly in the English courts, a contractual waiver by an international organisation 
will be enforceable.59 Although the point appears not yet to have been litigated 
elsewhere, similar reasoning would seem applicable.60
53 as compared to Article VII of the Articles of Agreement o f the IMF.
54 See Chapter 3 supra at note 88
55 e.g. in the UK, see Kahan v. Pakistan Federation [1951] 2 KB 1003..
56 See for example s.2(2) of the UK State Immunity Act 1978, § 1605 (a)(2) of the US FSIA which 
speaks of implicit, as well as explicit, waivers, which have been interpreted to include agreements to 
submit future disputes to the US courts (see Birch Shipping Co. v. Embassy o f  the United Republic o f  
Tanzania (1980) 507 F.Supp.311); s. 10(2) and (5) o f the Australian Foreign State Immunities Act 
1985. See also Article 2 o f the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity and Article 7(10(b) of 
the ILC draft Articles.
57 See E.J Cohn “Waiver of Immunity” (1958) 34 BYIL 260.
58 (1986) 77 ILR 8
59 see also Arab Banking Corporation v. ITC & others (15.1.86) 77 ILR 1, discussed below.
60 Many international organisations seek to avoid any such implication by deliberately omitting 
choice o f jurisdiction clauses in order to de-localise their contracts and avoid any implication o f a 
waiver - see chapter 2 supra.
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The judgment of Bingham J. in the Standard Chartered case has been criticised for 
having applied the law of State immunity on the point, without seeking to 
differentiate the special position of international organisations,61 notwithstanding that 
the defendant’s arguments had relied upon statements of the UN which had 
themselves placed reliance on State immunity cases. In any event such criticisms 
appear to be unfounded on two grounds. Firstly Bingham J. did in fact consider the 
position of international organisations in contradistinction to that of States, finding 
that, as a matter of English law, international organisations only enjoyed immunity to 
the extent granted by statute and that therefore the common law did not recognise 
any jurisdictional immunity in respect of international organisations. Secondly and 
more importantly from a policy point of view it seems unobjectionable that 
international organisations should be held to agreements into which they have 
entered voluntarily. In particular it is difficult to see how in these circumstances a 
national court by upholding its jurisdiction over a contractual dispute would be 
unduly infringing the independent functioning of an organisation. Further in the case 
of a contractual matters, the potential scope of any disputes (as to possible parties 
and liabilities) is sufficiently foreseeable for the international organisation to take a 
view on whether a waiver clause is acceptable to it.
61 See Bekker The Legal Position o f  International Organisations (1994) p.224-231
62 See 1967 YBILC vol.2 p. 154 at p.225 §§ 82-83
63 This particular finding may be open to challenge if  it could be established that customary 
international law required a degree of immunity, for example by reason o f the principle o f non­
intervention in the internal affairs o f an organisation, see section on immunity in the absence of treaty 
provision infra, at section 2. However this is not the basis o f Bekker’s criticisms o f the judgment 
note 61 supra.
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The latter point is further borne out by the rule that such contractual waivers must be 
interpreted restrictively, and that waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not, of 
itself, entail waiver of immunity from execution. The English High Court, in a 
slightly earlier case in the ITC litigation,64 found that a similar clause to that in the 
Standard Chartered case, did not entitle a creditor to seek a Mareva injunction/ 
freezing order to prevent the removal of funds by the ITC from the UK. In other 
words the Court considered that whilst the clause may have waived immunity from 
jurisdiction, it did not waive immunity from execution.
(bb) Choice of law
The question as to whether an express choice of law clause in a contract, electing a 
system of national law to govern the contract can constitute a waiver of immunity 
arose in the Italian case of Maida v. Administration for International Assistance.65 
The case involved an employment dispute concerning a doctor who had been 
employed by the International Refugee Organisation. The Staff Regulations provided 
that settlement of disputes should be by way of arbitration by the Italian Chamber of 
Advocates, and that in relation to matters on which the Regulations made no 
provision reference should be made to the relevant Italian legislation on private 
employment. The Court found that the plaintiff had been employed by the IRO in 
pursuance of public purposes and not as a commercial matter, and thus the IRO was 
immune except to the extent that it had waived immunity. The Court found that from 
the provision for the residuary application of Italian legislation on private 
employment, it followed that the IRO “notwithstanding that it is a subject of
64 See judgment of Steyn J. in Arab Banking Corp. v. ITC, (1986) 77 ILR 1
65 Decision of 27 May 1955, 23 ILR 510
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international law had placed itself indirectly and in a subsidiary manner under Italian 
law in certain respects.”66 Moreover as the arbitration clause was found to be 
ineffective because it made no provision for the number or appointment of 
arbitrators, the Court found the appropriate forum to be the ordinary civil labour 
court.
There appear be few other cases in which the question as to whether a contractual
fi7choice of law clause constitutes a waiver of immunity. Certainly some international 
organisations are aware of this possibility and thus in their practice prefer to omit 
express choice of national law to govern their contracts. It might be thought that 
implied waiver of this kind is unobjectionable, in that if an international organisation 
wished to avoid the implication of such a waiver, it has the opportunity to add an 
express provision to the effect that the parties agree that the inclusion of the choice of 
law clause does not imply a waiver of immunity, or alternatively to insist on the 
removal of the clause during the negotiation of the contract.
Nevertheless waiver implied from a choice of law clause is not generally accepted in 
State immunity, though practice is not uniform.69 In any event it should be stressed
66 ibid. at p.513
67 In the French case o f International Institute fo r  Refrigeration v. Elkaim 77 ILR 498, the court of 
first instance and the Cour d’Appel, similarly determined that a provision in the Staff Regulations 
referring to the residuary application of French employment law, was sufficient on which to base their 
jurisdiction. However subsequently the Cour de Cassation reversed this finding (1989) 35 AFDI 876.
68 see N.Valticos “Les contrats conclus par les organisations intemationales avec des personnes privees” 
(1977) Ann.IDI l,a tp .3 7 /
69 The practice in relation to State immunity varies between States: in the UK for example s.2(2) of 
the State Immunity Act specifically states that a contractual provision choosing UK law as the 
governing law shall not be considered a submission to the jurisdiction; similarly Article 7(2) of the 
ILC Draft Articles on the jurisdictional immunities of States. On the other hand statutes in some other 
jurisdictions do contain express provision on the point, e.g. the USA where the Courts have tended to 
treat a choice of US law as the governing law as an implicit waiver Transamerican SS v Somali
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that this reasoning only applies where there is an express choice of law clause. 
Therefore a waiver of immunity cannot be implied, simply from the fact that an 
international organisation enters into a contract which might ordinarily have some 
connecting factor with the local jurisdiction, (e.g. through the place where the 
contract was made, or the place of its performance), but does not contain an express 
provision for the jurisdiction of the local courts and/or the application of local law.70
(ii) Submission to arbitration
It will of course be recalled that most international organisations enjoying 
jurisdictional immunity are also under an obligation to make provision for alternative 
methods for the settlement of their disputes of a private law nature. The preference of 
many international organisations is to discharge this obligation by providing 
ultimately for arbitration (though the relative paucity of published arbitral awards 
suggests that this obligation is most frequently discharged by negotiation or other 
informal methods). Arbitration will primarily be agreed for contractual disputes but
* • • * 7 1is not necessarily limited to such disputes. In his survey of the subject for the 
Institut de droit international Valticos notes the variety in types of arbitration
Democratic Republic (1985) 767 F 2d 998; Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Commission (1985) 604 F. 
Supp. 703; and Resource Dynamics International v General Peoples Commission (1984) 604 F. 
Supp. 703.
70 An exception to this appears to be the case o f Branno v. Ministry o f  War (1954, 22 ILR 756) in 
which the Italian Court of Cassation found that when an international organisation “enters into 
contracts with private individuals it thereby agrees to be subject to the laws of Italian civil law which 
regulate such contracts, and therefore it agrees also to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts”. This 
case seems to go well beyond the mainstream o f cases on the point, and may perhaps be explained in 
part by the fact that the Court did not find that there was an applicable treaty provision on NATO’s 
immunity in this case, and also from the inclination in Italian jurisprudence (now overruled) to apply 
the restrictive doctrine of State immunity to international organisations see text at note 144f infra.
71 It is important to underline that the arbitrations dealt with in this section are arbitrations between an 
international organisation and a private person, and not public international arbitrations between a 
State and an international organisation, or as between international organisations.
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proceedings for which international organisations provide in their contracts. These 
may range from institutional arbitration agreements, such as ICC or the AAA, or ad 
hoc arbitrations, or, still rather exceptionally, arbitration before an organ of the 
organisation itself
In this last category the European Court of Justice can fulfil this function in relation 
to contracts entered into by the European Communities or their organs, and the ILO 
Administrative Tribunal may do the same for contracts entered into by the ILO 
(though not other organisations whose administrative disputes are settled by the 
ILOAT). Given the small number of organisations to whom recourse to a standing 
international tribunal is available and the limited practice on the point, this category 
of proceedings will not be considered here. The following discussion will centre only 
arbitrations between and an international organisation subject to some external 
institutional arbitration mechanism, or ad hoc arbitrations.
Although one of the effects of international arbitration may be to de-localise disputes 
by removing the process of settlement from a national jurisdiction (as is often the 
case in, for example, the context of disputes between a State and a private party), 
international arbitration proceedings may nevertheless require the support of the 
local legal system. This relates to aspects of supervision of the arbitration 
proceedings or recognition and enforcement of awards. Such supervisory jurisdiction
72 op. cit. note 68 supra
73 See Chapter 3, note 129ff supra. Also the OAU (now the AU) sometimes provides in its contracts 
for an ad hoc administrative tribunal of the Organisation to have competence in its contractual 
disputes. UNIDROIT may also provide for its administrative tribunal to submit contractual disputes 
with private parties to its administrative tribunal -  see Valticos ibid.at pp.85-6. However it has not 
been possible to locate a single instance where an international administrative tribunal has heard a 
contractual dispute outside the employment field.
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will frequently include residual powers concerning the constitution of the tribunal, 
procedure before the tribunal, questions of validity and interpretation of awards, and 
even, in limited circumstances, the possibility of setting aside the award. Further 
questions are raised in relation to the enforcement of awards and especially the 
question of execution against property owned by a person otherwise enjoying 
immunity from execution (i.e. States and many international organisations).74 In 
relation to arbitration of disputes between international organisations and private 
parties, clearly an international organisation cannot invoke its immunity to shield it 
from the arbitration proceedings themselves. However, the question arises as to 
whether the immunities from suit and execution of international organisations 
operate to prevent national courts from exercising such supervisory controls over an 
arbitration, or the enforcement of any resulting award.
Whilst there is some practice and writing on questions of State immunity and
nc
international arbitration, there are many fewer reported decisions and less 
discussion of similar questions concerning international organisations. If, as has
77 • •been suggested by the European Court of Human Rights, the provision of 
alternative modes of dispute settlement is essential to ensure that the jurisdictional 
immunity of international organisations does not violate the right of access to a court,
74 see for example G.Bemini an A.J. Van den Berg “The enforcement of arbitral awards against a 
State: the problem of immunity from execution” in Lew ed. Contemporary problems in international 
arbitration (Queen Mary College, London, 1986) at ch.33
75 see infra text at note 79ff
76 For such caselaw as there is, see infra, at notes 83ff. For one of the few articles on the point see 
Dominice “L’arbitrage et les immunites des organisations intemationales” in Dominice et al. Etdues 
en droit international en I ’honneur de Pierre Lalive (1993) 483-97; see also and P.Glavinis Les litiges 
realtifs aux contrats passes entre organisations intemationales et personnes privees (LGDJ, Paris 
1990)
77 see Beer and Regan v. Germany and Waite and Kennedy v. Germany both decided 18 February 
1999, discussed in Chapter 3, text at notes 154ff
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then such modes of settlement must clearly be effective. To the extent that the 
support of the local jurisdiction ensures the effectiveness of arbitration, it may be 
vital in maintaining an acceptable balance between the rights and interests of the both 
the international organisation and the private party. In this respect it might be noted 
that it is potentially as important to the international organisation as it is to the 
private party that this should be so.
As indicated above, discussion of the question of State immunity and its relation to 
the supervisory jurisdiction of the local courts, tends to focus on two aspects of 
immunity. The first is whether a State by agreeing to arbitrate should be deemed to 
have waived its immunity from jurisdiction in relation to the supervisory powers of 
local courts in relation to the arbitral proceedings themselves; and the second is 
whether by agreeing to arbitrate a State has implicitly waived its immunity from 
execution in relation to proceedings for the enforcement of an award in national 
courts. It is therefore on corresponding aspects in relation to international 
organisations that the following discussion focuses.
(aa) Arbitration and immunity from jurisdiction
There is now a considerable degree of consensus, certainly amongst those States 
which adopt the restrictive standard, that State immunity from jurisdiction should not 
operate as a bar to proceedings before local courts in the supervision of arbitral 
proceedings to which the State has voluntarily submitted. This may, in some legal
78 See G. Delaume “Sovereign Immunity and transnational arbitration”, in Lew (ed.) Contemporary 
Problems in International Arbitration (Queen Mary College, London, 1986) Ch.28 at p. 314-318.
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systems include the recognition or confirmation of an award by the national court, by
70means of an exequatur. In countries adopting the restrictive standard of State 
immunity, an agreement to arbitrate is either specifically subject to the supervisory
O /j
jurisdiction of the local courts by legislative provision, or is deemed to be waiver of
O |
immunity from such jurisdiction. The policy reasons for this were summarised by
the Australian Law Reform Commission in its Report on Foreign State Immunity:
“Most countries ... regulate the conduct of arbitrations within their 
jurisdiction, on the basis that the forum State has an interest in the conduct of 
such arbitrations in accordance with basic standards of due process and 
fairness. This interest is recognised in various multilateral treaties on 
arbitration which either apply specifically to or include ‘private law’ 
arbitrations to which States are parties [footnote reference to the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards and the 1965 ICSID Convention]. There is therefore clear 
justification for asserting jurisdiction over matters such as arbitral procedure, 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, etc in respect of such local 
arbitrations.”82
However there few cases concerning jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings relation 
to arbitrations between international organisations and private parties. In Beaudice v. 
ASECNA the Cour d’Appel of Paris found that a clause contained in a contract of 
employment which provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration presided
79 ibid. at p.316-7; however see Centre fo r  Industrial Development v. Naidu (116 ILR 424) in which a 
Belgian court held that to issue an exequatur would infringe the immunity from execution of the 
Centre.
80 In relation to international instruments see Art 12 of the European Convention on States Immunity 
and Art. 18 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities o f States; in terms of national 
statutory provisions see e.g. s.9 of the UK State Immunity Act has this effect (overruling the finding 
in Duff Development v. Kelanatan Gov. [192] AC 797); see also s. 17 o f the Australian Foreign States 
Immunities Act 1985; see also the 1998 amendment to US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in
s. 1605 (a)(6).
81 See in the previous US caselaw: Ipitrade International SA v. Federal Republic o f  Nigeria 465 F. 
Supp. 824 and LIAMCO v. Socialist P eople’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 482 F. Supp. 1175; see also a 
dictum in the much cited Victory Transport case 35 ILR 110; however for a conflicting case on the 
point see Verlinden v. Central Bank o f  Nigeria 488 F. Supp 1284, and 647 F2d 320. In France see 
SEEE v. Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia [1971] JDI 131.
82 See Australian Law Reform Commission , Foreign State Immunity Report No. 24 (1984).
83 (1977) [1979] JDI 128
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over by a nominee of the Administrative Tribunal of Paris, was implicitly a choice of 
French law to govern the arbitration. The Court therefore upheld its jurisdiction in 
accordance with French law on arbitration. However the case did not deal with the 
question of immunity, and the organisation may not have enjoyed immunity in any 
event as France was not a member State of ASECNA.
The case of ITC v. Amalgamet, agam involved a local court m a question relating 
to an arbitration between a private person and an international organisation of which 
the forum State was not a member. The contract provided that it should be governed 
by New York law, and disputes should be settled by arbitration in New York under 
the AAA rules. The case was in fact brought by the ITC to stay arbitration 
proceedings on the basis inter alia of its immunity. The New York Supreme Court 
found that the ITC enjoyed no immunity in the US as the US was not a member, and 
the organisation only enjoyed immunity by virtue of its Headquarters Agreement 
with the UK, which had no effect outside the UK. In any event, and strictly speaking 
obiter dictum, the Court found the agreement to arbitrate was a waiver of 
immunity.85
M 524 NYS 2d 971 (supp. 1988); 77 ILR 30
85 In relation to this group of cases where the supervisory jurisdiction of local courts has been 
successfully established in the situation where the organisation does not enjoy jurisdictional immunity 
brief mention might be made of the Westland Helicopters affair, a complex arbitration lasting over a 
considerable period o f time, during which various applications were made to the local courts in 
Switzerland. The Shareholders Agreement on which the arbitration was based, stated that it was to be 
governed by Swiss law and that disputes should be settled in the final analysis by arbitration in 
Geneva in accordance with the ICC rules. However the question of the immunity from suit of the Arab 
Organisation for Industrialisation did not arise before the Swiss courts. Rather, a major point in issue 
in the proceedings in the Swiss Federal Courts (80 ILR 622 and 653) was whether a voluntary 
submission to the arbitration by an international organisation could be deemed to be a submission by 
its member States. On the basis that the organisation enjoyed legal personality distinct from its 
member States, the answer of the Swiss Courts was that it could not.
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In contrast to these cases, in Groupement d ’Entreprises Fougerolle v. CERN86 the 
Swiss Federal Court was faced squarely with the question of the relationship of 
jurisdictional immunity with proceedings relating to arbitration. It will be recalled 
that, under its Headquarters Agreement with Switzerland, CERN enjoys immunity 
from “every form of legal process” save to the extent that it has waived such
on
immunity. A consortium of five companies had entered into a major construction 
contract with the CERN, containing a dispute settlement clause providing for 
arbitration by a three member panel. In case of disagreement on the appointment of 
the third arbitrator, the clause specified that he or she would be chosen by the 
President of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO. The clause also stipulated that 
the arbitral procedure should be governed by the “general principles of civil 
procedure”.
The consortium invoked the arbitration clause in seeking a payment of 430 million 
Swiss francs, by way of an equitable payment for increased costs of the work. The 
arbitral tribunal instead awarded it about 44.6 million Swiss francs (i.e. about 10% of 
what the consortium sought). The consortium therefore applied the Swiss Federal 
Court for the annulment of the award. The CERN resisted this application on the 
basis that it enjoyed absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the host 
State.
The Swiss court upheld the CERN’s plea of immunity in this case. It started from a 
statement of general principles relating to the question. Firstly it held that the
86 21 December 1992, 102 ILR 209
87 See Chapter 3 supra text at note 59
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immunity of international organisations, unlike that of States, derived from 
conventional instruments rather than a rule of customary international law, and 
therefore for the distinction between acta iure imperii and iure gestionis had no 
application in relation to international organisations. It found that the immunity of
QO
international organisation was absolute. Then, noting that the obligation of 
international organisations to provide appropriate alternative methods of dispute 
settlement was normally discharged by providing for arbitration, it found that “an 
award rendered within the framework of such arbitral proceedings is exempt from
on
any judicial control by the very reason of immunity from jurisdiction”. The Court
concluded this section on the general law by finding that
“in contrast to the position in relation to States, the submission of 
international organisations to an arbitration clause does not constitute waiver 
of their immunity. The arbitration in which they participate is exempt from 
any intervention by the national courts unless the organisation itself waives 
its immunity, or the Headquarters Agreement otherwise provides.” 90
The Court then applied these general findings to the present case finding that the 
CERN had not waived its immunity from suit by entering into the arbitration clause. 
The contract had provided that the award “shall be final and binding on the parties, 
who, in advance, waive any possible right of appeal”. It therefore found that all 
grounds for intervention by the national judge in the proceedings were excluded.
However the Court went further and asked itself (though it did not provide a 
definitive answer) the question of whether it should have dismissed the application,
88 ibid. at p.211
89 ibid. at p.213
90 ibid.
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not so much on the basis of immunity, but on the basis that the arbitration was one 
which was beyond its competence, being a public international arbitration and thus 
outside the scope of Swiss arbitral law.91 If this were so, the Court found that it 
would be unable to determine an application lodged against that same arbitration by 
the CERN, even if it waived its immunity.
The Court’s decision is clearly important, and is interesting in that the Court placed 
considerable reliance on doctrinal writings, and in particular those of Professor
09Dominice. The Court’s statement that an agreement to arbitrate by an international 
organisation should not constitute a waiver of its immunity from the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the national judge appears very broadly stated, but must be read in the 
light of the qualification that “where an arbitration agreement refers to national law 
... the possibility of intervention in the proceedings by national courts may be 
implied.”93 In this respect it is significant that the Court took care to interpret the 
relevant contractual provisions to see whether they amounted to a submission to the 
jurisdiction.94
91 i.e. s .l76 ff Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law 1987.
92 The Court considered Dominice’s 1984 Hague Lectures (cit. note 52 supra) as well a subsequent 
article “La nature et l’etendue et l’immunite de jurisdiction des organisations intemationales” from 
Bocksteigel et al. (ed.s) Festschrift fu rlgnaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (1988). The Court cited a number of 
other academic writings including the J-F Lalive op.cit. note 22 supra, N.Valticos op.cit. note 69 
supra, and P.Glavinis Les litiges realtifs aux contrats passes entre organisations intemationales et 
personnes privees (LGDJ, Paris 1990).
93 loc. cit. note 86 supra at p. 213
94 However it might be noted that both Professor Dominice and Dr. Glavinis take a more unequivocal 
position. Both suggest that the situation of States (for whom an arbitration clause may be considered 
as a waiver from the supervisory jurisdiction of the local court) can be differentiated from that of 
international organisations. These authors point particularly to the fact that it is since the introduction 
of the restrictive doctrine of State immunity from jurisdiction, that States do not enjoy jurisdictional 
immunity from suit in relation to their commercial contracts. Thus they claim that as international 
organisations enjoy immunity in respect of their contracts, an arbitration clause contained therein is 
similarly shielded from the supervisory jurisdiction of the local courts. See Dominice “L’arbitrage et 
les immunites des organisations intemationales” cit note 77 supra at p.490. Glavinis op. cit. note 92 
supra at pp.131-2, and in his casenote on this decision (1994) Rev. Arb. 180-7 at p.182.
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The decision has attracted some critical commentary in relation to the finding as to 
the complete autonomy of the arbitration from the local jurisdiction, and the Court’s 
consequent dictum that it was probably unable to intervene even if so requested by 
the international organisation.95 The latter appears to be based upon a view of the 
arbitration as being public international arbitration by virtue of the international 
personality of the CERN. In this respect the Court relied on a passage from 
Dominice,96 in which he refers to an arbitration award made in 1958 by Professor 
Batiffol in a contractual dispute between UNRWA and a private party.97 This award 
found that the personality and capacity to contract of the organisation arose under 
international law, and therefore that an arbitration clause, which it undertakes, 
derives its legal basis from public international law, and thus may be valid under that 
law without any need for reference to the national legal system. Thus it was held that 
there was no possibility for a national judge to exercise any supervisory jurisdiction 
over such an arbitration.
The approach of Professor Batiffol is highly unusual,98 and may be criticised for its 
apparent implication that whenever an international organisation enters into a
95 See e.g remarks by R. Briner in panel discussion “State immunity and sovereignty in relation to 
arbitration: issues related execution of awards” in [1995] ASIL/NVIR Proceedings p.62 at pp.66-69 . 
P.Glavinis criticises the judgment on a number of grounds considered infra, and also takes the view 
that if the CERN waived its immunity and the international obligations of Switzerland undertaken in 
the HQ Agreement require the seisin of the Swiss Courts -  see casenote [1994] Rev. Arb. 175 at p.
187.
96 Judgment at p.213 citing Dominice’s Hague lectures (cit. note 52 supra) at p. 199.
97 An English translation o f the pertinent sections o f the award appears in 1985 YBILC Vol.II pt.l at 
p.157
98 Glavinis suggests that the only other arbitration which appears to have taken a similar approach was 
Professor Dupuy’s award in the Texaco v.Libya (1971, 53 ILR 389) - see op cit note 92 supra at
p. 192. In this regard it might be noted that the concession agreement in question in the latter case was
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contract containing an arbitration clause, there is a presumption that public 
international law governs both the contract and the arbitration procedure itself. It 
may be that this would be true in relation to an arbitration concerned with the 
application of the internal law of the organisation. However it does not seem 
appropriate in relation to most contracts which international organisations enter into 
with private parties, which will usually be of a private law nature. Treaty provisions 
on the status, privileges and immunities of international organisations, provide for 
the contractual capacity of the organisation in terms of the domestic law of their 
member States, and the need to provide alternative modes of settlement “for disputes 
arising out of contracts and other disputes o f  private law nature”[emphasis added].99 
Further the writings of various commentators suggest that to the extent that public 
international law can operate as the governing law of contractual relations, it must be 
expressly chosen as such.100
By contrast, in a more recent case, the Cour d ’Appel of Paris has rejected a claim by 
UNESCO that a contractual arbitration clause was not subject to the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the local courts.101 Having entered into a contract with a private 
person containing an arbitration clause, UNESCO had refused to name an arbitrator, 
thus effectively preventing the constitution of an arbitral panel. The private party 
sought the assistance of the local court of first instance, which invited UNESCO to
of quite a different nature than more quotidian types of contract for goods and services, which for the 
main part international organisations undertake.
99 e.g. Section 29 o f the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the UN ST/LEG/SER.B/10 
p. 189
100 See Jenks, The Proper Law o f  International Organisations, (Stevens, London, 1962) at p. 151
101 UNESCO v. Boulois, Cour d’Appel de Paris (14 Ch.A), 19 June 1998, (1999) Rev. Arb. 343
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1 mappoint an arbitrator within 15 days. The Court at first instance simply found that 
since the voluntary acceptance by UNESCO of an arbitration clause constituted a 
waiver of any immunity from the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court, so that the 
chosen method of dispute settlement, arbitration, could be put into effect. It was 
simply a question of performance of the contractual provisions in good faith. On 
UNESCO’s appeal, the Cour d’Appel endorsed the reasoning of the lower Court, but 
added a further dimension, suggesting that allowing UNESCO’s immunity to 
override the supervisory jurisdiction of the local courts would lead to a denial of 
justice.103 The Cour d’Appel found that this denial of justice was contrary both to 
public policy and to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Cour d’Appel’s invocation of the Article 6(1) ECHR is interesting in pre­
figuring the findings in the Beer and Regan and Waite and Kennedy cases by the 
European Court of Human Rights.104 Interestingly the Cour d’Appel does not 
elaborate, but in the light of the subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence, the reasoning 
would presumably that immunity will not violate Article 6(1) ECHR provided that an 
alternative mode of settlement is available. It would therefore be inconsistent to 
permit immunity to be used so as to defeat the possibility of such alternative remedy. 
It is suggested that the Boulois case provides a strong antidote to a dogmatic 
application of the reasoning of the Swiss Court in Groupement d ’Entreprises 
Fougerolle case.
102 UNESCO v. Boulois, Triunal de grand Instance de Paris, 20 October 1997, (1997) Rev. Arb. 575, 
on which see Gaillard, E. and Pingel-Lenuzza “International Organisations and Immunity form 
Jurisdiction: to Restrict or Bypass” (2002) 51 ICLQ 1
103 loc cit note 101 supra
104 see Chapter 3 supra, at note 154
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(bb) Arbitration and immunity from execution
The next question which should be asked is whether, by agreeing to arbitrate, an 
international organisation implicitly waives its immunity from execution before 
national courts, in relation to the enforcement of the resulting arbitral award. There 
appears to be nothing to exclude an award in an arbitration between an international 
organisation and a private person from the scope of the 1958 New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.105 However that does not 
answer the question of immunity from execution. Given die coercive nature of 
enforcement and execution procedures in national legal systems, and the dangers of a 
significant impact on the autonomy of an international organisation, quite clearly 
questions of considerable delicacy are raised. Similar questions arise in relation to 
State immunity but uniform answers have not been forthcoming, with different 
jurisdictions adopting their own solutions.106
It should be noted straightaway that this problem has arisen very infrequently in 
practice and thus there is little hard law on which to base conclusions. In the survey 
carried out by Professor Valticos he found that international organisations rarely had 
recourse to arbitral proceedings and the subject of the enforcement of awards against
* 107 •international organisations did not even arise. Jenks points out that an 
“international organisation has the responsibility of a public body to give effect to
105 See Jenks p. cit. note 100, p.247-8; see also Glavinis op cit note 92 supra at pp. 154-6.
106 A number o f States which adopt the restrictive doctrine, consider the purposes for which the 
property to be executed upon is intended, and immunity is likely to be upheld if  the property is 
intended to be used , at least in part, for public purposes: Austria - Rep. o f  A Embassy Bank Account 
77 ILR 489; France -  Islamic Rep. O f Iran v. E u ro d if ll  ILR 513; Germany - Philippine Embassy 
Bank Account case 65 ILR 146; UK Alcom v. Rep. O f Colombia [1984] AC 580. For further see 
Bernini and Van den Berg op. cit. note 74 supra.
107 op. cit. note 54 supra at pp. 78-84
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10Sany award given against it”. It is perhaps likely that this is keenly felt by most 
international organisations, even if there are limits to enforceability.109
It will be recalled that in relation to many of the smaller, regional or technical
international organisations the treaty provisions under which they enjoy immunity
contain an exception to immunity in relation to the enforcement of arbitration
awards. An example of an exception to immunity of this kind was contained in the
Headquarters Agreement between the International Tin Council and the UK. When
the ITC declared it could no longer meet its liabilities, certain arbitral award creditors
sought to enforce their awards by applying to have the ITC wound up under English
company law. Millet J. rejected the claim that winding up proceedings could be
considered enforcement proceedings in relation to an arbitration award, and in doing
so placed particular reliance on the issues of policy at stake, and in particular those
concerning the independent functioning of the organisation.110 The nature of the
winding up process and die compulsory duties of the liquidator made it inappropriate
for application to an international organisation, which could be only be wound up
pursuant to the diplomatic process and therefore such matters were not justiciable in
the courts of a single member State. He found:
“Sovereign States are free if they wish to carry on a collective enterprise 
through the medium of an ordinary commercial company incorporated in the 
territory of one of their members. But if they choose instead to carry it on 
through the medium of an international organisation, no one member State by 
executive legislation or judicial action can assume the management of the 
enterprise and subject it to its own domestic law. For if one could then all
108 Jenks op cit note 100 supra at p.248
109 see Centre fo r  Industrial Development v. Naidu (116 ILR424).
uo In re International Tin Council [1987] 1 Ch. 419.
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could; and the independence and international character of the organisation 
would be fragmented and destroyed”. 111
At a later stage in the ITC proceedings an application by an arbitral award creditor
1 1
for discovery of assets, was also made to Millet J. Again the Judge considered the 
position of an international organisation adjudging it not be covered by the usual 
rules relating to such applications against a private persons. However exercising a 
broad discretion, he found that he had jurisdiction to make an order requiring an 
officer of the ITC to give evidence relating to the assets of the ITC, and found that 
reasons of policy required him to make the order.
Thus in cases where there is an express exception to immunity in relation to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under the relevant treaty provision, a national court 
may still have to exercise its powers with due deference to the effect its orders may 
have on the internal functioning of the organisation. On the other hand in cases 
where there is no such express exception to immunity, then in general the Court must 
look to see if there has been a waiver of immunity from execution (and not just a 
waiver of immunity from jurisdiction). However provided such waiver is specific in 
this sense, Dominice suggests that it may either be express (for example by a
i n
provision of the contract) or implicit. In relation to implicit waiver he suggests if
1,1 ibid at p.452
In a subsequent case before Millet J award creditors sought to enforce an award by the appointment of 
a receiver o f equitable execution to enforce, an obligation which the applicants claimed to be 
incumbent on the part o f the Member States to meet the debts o f the organisation. However the 
application failed because it did not disclose a justiciable cause of action - Maclaine Watson and Co. 
Ltd v. ITC [1988] 1 Ch.l
112 Maclaine Watson v. ITC (No.2) [1987] 1 WLR 1711. The judgment was upheld on appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, where Kerr LJ placed particular reliance on the exception to the ITC’s immunity 
from suit in respect o f the enforcement of arbitral awards.
113 Dominice, op. cit. note 76 supra at pp.494-5
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an international organisation fails to invoke its immunity from execution it may be 
deemed to have waived it.
* * *
To summarise therefore it appears that where an international organisation agrees to
arbitration with a private party, that can properly be considered to constitute a waiver
of immunity from the supervisory jurisdiction of the national courts of the place
where the arbitration is to take place, so as to ensure the effectiveness of the
arbitration agreement. However any waiver of immunity from execution for the
enforcement of the award must be express. Interestingly this the position which the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in its Optional Rules for Arbitration between
International Organisations and Private Parties, Article 1(2) of which reads:
“Agreement by a party to arbitration under these Rules constitutes a waiver of 
any right of immunity from jurisdiction, in respect of the dispute in question, 
to which such party might otherwise be entitled. A waiver of immunity 
relating to the execution of an arbitral award must be explicitly expressed.”
(c) The position of organisations enjoying a limited immunity
It was observed in the previous Chapter that treaty provisions vary in the extent to 
which they grant immunity to international organisations (other than the UN, most of 
its Specialised Agencies and those other organisations enjoying an apparently 
unlimited immunity from “every kind of legal process”). Faced with a situation in 
which there is a conventional immunity provision subject to express exceptions, and 
a dispute as to whether or not the immunity can be invoked by the organisation in a 
particular case, the forum is likely to have to interpret the treaty provision and may 
have the delicate task of characterisation of the dispute.
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Among the organisations whose immunity is limited under relevant treaty provisions 
are the World Bank and the various regional development banks. It will be recalled 
that in some cases, for example the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the relevant texts appear to deny jurisdictional immunity almost 
entirely in suits brought by private parties in member States in which the 
organisation has an office, or has appointed an agent to accept service of process, or 
has issued or guaranteed securities.114 However in the relevant agreements relating to 
some of the other regional development banks immunity is granted except in relation 
to certain financial transactions in particular the organisation’s powers to borrow 
money.115 Nevertheless it should again be observed that there have been 
comparatively few occasions, in absolute terms, on which such provisions have 
arisen for interpretation by the courts of member States.
In Lutcher S. A. Celulose e Papel Candoi v. Inter-American Development Bank116 a 
company which had borrowed from the I-ADB brought an action to restrain the I- 
ADB from making a loan to a competitor company, on the basis that it contravened 
an implied term of its own loan agreement. The US Federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia upheld the Bank’s claim to immunity in this matter, on the basis 
that the case effectively sought to review a decision taken by the governing board of 
the Bank in its discretion and judgment. It found that “where delicate, complex issues 
of international economic policy are involved, jurisdiction should be denied”.
114 see Chapter 3 supra text at note 44ff
115 See Art. 50(1) o f the Articles of Agreement o f the ADB, Art. 52 of the AfDB, and Art. 69(1) o f the 
Caribbean Development Bank, discussed in Chapter 3 supra at notes 47-50
116 42 ILR 138
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On appeal the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the suit, but only on the basis 
that it failed to state a cause of action for which relief was available either in contract 
or tort.117
However the Court of Appeals overruled the finding that the Bank enjoyed immunity 
from suit. It considered the Bank’s constitutive agreement and found that the
• • •  i 10exception to immunity contained therein was not to be read restnctively.
The Bank had argued that the policy behind the exception was to enable the Bank 
effectively to raise money on the capital markets, and that it should therefore be 
limited to suits with the Banks creditors and the beneficiaries of its guarantees. 
However the Court held that there was no necessity for limiting the exception to 
immunity as the Bank had argued, either from a textual analysis or from a policy 
analysis. From the policy perspective the Court appears to have started from an idea 
of the effective and independent functioning of the Bank, which was implicit in the 
Bank’s arguments. It found that there was no reason to differentiate between the 
Bank’s creditors and its borrowers, given that suits from the latter were unlikely to be 
more harassing to Bank or more expensive than those from creditors. Further just as 
the exception was necessary to enable the Bank to raise funds on the markets, the 
Court found that it was also necessary in order that the Bank could operate
117 ibid. at p. 139
118 The Court refers to the exception to immunity as “waiver”. However this is clearly not case of 
waiver in the sense of the word given in English jurisprudence and doctrine (i.e. a voluntary 
submission to the jurisdiction) but rather refers to an exception or limitation to immunity, which takes 
effect regardless o f the consent of the international organisation. The word waiver appears to be used 
because the US IOIA provides the immunity shall be granted except to the extent that it is waived. 
However in the case of the Inter-American Development Bank the Executive Order granting the Bank 
immunity spelt out that the immunities granted to it under the Act “shall not be construed to affect in 
any way the applicability of the provisions of section 3 o f Article XI [i.e. the limitations on 
immunity]”.
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effectively as a lender, since prudent borrowers would require the protection of the 
law. Finally in this respect it found that suits by borrowers were if anything likely to 
have less effect on the management and policy if the organisation, than suits by 
lenders (given the market power the Bank was likely to have over its borrowers). In 
the current case what was at issue was not an issue of international policy, but rather 
it purported (albeit wrongly) to allege a simple breach of contract or possible tort.
Whilst at first sight the rejection of the Bank’s restrictive view of the exception to 
immunity in its constitutive instrument may seem potentially alarming to other 
international organisations, the text in question was carefully considered and did not 
bear the Bank’s claim. Further careful reading suggests that the Court’s treatment of 
the policy arguments relating to the powers of effective functioning and self- 
organisation of the Bank, was appropriate in the light of the dispute over the extent 
of immunity. In a series of more recent cases the US Courts have been asked to 
consider a similarly limited immunity, but in the context of the employment relations 
of the World Bank. Whilst it has been proposed that employment by international 
organisations is a matter over which national courts lack competence ratione 
materiae,119 rather than a matter of immunity per se, it is necessary to consider here 
the judicial method actually adopted in these cases.
1*70 , , *In Mendaro v. IBRD, which involved allegations of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment by a former employee of the Bank, the Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) 
again analysed both the policy questions raised by the case as well as the applicable
119 See Chapter 2 supra section D.2.a
120 27 September 1983, 99 ILR 92
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treaty text. The Court found that international organisations enjoyed immunity in
relation to suits brought by their employees as a matter of customary international 
121law. It found that such immunity saved an organisation from having to administer 
different employment practices according to the country in which it employed its 
staff, and more importantly that the independence of the organisation from the 
national policies of any single member State was thus ensured. It then turned to the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement and took a strongly purposive approach to the 
exception to immunity contained therein. It stressed the links between the extent of 
the bank’s immunity from suit and the effective achievement of its international 
functions. Where a limitation might arguably enable the Bank to pursue its 
international goals more effectively a broad approach could be taken to the 
construction of the limitation on immunity. However where the exception to 
immunity opened the Bank to suits which could significantly hamper the Bank’s 
functions, this was less likely to have been the intention behind the provision, and a
199court should interpret the provision with that point in mind. The Court accepted 
that the immunity of the Bank was limited in cases of its external relations, especially 
in relation to its banking activities, but also in relation to other commercial contracts 
for goods and services, including such matters as telephone services.123 However it 
found that these limitations on immunity could not be construed so as to restrict the 
Bank’s immunity in relation to its internal operations such as its relationship with its
121 ibid. at p.615
122 ibid. atp.617
123 On the specific point o f telecommunications services see the IBRD and IMF v. All America 
Cables and Radio Inc., et al. (FCC Docket No. 9362) before the US Federal Communications 
Commission, discussed by J.Gold The Fund Agreement in the Courts -  II pp.21-28 and 55-59, in 
which the IBRD and IMF claimed that the supply of telecommunications services should be supplied 
at the official governmental (reduced) rate. See also J.Gold “The Interpretation by the International 
Monetary of its Articles o f Agreement” (1954) 3 ICLQ 256, at pp.265-70.
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employees, since that would lay the Bank open to disruptive interference with its 
employment policies in each of the thirty-six countries in which it has resident 
missions, and the more than 140 countries in which it could be involved in its 
lending and financing activities.124
This distinction between the external relations with third parties which are not 
immune under the limited immunity of the IBRD and the I-ADB, and their internal 
relations with for example their own employees, has been taken up in a number of 
subsequent cases . However the line is not always easily drawn. In Morgan v.
IBRD the plaintiff was the employee of a temporary employment agency, who was
placed as a secretary at the IBRD over a period of more than two years. An incident 
occurred after which he alleged that he had been detained against his will by the 
bank’s security staff, and denied access to a lawyer and accused of theft. He also 
alleged that subsequently the security staff had made threats against him in the 
course of continuing harassment. He therefore sought compensatory and punitive 
damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, libel
124 The Court distinguished the position o f multinational companies which, though they often had to 
ensure their employment practices conformed to the laws of each country in which they retain 
employees, were organised under the laws of one more countries. International organisations on the 
other hand were created by the joint action of several States, to solve international problems for the 
collective good, thus they owed their primary allegiance to the principles and policies established by 
their organic documents, rather than the legislation of any one member: loc. cit. note 118 supra at 
p.619.
125 see for example Novak v. World Bank in which a distinction was drawn between the Bank’s 
external, commercial activities and its internal personnel practices No. 81-1329 (DDC 21 Dec. 1983) 
quoted by Oparil in “Immunity o f International Organisations in United States Courts: Absolute or 
Restrictive?” (1991) 24 Van J T’nal L. 689 at p.699.
In Chiriboga v. IBRD (616 F Supp 963 at p.967) the issue arose as to whether a claim could be made 
against the Bank by the personal representatives o f an employee who had been killed in air accident, 
for benefits under an insurance policy taken out by the Bank as part o f its employee benefits plan. The 
Court found that “the dispute focuses on what the Bank did or did not contract with its employees. It 
is difficult to imagine a suit that touches more closely on the internal operations of an international 
organisation”.
126 13 September 1990, 752 F.Supp. 492
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and slander. The US District Court (District of Columbia) upheld the Bank’s claim of 
immunity, finding that the case concerned an employment relationship and to allow it 
to proceed “would force the bank to defend internal employment practices
197traditionally shielded by immunity”.
It had also been argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (i.e. the restrictive 
doctrine of State immunity) was applicable, but the Court avoided making a 
definitive finding on this, holding that in any event the investigation and treatment of
• • • 198 ,the plaintiff was the exercise of a “discretionary function” of the Bank, i.e. 
involving the exercise of policy judgment and monitored and guided by senior staff,
and should thus be immune.129 The Court’s judgment has understandably been
• • • 110 criticised for its characterisation of the dispute as an employment dispute. Not only
was the defendant not an employee of the Bank, but also his claims were for torts
rather than remedies for breach of employment law. It is indeed surprising that an
immunity which is not expressly provided for in the text of the Bank’s Articles of
Agreement but in fact has been found to exist only after an extensive interpretative
exercise by the Courts, should result in debarring a third party from bringing a suit
for compensation for common law torts, or, from Singer’s perspective, serious
► • • 1 T9infringements of his human rights.
127 ibid. at 494
128 see 28 USC § 1605(a)(5)(A) restores immunity in relation to claims for compensation in relation to 
personal injury or death, which are based upon “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, regardless o f whether the discretion be abused”.
129 loc. cit. note 124 supra at pp.494-5.
130 Notably by M. Singer “Jurisdictional Immunity o f International Organisations; Human Rights and 
Functional Necessity Concerns” (1995) 36 VJIL 53 at p. 152-4.
131 It seems Morgan, not being an employee of the Bank, would have been precluded from bringing a 
complaint in the Bank’s Administrative Tribunal under its internal administrative law.
132 op. cit. note 130 supra, at p. 153
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Contrastingly in the decision at first instance in Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim and the 
IFC,133 a claim brought by a female employee of the IFC for assault and battery by 
her supervisor (the first defendant) arising from her allegations of continued sexual 
harassment culminating in an assault, the IFC was found to be properly joined as 
second defendant, and without the benefit of immunity, by the court of first instance. 
The Court found that the more restrictive jurisdictional immunity under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act was applicable to international organisations under the 
IOIA, and that the assaults complained of could not be said to have been performed 
as a “discretionary function” and thus did not benefit from immunity. The Court also 
rejected the IFC’s argument that the proper remedy, of which the plaintiff should 
have availed herself, was to a complaint under the World Bank’s internal grievance 
procedures. The Court held that the injury complained of did not arise out of, or in 
the course of, the plaintiffs employment, and therefore those internal procedures 
were inapplicable.
Outside the USA the courts of other States have also drawn a distinction between an 
international organisation’s internal and employment relations and its external 
relations with third parties, when considering the possible extent of immunity. In the 
case of Eurocontrol it will be recalled that its constitutive instruments make no 
provision for jurisdictional immunity. However when a dispute between Eurocontrol 
and an employee came before a Dutch court, it held that it did not have jurisdiction
133 US District Court (District o f Columbia), 18 March 1996, (942 F.Supp 621) and 8 July 1996 (932 
F.Supp. 19). However subsequently the Court of Appeals found the claims against the IFC to be time- 
barred and upheld the immunity o f her supervisor -  US Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) 14 March 
1997 107 F.3d 913 and discussed in Chapter 5 infra text at note 89
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over the dispute as the contract of employment was not one of civil law but rather of 
administrative law in the performance of public purposes, and that under customary 
international law Eurocontrol was entitled to immunity in the performance of its 
public functions.134
Certain international organisations enjoy immunity only in respect of their official 
activities. In such cases there may be difficult problems of characterisation, as 
demonstrated by the European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration discussed 
in the previous chapter.135 The European Patent Organisation only enjoys immunity 
from jurisdiction and execution “within the scope of its to its official activities”. In 
E GesembHv. EPO137 the Austrian Courts had to determine a dispute relating to rent 
arrears brought by the landlord of property leased by the EPO. The Court at first 
instance found that the dispute concerned the official activities of the EPO. The 
Court of Appeals overturned that finding on the basis that only those activities 
strictly related to the granting of European patents were immune. The Supreme Court 
however reversed the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the immunity of an 
international organisation, though granted on a functional basis, was an absolute 
immunity.
134 See Eckhardt v. Eurocontrol (No.2) District Court of Maastricht, 12 Jan. 1984 (94 ILR 331), 
overruling judgment of the Local Court o f Sittard, 25 June 1976 (24 ILR 190).
For cases in which similar reasoning has been applied see also International Institute o f  Agriculture v. 
Profili (1930) 5 ILR 413and Chemidlin v. International Bureau o f  Weights and Measures (1945) 12 
ILR 281
135 See Chapter 3 supra, at note 121
136 See Art.3 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Patent Organisation 
(1065 UNTS 370)
137 (1992) 47 Osterreichische Juristenzeitung 661, no 161 discussed by Reinisch op cit.note 28 supra 
at p.211
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11RIn Mukoro v. European Bank o f Reconstruction and Development, the UK
Employment Appeal Tribunal was concerned with allegations of racial 
discrimination against the EBRD in rejecting the plaintiffs application for 
employment. The EBRD, which by virtue of its Headquarters Agreement enjoyed
11Qimmunity for its official acts (subject to various exceptions), asserted immunity. 
The plaintiff argued inter alia that an act of racial discrimination could not be an 
official act of the Bank, especially in the light of its constitutional commitment to 
“the rule of law” and “respect for human rights”. The EAT distinguished between the 
Bank’s activities and the manner in which they were carried out. Thus it found that 
the relevant activity was the selection of staff, which it found to be “administrative 
activity” which according to the Bank’s constitutive agreement fell within the 
category of “official activities”.140 The allegation of racial discrimination related to 
the manner in which the official activity was performed. The EAT held that to find 
otherwise would be to render the Bank’s jurisdictional immunity meaningless, since 
in order to establish whether or not an act of racial discrimination had occurred 
would require a full investigation of the matter by the Tribunal. Immunity would 
only be sustained if there had not been an act of unlawful discrimination (in which 
case it would of course be unnecessary). Thus the purpose of conferring immunity on 
the Bank, i.e. to shield it from having to defend itself from suits for alleged wrongs, 
would be defeated. The EAT thus considered the treaty provision its context and in 
the light of underlying policy, and sought an effective interpretation to the treaty in 
the light of the delicate issues at stake.
138 1 07 ILR 604
139 see Chapter 3 supra note 51
140 ibid. at p.612
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(d) The effect of the restrictive doctrine of State immunity
In contrast to the development of the restrictive doctrine of State immunity, the 
introduction of which was led by municipal courts asserting local jurisdiction over 
acts iure gestionis of foreign States, the immunities of international organisations are 
mainly based upon a large number of individual grants of immunity under treaties, 
and as a result a rather different pattern appears. As has been shown the degree of 
immunity granted to different organisations varies considerably.141 Furthermore 
though the use of the treaty to grant immunity seeks to ensure uniformity of 
treatment of an organisation amongst the member States, whether such uniformity is 
achieved may depend upon how treaty obligations are received into the national legal 
system, and other particular characteristics of that system.
Despite the modem trend towards the restrictive doctrine of State immunity, the 
acceptance of which by States has increased markedly in the post-WW2 period 
(coincidentally the same period which has seen the rapid growth in the numbers and 
structures of international organisations), the practice of the majority of States is not 
to require a wholesale superimposition of the restrictive doctrine of State immunity 
on to the immunities of international organisations.142 In most States the guide to the 
existence and extent of immunity will be the relevant treaty provisions granting 
immunity. Limitations on immunity should accord with the particular requirements 
of the relevant treaty provision, rather than an external notion of private or 
commercial acts. In relation to organisations whose jurisdictional immunity under
141 see Chapter 3 supra
142 There is nevertheless a growing minority of writers who call for the restrictive doctrine of 
immunity to be applied to international organisations -  see Chapter 2 supra text at note., ff
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treaty is unlimited, municipal courts have in most cases to have been able to apply 
the immunity without undue difficulty.143
However in Italy a number of rather different lines in the jurisprudence of the courts 
have arisen.144 It should be remembered not only that the Italian courts were amongst 
the first of the national legal systems to adopt the restrictive doctrine of State 
immunity,145 but also one of the first national legal systems to acknowledge the 
personality of international organisations.146 Thus it is perhaps less surprising that the 
decisions of the Italian courts are comparatively radical in seeking limits to the 
breadth of the immunities of international organisations. Some authors have 
criticised the Italian courts for simply importing the restrictive doctrine of State 
immunity to the immunities of international organisations,147 but whilst there may be 
some strength to these criticisms in relation to certain aspects of the caselaw, it is 
submitted that in fact the Italian caselaw as a whole shows greater subtlety than is 
sometimes recognised.
A distinguishing feature of the approach of the Italian courts in many of the leading 
decisions, has been to regard the enjoyment of immunity by an international 
organisation as a consequence of finding that it has international personality and
143 See for example the French cases of Procureur General pres de la Cour de cassation v. Societe 
Immobiliere Alfred Dehodencq [1954] RCDIP 612, 21 ILR 279 and Hintermann v. WEU (Court of 
Cassation, 14.11.95) 124 Clunet 141; the Belgian case o f Manderlier v. UN and Belgian State 45 ILR 
446: and the Swiss case of Groupement d ’Entreprises Fougerolle v. CERN 102 ILR 209.
144 For an introduction to the Italian caselaw see Cassese “L’immunite de juriidiction des 
organisations intemationales dans la jurisprudence italienne” (1984) 30 AFDI 556
145 see Brownlie op. cit. note 29 supra at p.330
146 see International Institute fo r  Agriculture v. Profili- see note 149 infra, and Chapter 1 supra at 
note 26
147 See for example Dominice op. cit. at note 52 supra
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consequently also the ability to organise itself independently of any national legal 
system, referred to in the caselaw as a power of “self-organisation”. This was the 
approach of the Court of Cassation in the landmark case of International Institute o f  
Agriculture v. Profili,148 in which it was faced with an international organisation 
which did not enjoy immunity by virtue of a written provision, either from a treaty or 
in Italian legislation, and thus its finding of immunity was based on the more general 
notion of personality.149
In subsequent cases the Italian courts applied the reasoning of the Profili case to 
international organisations whose immunities are the subject of a treaty provision. 
The courts have been prepared to give such treaty provisions an extensive 
interpretation, finding the existence of limitations on immunity, sometimes explicitly 
on the basis of a customary international law as applied to State immunity and 
sometimes on the basis of the broad principle of functional necessity. The Courts 
have tended to find that both approaches lead towards a similar distinction between 
the public acts of an international organisation, which will be immune, and its private 
acts, which are not immune. This distinction has sometimes been drawn explicitly 
upon the basis of the applicability of the distinction between acts iure imperii and
148 (1931) 5 Ann. Digest 413. This case has been influential in the development o f the Italian caselaw 
ever since, in particular in relation to situations where there is no applicable treaty provision granting 
an organisation immunity see for example Cristiani v. Italian -Latin American Institute (1985) 87 
ILR 21 and Galasso v. Italian -Latin American Institute [1987] RDIPP 827; ICEMv. D i Banella 
Schirone (1975) 77 ILR 572. However the same principle o f self-organisation is also applied in cases 
in which a treaty provision was applicable - see for example Camera Confederale de Lavoro CGIL v. 
Bari Institute (Court of Cassation) (1979) 78 ILR 86 and HAFSE v. Sindicato FILTAT-CISL Vicenza 
(1978) 77 ILR 630.
149 For a brief discussion o f the development o f status, privileges and immunities o f the IIA see Cahier 
Etude des accords de siege conclus entre les organisations intemationales et les etats ou elles 
resident 1959 at pp. 67-9.
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iure gestionis as applied to acts of foreign States.150 In such cases “public” acts are 
those which are necessary for an organisation to achieve its institutional purposes 
and which thus fall outside the competence of the local courts, whereas its “private” 
acts must be subject to local private law.
In considering the Italian caselaw it is also important to note that this approach is not 
solely judge-made, and reflects to some extent the position taken by the Italian 
Government in relation to various of the international organisations which maintain 
offices in Italy. In relation to the FAO the Italian Government had sought 
unsuccessfully to make a reservation to the effect that immunity under the 1947 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the UN 
should be limited to the immunity granted to foreign States. However the specialised 
agencies objected to the Italian reservation, with the result that Italy was not 
considered a party to the 1947 Convention.151 In the case of the Bari Institute, the 
Italian Government successfully made a reservation to the treaty granting it
• » » • •  .  1S2immunity, to the effect of limiting immunity to restrictive State immunity. In 
relation to the NATO bases, the 1951 SOFA draws the distinction between local and 
international civilian staff, and accepted that the former will be subject to local law 
and jurisdiction
150 see for example Branno v. Ministry o f  War, 22 ILR 756; Bari Institute o f  the International Centre 
fo r  the Advanced Mediterrraanean Agronomic Studies v. Jasbez (1977), 77 ILR 602; Bari Institute v. 
Scivetti (1975) 77 ILR 609; ICEMv. Chid, (1973) 77 ILR 577 ; Allied Headquarters in Southern 
Europe (HAFSE) v. Capocci Belmonte (1977) 3 IYIL 328
151 see Dominice op. cit. note 52 supra, at pp. 170
152 see Reinisch op cit note 18 supra, at pp 186-7
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However a decisive point in the Italian caselaw was reached with the well-known
1decision of the Court of Cassation in the case of FAO v. INPDA1. This case
concerned the question of whether an application for rent review by a landlord of 
premises leased to the FAO could be determined by the Italian courts. The Court of 
Cassation found that the immunity of the FAO did not extend to a lease on the 
alternative bases (a) that it was an act iure gestionis or (b) that “the choice of location 
of an office is a factor which is extraneous to the primary function pursued by the 
international organisation and which does not affect the autonomy and the structural 
planning of the entity under consideration”.154
However the controversy and criticism that this decision provoked155 led inter alia to 
Italy’s accession to the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialised Agencies of the UN156 (which provides both for immunity but also the 
obligation of the Agencies to provide appropriate alternative means of dispute
153 (1982) 87 ILR 1.
154 ibid. at p.9. The relevant treaty provisions before the Court were (a) Article XV o f the Constitution 
of the organisation under which “each Member nation undertakes, in so far as it may be possible 
under its constitutional procedure, to accord the Organisation all the immunities and facilities which 
it accords to diplomatic missions...” and (b) Article VIII section 16 o f the 1950 Headquarters 
Agreement between Italy and FAO which provided that “FAO and its property, wherever located and 
by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any 
particular case FAO shall have expressly waived its immunity”. The Court found that the first o f these 
provision specifically granted only diplomatic immunity which under both customary international 
law and the treaty provision itself, “must not infringe the basic tenor of the guarantee o f effective 
judicial protection to which [Italian] nationals are entitled with regard to their rights and legitimate 
interests” under Article 24 o f the Italian Constitution. It went on to find that the provision in the 
Headquarters Agreement could not grant an immunity wider in scope than diplomatic immunity.
155 The Council o f the FAO passed a number o f resolutions critical o f the decision of the Court of 
Cassation and asserting that the immunity granted by the Headquarters Agreement was clear and 
unlimited. It subsequently prepared a request to the International Court of Justice for an Advisory 
Opinion on the extent of immunity which the organisation enjoyed. However a settlement was reached 
whereby the Court o f Cassation’s judgment was not enforced, and Italy acceded to the 1947 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the Specialised Agencies. See 1984 UNJY
156 Italy still made a reservation to the Convention but it was much more limited, providing that the 
Convention should be interpreted subject to the provisions o f  an applicable HQ Agreement, between 
Italy and the Organisation in question - see Chapter 3 supra at note 23.
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settlement) and changes in Italian legislation. Furthermore the Court of Cassation has 
in a subsequent case specifically overruled the finding in the INPDAI case that the 
principles of customary international law concerning the immunity of States were
1 ^ 7applicable to the FAO. In this subsequent case the Court was prepared to accept 
the immunity of the Organisation from suit in relation to an employment dispute, 
since, in view of the obligation under the 1947 Convention for the FAO to provide 
alternative means to resolve disputes of a private law nature, there was no
1 fO
infringement of the right to judicial protection under the Italian Constitution.
It has yet to be seen how the Italian caselaw will develop outside the employment 
context, in which the majority of cases have arisen. However it would seem that the 
direct application of the law of State immunity to international organisations will no 
longer be arguable.159
The other major country in which the restrictive doctrine of State immunity is 
sometimes applied to international organisations, is the United States.160 The State 
Department appears to take the view that similar limitations apply to the immunities 
of international organisations as those applying to the immunity of foreign States
157 FAO v. Colagrossi 101 ILR 386
158 This is a rather unconvincing way of distinguishing the INPDAI precedent, as in that case the lease 
in question contained an arbitration clause. Nevertheless it is more in keeping with the approach o f the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Beer and Regan v. Germany and Waite and Kennedy v. 
Germany cases, o f 18 February 1999, discussed in Chapter 3 supra at text note 154ff
159 Though in the light of the reservation made by Italy to the immunities of the Bari Institute, 
exceptionally the State immunity standard might still be applicable.
160 As noted above the US Government has historically been cautious on the question o f the 
immunities o f international organisations (see supra note 14 ff) and has insisted upon its constitutional 
protected traditions of equality before the law in relation to other related matters also such as its 
refusal to grant exemption from income taxes to officials o f international organisations who are US 
nationals working in the US (see Chapter 5 infra at note 22)
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under the restrictive doctrine as formulated in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.161 As noted above, this view is supported by a literal interpretation of the terms 
o f the US International Organisations Immunities Act, which provides for 
international organisations to be granted the same immunities as are enjoyed by 
foreign governments. However given that die IOIA was enacted in 1945 at a time 
when the US afforded absolute immunity to foreign States, there is considerable 
debate among commentators as to whether the subsequent adoption of the restrictive 
doctrine should effect the interpretation of the IOIA.162 Nor has there been a 
definitive settlement of the issue by the courts. Whilst there is authority supporting 
the adoption of the restrictive view,163 there is also a larger number of cases in which 
the Courts have deliberately chosen not to determine whether immunity is restrictive 
or absolute, by means of finding that immunity would extend to the facts of these 
cases in either scenario.164
Thus at present the adoption of the restrictive doctrine in relation to State immunity 
has not, in the majority of jurisdictions, resulted in a similar approach being taken to 
the immunities of international organisations. However even though it may not be 
directly applicable the adoption of restrictive immunity may still have a broader
161 See for example the brief submitted by the State Department to the court of first instance in the 
case o f Broadbent v. OAS -  1978 Digest o f US practice in International law 115
162 See for Glenn et al. op cit. note 15 supra
163 See for example Dupree Associates Inc. v. OAS (63 ILR 92) in which the court found that 
international organisation enjoy only the same immunities as States, in a dispute concerning a 
construction contract.
164 These cases have mainly been in the sphere o f employment including cases such as Broadbent v. 
OAS ( m O ,  63 ILR 162), Morgan v. IBRD (supra note 126); Tuck v. PA HO  ( 668 F 2d 547) Mendaro 
v. IBRD (supra note 120) and De Luca v. UN ( 841 F Supp 531) in which the respective Courts have 
found the question before them was immune whether absolute or restrictive immunity applied. In 
another context see also Askir v. Boutros Boutros Ghali et al. (933 F Supp 368).
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significance in shaping expectations as to where the proper limits to national 
jurisdiction might lie for example for those negotiating relevant treaty provisions.
(e) Do national courts consider there to be a broad limitation to immunity based 
upon “functional necessity”?
Whilst there is general agreement, both in relevant texts and in doctrinal writing, to 
the effect that the basis of the immunities of international organisations is 
“functional”, it is much less clear whether this amounts to an additional limitation on 
immunity, and what precisely that might mean in practice. As was seen in Chapter 2 
there is a spectrum of doctrinal positions adopted on the question, and as was seen in 
Chapter 3 the question is not wholly resolved by the texts of international 
instruments on immunity. For example in relation to the UN, Article 105 of the UN 
Charter states the Organisation shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes, and this 
is again made clear in the preamble of the General Convention; whereas section 2 of 
Article II of the General Convention states that the organisation shall enjoy 
“immunity from every form of legal process”. It thus may be that considerations of 
functional necessity require that the Organisation should enjoy absolute immunity.
Or alternatively functional necessity might represent the general principle on the 
basis of which, and subject to which, jurisdictional immunity is granted -  it could 
thus be interpreted as providing the limits to immunity. However perhaps rather 
surprisingly this question has been little explored by national courts.165
165 The functional basis o f immunity has been accepted in a number of decisions in which immunity 
has been upheld and so that the question o f limits to the scope o f immunity deriving from functional 
necessity has not arisen, see Boimah v. UN (113 ILR 499). In that case relating to a claim of racial 
discrimination by an unsuccessful applicant for UN employment, it was stated that “an international 
organisations employment practices is an activity essential to the fulfilment of its purposes and thus an 
are to which immunity must extend”. The case is interesting as it was argued (unsuccessfully) that a
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The question as to whether the requirement of the functional necessity of immunity 
provides limits to the extent of the UN’s jurisdictional immunity arose in the case of 
Manderlier v. UN and Belgium.166 In that case the plaintiff sought compensation for 
damage to his property in the Congo, caused by the ONUC forces, in a suit in the 
Belgian Courts against the UN and the Belgian State. The Court of Appeals of 
Brussels however dealt with the point summarily, finding that the immunities 
contained in the General Convention were not limited by Article 105, but rather, 
represented what the signatories determined were necessary in accordance with 
Article 105. The Court found that it would be ultra vires for it to assess the essential 
nature of the immunities granted to the UN under the General Convention.
This rather terse finding is not fully explained by the Court, but die decision points 
up some important difficulties which might be faced by a national court in relation to 
an additional “functional” limitation on immunity. Firstly the broad terms in which 
the concept of functional necessity suggests that it may be difficult to apply in 
practice. Secondly, the vagueness of the standard is compounded by the question of 
the appropriateness or even competence of a national court to make this type of 
determination. As has been observed the competences of international organisations 
to carry out any activity are functionally determined. Thus all activities will be to 
some extent related to the achievement of the purposes of an organisation, and
provision in the US-UN HQ Agreement prohibiting racial and religious discrimination amounted to an 
express waiver o f immunity. In this respect an interesting argument that might have been made that 
the prevention of racial discrimination falls within the purposes for which the UN was established 
(Article 1(3) UN Charter), and that therefore the legal proceedings should be allowed to promote the 
purposes o f the UN. However it would be unlikely to succeed, but shows a similar issue of 
characterisation as was seen in the Mukoro v. EBRD case see text at note 138 supra.
166 69 ILR 139
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therefore what a national court would be asked in any case is whether immunity is 
necessary to enable the organisation to carry out its functions effectively and 
independently.
Nevertheless there has been some development of this approach in the caselaw of the 
Italian Courts, though this is obscured by the fact that findings that the extent of 
immunity is limited by reference to functional necessity have frequently been made 
alongside the application of State immunity principles.167 Whilst the general 
applicability of the principles of State immunity per se to international organisations 
may be doubtful, the parallel strand in the Italian caselaw which interprets the scope 
of immunity in accordance with what is necessary to enable the autonomous 
functioning of the organisation can clearly be observed since the case of Profili.168
167 See cases cited at note 148 supra
168 Thus in ICEM  v. Di Banella Schirone (1975) (77 ILR 572) the Court o f Cassation was willing to 
find that the employment of a secretary fell within the area o f autonomous self-organisation enjoyed 
by the ICEM, as she had been permanently and continuously employed as part o f the clerical staff.
In Bari Institute v. Scivetti (1975) (77 ILR 609) an employee who had continuous employment as an 
accountant took part in the institutional activities o f the Institute and therefore was not entitled to 
bring his claim in the Italian Courts.
In Bari Institute v. Jasbez (1977) (77 ILR 602) the Court o f Cassation found that an employment- 
related claim by a simultaneous translator/interpreter fell outside the scope of the Institute’s powers of 
self-organisation, as the responsibilities o f Ms Jasbez were limited to the mechanical repetition in 
another language of words written and spoken by other persons. Thus she played no role in the 
intellectual process of taking decisions or the public function of that process.
In Bari Institutue v. Chirico (1985) (87 ILR 19) a simultaneous translator/interpreter also supervised 
post-graduate students at the Institute, and so the Labour tribunal of Bari was able to distinguish the 
Jasbez case, and find that Ms Chiroco’s position was in fact integrated within the structure of the 
organisation.
In Christiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute (1981) (87 ILR 21) the Court of Cassation found 
that responsibilities o f an employee for the direction and organisation of the audio-visual centre o f the 
Institute, were ’’certainly to be considered inherent in the purposes of the and institutional tasks” of the 
Institute, and “were directly related to the cultural purposes and the promotional and organisational 
activities” set out in the Institute’s constitutive instrument.
In Porru v. FAO (1969, 71 ILR 240) an Italian messenger/lift operator, who had been employed 
continuously under a series o f fixed term contracts, claimed that he had been refused permanent 
employment entitling him to greater benefits and participation in the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund.
The local labour tribunal found that the challenged decision was a question of the internal structure o f  
the Organisation which fell outside Italian jurisdiction.
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However most of these cases have been determined in the field of employment, in 
which it might be said that, in light of the existence and applicability of the internal 
law of the organisation, national law is inapplicable.
However in other areas of activity of international organisations, seeking further 
limitations on treaty based immunities beyond those expressly included in the 
relevant treaty provisions, may well be more difficult and may well raise the kinds of 
difficulties alluded to by the Belgian Court in the Manderlier case (above). It 
therefore seems that whilst the concept of functional necessity may underlie and 
explain the relevant treaty provisions under which immunity is granted, in most cases 
it is unlikely to provide an additional source of limitation, beyond such express 
limitations as are contained in the relevant treaty provision itself.
2 Jurisdictional immunities in the absence of a treaty provision
The treaty basis of the immunities of international organisations considered thus far, 
raises the problem of how a national court should respond when there is no 
applicable treaty-based immunity. One approach is to ask whether there are 
applicable rules of customary international law which require that immunity be 
granted to international organisations. Lalive writing in 1953 asserted that there is a 
customary rule that the member States of international organisations should grant 
them absolute immunity from jurisdiction, and in some cases this extends to non­
member States as well.169
See also Cassese “L’immunite de juridiction civile des organisations intemationales dans la 
jurisprudence italienne” (1984) 30 AFDI 556
169 J-F Lalive “ Immunite de juridiction des Etats et des organisations intemationales”(1953) 84 
Recueil des cours 205, at p. 388
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Subsequent authors have made more nuanced findings. For example, Professor 
Dominice170 suggests that the UN and its Specialised Agencies enjoy jurisdictional 
immunity in relation to both its member States and to non-member States, by virtue 
of a rule of customary international law. In support of this conclusion he mainly cites 
(a) the extensive treaty practice of these organisations, in which their immunities 
have been granted or recognised, and (b) the breadth of their membership. However 
it might be noted that neither of these factors is in themselves unambiguous evidence
• 171of the existence of a norm of customary international law.
In relation to other international organisations Dominice suggests that for their 
member States, the question can only be determined on a case by case basis looking 
at a number of factors, though he does suggest that there should be presumption in 
favour immunity. Further, he takes the view that if it is clear from the attitude of its 
member States that an international organisation enjoys immunity from their 
jurisdiction by virtue of customary international law, then that organisation should in 
principle enjoy the same immunity against non-member States. For those 
organisations which do not enjoy immunity in respect of their member States he 
suggests that it is difficult to claim that they should benefit from a customary 
international law rule of immunity in respect of third parties, but suggests that the
177European Communities are exceptional in this respect.
170 C.Dominice “L’immunite de juridiction et de execution des organisations intemationales” (1984) 
187 Recueil des cours 145, at pp. 219-24
171 see for example R. Baxter “Multilateral Treaties as Evidence o f Customary International Law” 
(1965-6)41 BYIL275
172 op. cit. note 170 supra at pp.222-4
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From these writings it seems appropriate to examine the practice of national 
authorities on these questions, by taking two aspects of the problem in turn. Thus 
following subsections will consider on what, if any, basis national courts will decline 
jurisdiction over an international organisation in the absence of a treaty provision 
where: (a) the forum State is a member of the organisation in question; and (b) the 
forum State is not a member of the organisation in question.
(a) Where the forum State is a member of the organisation in question
This problem may arise either because the forum State, though a member of an 
organisation, is not a party to the treaty under which the immunity is granted, or 
because such treaties as there are relating to a given organisation do not provide for 
its immunity. In either case a national court may look to general international law to 
determine whether the organisation is entitled to immunity. It might, for example, 
seek to rely directly on a rule of customary international granting immunity, as 
suggested by Dominice.173 Alternatively it may derive immunity from broader 
obligations of good faith and co-operation, which might themselves be derived from 
the personality and/or the constituent instrument of an organisation.
In Christiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute,174 the Italian Court of Cassation 
considered this type of situation as the Headquarters Agreement between the Institute 
and Italy had not yet been ratified, and thus the Court found that it could not rely 
upon die privileges and immunities contained in that Agreement. The Court noted
173 ibid. at p. 220
174 25 November 1985, 87 ILR 21
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that there was not a consensus as to the precise basis of the immunities of
international organisations, but held:
“ whatever the basis of jurisdictional immunity may be, generally it is 
recognised by the doctrine and jurisprudence that it may be relied upon by 
unions of States, either when they enjoy legal personality or when they form 
a collectivity of States... On the question of the limits of immunity, the rule is 
that immunity will govern and cover all acts and relationships entered into the 
exercise of the essential functions of the organisation.”175
After establishing that the IILA had legal personality it found that, in accordance
with previous Italian caselaw, it enjoyed immunity under the customary international
law rule par in parem non habet jurisctionem. The Court considered that immunity
extended to the employment relationship between an international organisation and
its officials, provided that the employee had a stable contract and was fully integrated
into the structure of the organisation. Whilst such a direct assimilation of the position
of States and international organisations is, for reasons already discussed,
questionable, the decision appears to reach a balanced conclusion, taking into
account the particular functional needs of the organisation.
However employment disputes have their own characteristics, which do not 
necessarily mean that they can be dealt with in the same way as disputes whose 
nature is of an exclusively private law nature. In another case arising from the 
collapse of the International Tin Council, Bank Bumiputra v. ITC,176 the Malaysian 
High Court was faced with a plea of immunity by the ITC in respect of a suit 
commenced by the Malaysian Bank Bumiputra in relation to borrowings by the ITC. 
The ITC had borrowed money from the Bank in London, but by way of security had 
deposited tin warrants which related to tin held by a third party in Malaysia. The
175 ibid. at p.
176 13 January 187, 80 ILR 24
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Bank therefore commenced its action in Malaysia, to obtain payment and a 
declaration of its entitlement to the tin, against both the ITC and the third party. The 
ITC sought to resist the proceedings on the basis that it enjoyed immunity. However 
the Court found that it enjoyed immunity only under its Headquarters Agreement 
with the UK, and that the member States of the ITC had not intended that it should 
enjoy immunity outside the UK  In the light of the commercial nature of the 
transaction under examination, it held that the ITC had no immunity from the action.
It does not appear that an express argument based on customary international law 
was raised. The Court’s direct reliance on State immunity cases may be questionable, 
in so far as it did not also examine the particular situation of the ITC as an 
international organisation. Nevertheless the approach of the Court does suggest that 
it was not seen purely as a private respondent, and that, even in the absence of a 
specific treaty provision, some degree of immunity may be appropriate, at least in 
relation to certain types of dispute, i.e. those which the Court might adjudge to be 
analogous to acts iure imperii of States.
Where the founding States have not made any provision for the immunity from 
jurisdiction of an organisation under its constituent instrument, national courts seised 
of a dispute involving such an organisation will, nevertheless, usually be careful to 
examine their appropriateness to determine the dispute. In such cases this may well 
involve national courts examining whether, in the light of the international status of 
the organisation, the particular dispute is justiciable, notwithstanding the fact that the 
member States have not expressly granted immunity to the organisation. Thus whilst 
there may be no particular difficulty in these circumstances for a national court to
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adjudicate on the commercial acts of an organisation with a private person third
177party, where a dispute relates to the internal law of an organisation, a national 
court is likely to find that these matters do not fall within its competence.
By way of illustration, it will be recalled that Eurocontrol does not enjoy immunity 
from jurisdiction by virtue of any conventional provision. However on a number of 
occasions proceedings have been brought against the Organisation before the 
national courts of its member States in respect of its “public law” activities, but 
proved unsuccessful. Various attempts to bring claims against Eurocontrol for 
infringing European competition law have foundered on the basis that it is not of a 
purely economic or commercial nature and thus Articles 85-86 EEC are not 
applicable to it.178 Where employees have brought employment disputes before 
national courts they too have been unsuccessful because of the nature of employment 
relationships, which are governed not by national employment law but by the Staff 
Regulations of the Organisation.179
177 See also Branno v. Ministry o f  War (14 June 1954, 22 ILR 756) a case before the Italian Court of 
Cassation, relating to the provision of catering facilities to the NATO headquarters in Italy, at a time 
when there was no applicable treaty in existence. However as the Court relied directly upon the law of 
state immunity care is required in drawing conclusions from it
178 See Case C-364/92 SATFluggesllschaft v. Eurocontrol [1994] ECR1-43 (note Drijber 1995 
CMLR 1039); and the precursor SATFluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol (Brussels Appeal Court 8th 
Chamber) 4 October 1990 ((1992) 15Rev. Beige de droit international 611). See also Air Berlin v. 
Eurocontrol (Brussels Appeal Court, 7th Chamber), September 1986; and Irish Aerospace (Belgium) 
N.V. v. Eurocontrol, (Commercial Court)[1992] 1 Lloyd’s LR 383.
See also the analogous finding that judgments concerning the public law activities of Eurocontrol 
were outside the scope of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, in Case 29/76 LTU  v. Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541.
179 See Eckhardt v. Eurocontrol, 12 January 1984, 94 ILR 331, decision o f the District Court of 
Maastricht which overturned a decision of the local Court of Sittard which found that whilst Dutch 
labour law did not govern the contract there was nothing to prevent to the Dutch courts from assuming 
jurisdiction over the contract.
Similarly there appear to be a number of German decisions in cases brought by employees and former 
employees o f Eurocontrol, in which the Courts have found that they did not have jurisdictional 
competence over the these employment relationships, as underlined by the fact that the applicable
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Thus in disputes of an international organisation which does not benefit from an 
express immunity by virtue of a treaty instrument, rather than looking to establish 
whether there is an immunity by virtue of customary international law, national 
courts have instead tended to examine their own competence to apply national law to 
the subject-matter of such disputes. It is possible to argue that in a case where the 
forum State is a member of the organisation in question, there is an obligation based 
on international law, that the national court should not seek to assert its jurisdiction 
in cases in which it would interfere unduly with the independent achievement by the 
organisation of its international functions, based obligations of good faith or 
institutional loyalty. This was in large measure the approach of the German Federal
1KOAdministrative Court in the European School Employee Bonus case, m which it
found itself to be lacking jurisdiction over an employment dispute, as the School’s 
power to regulate its own employment relationships was based on its personal 
autonomy as an inter-govemmental organisation and thus was outside the scope of 
German public law.
(b) Where forum State is not a member of the organisation
In cases where the forum State is not a member of the organisation the question as to 
whether an international organisation enjoys personality in local law, in order to sue 
or be sued was considered in Chapter 1. It was shown how, in general national courts 
have not found particular difficulty recognising that international organisations enjoy 
a measure of personality in domestic law even where the forum State is not a
employment regulations provided for recourse to the ILOAT in cases of dispute see Reinisch op. cit. 
note 28 supra at p. 104
180 29.10.92, see 108 ILR 664
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member of the organisation and is not bound by any treaty provision to afford it
1 Q I
recognition. However on the question of immunity national courts have m general
been unwilling to recognise broad jurisdictional immunities in favour of an
international organisation of which their own State is not a member, in the absence of
18?an international agreement to this effect.
There are in fact few such cases reported and so generalisations must be treated with 
caution. That being said, there appear to be two distinct tendencies. On the one hand 
the cases display an unwillingness on the part of national courts to recognise 
jurisdictional immunity in respect of the international organisations in question. 
However on the other hand there is equally an unwillingness to assert national 
jurisdiction over matters which are not appropriate for the national courts to 
adjudicate. In this respect there are number of different techniques employed by the 
different national courts, but the result of them is to preclude the national courts 
from adjudicating questions relating to the functions of the organisation on the 
international plane or to its internal law.
The first of these tendencies can be observed in International Tin Council v.
184Amalgamet, in which the applicant sought to assert its immunity from suit and 
legal process in order to stay arbitration proceedings arising out of contracts it had
181 Although there have been some difficulties in this respect in the UK -  see chapter 1 supra text at 
notes 109ff
182 As an example o f such an agreement between an international organisation and a non-member 
State, see the Agreement between the UN and Switzerland on the privileges and immunities o f the UN 
of 1946 (UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.B/10 at p. 196).
183 Reinisch notes a variety o f what he describes as “avoidance techniques” and “judicial strategies 
involvement” op.cit. note 30 supra at pp.35-214.
184 Supreme Court, New York County, 25 January 1988, 80 ILR 31
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entered into for the purchase of tin with a US company. The contracts were subject to 
New York law and arbitration was provided for in New York. It will be recalled that 
the US was not a member of the ITC. The Court did not accept arguments by the ITC 
that either the act of State doctrine or considerations of comity required that it uphold 
immunity in favour of the ITC. In relation to the former it found that the contracts 
were simply commercial contracts, raising only private law issues, rather than 
broader questions of a political or sovereign rights. Whereas in relation to the 
arguments on the basis of comity the court found an examination of the constituent 
treaty and the ITC’s Headquarters Agreement with the UK, revealed no intention on 
the part of the member States that immunity be granted outside the UK.
The French case Communaute economique des Etats de I ’Afrique de VOuest 
(CEDEAO) et Fonds de cooperation, de compensation et de developpement de la 
CEDEAO v. BCCIet a/.,185 related to claims by ECOWAS and its Development 
Fund. The claimants were thus organisations of which France was not a member, and 
nor had France entered into any treaty granting them immunity in proceedings before 
the French Courts. They held deposits with BCCI, a bank which subsequently 
became insolvent and whose assets were then frozen and held by administrators until 
such time as they could be paid out in accordance with French insolvency law. The 
claimants sought a stay of the insolvency proceedings in relation to the moneys held 
in their accounts, and an immediate repayment by the Bank and its administrators of 
the balances of those accounts. The claim was based on the argument that the 
claimants, by reason of the objective international personality which they enjoyed,
185 see 13.1.93 Cour d’appel de Paris l ’ere chambre, section A, ([1993] JDI 353), upholding the 
judgment of the Tribunal de commerce de Paris 3’erne chambre, ([1992] JDI 692).
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were entitled to immunities from jurisdiction and execution. Thus they argued that 
funds representing the balances held in their accounts should be exempted from the 
operation of French insolvency law that applied to the rest of the BCCI assets in 
France.
However the arguments in favour of immunity from jurisdiction were not 
convincingly made as they were largely based on the treaty provisions between the 
member States of ECOWAS, and thus the Court held that they were defeated by the 
mle that treaties cannot impose obligations on States which are not party to them. An 
alternative argument based on customary international law also failed on the ground 
that it had not been made out sufficiently. The Cour d ’appel did not basis its 
conclusions expressly on the nature of the transaction. However it is interesting that 
the court of first instance found that the deposit of the money with BCCI had been to 
take advantage of the high rates of interest offered by it, and that therefore the 
transaction was of a commercial nature aimed at making profits and thus outside the 
scope of any privileges and immunities as their international status might afford 
them.
By contrast both the court of first instance and the Cour d ’appel suggest property 
belonging to the claimants may enjoy some immunity from execution in France. 
However both also found that the operation of the administration of the bank in 
accordance with insolvency law was not a measure of execution. Unfortunately 
neither of the decisions expands on the precise extent or exact basis of such
186 though it is not entirely clear from the courts rather brief statements on the question what content 
was claimed for the rule by ECOWAS.
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immunity from execution, but the fact in argument such immunity was derived from 
the international personality of the claimants, may suggest that such immunity from 
execution is necessary to protect the independent functioning of the organisation 
from the most intrusive aspects of judicial authority.
The Amalgamet and ECOWAS cases maybe compared with those cases in which 
national courts have found that an organisation was in fact immune from their 
jurisdiction or alternatively that they do not have jurisdictional competence over the 
dispute in question. In Spaans v. Iran-US Claims Tribunal,187 a dispute arose 
between the Tribunal and an interpreter in its employment, at a point before 
negotiations for a host State agreement between the Tribunal and the Netherlands 
had been concluded. The Dutch Supreme Court found that an international 
organisation enjoyed immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of its host State 
“for acts within the scope of the performance of its tasks” by virtue of customary 
international law. Basing itself on the extent of immunity generally contained in host 
State agreements, it found that there were some exceptions to this immunity, for 
example in relation to non-contractual liability for road accidents. It found further 
that there was an obligation on international organisations to provide for contractual 
disputes to be referred to arbitration. In relation to the instant case the Court held that 
employment disputes between an international organisation and those who play an 
essential role in the performance of its tasks, were immediately connected with the 
performance of those tasks, and thus the tribunal was entitled to immunity. The case
187 94 ILR 321. After the claimant had lost his case in the Supreme Court, he unsuccessfully 
petitioned the European Commission of Human Rights (Appl. No.12516/86, 58 D&R 119). The 
Commission found that the acts of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal did not occur within the jurisdiction 
of the Netherlands (for the purposes of Art. 1 ECHR), they did not engage the responsibility of the 
Netherlands.
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is unusual in that it arose before the relevant host State agreement had been 
concluded, but the court of first instance relied on a statement of the Dutch 
Government to Parliament that it assumed the Tribunal was entitled to “the usual 
immunity from jurisdiction ... necessary for the performance of the tasks for which
1 RRthe organisation has been established”.
Perhaps of more general interest is the case of EAL Delaware Corp. et al. v.
1 RQ •Eurocontrol et al., in which a US District Court found that Eurocontrol was 
entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), as if it 
were an agency or instrumentality of a foreign State. The case involved a claim for 
damages and injunctive relief against Eurocontrol and the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority, by US companies which were the owners of an aircraft which they had 
leased to a European airline. The aircraft had been seized by the CAA in the UK at 
the request of Eurocontrol, for the non-payment by the airline of fees for air 
navigation service provided by Eurocontrol. The Court found that as Eurocontrol’s 
functions were essentially governmental in nature, it should be accorded the same 
status as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign State. As such it was entitled to 
immunity under the FSIA (i.e. State immunity), as the acts complained of were 
performed in the exercise of its regulatory powers, and thus sovereign in nature 
rather than commercial.190 In addition the court also found that it did not have 
personal jurisdiction over Eurocontrol on the basis that it lacked the minimum
contacts with the US necessary to establish personal jurisdiction.
188
189 107 ILR 318
190 ibid. at p.328-34. As a supplementary and strictly speaking an alternative finding it found that 
even if  the acts complained o f were commercial, they did not have a direct effect within the US as 
required under the FSIA - ibid. 334-8
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A particularly interesting point to note in relation to the Court’s finding that State 
immunity precluded subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, is that Eurocontrol 
is not entitled to a conventional immunity from jurisdiction within the territory of its 
own member States. Nevertheless the US Court’s unwillingness to assert its 
jurisdiction over the public law activities of Eurocontrol is matched by a similar 
reluctance by the national courts of its member States.191
It should be emphasised that even in the absence of any right to immunity under 
customary international law, if the subject matter of a dispute is not one over which 
the national court can assert jurisdiction, for example it raises an issue of 
international law between the organisation and one of its member States or between 
two its member States, the national court is likely to declare the question non- 
justiciable, or find in similar terms that it has not been attributed the jurisdictional
• 109 •  # • •competence to decide the issue. This rule of non-justiciability will apply whether 
or not the forum State is a member of the organisation in question. However there are 
in fact few such cases reported, which may suggest that many international 
organisations either tend not to carry out any operations in non-member States or will 
at least first secure an agreement with such third States, providing for their status, 
privileges and immunities where they do so.
191 supra text at notes 178-179
192 See for example the judgment o f Coleman J, in Westland Helicopters v. A 01  [1995] 2 All ER 
387.
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Conclusion
The immunities enjoyed by international organisations from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of their member States, by virtue of treaty appear to have been implemented in 
local law and applied by the national courts reasonably successfully. There are 
relatively few cases that have been brought and relatively few issues on which there 
have been major controversies. One of these has been the applicability of the 
restrictive doctrine of State immunity to international organisations, particularly in 
the US and Italian courts. However even in those States judgments of the courts are 
in fact rather ambivalent, and the majority of academic opinion favours treating the 
immunities of international organisations as a distinct matter from those of foreign 
States.
In relation to the question of waiver, the issue of whether international organisations 
should immunity from the supervisory jurisdiction of national courts, in cases in 
which they have agreed to arbitrate with private persons is also unresolved in 
national caselaw, with divergent decisions coming out of different legal systems. It 
has been submitted here that an agreement to arbitrate with private person should in 
principle be considered as a waiver from the supervisory jurisdiction of the local 
courts, where this is necessary to give effect to an agreement to arbitrate. It is after 
all an important aspect of the immunity of international organisations that they are 
under a duty to provide alternative means of dispute settlement where they rely on 
their immunities. To rely upon an immunity from the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
local courts might mean that an organisation could effectively frustrate an agreement 
to arbitrate which it entered. However it accepted that an express waiver of immunity 
from execution would still be required in respect of enforcement proceedings.
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Interestingly thus far hie issue of whether the immunity violates human or 
constitutional right to due process, with some notable exceptions, is not widely 
discussed in the national caselaw. The Belgian courts were faced with the issue in the 
Manderlier case, but dealt with it rather unsatisfactorily. It of course underlies some 
of the Italian caselaw which considers the application of the restrictive doctrine of 
State immunity to international organisations. However international human rights 
law on the right of access to a court has been developed considerably in recent years, 
and following the Beer and Regan case cases in the European Court of Human 
Rights it might be expected that this will be increasingly a ground for challenge to 
immunity, particularly if it can be shown that the organisation in question has not 
provided a suitable alternative mode of settlement of disputes.
Finally it should be noted that since the immunities of international organisations are 
granted under treaty, they do not operate in the courts of non-member States. There 
does not appear to be a general rule of customary law extending these immunities 
beyond the scope of relevant treaty provisions. However it appears that in relation to 
matters of the internal law of an organisation or perhaps even matters which relate to 
its “public” functions, the courts of both member States or non-member States tend 
to decline jurisdiction. The terms by which this is achieved vary between national 
legal systems practice. Nevertheless, and despite the limited practice on the point, it 
is suggested here that this can be explained by the existence in customary 
international law of a rule of deference following from the international personality 
of an international organisation, that national courts do not have jurisdictional
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competence over institutional questions of international organisations, ratione 
materiae.
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Chapter 5
THE INDEPENDENCE AND JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS
Introduction
An international organisation, being a legal rather than a natural person, will only be 
able to carry out most of its activities through the acts of natural persons in its 
employment or otherwise under its instruction. Thus the institutional autonomy of an 
international organisation from its member States which is protected by its privileges 
and immunities, can only be effectively maintained when those acting in its name are 
also given a commensurate degree of independence from the member States. To 
quote Jenks:
“The immunity of international organisations would be illusory if their 
decisions could be questioned in proceedings against members of their 
staffs.”1
As will be discussed, the guarantee of such independence for officials has various 
consequences, both political and legal, for the member States. In jurisdictional terms 
it is necessary that officials should have protection from personal liability in relation 
to acts they perform on behalf of the organisation. Whilst as we have seen the extent 
of immunities of organisations themselves varies considerably between different 
organisations, the immunities of their officials show much greater uniformity in this 
respect.2
1 C.W. Jenks The Headquarters o f  International Institutions: a Study o f  their Location and Status 
(RIIA, London, 1945) at p.40
2 Although as will be discussed the can be some difference in the extent o f immunity which different 
categories of officials within organisations enjoy.
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Although in broad terms the immunities granted to international officials must be 
such as to enable the independent performance of the international functions of the 
organisations by which they are employed, this does not mean necessarily that the 
immunities of an official will be exactly co-extensive with that of his employer 
organisation. As will be discussed below an organisation may well be legally 
responsible for the acts of an employee, in relation to which the employee in question 
remains immune.
A. Historical Development
It is sometimes said that the immunities of international officials are an extension of 
those of the organisation.3 However this has not always been so clear. As will be 
shown, in the Nineteenth Century, before the international personality of 
international organisations was established, the primary recipients of international 
immunities were international officials. They were seen as the main international 
functionaries rather than the bodies to which they belonged, and the guarantee of 
their independence was seen as necessary for the achievement of the international 
functions with which they were charged.
In these early international organisations various attempts at conveying this concept 
of independence can be observed using approximations from the practice of inter­
state relations. Thus the status of “neutrality” was granted to officials of the first 
international bodies.4 Subsequently, concepts derived from the diplomatic practice of
3 See for example the views of the UN Office of Legal Affairs in 1981 UNJY 161
4 see for example the Rhine Commission discussed in Cahier Etude des accords de siege conclus 
entre les organisations internationales et les etats ou elles resident (Giufffe, Milan, 1959) at pp.280-1. 
See also Michaels International Privileges and Immunities -  a Case fo r  a Universal Statute (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971) at pp. 12-14 and 33-4
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the time were adopted. Thus the European Danube Commission though initially 
granted the status of neutrality, was later granted “independence from territorial 
authority”.5 The Congo Commission and its employees were granted “inviolability” 
and “independence”.6
However it was not until the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the 
Twentieth Centuries that international bodies and their officials were employed 
beyond such technical spheres, and directly in the political arena. Such tasks had 
hitherto been carried out through the processes of diplomacy, in particular at the 
multilateral level, through Conference diplomacy. In that system conferences were 
mainly staffed by the domestic civil service of the host State. The officials of the 
new international bodies of this period were granted “diplomatic status”: for example 
provision was made so that the Judges of the Permanent Court of Arbitration “... in 
the exercise of their duties, and out of their own country, enjoy diplomatic privileges 
and immunities”.8 The Covenant of the League of Nations provided that “... officials 
of the League, when engaged on business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities”.9
5 Art 53 o f the Treaty o f Berlin of 1878 - see also the PCIJ Advisory Opinion on Jurisdiction of the 
European Commission of the Danube (1927 PCIJ Ser.B No. 14 at p.63-4
6 Art. 18 and 20 General Act of the Conference at Berlin: Act of Congo Navigation of 26 February 
1885 ((1884-5) 76 BSP 4. For discussion o f the terms “neutrality”, “inviolability” and “independence” 
see Michaels op. cit. note 4 supra, at pp. 33-39.
7 Lemoine notes how the practice developed during the 19th Century of including diplomats of other 
nationalities, in the secretariats o f international conferences -  see The International Civil Servant-A n  
Endangered Species (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995) at pp. 16-7
8 Art. 46 of The Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement o f International Disputes 1907
9 Art.7(4) o f the Covenant of the League o f Nations
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The establishment of the Secretariat of the League as a permanent and independent 
body, required considerable innovation. Its early establishment was based on 
principles derived from the national civil services such as Great Britain and France, 
including permanence and political neutrality.10 However in the practice which 
developed during the life of the League, the simple grant of diplomatic status in itself 
proved to be too inexact to achieve the independence which international officials 
required for the proper discharge of their functions. As will be seen problems arose at 
a number of levels, some highly political, but at their heart was the relationship 
between the official and his own State of nationality. There are obvious sensitivities 
for States in loosening the ties of nationality between them and their nationals in 
order to enable the latter sufficient independence to discharge functions which are 
conceived of in the international interest, even if these are seen to conflict with the 
national interest. Effectively this was what was required and the declaration of 
loyalty to League which the Secretary-General and the higher officials of the 
Secretariat were required to make after 1932 makes this clear.11
10 See the Report o f  Lord Balfour adopted by the Council o f the League in June 1920, where it is 
stated that “...the members of the Secretariat once appointed are no longer the servants o f the country 
of which they are citizens, but become for the time being servants only o f the League of Nations. 
Their duties are not national but international” (LNOJ June 1920 136-9, at p. 137).
Many writers have pointed to the influence of the League’s first Secretary General Sir Eric 
Drummond as being crucial in determining the ethos of the Secretariat o f the League and his approach 
is often depicted as having been influenced in turn by the principles and traditions governing British 
civil service - see for example Lemoine op cit note 7 supra, at pp. 28-40.
11 The following declaration had to be made to the League’s Council “I solemnly undertake to 
exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions that have been entrusted to me as ... of 
the League of Nations, to discharge my functions and to regulate my conduct with the interests o f the 
League alone in view, and not to seek or to receive instructions from any Government or any other 
authority external to the League o f Nations/ Secretariat o f the League of Nations”; adopted by 
resolution o f the 13th Ordinary Session o f the League Assembly, on 13 October 1932 - see LNOJ 
Special Supplement, No. 103, Nov. 1932. It is in fact not very different to the declaration made by the 
members of the UN Secretariat today.
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The principle of independence of the League’s Secretariat was challenged most 
seriously by the Governments of Italy and Germany and also, to some degree,
19Japan. Italy, for example, went so far as passing a law in 1927 requiring, under 
threat of criminal sanction, that Italian nationals apply for authorisation from the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they could serve with international 
organisations and to leave such service when required to do so by the Italian 
Government.13
At a more technical (legal) level the “diplomatic” status which the Covenant 
endowed on the members of the League’s Secretariat, caused problems of a rather 
different order for Switzerland and the Netherlands - the host States of the largest 
international organisations of that time. Whilst the choice of the term “diplomatic” 
appears largely to have ensured the requisite degree of independence to non-nationals 
of the host State, there were significant problems as to how such diplomatic status 
should apply to nationals of the host State.14
12 Lemoine describes the German and Italian approach to a review of the operation of the Secretariat. 
They sought to the installation o f a rung o f Under Secretaries General who would be nationals of the 
permanent members of the Council, who would form a Governing Board, which the Secretary General 
would be obliged to consult before taking any action. These two countries argued that such a 
mechanism was necessary because “so long as there was no super-State and therefore no ‘international 
man’, an international spirit can only be assured through the cooperation of men of different 
nationalities who represent the public opinion of their country”. The majority o f member States 
rejected this scheme as contrary to the spirit o f the Covenant, a none too subtle attempt to ensure that 
more power within the organisation was controlled by the small number o f permanent members of the 
Council: op cit note 7 supra, at pp.66-72.
13 see Law of 16 June 1927 cited by Lemoine op. cit. note 7 supra at p. 105
14 See the case of C.M. v.A.C. (Ann.Dig 1929-30 case no 204 at p.313) before the Cour de Justice 
civile o f Geneva. In the case o f Avenol v. Avenol (Ann. Dig. 1935-7 case no 185 at p. 395) a French 
court found that the Secretary-General o f the League enjoyed immunities on a functional basis but 
only before the Swiss courts. These immunities could not displace the jurisdiction of his home State. 
The case was a matrimonial dispute and so fell outside the official capacity of M.Avenol, but the 
judgment is ambiguous as to whether the Court would have jurisdiction over all acts of M.Avenol on 
the basis of his nationality or whether his immunity for official acts extended beyond Switzerland.
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At the time the immunities of diplomats who held the nationality of the sending State 
covered all of their activities, both public and private. However there was no 
obligation on a receiving State to confer diplomatic status on any of its nationals who 
chose to work for a sending State, and such privileges as it might grant, were purely 
granted as courtesies.15 The problems took on particular definition when it came to 
jurisdictional immunity. Whilst a foreign diplomatic agent, enjoyed immunity in the 
courts of the receiving State, he remained subject to the courts of the sending State. 
On the other hand if immunity from suit was granted to nationals of the receiving 
State who worked in the diplomatic mission of a sending State, that person would not 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending State in the same way, and there would 
thus be no national court with competence to hear complaints against such persons. 
This would create the dangers of denial of justice and a class of persons wholly 
outside national jurisdiction.
Writers of the time who were sympathetic to the League project sought to distinguish 
traditional diplomatic immunities and to insist upon a solution which met its policy 
requirements.16 Secretan, for example, argued that the superior interest of the 
international community made it essential that the international official should be
15 Even today under Art 8 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, nationals o f the 
receiving State may only be appointed to the diplomatic missions of foreign States, with the consent 
of the receiving State, which may be withdrawn at any stage. Further under Art.38 they only enjoy 
immunity from jurisdiction ratione materiae in respect o f their official acts -  see Denza Diplomatic 
Law  (OUP, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1998) at pp.339-49.
16 see Secretan “The independence granted to agents o f the international community in their relations 
with national public authorities” (1935) XVI BYIL 56; Hill Immunities and Privileges o f  
International Officials -  The Experience o f  the League o f  Nations ( Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, 1947) esp at pp.8-9, 45-49, 56-7 and 76-80; Jenks The Headquarters 
o f  International Institutions (RIIA, London, 1945) esp. at pp.40-1. See also the work of the Institut de 
droit international at its 1924 Session in Vienna.
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exempted from the jurisdiction of all States, and this was at least as necessary, if not
17more so, in respect of the jurisdiction of his own State of nationality.
However, notwithstanding strong statements of principle from some States in 
favouring equality of treatment of international officials by the member States as
1 Rbetween nationals and non-nationals, it did not gain universal approval. Both 
Switzerland and the Netherlands refused to grant officials of their respective 
nationalities, the full range of immunities which they granted to officials of other 
nationalities. In particular on the issue of jurisdictional immunity, instead of full 
diplomatic immunity, Switzerland only granted its nationals who were officials of 
the League immunity from suit before the local courts “in respect of acts performed 
by them in their official capacity and within the limits of their official duties”.19 The 
Netherlands insisted on a similar limitation in the Regulations concerning the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in relation to Dutch nationals who were 
either members of the Court or senior officials in the Registry.
B. Officials of the United Nations
1. Jurisdictional immunities
17 op cit note 16 supra at p.71
18 For example in the negotiations the League’s Advisory Committee of Jurists in relation to the 
establishment o f the Permanent Court of International Justice, Sir Cecil Hurst on behalf of the British 
Empire sought to remove proposed wording which would have restricted the enjoyment of 
immunities by judges of the Court, only when they were outside their own countries. See Secretan op. 
cit. note 17 supra at p.72.
19 see Article IX of the 1926 Modus vivendi between Switzerland and the League. For more detailed 
discussion o f the situation in Switzerland and Italy at that time, see Hill op. cit. note 16 supra, 
especially at pp. 14-57
20 Other contentious issues of this nature related to exemption from taxation (see below); national 
requirements in respect o f military service; and because o f the lack o f a League passport the need to 
rely on national travel documents, see Hill op. cit. note 16 supra
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The shortcomings of the system as set up under the Covenant of the League led to 
calls for clearer delineation of States’ obligations in relation to the independence of 
the international civil service.21 These were taken into consideration at the time of 
the drafting of the UN Charter. The first paragraph of Article 100 spells out in 
obligatory terms that the Secretary-General and his staff “shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any Government or other authority external to the Organisation” 
and “shall refrain from any action which reflect on their position as international 
officials responsible only to the Organisation”. The second paragraph of Article 100 
obliges member States “to respect the exclusively international character of the 
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence 
them in the discharge of their responsibilities”.
The range of issues raised by Article 100 of the Charter is very broad indeed and the 
years since 1945 have seen a number of causes celebres which have arisen in relation 
to the application of the principle of independence of the international civil service, 
the details of which go beyond the scope of this thesis.22 Instead the focus of the
21 See Jenks “Some Problems of an International Civil Service” (1942) III (2) Public Administration 
Review 93, at pp. 102 -104
22 However mention might be made of the following controversies, arguments concerning the 
obligations of States under article 100(2) have arisen in a number of contexts. Early on in the history 
of the UN, the difference between the UN and the US concerning the taxation of UN officials o f US 
nationality, which eventually resulted in the general levy of the staff assessment plan on all UN 
officials. During the negotiation o f the General Convention the US strongly maintained that the 
principle of equality of treatment o f US citizens for the purposes of taxation was of great importance 
and sensitivity within the US (in the light of strong Congressional insistence on this point) -  See US 
Foreign Relations 1947 V ol.l at pp.22-68
The episode of loyalty investigations of UN officials of US nationality during the McCarthy era, on 
which see Lemoine op cit note 7 supra at pp.l 14-63 and which forms the background to the Advisory 
Opinions of the ICJ on Effects o f  Awards o f  the UNAT1954 ICJ Rep. 47 and the ILOAT, 1956ICJ 
Rep 77. The State Department’s took the view that care should be taken by the US authorities not to 
interfere with the official functions o f international civil servants in the course o f the investigations - 
US Foreign Relations 1952-4, Vol.Ill at pp. 312-413. It might also be noted tat the US “Loyalty 
Program” for US nationals employed by the US, has subsequently been declared unconstitutional in 
the US courts -  see Hinton v. Devine (1986) 633 F.Supp. 1023, for comment see 80 AJIL 984.
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remainder of this chapter will be on those issues which relate directly to the 
jurisdictional immunities of international officials.
In the context of the United Nations this of course involves not only the principle of 
independence set out in Article 100 of the Charter, but also the more specific grant of 
immunities to the Organisation and its officials as required under Article 105 and in 
the provisions of the General Convention. As was discussed above, during the 
negotiations relating to the drafting of Article 105, the “diplomatic” standard of 
privileges and immunities was not felt to be “appropriate”, and the “functional” 
standard was adopted in its place.23
2. The holders of immunities
In fact the General Convention, in seeking to give greater definition to these broad 
principles provides for different categories of UN personnel:
(a) High officials -  (Officials of the first category)
The Secretary-General and his Assistant Secretaries-General and their immediate 
families enjoy full diplomatic status, under international law.24 Thus on the basis that
The subversion o f the principle of independence o f the international civil service by the USSR and 
other East European States during the Cold war, see for example Lemoine op. cit. note 7 supra at 
pp. 194-233; and Zoller “ The National Security o f the United States as the Host State for the United 
Nations” 1989 1 Pace YIL 127, esp p.l56ff. In particular the practice of insistence that USSR 
nationals be seconded from the national civil service on short-term contracts, thus requiring the 
consent of the USSR to extend or renew such contracts, see e.g. the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in the 
Yakimetz case (esp. the dissenting opinions of Judges Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings and Evensen), 
1987 ICJ Rep. 18.
23 UNCIO Documents, Vol. 13 pp. 778-780 - see Chapter 3 supra, at note 4.
24 Article V, section 19 of the General Convention. Due to the expansion of the work o f the UN and 
subsequent reorganisations under which Under-Secretaries have been given substantial executive 
authority, diplomatic privileges may now also be accorded to Under-Secretaries (1967 YBILC at 
p.281-2). At UN Headquarters in New York such privileges and immunities are more strictly limited 
to the Secretary-General and his Assistant Secretaries-General. Though at other important UN
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the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations may also be 
considered customary international law in respect diplomatic privileges and 
immunities, these high officials enjoy personal inviolability, absolutely immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction, and immunity from civil jurisdiction in most respects, 
save in three types of case of purely private activity.26
(b) other officials (officials of the second category)
The second category consists of those officials designated by the Secretary-General, 
who are “immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all
acts performed by them in their official capacity” 27 They are also to be exempted
from taxes, immune from national service obligations, immune from immigration 
restrictions, as well given certain other rights akin to diplomatic representatives, 
including on appointment the right to import furniture and personal effects free of 
customs duties, and, at times of international crisis, repatriation facilities.
The scope of this second category of officials is in fact very broad. In UN General 
Assembly Resolution 76(1) of 7 December 1946 (which approved the General 
Convention) an exclusion from the protection under the Convention was made in 
respect of locally-recruited staff on hourly rates. Thus jurisdictional immunities 
under the Convention do not apply to this category of staff per se, nevertheless if a 
local jurisdiction sought to prevent them from carrying out official acts on behalf of
stations, such as Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi, the host State arrangements provides for a broader 
range of officials to benefit from such status.
25 See for example the decision of the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, at para 45 
and 62
26 see Art 29 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
27 Article V section 18 o f the General Convention
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the UN, the Organisation might be able to claim its own immunities were being 
affected. In any event, in practice the number of staff members in this category are 
likely to be small, since most of the staff in the lower ranks of the Secretariat such as 
drivers, clerks and secretaries, whilst often recruited locally, are usually salaried 
rather than paid on hourly rates, and thus enjoy the same immunity in relation to 
official acts as other officials.28
(c) Experts on mission
The final category of UN personnel granted immunities under the General 
Convention, is that of “experts on Mission”. In 1956 Legal Counsel of the UN 
explained that “the terms ‘experts on missions for the United Nations’ and ‘experts 
serving on Committees or performing missions’ for a Specialised Agency were 
intended to apply only to persons performing a mission for the UN or a Specialised 
Agency who, by reason of their status, are neither representatives of governments nor 
officials of the Organisation concerned but who, for the independent exercise of their 
functions in connection with their respective Organisations, must enjoy certain 
privileges and immunities.”29 Examples of such persons were cited as being 
members of commissions and committees of the UN or a Specialised Agency, who 
serve in their individual capacity - in the UN context this included military observers, 
headquarters staff of peacekeeping missions, members of bodies such as the UNAT 
and the ILC.
28 See the statement of Legal Counsel to the General Assembly in 1981 cited 1985 YBILC, Vol.II part 
1, at pp.170-1
29 see 1967 YBILC Vol.II at p.284.
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A broadly similar approach has been endorsed by the International Court of Justice.
In the Mazilu case the Court found that the purpose for the including of privileges
and immunities for experts on mission, was:
“to enable the United Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have 
the status of an official of the Organisation, and to guarantee them ‘such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of 
their functions’. The experts thus appointed or elected may or may not be 
remunerated, may or may not have a contract, may be given a task requiring 
work over a lengthy period or a short time. The essence of the matter lies not 
in their administrative position but in the nature of their mission.”30
After considering the breadth of the tasks entrusted to such persons the Court
considered that the term “mission” was not used in narrow sense, implying a journey,
but in a broad sense, to “embrace in general the tasks entrusted to person, whether or
 ^1
not those tasks involve travel”.
Experts on mission are expressly granted immunity from arrest and detention, and 
seizure of their baggage. They are granted certain rights of communication, including 
inviolability of papers and documents, the right to use codes and to receive
30 [1989] ICJ Rep. 177, at p. 194 para 47.
31 ibid.
Zacklin points out that in practice now international organisations often employ short-term consultants 
and other persons to perform services on their behalf, which do not fit within either the category of 
officials or experts on mission. In this respect he cites the standard UNDP Basic Assistance 
Agreement provides that “persons performing services” on behalf o f UNDP shall enjoy the same 
privilege and immunities as officials of the organisation. Article 17(5) defines “persons performing 
services” to include operational experts, volunteers, consultants and juridical as well as natural 
persons and their employees, whether governmental or non-governmental. See Handbook on 
International Organizations ed R-J Dupuy, (Martinus Nijhoff, Dodrecht, 1988) at p. 191-2. See also 
the Secretary-General’s circular o f 9 May 1951 the status of technical assistance experts o f the UN, 
reproduced in 1967 YBILC Vol.II at p.264.
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documents by courier or sealed bags. As for jurisdictional immunity the
Convention provides:
“In respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of 
the performance of their mission, immunity from process of every kind. This 
immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding 
that the persons concerned are no longer employed on mission for the United 
Nations.”33
3. Nature of immunities
The jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by the Secretary-General and Assistant 
Secretaries-General under Section 19 of the General Convention i.e. officials of the 
first category, being assimilated to diplomatic immunity, is an immunity ratione 
personae, relating not only to the public/official activities of the holder but also to 
most of his or her private actions. Immunity may be waived by the Secretary-General 
in relation to the Assistant Secretaries-General, or by the Security Council in relation 
to the Secretary-General himself. The holder of such immunity enjoys it whilst he or 
she remains in the office to which it attaches. Once he or she leaves office he or she 
will no longer enjoy the broad immunities granted under section 19. However, to the 
extent that the immunity enjoyed by all officials (i.e of both the first and second 
categories) under section 18(a) of the General Convention continues to subsist after 
they cease to be employed by the UN, he or she will still enjoy immunity for all of 
his or her actions that are performed in official capacity.
32 Art VI section 22 of the General Convention. In addition experts enjoy similar facilities in relation 
to currency and exchange restrictions as accorded to representatives of foreign governments on 
temporary official missions and also the same immunities and facilities in relation to their personal 
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys.
33 ibid. Art VI section 22(b)
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The nature of the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by officials of the second category 
under section 18(a) is limited to “words spoken or written and acts performed by 
them in their official capacity”. The extent of the immunity is therefore primarily 
determined by the nature of the act in issue, rather than the office or status of the 
person performing it, and thus might be described as an immunity ratione materiae,34
Here a comparison with the position of diplomats is illustrative. The immunity from 
jurisdiction of a diplomatic agent while in office is broad and granted ratione 
personae under Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). 
Nevertheless it is now accepted that an underlying immunity ratione materiae in 
respect of the official acts of a diplomatic agent co-exists during his period in office, 
and this continues to subsist even after he has left office as recognised in Article 
39(2) VCDR.35 This subsisting immunity for official acts enjoyed by diplomats even 
after they have ceased to be diplomats, is sometimes justified on the basis that such 
acts are, in fact, acts of the sending State: that is they are attributable to the sending 
State, and as such engage the responsibility of that State. Therefore it may be said 
that this underlying immunity ratione materiae, is not a right of the former diplomat
34 It should be noted that the immunity of officials, though granted ratione materiae, is distinguishable 
from what common law courts know as the question of justiciability, i.e. the question o f whether the 
dispute is a proper one for the local court to adjudicate, or whether it is more appropriately determined 
at the international level. The inquiry into justiciability although also pertaining to the subject-matter 
of the dispute, can usually only be asked at a later stage once the parameters of the dispute are known 
(see Kuwait Airways v. Iraq Airways [1995] 1 WLR 1147). It might be added that in relation to suits 
against UN officials pleas of non-justiciability are unlikely to arise. Where an official act is in dispute, 
immunity will either be asserted in which case proceedings are terminated before the justiciability of 
the dispute can be considered by the court, or alternatively immunity will be waived in which case the 
UN will have by implication opined that it is a dispute suitable for settlement by the local court. In the 
latter case it seems highly unlikely that the respondent UN official himself could successfully plead 
non-justiciability.
35 See Dinstein “Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction ratione materiae” (1966) 15 ICLQ 76. In 
respect o f former Heads o f State, see R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
(No. 3), (House of Lords, [1999] 2 WLR 827).
36 See for example Denza “Ex parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?” (1999) 48 ICLQ 949.
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->7at all, but rather a prerogative of the State in whose name he was acting. Similarly 
immunity from jurisdiction ratione materiae can be claimed by other State officials
10
who do not enjoy immunity ratione personae by virtue of their office. 
Correspondingly it is interesting to note that the United Nations Legal Counsel has 
taken the view that the immunity UN officials under Section 18(a) subsists even
•5Q
when the official ceases to be employed by the UN.
That this immunity of officials is essentially an immunity of the Organisation is also 
brought out by the provision on waiver (section 20). This section makes clear that 
immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the Organisation and not for the 
personal benefit of the individuals themselves.40 The Secretary-General is entitled, 
and indeed obliged, to waive official immunity, where in his opinion the immunity 
would impede the course of justice and where it can be waived without prejudice to 
the interests of the Organisation.41 Moreover even where a member of the UN 
professional staff himself requests waiver (for example in order to obtain permanent 
resident status in the State in which he is serving), the general practice of the United
37 see Rahimatoola v. The Nizam o f  Hyderabad [1958] AC 379. For the application of this principle in 
relation to officials o f international organisations see Zoernsch v. Waldock [1964] 1 WLR 675 
(discussed infra at note 111)
38 Thus for example the immunities of consuls under Art 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations are limited to acts performed in the performance o f consular functions. Under Art. 38 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations the immunities of diplomatic agent who has the 
nationality o f the receiving State enjoys immunity only in respect o f official acts performed in the 
exercise of his functions. Other visiting State officials may also be able to claim the benefit o f State 
immunity in respect of official acts -  eg Propend Finance v. Sing (1996, Court o f Appeal, 111ILR 
611).
39 The Office of Legal Affairs prepared a memorandum to this effect in 1952, reaching its conclusion
on the basis of the Article 105 of the UN Charter, the functional analogy between diplomats and UN
officials, and the relationship between the General Convention and the 1947 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies o f the UN (as during the negotiation of the 
latter the question was discussed and although no express wording was included, it was thought to 
follow from the wording of the section as a whole) - see [1967] YBILC Vol.II at pp.269-270.
40 see Section 20 of the General Convention.
41 Section 20
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Nations is not to waive immunity.42 This would seem to suggest that even a 
voluntary appearance in Court by a UN official would not be sufficient in itself to 
constitute a waiver of his immunity, unless it is accompanied by an act of assent by 
the Organisation itself 43
The question of waiver brings out a further aspect of the nature of immunity. 
Although the immunity of an official is an immunity ratione materiae, the fact that it 
may nevertheless be waived, will enable a local court to assert its jurisdiction to hear 
the complaint. The immunity simply works as a bar to the jurisdiction of the national 
court which must be determined as a preliminary question at the outset of 
proceedings.44 An enquiry is therefore necessary into whether the subject-matter of 
the dispute concerns an official ac t45 If a non-official act is involved, the Court will 
have jurisdiction and the case may proceed. If however an official act is in issue, 
immunity will preclude the local court from asserting jurisdiction, unless the 
Secretary-General chooses to waive it.
42 see Knapp “Les privileges et immunites des organisations intemationales et leurs agents devant les 
tribunaux intemationaux” (1965) 69 RGDIP 615
43 Indeed Cahier goes further, suggesting that high ranking international officials, who enjoy full 
diplomatic immunities, can not commence proceedings before municipal courts without the prior 
consent of the organisation by which he/she is employed, as commencing proceedings involves a 
submission to the jurisdiction -  op cit note 4 supra p.307 (See also the case o f Jurado v. ILO 
discussed infra at note). The UN Secretariat has now issued instructions for the handling o f suits 
against UN officials ST/SGB/198 and ST/AI/299.
44 See the Advisory Opinion in the Cumaraswamy case, 2000 ICJ Rep. 62, para 63 in which the ICJ 
held
“By necessary implication, questions of immunity are therefore preliminary issues which must be 
decided in limine litis. This is a generally recognised principle of procedural law, ...The Malaysian 
courts did not rule in limine litis on the immunity of the Special Rapporteur, thereby nullifying the 
essence of the immunity rule...”
45 On the questions of who ultimately has the power to make this determination see the discussion of 
the Cumaraswamy case text infra at notes 98f.
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The nature of the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by experts on mission does not 
materially differ from that of officials. It may be noted that the subsistence of 
immunity even after the expert has completed his mission is expressly provided for 
under the General Convention. However the additional express grant of immunity 
from personal arrest or detention during their mission (including on journeys 
connected therewith), appears to be absolute and would thus be applicable in relation 
to arrest or detention effected in connection with acts of the experts, which 
undertaken outside the accomplishment of their mission.46
C. The jurisdictional immunities of officials of other organisations
In contrast to the jurisdictional immunities of international organisations themselves, 
the immunities enjoyed by their officials are much more uniform. Relevant treaty 
provisions concerning the officials of most international organisations are similar to 
the provisions of the General Convention in this respect, generally extending to acts 
they perform in their official capacity. Under the 1947 Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies of the UN, officials of the Specialised 
Agencies are granted jurisdictional immunity in identical terms to the second 
category officials of the UN under the General Convention. Full diplomatic 
privileges and immunities are also granted to the executive head of each Agency and 
those officials who deputise for him in his absence47 In addition many of the 
Agencies have, in the annexes they attach to modify the basic terms of the 1947
46 see Zacklin op cit note 31 supra at p. 192. Also see Schermers and Blokker “Mission impossible?
On the immunities o f staff members of international organisations on missions” in Hafner et al. (ed.s) 
Liber Amicorum Seidl-Hohenveldern (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) at pp.37-53.
47 In relation to some of the specialised agencies diplomatic immunities are recognised in relation to a 
relatively large class o f senior officials, for example under the UNESCO HQ Agreement effectively 
all officials o f the rank of senior officer (P.5) and above are granted diplomatic privileges and 
immunities.
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Convention to their own particular requirements, included provision for the 
immunities of experts on mission in exactly the same terms as the General 
Convention.48 The IMF, the IBRD, the IFC have attached annexes stating that the 
1947 Convention shall not modify the effect of their constitutive instruments on the 
question of immunities their governors, executive directors, alternates, officers and 
employees, who therefore all enjoy jurisdictional immunity for their official acts. All 
are therefore granted jurisdictional immunity similar to that of “officials” under the 
1947 Convention, without separate provision being made for the highest ranking 
officials or experts on mission.49
At the regional level there is a similar uniformity of provisions on the jurisdictional 
immunities of international officials. The OAS,50 the OAU,51 the Council of 
Europe,52 the OECD,53 and the WEU54 all provide for jurisdictional immunity in the
48 These include ILO, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO,WHO,IMO and UNIDO see ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at
pp. 112-20.
49 These instruments provide that such persons “shall be immune from legal process with respect to 
acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the [institution] waives this immunity” - 
IBRD Article VII Section 8(i), IMF Article IX Section 8(1), IFC Article VI Section 8 (i) (though 
reference to waiver is made in a later section), and IDA Article VIII Section 8(i). Similar provisions 
also appear in the Articles of Agreement o f the regional Development Banks and Funds.
Some o f the highest ranking officials o f these organisations have in fact been granted diplomatic 
immunities, though as a courtesy rather than as of right. (1967 YBILC at p. 136)
A recent case has arisen in which the failure to make special provision for the immunity from personal 
arrest or detention o f experts on mission, has be highlighted. In the Hong Yang case an IMF official 
on mission was arrested and tried, while on mission in China, his State o f nationality, in connection 
with acts performed before his appointment as an IMF official. As an IMF official he was only 
entitled to immunity for his official acts, and as the IMF did not make provision in relation to its 
participation in the 1947 Convention for a more general immunity from arrest and detention for 
experts on mission, he could be arrested and tried for acts alleged against him which did not relate to 
his official functions. Schermers and Blokker point out the vulnerability of the expert on mission in 
this respect and the dangers for the functioning o f the organisation {op. cit. note 46 supra).
50 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities o f the OAS 15 May 1949, see Art.s 8 and 10, ST/ 
LEG/SER.B/11 at p.377
51 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the OAU, 25 October 1965, reproduced in 
G.Naldi (ed.) Documents on the Organisation o f  African Unity, (Mansell, London, 1992)
52 General Agreement on the Privileges ad Immunities o f the Council o f Europe 5 May 1949, Art.s 16- 
19, ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.390
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same terms as the General Convention. This appears to apply whatever the nature or 
functions of an organisation.
Thus the scope of the jurisdictional immunity of international officials may in fact be 
broader than that of the organisation for which he or she works, in that in respect of 
his or her official acts, he or she will be immune notwithstanding that the immunity 
of the employer organisation may be limited. In such cases the organisation bears 
vicarious responsibility for the official acts of its agents, and claims are channelled 
towards the organisation rather than the agent in person.55
In this respect the position of the European Communities is interesting for whilst it
will be recalled that the immunities of the Communities themselves are very
limited,56 Article 12 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Communities provides:
“In the territory of each Member State and whatever their nationality, 
officials and other servants of the Communities shall:
(a) subject to the provisions of the Treaties relating, on the one hand, 
to the rules on the liability of officials and other servants towards the 
Communities and, on the other hand, to the jurisdiction of the Court [i.e. the 
ECJ] in disputes between the Communities and their officials and other 
servants, be immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts performed by 
them in their official capacity, including their words spoken or written. They 
shall continue to enjoy this immunity after they have ceased to hold office”.
53 See supplementary Protocol N o.l to the Convention for European Economic Co-operation, 16 April 
1948, Art.s 13-17, ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.369
54 See Agreement on the Status of the WEU, National Representatives and International Staff, 11 May 
1955, Art.s 19-25, ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.421
55 See for example Rendall Speranza v. Nassim (1997, Court of Appeals, DC Circuit, 107 F.3d 913), 
discussed in text at note 80f infra
56 see Chapter 3 supra text at note 65.
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In cases which involve the official acts of Community officials therefore suits are 
channelled to the Communities themselves, and must be determined in accordance 
with the relevant rules of liability in European (eg in relation to non-contractual 
liability Article 288 is the governing law which must be applied by the ECJ) or 
national law (e.g. contractual liability is determined under the law and before the 
forum chosen by the parties).
Schermers has questioned whether the category of “official acts” for the purposes of 
the immunities of Community officials is entirely congruent with attribution of non­
contractual liability of the Communities under Article 288, which establishes the 
Community’s obligation to “make good damage caused ... by its servants in the
cn
performance of their duties”. He suggests that on the one hand there are policy 
reasons for wishing to see a limited category of official acts for the purposes of 
immunities, i.e. so far as possible to ensure the equal protection of the law. Whereas 
on the other hand he suggests it will be important for good labour relations of the 
Communities that a broad definition of official act is adopted for the purposes of 
liability under Article 288, so that the Communities bear liability, rather than their 
servants personally. He suggests that the solution is the adoption of a single broad
co . # f
interpretation of official acts, but for the Communities to waive the immunity in 
accordance with their duty to do so (Article 18 of the Protocol). The device of waiver 
of immunity therefore ensures that the concerns requirements concerning equal
57 See Schermers “Official Acts o f Civil Servants” in Schermers et al (ed.s) Non-Contractual Liability 
o f  the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988) at pp.75-81
58 In this respect see the two cases of Sayag v. Leduc, Cases 5-68 and 9-69 discussed infra text at note 
96
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protection of the law can be met, whilst at the same leaving unaffected the liabilities 
of the Communities for the acts of their officials.59
D. Immunities of officials in practice
In broad terms the jurisdictional immunities of international officials have been 
widely recognised by national authorities. Nevertheless a survey of the practice of 
the decisions of courts and other authorities in this respect reveals a number of 
common issues.
1. Officials of the first category
Where the official in question is of the first category, i.e. he or she enjoys full 
“diplomatic” status, national courts have frequently sought to apply directly the law 
relating to diplomatic immunities, notwithstanding the important contextual 
differences between the regimes of diplomatic and international immunities.60 In 
such cases an international official will enjoy immunity both in relation to his official 
acts and also to most of his private acts.61 Unlike the traditional diplomatic
59 ibid. p. 80
60 Switzerland grants full diplomatic immunities to a broader category o f officials than simply the 
executive leadership of an organisation, and accordingly Swiss caselaw on international officials 
makes frequent reference to the standards of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (though in 
fact many o f the cases relate to taxation, rather than to jurisdictional immunity per se): see e.g. CERN 
Official Taxation Case (1982) 102 ILR 174; Rastello and another v. Caisse Genevoise de 
Compensation and another (1984) 102 ILR 183; Residence Miremont v. Administrative Tribunal o f  
Geneva (1985) 102 ILR 189
61 An exception to immunity in relation to proceedings their private residences may be applicable to 
international officials o f the first category on the basis o f the exceptions contained in Art31(l)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. However this exception relates to real actions 
relating to immoveable property. In strict terms a lease may not be realty, but see the Deputy Registrar 
case (District Court of The Hague) (94 ILR 308) in which a plea of immunity was denied on the basis 
that there was an exception to diplomatic immunities in relation to rights in rem in immoveable 
property which ensures that such claims should be brought before the courts of the State in which the 
property was situate. The international official could not claim that he held the property on behalf o f
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representative of a State whose immunity generally only operates in respect of the 
receiving State, an international official of the first category is able to rely upon it 
in all member States, including his own State of his nationality. There is a very clear 
danger of a denial of justice if immunity is maintained, and in response, therefore, a 
number of host States, whilst recognising diplomatic privileges and immunities in 
general for such high officials, have sought to restrict the enjoyment of such 
privileges and immunities for officials of their own nationality.63
In practice a particular area for problems has been family law.64 It appears that in 
family law proceedings involving an official of the first category, such an official 
would, strictly speaking, be immune unless the organisation by which he/she is 
employed waives immunity. The complainant should therefore apply to the 
organisation to waive the respondent’s immunity. It is likely that in most family law 
cases an organisation would be under an obligation to waive immunity to a court 
properly seised of the matter,65 as it is unlikely to prejudice the interests of the
the International Court of Justice (by whom he was employed), since, notwithstanding either that the 
Court found it useful or necessary for him to live nearby, or that he kept his own library at the 
premises, the sole function which the dwelling served in relation to his work was to provide him and 
his wife somewhere to live relatively close to the Court and thus it was a private property.
In relation to property rented by an official on behalf o f an organisation however see the case of 61 In 
Askir v. Boutros Ghali and others (US District Court, Southern District New York 933 F. Supp 368) 
discussed infra at note 83.
62 Though see Art.40 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in respect transit rights.
63 See for example Art. 19(3) of UNESCO HQ Agreement with France o f 2 July 1954 
(ST/LEG/SER.B/11 at p.240); Exchange of Letters between the ICJ and the Netherlands o f 26 June 
1946 (ST/LEG/SER.B/10 at p. 193);
64 It should be noted here that this subsection deals with substantive proceedings brought against an 
international official alone. Where enforcement proceedings are brought in relation to maintenance 
obligations, for garnishment of the salary or pension of an official, it should be remembered that the 
immunity of the organisation itself, from measures of execution are likely to be an issue see Means v. 
Means (1969) 53 ILR 588, Shamsee v. Shamsee, 1980 UNJY 222 and Menon v. Weil 66 Misc. 2d 114 
(New York City Civil Court).
65 i.e. in accordance with obligation to waive immunity where the interests o f the organisation are not 
prejudiced - see eg section 20 of the General Convention.
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organisation unduly.66 In any event a court which has jurisdiction under the usual 
rules of private international law, is, as Jenks suggests, likely to view plea of
£ * J  iTQ
immunity with “scant sympathy”. Indeed a French court in Avenol v. Avenol, 
rejected plea by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations (a French national) 
in colourful terms, though probably inaccurately if Article 7 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations was interpreted strictly. Subsequently jurisdiction over family law 
cases has been established either by seeking a waiver by the organisation69 or on the
70basis of the exception to immunity based on a counterclaim. Where immunity is not 
waived an unsatisfactory situation may arise in which family proceedings will not be 
admissible in the courts of any State, leaving the spouse or family of an international 
official in a precarious position.71
66 In the context o f diplomatic immunities the recent case o f Re P. ([1998] 1 FLR 1026, CA; and 
[1998] 1 FLR 624, FD) suggests that requirements o f public employment in the diplomatic service 
may have effects on domestic arrangements which can not be reviewed in foreign family courts. It is 
conceivable that a similar type of case might arise in relation to an international official, but if  such 
official and his employer organisation maintained his immunity, there is a serious danger o f a total 
denial of justice, there being no court to determine the case. In the case o f a diplomat, his/her sending 
State is likely to be able to exercise jurisdiction in family law matters, as was found by the Court of 
Appeal in Re P.
67 See Jenks International Immunities (Stevens, London, 1961) at p. 135
68 The Juge de Paix XVI arrondissement de Paris (Ann Dig. 1935-37 case No. 185 at pp.395-7) 
expressed himself as follows: “Avenol further claims ... that the effect o f this diplomatic immunity 
absolves him from answering before the courts of members o f the League of Nations, and in particular 
before the French Courts; and that all proceedings taken against him are absolutely null and void ... If 
we were to decide that Avenol is covered by diplomatic immunity before the courts of sixty States 
Members of the League, we should have reached a decision which is .. .palpably contrary to all the 
notions o f law which have been gradually imposed on the human conscience since the ages of 
barbarism and which have become the universal charter for all civilised actions -  a decision that 
Avenol is placed above the law, higher than heads of States...”
69 As had happened in the cases of Parlett v. Parlett (1927) 5 ILR 316, Case No.207 and also in the 
relation to the Jurado case, ILOAT Judgment No. 70 (1964) 40 ILR 296
70 In Re RFN (\911, 77 ILR 452) an Austrian court found that an international official who enjoyed 
diplomatic immunities, and who had petitioned the Court for custody o f his child, was subject to the 
court’s jurisdiction in relation to cross-petitions by his former wife.
71 see Picasso de Oyague v. Picasso de Oyague (1986) 77 ILR 506
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2. Officials of the second category and experts on mission
(a) Scope of immunity
The immunity from suit enjoyed by officials of the second category is more complex, 
as it only extends to acts performed in official capacity. As has been explained above 
it differs in nature from the jurisdictional immunity granted to officials of the first 
category, being an immunity for the benefit of the organisation in question thus 
granted ratione materiae, rather than an immunity attaching to an individual by 
virtue of his or her status, ratione personae. It is now well established that this more 
limited jurisdictional immunity should be granted by States to all officials
• • • • 75irrespective of their nationality for all acts performed in their official capacity.
This may of course involve difficult judgments concerning the proper limits to 
immunity and the characterisation of the acts in question. As a first step it has been 
important to define clearly the act which is in issue, and to ask in what capacity it 
was performed. Since the immunity is granted ratione materiae, to maintain a plea of 
immunity it is necessary to show that the act itself was performed in the exercise of 
the official functions, and not merely that the assertion of jurisdiction would affect 
the official’s performance of his official functions. Thus in some early cases relating 
to allegations of espionage by members of the UN Secretariat in the US, the US
72 See the cases of Mazilu (1989 ICJ Rep. 177) and Cumaraswamy (1999 ICJ Rep. 62). Whilst the 
jurisdictional immunities o f officials is generally recognised irrespective o f nationality, certain other 
privileges are not always granted by host States in respect o f their own nationals. In this respect there 
is some variation in the treatment by host States o f officials o f their own nationality in respect of fiscal 
exemptions and exemption form national service obligations -  as for example in the US (see note 22 
supra).
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courts were able to establish jurisdiction on the basis that the acts alleged did not
'7 ‘j
form part of official functions of the defendants in question.
Where the acts in issue were clearly not performed in an official capacity the relevant 
international organisation has a very limited role. Thus in relation to criminal 
proceedings against one of its officials an organisation may make inquiries of the 
State bringing the proceedings, to ensure that the acts in issue were not performed in 
his official capacity.74 In so far as an international organisation may exercise 
functional protection in respect of its officials, it may also seek assurance that the
nc
official should be treated in accordance with accepted standards of due process.
In relation to purely private civil claims against international officials of the second 
category, national courts have found few obstacles to their jurisdiction. Thus in 
relation to proceedings arising from a lease for the private residence property of such
73 See US v. Melekh ( 32 ILR 308 esp at p.333); and also US v. Coplon and Gubitchev ((1949) 16 ILR 
293, Case no. 102). In both of these cases the Court was also faced with arguments that the Russian 
defendants were also diplomatic representatives o f the USSR, though examination o f their official 
status made clear that they were officials o f the UN and so entitled only immunity in respect of their 
official actions and not to full diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction. As Bedjaoui points out, 
it would have been contrary to the basic principle of the independence of the international civil service 
for persons to be considered both officials o f the organisation and representatives of their national 
States (see Fonction publique intemationale et influences nationales (Stevens, London, 1958) at
p.228).
74 Thus in 1948 when a UN official was arrested at the UN Information Centre in Prague, the 
Secretary-General complained to the Czech Government about the contravention o f the inviolability 
of UN premises and the arrest o f the official. The Czech Government sought to excuse the alleged 
violation o f the premises, but assured the Secretary-general that the official was not to be interrogated 
in related to his official acts. See Bedjaoui ibid. at p. 224
75 Bedjaoui {ibid. at p.225) cites the arrest o f two officials of the UN Commission for Korea in 1949 in 
which the Secretary-General explained to the Foreign Ministry of Korea that in such cases (1) the 
Secretary-General should be informed in advance of any arrest or proceeding against an international 
official; (2) an assurance should be given that the official would not be questioned about facts relating 
to his activities for the UN; and (3) the official should be treated in accordance with universally 
accepted principles o f justice. The Korean Government replied that though it was not a member o f the 
UN that it fully accepted the principles of Art. 105 of the Charter and GA Resolution 76(1) which 
defined the privileges and immunities of the UN. It assured the Secretary-General that the officials 
were arrested in relation to crimes which had no connection with their official duties, but that it was 
often not possible to give the Secretary-General prior notice o f arrests.
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an official, immunity has been found not to be available, since the proceedings arise 
from a non-official act. Where however immoveable property is rented in the name 
of an official on behalf of the organisation, for use by the organisation, such lease 
will in most cases be found to be an official act for which the individual will enjoy 
immunity. 77
On the other hand in cases in which the acts in question were clearly performed in an 
official capacity national courts have taken a fairly broad approach and not allowed 
themselves to be drawn into reviewing the lawfulness of the particular act in 
question. Thus in cases brought by employees of international organisations against 
their superiors in relation to matters relating directly to their employment national 
courts will generally uphold the immunity of the superior employee. In Donald v. 
Orfila, a former employee of the OAS brought an action against the former 
Secretary-General of the OAS for wrongful termination of his employment contract. 
The former Secretary-General submitted a plea of immunity on the basis that the acts 
complained of were performed in as part of his official functions. The complainant 
argued that the termination was not an official act because it was carried out in bad 
faith for reasons of a personal nature. The Court found that personnel management 
was one of the functional duties of the respondent, and was thus immune. There was
76 See Essay an v. Jouve (Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Seine, 42 ILR 241), which related to 
proceedings for eviction o f a delegate of the UNHCR in France.
77 In Askir v. Boutros Ghali and others (1996, 113 ILR 516) the use o f property in Mogadishu by 
UNOSOM troops as found to be immune. The question of whether restrictive State immunity should 
also apply to international organisations, which has not been resolved in the US caselaw, was raised, 
but the Court found that the billeting of troops were part and parcel o f the military operations of 
UNOSOM and thus would be immune whether the UN enjoyed absolute or restrictive immunity.
78 US District Court, District o f Columbia 618 F.Supp 645, affirmed by the Court of Appeals (DC 
Circuit) 788 F 2d 36. The case is somewhat confused in use of the terms absolute and qualified 
immunity. Nevertheless its ratio was applied in De Luca v. UN and others (113 ILR 503) in respect 
of the individual respondents.
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no qualification to the immunity of the respondent on the basis of the motivation of 
his official acts and that to find otherwise would undermine the nature of the 
immunity.79
Where the acts complained of take place within the context of the parties’ 
employment in an international organisation, but are in fact of a non-official nature, a 
plea of immunity may still succeed. Thus in the case of Rendall-Speranza v.
on
Nassim a junior employee of the IFC brought a suit for assault and battery against 
her supervisor. The complainant alleged a course of sexual harassment culminating 
in a physical assault. The respondent claimed the alleged assault had occurred when 
he discovered the complainant trespassing in his office, and pleaded immunity. The 
IFC filed an amicus brief to the effect that the respondent was acting in his official 
capacity as an IFC employee, by protecting IFC offices from unauthorised entry and 
potential theft of documents. At first instance the plea of immunity failed on the basis
Q 1
that the alleged assault was not an act within his official functions. The plaintiff 
also sought to join the EFC, claiming that it bore vicarious liability. The Court of 
Appeals however found that by this stage, any claim against the IFC was time- 
barred. It further found that in the motion to join the IFC the plaintiff was effectively 
maintaining that the supervisor’s acts were official, in that she was asserting that they 
engaged the responsibility of the IFC itself. The Court therefore found that the 
supervisor was immune.
79 See also the ESOC Official Immunity case (1973) (73 ILR 683), a German Federal Labour Court 
upheld the immunity o f an official in relation to an adverse assessment he had drafted on the 
complainant’s work. The Court found that the complainant’s argument that the assessment did not 
conform to the Staff Regulations of the Organisation, did not affect whether or not the respondent was 
acting in the exercise of his official functions.
80 1997, Court of Appeals (DC Circuit), 107 F.3d 913.
81 District Court, DC, 932 F.Supp. 19
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The scope of immunity from jurisdiction is not limited to cases in which an agent of
an international organisation is a party to litigation, as the practice in relation to cases
in which international officials are required to give evidence in national judicial
proceedings or other public bodies. Where an international official is required to
give evidence to judicial proceedings under oath there is a danger that die official
will be constrained to give evidence relating to matters of which he or she has
knowledge by virtue of his or her official employment, and in relation to which he or
she owes a duty of confidentiality to the organisation. The case of Keeney v. U£?3
arose in the context of the “loyalty” investigations by a sub-committee of the
Judiciary Committee of the US Senate into international officials of US nationality.
The defendant had been asked by the Sub-Committee questions which related to her
appointment by the UN in relation to which she had a duty to exercise the utmost
discretion. On her refusal to answer the questions she was convicted of contempt of
court. However the conviction was overturned on appeal. For Circuit Judge Edgerton
the question clearly related to the functioning of the organisation and thus the
defendant enjoyed privilege. He observed:
“Compulsory disclosure of the persons who influence appointments to the 
staff of the United Nations would not be consistent with the independence of 
the Organisation or ‘the exclusively international character of the 
responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff...’ (art. 100 (2)). And 
the prospect of such disclosure might influence staff members, in one degree 
or another, to regulate their conduct with a view to avoiding embarrassment 
of sponsors. The privilege of non-disclosure is therefore ‘necessary for the
82 The breadth of immunity may be reflected in the wording o f the relevant treaty provision eg 
“immunity from legal process o f every kind” enjoyed by UN experts on mission under Article VI 
section 22(b) of the General Convention. It might be noted that Article V, section 18 relating to the 
immunities of UN officials does not include these words, but practice suggests that their immunities 
will be similarly broad.
83 218 F.2d 843
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independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organisation’ 
(Art.l05(2)).”84
In general the UN’s stated policy is to waive immunity in cases in which staff 
members are requested to appear as witnesses but in which the UN as such has no 
interest. However the UN may only authorise an official to give evidence on matters 
of which they have knowledge by virtue of their official employment, on the basis 
(1) that there is no reasonable alternative to testifying for the “orderly adjudication or 
prosecution” of the of the case; and (2) that no significant UN interest would be
Of
adversely affected by such testimony. In practice if a UN official is sub-poenaed to 
give evidence, the UN may assert immunity, but then authorise the voluntary giving 
of answers to specific questions, and/or, if possible, deal with it by correspondence 
or documentary evidence. Where a staff member does appear the UN takes the view 
that taking the usual oath or affirmation will not conflict with the obligations of his 
or her employment.
International organisations are of course reliant on the local legal system in relation 
to criminal offences, in that they do not have criminal jurisdiction themselves. 
However where an organisation is the victim or complainant of an offence, there may 
nonetheless be implications for its immunities and those of its officials. This is 
illustrated by the case of Weiner v. US. The defendant was being prosecuted, 
following a complaint by a UN security guard who had apprehended the defendant 
for damaging UN property. The defendant indicated in pre-trial proceedings that he
84 ibid. at p. 845
85 1 985 YBILC Vol.II pt.l at p. 172
86 378 NYS 2d 966
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would be seeking to raise a cross-complaint that the security guard had assaulted 
him. The UN was asked by the Court for its opinion as to the immunity of the 
security guard. The UN claimed that whilst it was compatible with his immunity for 
him to appear voluntarily as a witness in the proceedings, it would be for the UN to 
determine on functional grounds whether immunity should be asserted in relation to 
contempt of court citations, peijury charges or cross-complaints, and there was no
R7waiver by virtue of his voluntary testimony. The Court found this to be an 
unacceptable position on the basis that it violated concepts of fundamental fairness 
and equal treatment.88
(b) Characterisation of “official acts”
In many of the cases considered the question as to how to determine whether an act 
of an international official is an official act was not given extensive consideration. 
However as we have seen questions of legal characterisation can raise issues of both
• i  RQcomplexity and sensitivity, and this is no less true of an act as having been 
performed in official capacity or not, as will be seen in a number of leading cases.
In the well-known case of Westchester County v. Ranallo90 proceedings were 
brought against the chauffeur of the Secretary-General of the UN for exceeding the 
speed limit, whilst driving the Secretary-General to an official meeting. Initially the 
UN sought to assert the immunity of the defendant. At a preliminary hearing on the
87 The text o f the UN letter appears in 1976 UNJYB 234
88 The case also raised the controversy as to whether the UN or the local court should make the 
determination o f the scope o f immunity. The UN raised its concerns on this issue to US Government 
see 1976 UNJYB 236. For further discussion of this issue see section (ii) below.
89 See chapter 4 supra text at note 38ff
90 67 NYS (2d) 31,13 ILR 168 -  on which see Preuss “Immunity o f officers and employees of the 
United Nations for official acts: the Ranallo case” (1947) 41 AJIL 555
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issue of immunity the Judge of the City Court of New Rochelle found that the 
defendant was not entitled to immunity as a matter of law, without trial of the issue 
of “fact” as to whether the defendant “was engaged in an official act which justified 
the grant of immunity”. The Court therefore ordered the trial of the factual issue to 
proceed. However at that point the UN decided to waive the defendant’s immunity, 
rather than press the issue of immunity, and so the issues which were raised in the 
preliminary ruling, were not finally resolved.91
The case raises the important question as to whose is the final determination of
q <7
whether an act is official and thus immune (unless immunity is waived). The Judge 
dealt with the Secretary General’s submission that the acts in question were official 
as not being determinative of the issue. Interestingly however he indicated that he 
would consider a certificate from the State Department as determinative. The 
central problem for the Court appears to have been that the United Nations was seen 
as essentially a foreign body imposing itself on the local legal system, which did not 
have the means to give full effect to such a claim. The Judge found that the UN 
position would require him to override important values of the local legal system,
91 It has been suggested that the reason for this decision lies in the fact that UN did not want to 
prejudice the negotiations on its Headquarters Agreement with the US, in which it was engaged at that 
time (see Preuss op. cit. note 90 supra). Certainly the case appears to have attracted a good deal o f  
publicity - so much so that Bedjaoui questions the influence o f public opinion on the findings o f the 
Court (op. cit. note 79 supra, at p.223 note 41) . However there are also sound reasons why the 
Secretary General might either have reconsidered and found that speeding was not an official act, or 
that waiver would not prejudice the interests of the organisation unduly (see Preuss op. cit., at p.575).
92 The case also raises the question of what point in the proceedings immunity should be dealt with -  
which is also raised in the Cumaraswamy case, on which see text at note 108 infra.
93 See the Court’s finding at p. 171 of the ILR Report: “This Court feels strongly that the question of 
immunity should be entrusted, not to the whim or caprice of any individual or committee that might 
speak for the United Nations Organisation, but rather that such immunity should be available only 
when it is truly necessary to assure the proper deliberations o f the Organisation -  a circumstance that 
could readily be brought about if the granting of immunity were restricted to those cases where our 
own State Department certified that the exemption from prosecution or suit was in the public interest.”
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whereas he felt that did not have the authority to do so.94 However he appears to 
suggest that he would have been able to do this, if the Executive branch of 
Government certified that the granting of immunity would be in the public interest. 
The difficulty with this argument is that, whilst the Executive branch of government 
in the forum State may indeed be an appropriate body to determine the national 
public interest (including its foreign policy dimension),95 the national public interest 
is not usually the decisive issue to determine issues of immunity of international 
organisations.
An interesting contrast is the case of Sayag v. Leduc before the European Court of 
Justice,96 which concerned also concerned the question of driving and official 
activities. Sayag, an employee of Euratom (who was not employed as a driver) had 
been instructed to escort two representatives of private companies to a meeting. He 
was doing this by driving them in his private car, when he had an accident in which 
they were injured. A question was raised as to the extent of his immunity in relation 
to his driving of a car. The ECJ took the view that:
94 The Court found (ibid. at p. 169): “To recognise the existence o f a general and unrestricted 
immunity from suit or prosecution on the part of the personnel o f the United Nations, so long as the 
individual be performing in his official capacity even though the individual’s function has not relation 
to the importance or the success o f the Organisation’s deliberations, is carrying the principle of 
immunity completely out of bounds. To establish such a principle would in effect create a large 
preferred class within our borders who would be immune to punishment on identical facts for which 
the average American would be subject to punishment. Any such theory is does violence to the 
American sense o f fairness and justice....”
95 In this respect perhaps the decision should be seen in its own context. At that time in common law 
countries Executive certificates or suggestions o f immunity, tendered to the court in a broad range of 
immunity cases, were often determinative of such cases, and had the effect o f reducing the scope of  
the judicial function considerably. However in recent times, and in many o f these countries with the 
statutory enactment of the restrictive doctrine o f State immunity, many more important decisions in 
immunity cases are now judicially determined (for example as to the extent o f immunity), and the role 
of the Executive is correspondingly reduced.
96 Case 5-68, 11 July 1968 (1968 ECR 395) - on which see Schermers op. cit. note 64 supra
290
“The immunity from legal proceedings conferred on officials and other 
agents of the Community thus only covers acts which, by their nature, 
represent a participation of the person entitled to the immunity in the 
performance of the tasks of the institution to which he belongs ... driving a 
motor vehicle is not in the nature of an act performed in an official capacity 
save in the exceptional cases in which this activity cannot be carried out 
otherwise than under the authority of the Community and by its own 
servants.”97
This decision was given as a preliminary ruling and suggests that whatever the 
Commission’s view, the scope of immunity is a legal question to be determined in 
the final analysis by a competent court.
The issue as to who has die final determination of the scope of immunity has recently
QO
arisen very clearly in the Cumaraswamy case. It should be noted at the outset that 
this case concerned the jurisdictional immunity of an “expert” rather than an 
“official”, but it appears that its ratio would be equally applicable in relation to 
officials of the second category as well.99 The case concerned a Special Rapporteur 
of the Human Rights Commission, (of Malaysian nationality) who was sued for libel 
in relation to an interview he gave to a legal journal, concerning certain issues in 
Malaysia that he was investigating in connection with the mandate that he had been 
given by the Commission. He sought to assert immunity from suit on the basis that 
the interview had been given “in the course of the performance of his mission” and 
was thus immune by virtue of Article VI, section 22 (b) of the General Convention. 
The Secretary-General of the UN confirmed that the words were spoken in the course
97 ibid. at p.402. In a subsequent preliminary ruling in the case the Court found that the Community’s 
non-contractual liability was coextensive with this definition o f an official act, Case 9-69 (1969 ECR 
329).
98 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process o f  a Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on 
Human Rights 1999 ICJ Rep. 62 -  see casenote Wickremasinghe (2000) 49 ICLQ 724
99 In a number of important findings the ICJ addresses its findings in respect o f “UN agents”, e.g. para 
60 and 61
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of his mission and were thus immune from legal process, and issued a certificate to 
this effect, which it asked the Malaysian Government to place before the relevant 
local court.
The Special Rapporteur applied to the court to dismiss the suit on grounds of his 
immunity, and entered the Secretary-General’s certificate in support. The Malaysian 
Government took the view that the question as to whether or not the words of the 
Special Rapporteur which were at issue in this case, were immune was for the local 
court to decide, and issued its own certificate, making no reference to that of the 
Secretary-General, but setting out that the Special Rapporteur enjoyed immunity only 
in respect of acts done or words said in the course of the performance of his mission.
Both the Kuala Lumpur High Court100 and the Malaysian Court of Appeal 101 
considered that the question as to whether or not the words in issue were spoken in 
the performance of the Special Rapporteur’s mission were issues which should only 
be heard at trial alongside the other evidence and issues. Both courts therefore denied 
the Special Rapporteur’s application to dismiss and awarded the costs of the 
application against him.
The UN complained to the Malaysian Government that it had failed to place the 
Secretary General’s certificate before the courts and that its own certificate to the 
courts was inadequate. More importantly for present purposes it disputed the opinion
100 See MBf Capital Bhd & Another v. D ato’ Param Cumaraswamy, 28 June 1997, [1997] 3 MLJ 300
101 See D ato ’ Param Cumaraswamy v. M Bf Capital Bhd & Another v., 20 October 1997, [1997] 3 
MLJ 824
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of the Malaysian Government and the findings of the Malaysian courts on the basis 
that they had failed to give conclusive or determinative effect to the Secretary- 
General’s certificate.
The case was eventually referred to the ICJ to settle under the “binding Advisory 
Opinion” mechanism provided for in Article VIII Section 30 of the General 
Convention. Though the question presented to the ICJ by ECOSOC was amended to 
consider the applicability of Article VI Section 22 of the General Convention to the 
Special Rapporteur, much argument centred on the question of conclusiveness of 
the Secretary-General’s determination of whether an act was done or said in the 
performance of the mission of the Special Rapporteur.
The Secretary-General took the position that it was implicit in the scheme of the 
General Convention and of the organisational structure of the UN that he should have 
the exclusive authority to determine whether or not an act was done by a UN official 
in his official capacity or by an expert in the performance of his mission, and that 
determination should be binding on the national court. In particular he pointed to 
the discretion vested in him whether to assert or waive the immunity of an expert 
under Article VI, section 23 of the General Convention,104 and to the removal of
102 The Secretary-General had proposed to the ECOSOC that it ask the question whether the exclusive 
determination as to whether words were spoken in the course of the performance a mission for the UN 
for the purposes of an expert’s immunity? And whether member States were under an obligation to 
effect to such immunity in its national courts? - see Advisory Opinion at para. 20.
103 The see the written statements submitted on his behalf dated 2 October 1998 (paras 38-56) and 30 
October 1998, and the oral Statement of 7 December 1998(para.s 15-36) and 10 December 1998 
(para.s 45-55).
104 In the present case the Secretary-General claimed that immunity would not prejudice the interests 
of justice since section 29 of the General convention provided for the settlement of UN disputes by 
appropriate alternative modes; whereas waiver would prejudice the interests o f the UN in that any 
encroachment on the complete independence o f Special Rapporteur’s to speak out on human rights
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disputes from national courts by virtue of the dispute settlement provisions contained 
in Article VIII, sections 29 and 30. Further it was he who had authority to offer 
functional protection to the agents of the Organisation in the performance of the 
official responsibilities. Pointing to his position as chief administrative officer of the 
Organisation and the exclusively international character of the organisation and its 
agents, he claimed that the question of whether or not an agent was acting in his 
official capacity was a question of fact, which was subject to his exclusive 
determination. His decision could not be reviewed by the domestic courts, but could 
only be reviewed by the ICJ under the Advisory Opinion procedure provided for in 
Section 30.
Although a number of States were broadly supportive of the Secretary-General’s 
contentions,105 some took slightly different approaches. Italy, the UK and the US all 
took the view that whilst the Secretary-General’s determination, though persuasive in 
most cases, was not binding on the States parties to the General Convention or their 
domestic courts.106 For the US, the Secretary-General’s determination amounted to a 
rebuttable presumption, but the final decision lay with the national courts which 
might only overrule it for the most compelling reasons. It urged that no such reasons 
were apparent in the present case.
questions would frustrate the and potentially endanger the human rights mechanism of the UN -  see 
oral Statement of the UN Legal Counsel on 7 December 1998 (para.s 30-33) and 10 December 1998 
(para.s 64-68)
105 Notably Costa Rica in statement of 7 October 1998 and written comments o f 6 November 1998; 
Germany, in letter of 5 October 1998; and Sweden in its Note of 6 October 1998.
106 Italy submitted a note and made oral observations during the proceedings; the UK written 
statement of October 1998; and the US in written statement o f 7 October 1998, and subsequent written 
comments.
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On the issue of the authority of the Secretary-General to issue a conclusive 
determination of the scope of immunity in a given case, Malaysia started explicitly 
from the position of State sovereignty, and noted that in other regimes of immunity 
in international law (e.g. State and diplomatic immunities) the general approach was 
that it was a question for the forum whether or not immunity applied in the 
circumstances of a given case. Exceptions to this whereby a foreign authority had the 
power to make a binding determination of this question had to be specifically 
provided by treaty.
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion focussed on the applicability107 of the General 
Convention in concreto to Mr. Cumaraswamy’s case. The Court endorsed the 
Secretary-General’s determination as it applied the Convention in the case before it. 
It found Malaysia to be in breach of its obligations under the General Convention (a) 
by failing to inform the Malaysian courts of the Secretary-General’s determination 
and (b) by the Malaysian courts failure to deal with immunity as preliminary issue 
(i.e. thus effectively denying the immunity by postponing its determination until the 
merits of the case and thus forcing the respondent to file a substantive defence).108 
However the ICJ appears to find that the national court is entitled to make the final 
determination on the issue of immunity, but in doing so it should treat the Secretary- 
General’s determination as creating “a presumption which can only be set aside for 
the most compelling reasons and is thus to be given the greatest weight”.109
107 In apparent contrast with its finding in the Mazilu case (1989 ICJ Rep 177, at para 27) the Court 
found “applicability” to be same for these purposes as “application” of the Convention -  see para 49 
of the Advisory Opinion
108 see para 63
109 see para 61
295
The Court does not give examples of what such compelling circumstances might be, 
the strength of the language it uses suggests that such circumstances are likely to be 
highly exceptional. Thus in practice it is likely that in most cases the Secretary- 
General’s determination of the scope of immunity will be conclusive of the issue. 
The United Nations did however make clear in its pleadings - and the Court also 
makes reference to this110 - that the assertion of immunity before national courts does 
not dispose of the question of the legal responsibility of the Organisation in relation 
to the claims of the private party plaintiff, which may pursue such claims directly 
against the Organisation in accordance with section 29 of the General Convention.
The special place given to the Secretary-General’s determination can be defended on 
institutional grounds in that he is better placed than a national court to consider 
whether a given act falls within the official functions of an employee. This is 
underlined by the constant development of the United Nations functions and 
activities as it seeks to fulfil its broad purposes. The question of whether an act falls 
within or goes beyond the functions of an international official could be 
characterised as a question of the internal law of the Organisation, over which 
national courts do not have jurisdiction. This would be further borne out to the extent 
that the Secretary-General’s finding that a given act of an official is immune engages 
the responsibility of the United Nations to settle the dispute in accordance with 
section 29 of the General Convention.
110 see para 66
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(c) Scope of immunity ratione temporis
It has been observed above that the immunity of international officials essentially 
relates to subject-matter (i.e. to acts done or words said in the performance of their 
official functions) immunity should prevail if the dispute concerns such subject- 
matter notwithstanding that by the time the dispute comes to the court the respondent 
is longer an official of the organisation. In practice the question has not been 
particularly controversial. In the case of Zoemsch v. Waldock, 111 the plaintiff tried to 
bring proceedings against the former President of the European Commission of 
Human Rights, alleging that he had been responsible for mishandling the plaintiffs 
unsuccessful application to the Commission. The English Court of Appeal 
considered that by analogy with the position of diplomats, international official 
similarly enjoyed a subsisting immunity for their official acts even after they had 
ceased to be officials of the organisation in question. The implication being that such 
immunity is necessary to protect the interests of the organisation, not the former 
official himself, just as the subsisting immunities enjoyed by the former diplomat are 
in fact an aspect of the immunity of his sending State.
The other aspect of this proposition is that an official of the second category en poste
may be subject to jurisdiction in relation to acts he performed before his
* 11? appointment, as is illustrated by the case of Hong Yang. It might be noted however
that experts on mission of the UN and most of its Specialised Agencies, enjoy an
apparently unlimited immunity from personal arrest or detention during the period of
their missions, which would preclude arrest or detention even in relation to acts done
1,1 [1964] 1WLR675
112 See Schermers and Blokker op. cit. at note 46 supra
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prior to their appointment as experts. In relation to other persons who exercise 
official functions intermittently , and thus immunity attaches to them intermittently, 
it will probably be for the official claiming immunity to establish his entitlement to
113immunity in a given case.
3. Waiver
The main means by which the draconian effects of immunity are mediated, and abuse 
of immunity is prevented, is by waiver. Waiver of the immunity of an international 
official is a matter for determination by the employer international organisation, as is 
established by the relevant treaty provisions and by the practice of organisations. 
Accordingly requests for waiver are addressed to the organisation. On receipt of such 
requests that the chief administrative officer of an international organisation is often 
under a duty to waive immunity of an official in certain circumstances, and must 
therefore be under a duty to consider each request in good faith.
In the case of the UN, Sections 20 and 23 of the General Convention oblige the 
Secretary-General to waive the immunities of officials and experts where the 
assertion of immunity would impede the course of justice and waiver will not 
prejudice the interests of the Organisation. Since the test is cumulative the Secretary- 
General is entitled to decide not to waive immunity where either: (i) the maintenance 
of immunity would not impede the course of justice; or (ii) where the jurisdiction of 
the local court would prejudice the interests of the UN.
1,3 See Stahel v. Bastid 75 ILR 78; this case also suggests that immunities from instruction or 
investigation proceedings into the official enjoying intermittently, would have to be suspended during 
the periods for which he enjoyed immunity.
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The UN appears not to have published detailed guidance on either limb of this test. 
However it has said that where for example a settlement cannot be negotiated the 
Secretary-General will normally waive immunity in cases of civil claims against staff 
members for their involvement in road traffic accidents whilst on official business.114 
Taking a literal approach to the first limb, it might be thought that the effect of 
immunity from jurisdiction in most cases would impede the course of justice. 
However a more nuanced view might be that where an alternative forum or means of 
settlement of the dispute can be established (e.g. some form of international tribunal, 
or the parties agree to arbitrate) immunity from the jurisdiction of the local courts 
would not necessarily impede the course of justice.
The question raised by the second limb, of when the interests of the Organisation are 
prejudiced by the assertion of local jurisdiction, is likely to prove more complex -The 
broadest interpretation of the expression suggests that it would cover any case in 
which official responsibility is in issue, and that would allow little scope for waiver. 
Alternatively a narrower interpretation may be given by considering first what 
interest(s) of the organisation are intended to be protected by the immunity, namely 
the independent functioning of the organisation. The question would then become 
whether the assertion of local jurisdiction would prejudice the independent 
functioning of the Organisation.
There is in fact little detailed practice available as to how such duty is discharged. 
Although the Cumaraswamy case concerned the scope of immunity, rather than its
114 see 1967 YBILC Vol. II at p.283. Zacklin seems to suggest that this is generally the case in relation 
to civil actions op cit note 31 supra at pp. 195-6, though in relation to criminal actions a decision is 
taken in the light of the particular circumstances o f the case.
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waiver, various comments in the UN’s pleadings related to waiver. The UN 
suggested that it will consider that if an alternative remedy to litigation before the 
national courts is available, the assertion of immunity will not be considered to 
impede the course of justice.115 The UN appears to take a broad interpretation of this 
requirement (which is of course contained in section 29 of the General Convention), 
to the effect that it may be satisfied by the possibility available to a complainant of 
submitting a claim to the Organisation for settlement by negotiation, with the 
eventual possibility of ad hoc arbitration.116 The question of whether waiver would 
result in prejudice to the interests of the Organisation, appears to have been dealt 
with by the UN in broad terms in the Cumaraswamy case. It put forward the view 
that any encroachment by national authorities on the independence of Special 
Rapporteurs in the human rights field might inhibit their ability to speak out and 
potentially endanger the effectiveness of the human rights mechanism in the UN 
system.117
The duty to waive immunity therefore in fact involves the exercise of a discretion in 
respect of both the question of impediments to justice and the question of prejudice 
to the interests of the organisation. Whether or not such decisions are reviewable will 
depend upon the availability of an appropriate forum. In relation to the UN and its 
Specialised Agencies, it would seem that such a question could go before the 
International Court of Justice if it arose between an organisation and a State, by 
virtue of the “special” Advisory Opinion procedure in Article 30 of the General
115 See note 104 supra
116 See oral pleadings of the UN Legal Counsel o f 10 December 1998 at para.s 5-14
117 See Written Statement submitted on behalf of the UN Secretary General of 2 October at para.s 54- 
55
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Convention and Article 32 of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Specialised Agencies.118 Similarly in relation to the European Communities, 
the European Court of Justice has considered the issue as justiciable requiring, the 
Commission to provide “a statement of the imperative reasons relating to the need to 
avoid any interference with the functioning and independence of the Communities” 
in order to justify its refusal waive immunity of its officials in connection with their 
official acts.119
On the other hand it seems unlikely that an official whose immunity is waived will 
be able to challenge that decision, which corresponds with the view that the 
immunities are for the benefit of the organisation rather than the individuals 
themselves. The case of Jurado v. ILO (No. I ) 120 is illustrative, although it deals with 
an employee who enjoyed the fuller immunities of officials of die first category. In 
the course of family law proceedings brought by the wife of an ILO official, the 
Secretary-General waived the latter’s immunity. The official complained to the 
ILO AT that the decision of waiver infringed his rights under the staff regulations and 
his right to diplomatic protection by the Organisation. The ILOAT found that the 
complaint raised no justiciable issue. The privileges and immunities of officials were 
agreed between the Organisation and the forum State, and were granted solely in the 
interests of the Organisation. As a matter of international administrative law, an 
official has no subjective right to immunity, where the Director has waived it in
118 for a summary of aspects o f this procedure, which differ from traditional dispute settlement 
procedures, see Wickremasinghe (2000) 4 9 ICLQ 724-30, esp.729-730
1,9 See Zwartfeld Case C-2/88, Judgment o f 13 July 1990, 1990 ECR1-3367
120 40 ILR 296
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accordance with his duty to do so, i.e. where immunity would impede the course of 
justice and its waiver would not prejudice the interests of the Organisation.
Conclusions
It has been shown that the immunities of international organisations cannot simply be 
equated with those of States, because of various important differences between them. 
Such differences are also reflected in die immunities of their officials when 
compared to those of diplomats. The experience of the League of Nations whose 
officials were granted diplomatic privileges was so unsatisfactory that a new 
approach had to be taken by the founders of the United Nations, and subsequent 
organisations.
Diplomats and other high State officials will enjoy immunities ratione personae
191whilst overseas, which may cover both their private and official acts. However 
even these are primarily justified upon functional grounds given the important roles
199which these persons play in international relations. However it is only the very 
highest ranks of the international civil service (who play comparable roles in 
international relations) who now enjoy the broader immunities ratione personae 
equivalent to a diplomatic agent. Nevertheless functional reasons also justify the 
temporary grant to those on mission for the UN of express protection from arrest or 
detention whilst on mission to enable them to fulfil the purposes of such mission.
121 see for example the personal inviolability, and absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction of 
diplomatic agents under Art.s 29 and 31 o f the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as well 
those of serving Heads o f State (as for example are granted under s.20 o f the UK State Immunity Act), 
and were recently found by the ICJ to be enjoyed by serving Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the 
Arrest Warrant case (14 February 2002).
122 See for example the fourth preambular paragraph of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations; and also the reasoning o f the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case (14 February 2002) at 
paragraph 53.
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The majority of international civil servants do not enjoy the broad immunities of 
diplomatic agents but only enjoy immunities ratione materiae in respect of their 
official acts. As regards immunities claimed by State officials or former State 
officials ratione materiae for their official acts, the determination of what constitutes 
an official act is often linked to the test of imputability in the law of State 
responsibility. Thus an act should be considered an “official act” where it engages 
the responsibility of the State on whose behalf it was done. A similar approach seems 
broadly appropriate (mutatis mutandis) in respect of international organisations.
The immunities of agents of international organisations for their official acts may 
therefore be considered as a manifestation of the immunity of the organisations 
themselves. This is bome out by the provisions on waiver which make clear that it is 
for the Organisation to determine whether or not to waive immunity based on its own 
interests rather than those of the individual concerned. Where immunity is asserted 
on behalf of the individual in respect of an official act, the organisation thereby 
accepts responsibility for both the act itself and, in most cases, for the provision of 
appropriate alternative means by which to settle the dispute.
Since the immunities of international officials correspond with the responsibility of 
the organisation, they operate so as to channel claims away from the individual 
personally and against the organisation itself. It, of course, depends upon the degree 
of immunity enjoyed by the organisation as to how far such claims can be made in 
local courts, and how far alternative modes of settlement must be relied upon in this
123 See Denza “Ex parte Pinochet: Leap or Lacuna?” (1999) 48 ICLQ 949
303
respect. Nevertheless the point here is that the immunities of the officials of an 
organisation correspond with its legal responsibility rather than its own immunity in 
national courts. Thus, for example where an organisation only enjoys a limited 
degree of immunity, its officials will enjoy immunity from suit in relation to their 
official acts, notwithstanding that the Organisation itself does not enjoy immunity in 
respect of its liability for those acts.
This approach to the immunities of officials, based upon the vicarious liability of the 
organisation for official acts, operates most clearly in relation to civil liability. As has 
been shown by contrast many criminal acts by officials cannot be considered as 
official acts of the organisation, and so the question of immunity does not arise.124 
Nevertheless official act immunity should still be available in relation to criminal 
jurisdiction, where the independent functioning of the organisation would be 
adversely affected by criminal proceedings. However given the reasoning of the 
House of Lords in the Pinochet case125 it debatable how far such immunity would 
shield an official from personal responsibility for the most serious of international 
crimes.
124 see for example the cases of US v. Coplon (1949) (84 F.Supp. 472) and US v. Melekh (1960) (190 
F.Supp. 67); also Westchester County v. Ranallo (1946) 13 ILR 168
125 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (No. 3) [1999] 2 WLR 827
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CONCLUSIONS
The questions raised when international organisations come before national courts 
are complex and do not lend themselves easily to generalised conclusions. It has 
been shown that the range of variables is very broad. Different answers may be 
reached depending upon the nature of the organisation in question, or upon the nature 
of the acts under consideration. Differences may also arise as between national legal 
systems, particularly where their core values are at stake, such as the role of the 
courts themselves, and human and constitutional rights to judicial protection. The 
aim of this study has therefore been to map a route through this wide field, by which 
its different facets can be appreciated.
Broadly speaking two inter-related aspects have been identified in the 
accommodation of international organisations within the present international 
system, which is established on the basis of the allocation of jurisdictional 
competence to States. These are respectively: (i) a functional aspect and (ii) an 
institutional aspect. The first is outward looking concerns the scope of the activities 
of an organisation and its relations with outsiders. The second is inward looking and 
concerns the structures of the organisation itself and its internal relations.
The reason for the existence of any international organisation is the achievement of 
the functions which its member States have collectively entrusted to it, having 
determined that they are better achieved collectively than individually. The functions 
of an organisation are therefore at its very core, defining the scope of its powers and 
activities. The immunities of an international organisation are of particular
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importance since they seek to guarantee its ability to achieve its functions free from 
any undue influence which any one of its member States (but perhaps particularly its 
host State) may have over that organisation through the exercise of national 
jurisdiction. The jurisdictional immunities of an international organisation are the 
primary means of accommodating a public international organisation, which does not 
have its own territory or population, within the system of which allocates jurisdiction 
amongst States.
Nevertheless this process of accommodation is not necessarily uniform or rigid but 
instead depends upon the functions of the organisation in question. Nor are analogies 
with other regimes of immunity, such as State or diplomatic immunities, directly 
transferable in relation to international organisations, since the recipients of those 
immunities are in legal terms treated equally, i.e. the legal equality of States suggests 
that a national jurisdiction will recognise the same immunities in respect of all 
foreign States, or diplomats from all foreign States. On the other hand each 
organisation is endowed with the immunities appropriate to the fulfilment of its own 
particular functions, with considerable differences between them in this respect.
From a review of a broad selection of relevant treaty provisions, certain patterns 
begin to emerge. Thus the UN and many of specialised agencies, and many of the 
broad political and military organisations, whose primary functions are what might 
broadly be described as “political” being concerned with inter-State relations, enjoy a 
broad range of immunities from “every form of legal process”. Similarly 
international courts whose independence from State influence is absolute in relation 
to their judicial functions, must be also be granted broad immunities. Whereas 
organisations whose functions involve them in extensive activities in the market­
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place, as for example the World Bank Group, will enjoy more limited immunities, 
particularly in relation to those market-oriented activities. Further regional 
organisations and those with specific non-political functions such as for example a 
scientific research organisation may enjoy much more restricted immunities.
The flexibility inherent in the functional approach to immunity is also demonstrated 
in the range of international caselaw reviewed. A striking feature of many of those 
cases is the need to accommodate the various interests at stake. The immunities of an 
international organisation are seen as part of an ongoing relationship, based on duties 
of good faith and cooperation, in which the interests of an organisation and those of 
its member States must be balanced against each other. Thus for example in the 
Cumaraswamy case it was shown that the ICJ gave a rather nuanced answer to the 
question as to who ultimately should decide on whether an act of an official is 
performed pursuant to his official functions and is therefore (in the absence of 
waiver) immune. On the other hand the European Court of Human Rights, 
considering the position of the individual who is prevented from access to the local 
court an international organisation by reason of its immunity, upheld the immunity. 
However it balanced that finding on the basis that there were reasonable alternative 
remedies available to the individual.
The position of a national court is of course distinguishable from that of an 
international court. In many cases what is required of the national court is to give 
effect to the treaty-based immunities of international organisations duly given effect 
in the national legal system, in whatever way that may be achieved. If one considers 
the results of the various cases examined, it appears that a considerable degree of
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uniformity has been achieved in the application of core treaty provisions on 
immunity. Despite some contrary indications from the US, and formerly Italy, it 
appears that a direct application of State immunity is not considered appropriate and 
much of the caselaw considers the situation of international organisations as 
particular. Nor, so far, has there been a widespread tendency to apply additional 
restrictions to immunity beyond those contained in treaties, based on a more 
extensive reading of the functional immunity standard, though again some aspects of 
the Italian caselaw reflect this approach. However it is not clear that national courts 
would generally be well-placed to make this decision.
Finally it is interesting to note that to date there have been few cases in which human 
or constitutional rights of access to justice have been opposed to international 
immunities, before national courts. It remains to be seen whether the Beer and Regan 
case before the European Court of Human Rights will lead to further challenges, 
particularly as regards the adequacy of alternative remedies provided by international 
organisations.
A further means by which flexibility may be achieved on questions of immunity is 
through the device of waiver. International organisations, understandably 
conscientious of the potential vulnerability in relation to national authorities, tend to 
try to avoid waiving immunity in advance by contractual provisions. Frequently an 
alternative remedy in the form of arbitration is provided for. However the importance 
of the provision of such alternative remedies as a balancing factor, suggests that any 
alternative remedy offered must be effective. It therefore appears that the treatment 
of an agreement to arbitrate as an implied waiver from the supervisory jurisdiction of
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the local courts appears to be unobjectionable in principle, though there is some 
difference in treatment of this issue between national courts. It remains the case 
however that the more coercive nature of the process, means that any waiver of 
immunity from execution in respect of the enforcement of arbitral awards, must be 
express.
The second aspect of the accommodation of an international organisation within the 
system of national jurisdiction, has been termed the “institutional” aspect. What is 
intended here is that the focus should shift from questions of the appropriateness of 
exercise of national adjudicative jurisdiction over an organisation, to an 
acknowledgement by national courts that the proper law of an international 
organisation in respect of its internal or institutional relations derives from 
international law. This is a consequence of the creation of international organisations 
under international law, and an aspect their international personality.
The internal relations of international organisations, as for example as between the 
organisation and its member States or between organs of an international 
organisation, are governed by their own internal law which derives from their 
establishment in international law. In matters governed by the internal law of an 
organisation there is simply no place for the adjudication by national courts or the 
application of national law. Unlike with functional immunities, this lack of 
competence ratione materiae of national jurisdiction, does not arise by way of 
express treaty provision, but rather arises in general international law.
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As such the scope of this lack of competence ratione materiae remains uncertain. In 
practice an important question is whether it extends to the employment relations of 
an international organisation. It would appear that most international organisations 
have developed their own systems of international administrative law, complete with 
not only substantive norms but also judicial procedures. Where this is the case there 
seems to be little place for the exercise of national law or jurisdiction. Clearly the 
independence from all forms of national influence of the staff of international 
organisation is a key principle of the international civil service and essential to the 
genuinely international status of international organisations.
In many cases the co-existence of broad jurisdictional immunity masks the dismissal 
of employment suits in national courts. An organisation which enjoys broad 
immunities by virtue treaty, may seek to rely on that immunity for the dismissal of 
employment suits, being a simpler or more immediate means to put an end to a suit. 
However where an organisation enjoys only limited or no immunity under treaty, the 
lack of competence ratione materiae of any national jurisdiction over these matters 
will provide a solution to the question. However it is noticeable that in such cases, 
national courts have not always explained this in full, but have expressed themselves 
in terms of an immunity in customary international law in respect of the employment 
relations of international organisations.
Finally the immunities of employees of international organisations for their official 
acts is so widely recognised in respect of organisations of all types that its is 
probably a rule of customary international law. They too have both functional and 
institutional aspects. They are necessary in part because to avoid the possibility of
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rendering meaningless the functional immunities of the organisation itself, by the 
expedient of naming its officials instead of the organisation as respondents.
However as we have seen the immunities of international officials are not 
coterminous with the functional immunities of the employer international 
organisation. They can in fact apply in situations where the employer organisation is 
itself not immune, thus effectively channelling claims towards the organisation rather 
than the individual employees. Thus these immunities have an institutional aspect in 
maintaining the integrity and internal cohesion of the organisation itself.
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